From d158cd646cc29d4960a93796b3b66ef95170bb40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 15:02:12 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 01/22] feat(api): advertise who may change the runtime version The editor needs to know whether it may offer a version change before it offers one, and it needs that answer before login -- so updatePolicy joins the unauthenticated /api/capabilities payload alongside sidecarPort. Resolution is capability-based, not identity-based: an explicit OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY wins (the sidecar sets "self" when it creates the runtime container, an OEM sets "none"), otherwise a containerized runtime is "managed" -- somebody else created it and therefore chose the image tag, which is the version -- and a native install is "manual". Sniffing for orchestrator-shaped networks or cgroup patterns would have been a guess that can be wrong in both directions; this cannot report "self" unless our own sidecar said so. An unrecognised override falls through to detection, so a typo can only ever cost us an update we were allowed to make, never grant one we were not. Host facts for the Runtime Status header land on a new authenticated /api/device-info. Separate blueprint because restapi.py sits at pylint's per-module line ceiling and host metadata is not PLC control; its static rule outranks restapi_bp's /api/ catch-all, which a test pins. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py | 5 + tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py | 140 +++++++++++++++++++++- webserver/app.py | 9 +- webserver/restapi.py | 13 ++ webserver/runtime_info.py | 62 ++++++++++ webserver/update_policy.py | 112 +++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 338 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 webserver/runtime_info.py create mode 100644 webserver/update_policy.py diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py index b819b954..a71d74fb 100644 --- a/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py @@ -22,11 +22,16 @@ import pytest # noqa: E402 from webserver import restapi # noqa: E402 +from webserver.runtime_info import runtime_info_bp # noqa: E402 # The Flask app is a module-level singleton, so register the blueprint exactly # once (registering twice raises). Subsequent fixtures only reset the DB. if "restapi_blueprint" not in restapi.app_restapi.blueprints: restapi.app_restapi.register_blueprint(restapi.restapi_bp, url_prefix="/api") +# Registered here too so /api/device-info is reachable under test, mirroring +# what run_https() does in webserver/app.py. +if "runtime_info" not in restapi.app_restapi.blueprints: + restapi.app_restapi.register_blueprint(runtime_info_bp) restapi.app_restapi.config.update(TESTING=True) diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py index 824b658c..1de9909d 100644 --- a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py @@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ import re -from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION +from conftest import auth, create_user -from conftest import create_user +from webserver import update_policy +from webserver.update_policy import SIDECAR_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY +from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION _VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$") @@ -49,6 +51,8 @@ def test_capabilities_reports_runtime_version_and_editor_floor(client): "runtimeVersion": RUNTIME_VERSION, "minEditorVersion": MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, "projectSnapshot": True, + "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, + "sidecarPort": SIDECAR_PORT, } @@ -73,3 +77,135 @@ def test_runtime_version_header_is_present_on_capabilities(client): # after_request hook must cover the new route too. resp = client.get("/api/capabilities") assert resp.headers["X-OpenPLC-Runtime-Version"] == RUNTIME_VERSION + + +# --- update policy -------------------------------------------------------- +# +# The policy tells a client WHO may change this runtime's version (RTOP-283). +# It is resolved once at import, so the resolver is exercised directly rather +# than by reloading the module: what matters is the decision, not the caching. + + +def test_update_policy_is_one_of_the_published_values(client): + body = client.get("/api/capabilities").get_json() + assert body["updatePolicy"] in update_policy.VALID_POLICIES + + +def test_explicit_override_wins_over_detection(monkeypatch): + # The sidecar sets this when it creates the runtime container. It has to + # beat detection, because a sidecar-managed runtime IS containerized and + # would otherwise be mistaken for somebody else's vPLC. + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "self") + monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) + assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_SELF + + +def test_override_is_case_insensitive(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", " NONE ") + assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_NONE + + +def test_container_without_an_override_is_managed(monkeypatch): + # An orchestrator vPLC: something else created the container and therefore + # chose the image tag, which is the version. We must not offer to update it. + monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", raising=False) + monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) + assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED + + +def test_native_install_without_an_override_is_manual(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", raising=False) + monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: False) + assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL + + +def test_an_unrecognised_override_falls_through_to_detection(monkeypatch): + # A typo must not be read as permission. Falling through means the worst + # case is "we refuse an update that was actually allowed", never the + # reverse. + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "yes-please") + monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) + assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED + + +# --- sidecar port --------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_sidecar_port_is_absent_unless_the_policy_is_self(): + # Publishing a port nothing answers on would send clients somewhere + # useless, so every non-self policy reports None. + for policy in ( + update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED, + update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL, + update_policy.POLICY_NONE, + ): + assert update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(policy) is None, policy + + +def test_sidecar_port_defaults_when_the_policy_is_self(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", raising=False) + assert ( + update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) + == update_policy.DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + ) + + +def test_sidecar_port_honours_an_explicit_value(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", "9445") + assert update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) == 9445 + + +def test_an_unusable_sidecar_port_falls_back_to_the_default(monkeypatch): + # Garbage or an out-of-range port means the sidecar is still there on the + # port it almost certainly used; refusing to report one at all would hide + # a working sidecar behind a config typo. + for raw in ("not-a-port", "0", "70000", "-1"): + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", raw) + assert ( + update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) + == update_policy.DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + ), raw + + +# --- device info ---------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_device_info_requires_a_token(client): + # Unlike /capabilities: the policy has to be readable before login, but + # kernel and architecture are only for somebody already authenticated. + assert client.get("/api/device-info").status_code == 401 + + +def test_device_info_reports_host_facts(client, admin_token): + body = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)).get_json() + assert set(body) == { + "hostname", + "architecture", + "kernel", + "system", + "containerized", + "updatePolicy", + "sidecarPort", + } + assert body["hostname"] + assert body["architecture"] + assert isinstance(body["containerized"], bool) + + +def test_device_info_agrees_with_capabilities_on_the_policy(client, admin_token): + # Two routes, one answer -- a client that reads either must not be able to + # reach a different conclusion about whether an update is possible. + capabilities = client.get("/api/capabilities").get_json() + info = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)).get_json() + assert info["updatePolicy"] == capabilities["updatePolicy"] + assert info["sidecarPort"] == capabilities["sidecarPort"] + + +def test_device_info_is_not_swallowed_by_the_command_catch_all(client, admin_token): + # restapi_bp owns a GET /api/ catch-all that forwards to the PLC + # command handler. device-info lives on a different blueprint, so this + # pins the routing precedence: a static rule must win over the converter, + # or the editor's header request would be dispatched as a PLC command. + resp = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)) + assert resp.status_code == 200 + assert resp.get_json()["hostname"] diff --git a/webserver/app.py b/webserver/app.py index 344c7779..2f414198 100644 --- a/webserver/app.py +++ b/webserver/app.py @@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ from webserver.credentials import CertGen from webserver.debug_websocket import init_debug_websocket from webserver.discovery.discovery_routes import discovery_bp -from webserver.discovery.network_discovery import responder as network_discovery_responder +from webserver.discovery.network_discovery import ( + responder as network_discovery_responder, +) from webserver.logger import get_logger from webserver.plcapp_management import ( MAX_FILE_SIZE, @@ -47,6 +49,7 @@ repair_missing_admin, restapi_bp, ) +from webserver.runtime_info import runtime_info_bp from webserver.runtimemanager import RuntimeManager logger, _ = get_logger("logger", use_buffer=True) @@ -488,6 +491,10 @@ def run_https(): # rest api register app_restapi.register_blueprint(restapi_bp, url_prefix="/api") app_restapi.register_blueprint(discovery_bp) + # Carries its own /api prefix, like discovery_bp. Its /api/device-info rule + # is static, so Werkzeug matches it ahead of restapi_bp's /api/ + # catch-all regardless of registration order. + app_restapi.register_blueprint(runtime_info_bp) register_callback_get(restapi_callback_get) register_callback_post(restapi_callback_post) diff --git a/webserver/restapi.py b/webserver/restapi.py index 4b2b798a..1ee3fb9f 100644 --- a/webserver/restapi.py +++ b/webserver/restapi.py @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import webserver.config from webserver import project_snapshot from webserver.logger import get_logger +from webserver.update_policy import SIDECAR_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION logger, buffer = get_logger("logger", use_buffer=True) @@ -111,6 +112,13 @@ def restapi_capabilities(): minEditorVersion: type: string description: Oldest OpenPLC Editor version this runtime accepts programs from + updatePolicy: + type: string + enum: [self, managed, manual, none] + description: Which mechanism may change this runtime's version + sidecarPort: + type: integer + description: Port of the managing sidecar; null unless updatePolicy is "self" """ return ( jsonify( @@ -121,6 +129,11 @@ def restapi_capabilities(): # upload and retrieve it later. Unauthenticated like the rest of # this endpoint, so a client can decide before logging in. "projectSnapshot": True, + # Who owns this runtime's version (RTOP-283) -- unauthenticated + # because the editor picks its actions before it has + # credentials. Resolution order: webserver/update_policy.py. + "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, + "sidecarPort": SIDECAR_PORT, } ), 200, diff --git a/webserver/runtime_info.py b/webserver/runtime_info.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1da9a17b --- /dev/null +++ b/webserver/runtime_info.py @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +"""Host metadata for the editor's Runtime Status header. + +Its own blueprint rather than another route in ``webserver/restapi.py``: that +module is at pylint's per-module line ceiling, and host facts are a different +concern from the PLC control and user-management surface that fills it. Mounted +under ``/api`` so the route reads ``/api/device-info`` like every other +endpoint the editor calls. + +Authenticated, unlike ``/api/capabilities``. The split is deliberate: +``updatePolicy`` has to be readable BEFORE login so a client can decide which +actions to offer, whereas kernel and architecture are only ever shown to +somebody already looking at a device they hold credentials for. +""" + +from flask import Blueprint, jsonify +from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required + +from webserver.update_policy import device_info + +runtime_info_bp = Blueprint("runtime_info", __name__, url_prefix="/api") + + +@runtime_info_bp.route("/device-info", methods=["GET"]) +@jwt_required() +def restapi_device_info(): + """Return host facts about the device this runtime is running on. + --- + tags: + - Runtime + security: + - BearerAuth: [] + responses: + 200: + description: Device information retrieved + schema: + type: object + properties: + hostname: + type: string + architecture: + type: string + description: Machine architecture reported by the kernel (e.g. aarch64) + kernel: + type: string + description: Kernel release string + system: + type: string + description: Operating system name + containerized: + type: boolean + description: Whether the runtime is running inside a container + updatePolicy: + type: string + enum: [self, managed, manual, none] + description: Which mechanism may change this runtime's version + sidecarPort: + type: integer + description: Port of the managing sidecar; null unless updatePolicy is "self" + 401: + description: Missing or invalid token + """ + return jsonify(device_info()), 200 diff --git a/webserver/update_policy.py b/webserver/update_policy.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45488235 --- /dev/null +++ b/webserver/update_policy.py @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +"""Who is allowed to change this runtime's version, published at +``GET /api/capabilities`` as ``updatePolicy``. + +The runtime never updates itself. It only reports which mechanism owns that +job, so a client can offer the right action instead of a button that cannot +work. Resolution order: + + 1. ``OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY`` -- explicit, and wins outright. The sidecar + bootloader sets ``self`` when it creates the runtime container. An OEM + shipping a vendor-managed device sets ``none``. + 2. Running in a container with no override -> ``managed``. Something else + created this container, and whatever created it chose the image tag -- + which IS the version. An orchestrator-managed vPLC lands here. + 3. Otherwise -> ``manual``. A native source install, updated from a shell. + +This is deliberately capability-based rather than identity-based: we report +what the deployment CAN do, never a guess at what it IS. Only our own sidecar +sets ``self``, so a false positive is impossible -- an orchestrator vPLC never +runs our installer and never receives that variable. Getting this backwards +(sniffing for orchestrator-shaped networks or cgroup patterns) would be a +guess that can be wrong in both directions. + +Clients that predate this field see it missing and must treat that as "no +update support", which is exactly the behaviour they had before. +""" + +import os +import platform +import socket +from typing import Optional + +from webserver.config import is_running_in_container + +# The sidecar owns the container spec and may replace the image (RTOP-283). +POLICY_SELF: str = "self" +# Some other supervisor owns the container; it must perform the swap. +POLICY_MANAGED: str = "managed" +# Native install: a human with a shell owns it. +POLICY_MANUAL: str = "manual" +# Vendor-locked. Set by an OEM that ships its own update channel. +POLICY_NONE: str = "none" + +VALID_POLICIES: frozenset[str] = frozenset( + {POLICY_SELF, POLICY_MANAGED, POLICY_MANUAL, POLICY_NONE} +) + +# Port the sidecar's control API listens on. Reported so a client does not +# have to hard-code it; the sidecar passes the real value when it differs. +DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT: int = 8445 + + +def _resolve_update_policy() -> str: + """Return the update policy for this deployment. See module docstring.""" + override = os.getenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "").strip().lower() + if override in VALID_POLICIES: + return override + + # An unrecognised override is a deployment error, not a reason to guess a + # permissive answer -- fall through to detection rather than trusting it. + if is_running_in_container(): + return POLICY_MANAGED + + return POLICY_MANUAL + + +def _resolve_sidecar_port(policy: str) -> Optional[int]: + """Port of the managing sidecar, or ``None`` when there is not one. + + Only meaningful under ``self``: every other policy means no sidecar of + ours is listening, and publishing a port nothing answers on would send + clients somewhere useless. + """ + if policy != POLICY_SELF: + return None + + raw = os.getenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", "").strip() + if not raw: + return DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + try: + port = int(raw) + except ValueError: + return DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + if not 1 <= port <= 65535: + return DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + return port + + +UPDATE_POLICY: str = _resolve_update_policy() +SIDECAR_PORT: Optional[int] = _resolve_sidecar_port(UPDATE_POLICY) + + +def device_info() -> dict[str, object]: + """Host facts for the editor's Runtime Status header. + + Served from an authenticated route, unlike ``updatePolicy`` itself: the + policy has to be readable before login so a client can decide what to + offer, whereas kernel and architecture are only ever shown to somebody + already looking at a device they can log in to. + + ``hostname`` is the one field that is also broadcast unauthenticated (the + discovery responder already publishes it), so nothing here widens what an + unauthenticated observer on the LAN can learn. + """ + return { + "hostname": socket.gethostname(), + "architecture": platform.machine(), + "kernel": platform.release(), + "system": platform.system(), + "containerized": is_running_in_container(), + "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, + "sidecarPort": SIDECAR_PORT, + } From b602a0bede1e2792fb4e86b44e065f08f04e94a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 15:16:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 02/22] feat(sidecar): bootloader that supervises the runtime container First half of the sidecar from RTOP-283: the piece that makes a device reachable when its runtime will not start. It reconciles the runtime container at boot, then blocks on the Docker events stream and does nothing until something happens -- no timers, no polling. Go with no third-party dependencies, on scratch, 8 MB. This is the component that has to work when everything else is broken, so every dependency is a way for that recovery to fail; the Engine API is JSON over a unix socket, which net/http speaks natively. It cross-compiles for all three architectures from a native runner, so its workflow job needs no QEMU and takes seconds rather than the minutes the runtime image spends under emulation. Two decisions are load-bearing and encoded in tests rather than comments: Reconcile ADOPTS a healthy running container. The sidecar restarts far more often than the runtime does -- its own crash, a self-update -- and a reconcile that recreated or bounced a working runtime would turn a sidecar hiccup into a plant outage. A healthy restart does NOT clear the crash window. The common crash-loop shape is die, come back up fine, die again, because a program that faults on load lets the webserver start before it takes the process down. Clearing the count on each healthy start zeroed the evidence between crashes, so the threshold was unreachable and the supervisor restarted forever instead of handing the device over -- caught by the tests, fixed by letting the sliding window forget by age alone. Health stops at "the webserver came up". plc_main, PLC state and program faults belong to runtimemanager._monitor(), which already restarts and safe-modes them. A sidecar that watched PLC state would let bad ST trigger a runtime rollback. runtimespec is the single place the container's flags live, and it has no field for CpuQuota/NanoCpus/Memory at all -- those enable the cgroup CPU controller, and under CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED a non-root cgroup starts at rt_runtime_us = 0, which makes SCHED_FIFO fail silently. Operator-supplied mounts may only be added, never substituted, and the docker socket is refused outright: handing it to the runtime would give its API the host. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) --- .github/workflows/docker.yml | 57 ++ sidecar/Dockerfile | 64 ++ sidecar/VERSION | 1 + sidecar/go.mod | 7 + sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go | 230 +++++++ sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go | 132 ++++ sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go | 174 +++++ sidecar/internal/health/prober.go | 79 +++ sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go | 289 ++++++++ sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go | 301 +++++++++ sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go | 103 +++ sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go | 628 ++++++++++++++++++ .../internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go | 465 +++++++++++++ sidecar/main.go | 128 ++++ 14 files changed, 2658 insertions(+) create mode 100644 sidecar/Dockerfile create mode 100644 sidecar/VERSION create mode 100644 sidecar/go.mod create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/health/prober.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go create mode 100644 sidecar/main.go diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker.yml b/.github/workflows/docker.yml index 299f0be0..763f9941 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/docker.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/docker.yml @@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ on: push: tags: - 'v*' + # The sidecar has its own version line, so it also builds from a branch + # push without waiting for a runtime tag. Deliberately no `paths` filter: + # GitHub applies it to tag pushes as well, which would make the runtime + # release build conditional on sidecar files having changed. The jobs below + # gate themselves instead. + branches: + - development + - main workflow_dispatch: inputs: platforms: @@ -18,6 +26,10 @@ on: jobs: build: + # Release tags and manual runs only -- unchanged from before the sidecar + # job was added. A branch push produces no semver tag for the metadata + # step, so letting it through would fail with an empty tag list. + if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read @@ -67,3 +79,48 @@ jobs: # default ("dev") for ad-hoc builds without a release tag. build-args: | RUNTIME_VERSION=${{ inputs.release_tag != '' && inputs.release_tag || github.ref_name }} + + # The sidecar is versioned independently of the runtime (sidecar/VERSION). + # Tying it to every runtime tag would publish a long run of byte-identical + # images and make "which sidecar is on this device" a meaningless question. + sidecar: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + # Runs on release tags AND branch pushes: it is a seconds-long + # cross-compile, and re-pushing an unchanged sidecar/VERSION is an + # idempotent overwrite. + permissions: + contents: read + packages: write + + steps: + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: Read sidecar version + id: sidecar_version + run: echo "version=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < sidecar/VERSION)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + + - name: Set up Docker Buildx + uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 + + - name: Login to GHCR + uses: docker/login-action@v3 + with: + registry: ghcr.io + username: ${{ secrets.GHCR_USERNAME }} + password: ${{ secrets.GHCR_TOKEN }} + + # No QEMU step, unlike the runtime build: the sidecar is pure Go and + # cross-compiles from the native runner for every target, which takes + # seconds instead of the many minutes emulation costs. + - name: Build and Push Sidecar + uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 + with: + context: ./sidecar + push: true + platforms: ${{ inputs.platforms || 'linux/amd64,linux/arm64,linux/arm/v7' }} + build-args: | + SIDECAR_VERSION=${{ steps.sidecar_version.outputs.version }} + tags: | + ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-sidecar:${{ steps.sidecar_version.outputs.version }} + ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-sidecar:latest diff --git a/sidecar/Dockerfile b/sidecar/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49befaa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 + +# Sidecar image: a single static binary on scratch. +# +# Cross-compiled rather than emulated. Go targets every architecture we ship +# from one native builder, so buildx needs no QEMU here -- BUILDPLATFORM pins +# the build stage to the host and TARGETOS/TARGETARCH pick the output. That is +# the difference between seconds and the many minutes the runtime image spends +# under emulation. +# +# scratch, not alpine: this is the component that has to work when the runtime +# will not start, and every byte in the image is a byte that could stop it +# starting. There is no shell to debug with, which is the intended trade -- the +# sidecar's job is to report over HTTP, not to be poked at over exec. +FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.23-alpine AS build + +ARG TARGETOS +ARG TARGETARCH +# Sidecar version, independent of the runtime's. It changes rarely, so tying it +# to every runtime release would produce a long run of identical images. +ARG SIDECAR_VERSION=dev + +WORKDIR /src + +# go.mod first so the dependency layer survives source-only changes. There are +# no third-party dependencies today, which keeps this honest rather than +# theatrical: `go mod download` is a no-op and the layer is a cache anchor. +COPY go.mod ./ +RUN go mod download + +COPY . . + +# CGO off so the result is genuinely static and runs on scratch. +# -trimpath and -s -w keep the binary small and reproducible. +RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=${TARGETOS} GOARCH=${TARGETARCH} \ + go build \ + -trimpath \ + -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=${SIDECAR_VERSION}" \ + -o /out/openplc-sidecar . + +# Fail the build rather than ship an untested sidecar. Tests run on the build +# platform, which is where they are meaningful -- the logic under test is a +# state machine, not anything architecture-specific. +RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./... + +FROM scratch + +ARG SIDECAR_VERSION=dev +LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="OpenPLC Runtime Sidecar" \ + org.opencontainers.image.description="Bootloader and update manager for a local OpenPLC runtime" \ + org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime" \ + org.opencontainers.image.version="${SIDECAR_VERSION}" + +# CA roots for any future outbound HTTPS. Nothing needs them today -- image +# pulls go through the Docker daemon, which has its own -- but a missing root +# store fails in a way that is genuinely hard to diagnose from a scratch image. +COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt + +COPY --from=build /out/openplc-sidecar /openplc-sidecar + +# Control API. 8445 keeps to the odd numbers alongside the runtime's 8443. +EXPOSE 8445 + +ENTRYPOINT ["/openplc-sidecar"] diff --git a/sidecar/VERSION b/sidecar/VERSION new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c59a658f --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/VERSION @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +sidecar-v1.0.0 diff --git a/sidecar/go.mod b/sidecar/go.mod new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1d5d597 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/go.mod @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +// The sidecar deliberately has no third-party dependencies. It is the +// component that recovers a device when the runtime will not start, so every +// dependency is a way for that recovery to fail. The Docker Engine API is +// plain HTTP over a unix socket, which net/http speaks natively. +module github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar + +go 1.23 diff --git a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go b/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..90876421 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +// Package dockerapi is a minimal client for the Docker Engine API over the +// host's unix socket. +// +// Hand-rolled rather than using the official SDK on purpose: the sidecar needs +// eight calls, and the SDK brings a dependency tree into the one component +// whose job is to still work when everything else is broken. The Engine API is +// JSON over HTTP; the only unusual part is dialing a unix socket instead of a +// TCP address, which the transport below handles. +package dockerapi + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// DefaultSocket is where the Docker daemon listens on a standard install. The +// sidecar bind-mounts it read-write; there is no read-only mode for a socket, +// which is why the sidecar stays small enough to audit. +const DefaultSocket = "/var/run/docker.sock" + +// apiVersion is pinned low enough to work on the oldest engine we support. +// The SLM-RP4 test device ships Docker 20.10 (API 1.41), and every call this +// package makes has been stable since well before that. Pinning avoids a +// daemon upgrade silently changing a response shape under us. +const apiVersion = "v1.41" + +// Client talks to the Docker daemon. Safe for concurrent use: the embedded +// http.Client is, and nothing else here holds mutable state. +type Client struct { + http *http.Client + socket string +} + +// New returns a client bound to socket. A zero-value socket means +// DefaultSocket. +// +// The timeout applies to unary calls only. Streaming calls (events, image +// pull) must not be bounded by it -- an events stream is meant to stay open +// for the life of the process -- so they run on a separate, timeout-free +// client. Using one client for both is the classic way to end up with an +// events stream that dies silently after 30 seconds. +func New(socket string) *Client { + if socket == "" { + socket = DefaultSocket + } + dial := func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { + var d net.Dialer + return d.DialContext(ctx, "unix", socket) + } + return &Client{ + http: &http.Client{ + Transport: &http.Transport{DialContext: dial}, + Timeout: 30 * time.Second, + }, + socket: socket, + } +} + +// streamClient is New's client without the request timeout, for long-lived +// response bodies. It shares nothing with the unary client but the socket +// path. +func (c *Client) streamClient() *http.Client { + dial := func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { + var d net.Dialer + return d.DialContext(ctx, "unix", c.socket) + } + return &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{DialContext: dial}} +} + +// APIError is a non-2xx response from the daemon. The daemon's own message is +// preserved verbatim: it is almost always more specific than anything we would +// write, and it is what ends up in front of an operator. +type APIError struct { + Status int + Message string + Path string +} + +func (e *APIError) Error() string { + if e.Message == "" { + return fmt.Sprintf("docker %s: HTTP %d", e.Path, e.Status) + } + return fmt.Sprintf("docker %s: HTTP %d: %s", e.Path, e.Status, e.Message) +} + +// IsNotFound reports whether err is a 404 from the daemon, which is how it +// says "no such container" and "no such image". Callers branch on this +// constantly -- a missing container is the normal case on first boot, not a +// failure. +func IsNotFound(err error) bool { + return hasStatus(err, http.StatusNotFound) +} + +// IsConflict reports whether err is a 409, which the daemon uses for "already +// started", "already stopped" and name collisions. All three mean the desired +// state already holds, so reconcile treats them as success. +func IsConflict(err error) bool { + return hasStatus(err, http.StatusConflict) +} + +func hasStatus(err error, status int) bool { + var apiErr *APIError + return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.Status == status +} + +// do issues a unary request and decodes a JSON response into out. A nil out +// discards the body, which several endpoints return empty anyway. +func (c *Client) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body, out any) error { + req, err := c.newRequest(ctx, method, path, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + resp, err := c.http.Do(req) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("docker %s: %w", path, err) + } + defer resp.Body.Close() + + if err := checkResponse(resp, path); err != nil { + return err + } + if out == nil { + // Drain so the connection can be reused rather than closed. + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body) + return nil + } + if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(out); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("docker %s: decoding response: %w", path, err) + } + return nil +} + +// stream issues a request whose response body the caller consumes +// incrementally. The caller owns the returned ReadCloser and must close it. +func (c *Client) stream(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body any) (io.ReadCloser, error) { + req, err := c.newRequest(ctx, method, path, body) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + resp, err := c.streamClient().Do(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("docker %s: %w", path, err) + } + if err := checkResponse(resp, path); err != nil { + resp.Body.Close() + return nil, err + } + return resp.Body, nil +} + +func (c *Client) newRequest(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body any) (*http.Request, error) { + var reader io.Reader + if body != nil { + encoded, err := json.Marshal(body) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("docker %s: encoding request: %w", path, err) + } + reader = bytes.NewReader(encoded) + } + // The host part is ignored by the unix-socket dialer but http.NewRequest + // insists on an absolute URL. + req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, "http://docker"+apiVersion+path, reader) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("docker %s: building request: %w", path, err) + } + if body != nil { + req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + } + return req, nil +} + +// checkResponse turns a non-2xx into an *APIError carrying the daemon's own +// message. The daemon answers errors as {"message": "..."} but not always, so +// a body that will not decode falls back to the raw text. +func checkResponse(resp *http.Response, path string) error { + if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 { + return nil + } + // Bounded: an error body is small, and an unbounded read here would let a + // misbehaving daemon exhaust memory in the recovery component. + raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64*1024)) + message := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw)) + var decoded struct { + Message string `json:"message"` + } + if json.Unmarshal(raw, &decoded) == nil && decoded.Message != "" { + message = decoded.Message + } + return &APIError{Status: resp.StatusCode, Message: message, Path: path} +} + +// Ping reports whether the daemon is reachable. Used at start-up so a missing +// or unmountable socket is reported as exactly that, instead of surfacing later +// as a confusing container-create failure. +func (c *Client) Ping(ctx context.Context) error { + return c.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/_ping", nil, nil) +} + +// Version reports the daemon and API versions, for logging and for the status +// the editor displays. +func (c *Client) Version(ctx context.Context) (Version, error) { + var v Version + err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/version", nil, &v) + return v, err +} + +// Version is the subset of /version the sidecar reports. +type Version struct { + Version string `json:"Version"` + APIVersion string `json:"ApiVersion"` + Arch string `json:"Arch"` + KernelVer string `json:"KernelVersion"` +} + +// encodeQuery renders params as a query string, or "" when there are none. +func encodeQuery(params url.Values) string { + if len(params) == 0 { + return "" + } + return "?" + params.Encode() +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go b/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b377a00a --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +package dockerapi + +import ( + "context" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "strconv" + "time" +) + +// ContainerState is the subset of a container inspect that the supervisor +// reasons about. +type ContainerState struct { + Status string `json:"Status"` // created|running|paused|restarting|removing|exited|dead + Running bool `json:"Running"` + ExitCode int `json:"ExitCode"` + StartedAt string `json:"StartedAt"` + FinishedAt string `json:"FinishedAt"` + Health *struct { + // starting|healthy|unhealthy, or absent when the image declares no + // HEALTHCHECK. Absent is not a failure: it means "no opinion", and the + // supervisor falls back to liveness alone. + Status string `json:"Status"` + } `json:"Health"` +} + +// ContainerInspect is the subset of GET /containers/{id}/json we use. +type ContainerInspect struct { + ID string `json:"Id"` + Name string `json:"Name"` + State ContainerState `json:"State"` + Config struct { + Image string `json:"Image"` + Env []string `json:"Env"` + Labels map[string]string + } `json:"Config"` + Image string `json:"Image"` // resolved image ID, not the tag +} + +// HealthStatus returns the container's healthcheck verdict, or "" when the +// image declares none. +func (c *ContainerInspect) HealthStatus() string { + if c.State.Health == nil { + return "" + } + return c.State.Health.Status +} + +// InspectContainer returns the container's current state. A missing container +// yields an error satisfying IsNotFound, which is the normal first-boot case. +func (c *Client) InspectContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) (*ContainerInspect, error) { + var out ContainerInspect + if err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/containers/"+url.PathEscape(name)+"/json", nil, &out); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &out, nil +} + +// CreateContainerResponse is the daemon's reply to a create. +type CreateContainerResponse struct { + ID string `json:"Id"` + Warnings []string `json:"Warnings"` +} + +// CreateContainer creates a container from spec under the given name. The +// spec is passed through as-is so the caller owns the whole configuration -- +// see internal/runtimespec, which is the single place the runtime's flags are +// decided. +func (c *Client) CreateContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, spec any) (*CreateContainerResponse, error) { + params := url.Values{} + params.Set("name", name) + var out CreateContainerResponse + path := "/containers/create" + encodeQuery(params) + if err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, spec, &out); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &out, nil +} + +// StartContainer starts an existing container. A 409 means it is already +// running, which the caller may treat as success. +func (c *Client) StartContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) error { + return c.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/containers/"+url.PathEscape(name)+"/start", nil, nil) +} + +// StopContainer sends SIGTERM and, after the grace period, SIGKILL. +// +// The grace period matters: the runtime shuts the PLC down and flushes retained +// variables on SIGTERM, so cutting it short risks losing the retain image. The +// daemon returns 304 when the container is already stopped, which is inside the +// 2xx-or-not check and so surfaces as success. +func (c *Client) StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Duration) error { + params := url.Values{} + params.Set("t", strconv.Itoa(int(grace.Seconds()))) + path := "/containers/" + url.PathEscape(name) + "/stop" + encodeQuery(params) + err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, nil, nil) + if err != nil && (IsNotFound(err) || hasStatus(err, http.StatusNotModified)) { + return nil + } + return err +} + +// RemoveContainer deletes a container, forcing it down if still running. +// A missing container is success: the goal is "not present". +func (c *Client) RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) error { + params := url.Values{} + if force { + params.Set("force", "true") + } + path := "/containers/" + url.PathEscape(name) + encodeQuery(params) + if err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodDelete, path, nil, nil); err != nil && !IsNotFound(err) { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// ContainerLogs returns the tail of a container's combined output. Used by the +// sidecar's status endpoint so an operator can see why a runtime would not +// start without needing shell access -- which is the entire point of RTOP-283. +func (c *Client) ContainerLogs(ctx context.Context, name string, tail int) (string, error) { + params := url.Values{} + params.Set("stdout", "true") + params.Set("stderr", "true") + params.Set("tail", strconv.Itoa(tail)) + path := "/containers/" + url.PathEscape(name) + "/logs" + encodeQuery(params) + body, err := c.stream(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, nil) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + defer body.Close() + return readMultiplexed(body, 512*1024) +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go b/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99667858 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +package dockerapi + +import ( + "bufio" + "context" + "encoding/binary" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "strings" +) + +// Event is one entry from GET /events, narrowed to what the supervisor needs. +type Event struct { + Type string `json:"Type"` // "container", "image", ... + Action string `json:"Action"` // "die", "start", "health_status: unhealthy", ... + Actor struct { + ID string `json:"ID"` + Attributes map[string]string `json:"Attributes"` + } `json:"Actor"` + TimeNano int64 `json:"timeNano"` +} + +// ContainerName returns the container name the event concerns, which the +// daemon supplies as an actor attribute rather than a top-level field. +func (e *Event) ContainerName() string { + return e.Actor.Attributes["name"] +} + +// ExitCode returns the exit code carried by a "die" event. Present only on +// die; the second return reports whether it was there at all, because exit 0 +// and "no exit code" mean very different things to crash-loop accounting. +func (e *Event) ExitCode() (int, bool) { + raw, ok := e.Actor.Attributes["exitCode"] + if !ok { + return 0, false + } + var code int + if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(raw, "%d", &code); err != nil { + return 0, false + } + return code, true +} + +// HealthStatus returns the verdict from a "health_status: X" action, or "". +// The daemon encodes it in the action string rather than an attribute. +func (e *Event) HealthStatus() string { + const prefix = "health_status: " + if strings.HasPrefix(e.Action, prefix) { + return strings.TrimPrefix(e.Action, prefix) + } + return "" +} + +// StreamEvents delivers container events for the named container to handle +// until ctx is cancelled or the stream breaks. +// +// It returns the error that ended the stream, always non-nil -- a broken +// events stream is never a normal end of work, and the caller is expected to +// reconnect and re-reconcile. That reconnect matters: the daemon restarting +// closes this stream, and any state change during the gap is missed, so the +// caller must re-inspect rather than assume it saw everything. +// +// Filtering happens daemon-side so an unrelated busy host does not push +// thousands of irrelevant events through this process. +func (c *Client) StreamEvents(ctx context.Context, containerName string, handle func(Event)) error { + filters := map[string][]string{ + "type": {"container"}, + "container": {containerName}, + } + encoded, err := json.Marshal(filters) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("encoding event filters: %w", err) + } + params := url.Values{} + params.Set("filters", string(encoded)) + + body, err := c.stream(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/events"+encodeQuery(params), nil) + if err != nil { + return err + } + defer body.Close() + + // The daemon writes one JSON object per line, indefinitely. + decoder := json.NewDecoder(body) + for { + var event Event + if err := decoder.Decode(&event); err != nil { + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return ctx.Err() + } + if err == io.EOF { + return fmt.Errorf("docker events stream closed by daemon") + } + return fmt.Errorf("docker events stream: %w", err) + } + handle(event) + } +} + +// readMultiplexed decodes Docker's non-TTY stream framing into plain text. +// +// Without a TTY the daemon interleaves stdout and stderr as frames with an +// 8-byte header: [stream byte, 3 zero bytes, 4-byte big-endian length]. Reading +// the body raw would splice those headers into the middle of log lines, which +// is exactly the kind of small wrongness that makes an operator distrust the +// recovery screen. Both streams are kept, in arrival order, because a runtime +// that failed to start says why on stderr. +// +// Output is capped at limit bytes; the tail is kept, since the end of the log +// is where the failure is. +func readMultiplexed(r io.Reader, limit int) (string, error) { + reader := bufio.NewReader(r) + var out strings.Builder + header := make([]byte, 8) + + for { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(reader, header); err != nil { + if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF { + break + } + return trimToLimit(out.String(), limit), err + } + // A first byte outside the known stream ids means this is not framed + // output at all (a TTY-allocated container streams raw). Fall back to + // reading the remainder verbatim rather than emitting garbage. + if header[0] > 2 { + out.Write(header) + rest, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(reader, int64(limit))) + out.Write(rest) + return trimToLimit(out.String(), limit), err + } + size := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(header[4:8]) + if size == 0 { + continue + } + // Bound a single frame so a corrupt length cannot allocate wildly. + if size > uint32(limit) { + size = uint32(limit) + } + frame := make([]byte, size) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(reader, frame); err != nil { + out.Write(frame) + if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF { + break + } + return trimToLimit(out.String(), limit), err + } + out.Write(frame) + // Keep the builder from growing without bound on a long-lived + // container: trim as we go, not just at the end. + if out.Len() > limit*2 { + trimmed := trimToLimit(out.String(), limit) + out.Reset() + out.WriteString(trimmed) + } + } + return trimToLimit(out.String(), limit), nil +} + +// trimToLimit keeps the last limit bytes, starting at a line boundary so the +// output never opens mid-line. +func trimToLimit(s string, limit int) string { + if len(s) <= limit { + return s + } + s = s[len(s)-limit:] + if idx := strings.IndexByte(s, '\n'); idx >= 0 && idx+1 < len(s) { + return s[idx+1:] + } + return s +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/health/prober.go b/sidecar/internal/health/prober.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2d32d0be --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/health/prober.go @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// Package health probes the runtime webserver. +// +// Scope is deliberately narrow: "is the webserver answering". Whether plc_main +// is running, whether a program is loaded, and whether that program is in +// ERROR are all the webserver's own business -- runtimemanager._monitor() +// already restarts plc_main and drops it into safe mode on rapid crashes. A +// probe that cared about PLC state would let a bad user program trigger a +// runtime rollback, turning a logic bug into a device outage. +package health + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/tls" + "fmt" + "io" + "net/http" + "time" +) + +// Prober checks the runtime's unauthenticated version endpoint. +// +// /api/version, not /api/ping: ping sits behind @jwt_required(), so the +// sidecar has no credentials for it and a probe there would report a healthy +// runtime as dead. (The healthcheck example in docs/DOCKER.md has this wrong +// and always gets a 401.) +type Prober struct { + url string + client *http.Client +} + +// DefaultURL is where the runtime listens on a host-network container. +const DefaultURL = "https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/version" + +// New returns a prober for url, or DefaultURL when empty. +// +// TLS verification is off by design. The runtime generates a self-signed +// certificate at start-up, and this connection is to 127.0.0.1 inside the same +// host -- there is no name to verify and no network path to intercept. Turning +// it on would simply make the probe always fail. +func New(url string, timeout time.Duration) *Prober { + if url == "" { + url = DefaultURL + } + if timeout <= 0 { + timeout = 5 * time.Second + } + return &Prober{ + url: url, + client: &http.Client{ + Timeout: timeout, + Transport: &http.Transport{ + TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // loopback, self-signed + }, + }, + } +} + +// Probe returns nil when the runtime webserver answered. +// +// Any 2xx counts. The body is not parsed: this asks "is it up", and a runtime +// that answers at all has its Flask app serving, which is the whole question. +func (p *Prober) Probe(ctx context.Context) error { + req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, p.url, nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("building probe request: %w", err) + } + resp, err := p.client.Do(req) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("probing %s: %w", p.url, err) + } + defer resp.Body.Close() + // Drain so the connection is reusable across the start-up poll loop. + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 8*1024)) + + if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 { + return fmt.Errorf("probing %s: HTTP %d", p.url, resp.StatusCode) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bd2a2e98 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +// Package runtimespec decides how the runtime container is run. +// +// This is the ONE place those flags exist. The plan settled on a single +// privilege level rather than a matrix of profiles, because multiple profiles +// mean multiple ways to be misconfigured and a support matrix nobody can hold +// in their head. Every flag below is load-bearing: +// +// - Privileged + /dev bind: exact parity with the current root install. +// Verified against the SLM-RP4 HAL, which drives /dev/spidev6.0 through +// SPI_IOC_MESSAGE and /dev/gpiochip0 through the GPIO line-handle ioctls. +// Binding the host's live devtmpfs also means hot-plugged serial adapters +// appear without mknod or device cgroup rules. +// +// - NetworkMode host: every NIC visible under its real name in the host's +// own namespace. EtherCAT needs AF_PACKET and SIOCSIFFLAGS on a real +// interface, and the UDP discovery responder needs to see broadcasts. +// Deliberately NOT the orchestrator's dedicated-NIC mechanism, which moves +// a host NIC into a container namespace and removes it from the host. +// +// - No CPU limits, ever. This is the one trap that survives "just make it +// privileged", because it is not a privilege. Setting Cpus/CpuQuota/ +// CpuPeriod/Memory enables the cgroup CPU controller, and with +// CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED a non-root cgroup starts at rt_runtime_us = 0 -- +// at which point sched_setscheduler(SCHED_FIFO) fails outright and the +// runtime silently loses real-time scheduling. There is no field for them +// in this package, so they cannot be set by accident. CpusetCpus would be +// safe (pinning is not bandwidth throttling) but nothing needs it yet. +// +// - rtprio/memlock ulimits are redundant under Privileged, since +// CAP_SYS_NICE bypasses RLIMIT_RTPRIO and CAP_IPC_LOCK bypasses +// RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. They stay as documented intent, and they are what saves +// the deployment if anyone ever de-privileges the container. +// +// - RestartPolicy "no": the supervisor owns the lifecycle. Letting Docker +// also restart it would race the crash-loop accounting and hide exactly +// the signal recovery mode depends on. +// +// Board-specific additions come from a JSON file in the sidecar's own volume, +// written by install.sh. That file may only ADD binds and environment; it can +// never remove privilege, change the network mode, or introduce a CPU limit. +// Validation is strict because the file is the one operator-supplied input to +// a component that runs as host root. +package runtimespec + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" +) + +// Ulimit is Docker's rlimit shape. +type Ulimit struct { + Name string `json:"Name"` + Soft int64 `json:"Soft"` + Hard int64 `json:"Hard"` +} + +// RestartPolicy is Docker's restart-policy shape. +type RestartPolicy struct { + Name string `json:"Name"` +} + +// HostConfig is the subset of Docker's HostConfig we set. Fields we must never +// set are simply absent from the struct. +type HostConfig struct { + Privileged bool `json:"Privileged"` + NetworkMode string `json:"NetworkMode"` + Binds []string `json:"Binds"` + Ulimits []Ulimit `json:"Ulimits"` + RestartPolicy RestartPolicy `json:"RestartPolicy"` +} + +// CreatePayload is the body of POST /containers/create. +type CreatePayload struct { + Image string `json:"Image"` + Env []string `json:"Env"` + HostConfig HostConfig `json:"HostConfig"` +} + +// Config is the operator-supplied part, read from disk. +type Config struct { + // Repository is the image repository, without a tag. + Repository string `json:"repository"` + // Version is the tag currently desired. The sidecar rewrites this when an + // update succeeds, which is what makes the choice survive a reboot. + Version string `json:"version"` + // DataDir is the host path holding the runtime's persistent data. Bound + // into the container at the same path so the runtime's own defaults apply + // unchanged. + DataDir string `json:"dataDir"` + // ExtraBinds are additional host:container[:mode] mounts for boards that + // need more than /dev -- /lib/modules for a package that loads a kernel + // module, a vendor path, and so on. + ExtraBinds []string `json:"extraBinds,omitempty"` + // ExtraEnv are additional KEY=VALUE pairs. + ExtraEnv []string `json:"extraEnv,omitempty"` + // SidecarPort is advertised to the runtime so /api/capabilities can tell + // the editor where to send an update request. + SidecarPort int `json:"sidecarPort,omitempty"` +} + +const ( + DefaultRepository = "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime" + DefaultDataDir = "/var/lib/openplc-runtime" + DefaultSidecarPort = 8445 +) + +// forbiddenBindTargets are host paths that must never be handed to the runtime +// container. The docker socket is the important one: mounting it would give +// the runtime's HTTP API control of every container on the host, which is +// precisely the privilege the sidecar exists to keep away from it. +var forbiddenBindSources = []string{ + "/var/run/docker.sock", + "/run/docker.sock", +} + +// Load reads and validates a spec file, filling in defaults. +func Load(path string) (*Config, error) { + raw, err := os.ReadFile(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading runtime spec %s: %w", path, err) + } + var cfg Config + // DisallowUnknownFields so a typo in an operator-edited file is reported + // rather than silently ignored -- a mount that quietly did not apply is + // how a board comes up with no SPI and no explanation. + decoder := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(string(raw))) + decoder.DisallowUnknownFields() + if err := decoder.Decode(&cfg); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing runtime spec %s: %w", path, err) + } + cfg.applyDefaults() + if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid runtime spec %s: %w", path, err) + } + return &cfg, nil +} + +// Save writes the config back, atomically, so a crash mid-write cannot leave +// the sidecar unable to parse its own spec on the next boot. +func (c *Config) Save(path string) error { + encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(c, "", " ") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("encoding runtime spec: %w", err) + } + encoded = append(encoded, '\n') + + dir := filepath.Dir(path) + tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, ".runtime-spec-*") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating temp spec in %s: %w", dir, err) + } + tmpName := tmp.Name() + defer os.Remove(tmpName) // no-op once the rename succeeds + + if _, err := tmp.Write(encoded); err != nil { + tmp.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("writing temp spec: %w", err) + } + if err := tmp.Sync(); err != nil { + tmp.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("syncing temp spec: %w", err) + } + if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("closing temp spec: %w", err) + } + if err := os.Rename(tmpName, path); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("replacing spec %s: %w", path, err) + } + return nil +} + +func (c *Config) applyDefaults() { + if c.Repository == "" { + c.Repository = DefaultRepository + } + if c.DataDir == "" { + c.DataDir = DefaultDataDir + } + if c.SidecarPort == 0 { + c.SidecarPort = DefaultSidecarPort + } +} + +// Validate rejects a spec that would produce an unsafe or unusable container. +func (c *Config) Validate() error { + if c.Version == "" { + return errors.New("version is required") + } + if strings.ContainsAny(c.Version, " \t\n/") { + return fmt.Errorf("version %q is not a valid image tag", c.Version) + } + if !filepath.IsAbs(c.DataDir) { + return fmt.Errorf("dataDir %q must be an absolute path", c.DataDir) + } + if c.SidecarPort < 1 || c.SidecarPort > 65535 { + return fmt.Errorf("sidecarPort %d is out of range", c.SidecarPort) + } + for _, bind := range c.ExtraBinds { + if err := validateBind(bind); err != nil { + return err + } + } + for _, env := range c.ExtraEnv { + if !strings.Contains(env, "=") { + return fmt.Errorf("extraEnv entry %q is not KEY=VALUE", env) + } + } + return nil +} + +// validateBind enforces the shape and the safety rules for an operator-added +// mount. +func validateBind(bind string) error { + parts := strings.Split(bind, ":") + if len(parts) < 2 || len(parts) > 3 { + return fmt.Errorf("bind %q must be host:container[:mode]", bind) + } + source, target := parts[0], parts[1] + if !filepath.IsAbs(source) || !filepath.IsAbs(target) { + return fmt.Errorf("bind %q must use absolute paths", bind) + } + if len(parts) == 3 && parts[2] != "ro" && parts[2] != "rw" { + return fmt.Errorf("bind %q mode must be ro or rw", bind) + } + // Cleaning first so /a/../var/run/docker.sock does not slip past. + cleaned := filepath.Clean(source) + for _, forbidden := range forbiddenBindSources { + if cleaned == forbidden { + return fmt.Errorf( + "bind %q is refused: mounting the docker socket into the runtime "+ + "would give its API control of the host", bind) + } + } + if cleaned == "/" { + return fmt.Errorf("bind %q is refused: the whole host filesystem", bind) + } + return nil +} + +// ImageRef is the fully qualified image the runtime should run. +func (c *Config) ImageRef() string { + return c.Repository + ":" + c.Version +} + +// ImageRefFor is ImageRef for an arbitrary version, used to pull a target +// before committing to it. +func (c *Config) ImageRefFor(version string) string { + return c.Repository + ":" + version +} + +// ContainerSpec builds the Docker create payload for imageRef. +func (c *Config) ContainerSpec(imageRef string) any { + binds := []string{ + // Host devtmpfs: SPI, GPIO, I2C, serial. Live, so hot-plug works. + "/dev:/dev", + // Persistent data at the same path inside, so the runtime's own + // defaults resolve without any env override. + c.DataDir + ":" + c.DataDir, + } + binds = append(binds, c.ExtraBinds...) + + env := []string{ + // Tells /api/capabilities to report updatePolicy "self". Only our + // sidecar sets this, which is what makes the answer trustworthy. + "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self", + fmt.Sprintf("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT=%d", c.SidecarPort), + } + env = append(env, c.ExtraEnv...) + + return CreatePayload{ + Image: imageRef, + Env: env, + HostConfig: HostConfig{ + Privileged: true, + NetworkMode: "host", + Binds: binds, + Ulimits: []Ulimit{ + {Name: "rtprio", Soft: 99, Hard: 99}, + {Name: "memlock", Soft: -1, Hard: -1}, + }, + // The supervisor restarts it; Docker must not also try. + RestartPolicy: RestartPolicy{Name: "no"}, + }, + } +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7fba7164 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,301 @@ +package runtimespec + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" +) + +func writeSpec(t *testing.T, body string) string { + t.Helper() + dir := t.TempDir() + path := filepath.Join(dir, "runtime-spec.json") + if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("writing spec: %v", err) + } + return path +} + +// --- loading ------------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestLoadAppliesDefaults(t *testing.T) { + path := writeSpec(t, `{"version": "v4.2.1"}`) + cfg, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("load: %v", err) + } + if cfg.Repository != DefaultRepository { + t.Fatalf("want default repository, got %q", cfg.Repository) + } + if cfg.DataDir != DefaultDataDir { + t.Fatalf("want default data dir, got %q", cfg.DataDir) + } + if cfg.SidecarPort != DefaultSidecarPort { + t.Fatalf("want default sidecar port, got %d", cfg.SidecarPort) + } +} + +func TestLoadRejectsUnknownFields(t *testing.T) { + // A typo in an operator-edited file must be reported, not ignored. A mount + // that quietly did not apply is how a board comes up with no SPI and no + // explanation. + path := writeSpec(t, `{"version": "v4.2.1", "extraBind": ["/dev:/dev"]}`) + if _, err := Load(path); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a misspelled field must be rejected") + } +} + +func TestLoadRequiresAVersion(t *testing.T) { + path := writeSpec(t, `{"repository": "example.com/x"}`) + if _, err := Load(path); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a spec with no version must be rejected") + } +} + +// --- bind validation ----------------------------------------------------- + +func TestTheDockerSocketCannotBeMountedIntoTheRuntime(t *testing.T) { + // This is the whole security argument for the split: the sidecar holds the + // socket, the runtime never does. Mounting it into the runtime would give + // its HTTP API control of every container on the host. + for _, bind := range []string{ + "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", + "/run/docker.sock:/run/docker.sock:rw", + // Path traversal must not get around the check. + "/var/run/../run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", + } { + cfg := &Config{Version: "v1", ExtraBinds: []string{bind}} + cfg.applyDefaults() + err := cfg.Validate() + if err == nil { + t.Fatalf("bind %q must be refused", bind) + } + if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "docker socket") { + t.Fatalf("bind %q refused for the wrong reason: %v", bind, err) + } + } +} + +func TestTheWholeHostFilesystemCannotBeMounted(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{Version: "v1", ExtraBinds: []string{"/:/host"}} + cfg.applyDefaults() + if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil { + t.Fatal("mounting / must be refused") + } +} + +func TestBindsMustBeWellFormedAndAbsolute(t *testing.T) { + for _, bind := range []string{ + "/dev", // no target + "dev:/dev", // relative source + "/dev:dev", // relative target + "/a:/b:ro:extra", // too many parts + "/lib/modules:/lib/modules:x", // bad mode + } { + cfg := &Config{Version: "v1", ExtraBinds: []string{bind}} + cfg.applyDefaults() + if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil { + t.Fatalf("malformed bind %q must be refused", bind) + } + } +} + +func TestLegitimateBoardMountsAreAccepted(t *testing.T) { + // The SLM-RP4 case: /dev covers SPI and GPIO, but a package that loads a + // kernel module needs /lib/modules too. + cfg := &Config{ + Version: "v4.2.1", + ExtraBinds: []string{"/lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro", "/etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro"}, + ExtraEnv: []string{"TZ=America/New_York"}, + } + cfg.applyDefaults() + if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("a legitimate board mount must be accepted: %v", err) + } +} + +func TestExtraEnvMustBeKeyValue(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{Version: "v1", ExtraEnv: []string{"JUST_A_NAME"}} + cfg.applyDefaults() + if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil { + t.Fatal("an env entry without = must be refused") + } +} + +func TestVersionMustBeAUsableTag(t *testing.T) { + for _, version := range []string{"v4.2 .1", "latest/stable", "with\ttab"} { + cfg := &Config{Version: version} + cfg.applyDefaults() + if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil { + t.Fatalf("version %q must be refused", version) + } + } +} + +// --- container spec ------------------------------------------------------ + +// decodeSpec renders ContainerSpec through JSON, which is what actually +// reaches the daemon -- asserting on the struct would miss a field that does +// not serialise. +func decodeSpec(t *testing.T, cfg *Config) map[string]any { + t.Helper() + encoded, err := json.Marshal(cfg.ContainerSpec(cfg.ImageRef())) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("marshalling spec: %v", err) + } + var out map[string]any + if err := json.Unmarshal(encoded, &out); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unmarshalling spec: %v", err) + } + return out +} + +func TestContainerSpecCarriesTheParityFlags(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1"} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + host := spec["HostConfig"].(map[string]any) + + if host["Privileged"] != true { + t.Error("Privileged is required for /dev/mem, GPIO and SPI parity") + } + if host["NetworkMode"] != "host" { + t.Errorf("NetworkMode must be host for EtherCAT and UDP discovery, got %v", + host["NetworkMode"]) + } + binds := host["Binds"].([]any) + var sawDev bool + for _, b := range binds { + if b == "/dev:/dev" { + sawDev = true + } + } + if !sawDev { + t.Error("/dev must be bound so hot-plugged devices appear without mknod") + } + if host["RestartPolicy"].(map[string]any)["Name"] != "no" { + t.Error("the supervisor owns restarts; docker must not also restart it") + } +} + +func TestContainerSpecNeverSetsACPULimit(t *testing.T) { + // The one trap that survives "just make it privileged", because it is not + // a privilege: any of these enables the cgroup CPU controller, and with + // CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED a non-root cgroup starts at rt_runtime_us = 0, so + // sched_setscheduler(SCHED_FIFO) fails and the runtime loses real-time + // scheduling silently. + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1"} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + host := spec["HostConfig"].(map[string]any) + + for _, forbidden := range []string{ + "CpuQuota", "CpuPeriod", "NanoCpus", "Memory", "CpuShares", "CpuRealtimeRuntime", + } { + if _, present := host[forbidden]; present { + t.Errorf("HostConfig must not carry %s: it would break SCHED_FIFO", forbidden) + } + } +} + +func TestContainerSpecSetsTheRealTimeUlimits(t *testing.T) { + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1"} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + host := spec["HostConfig"].(map[string]any) + + limits := map[string]float64{} + for _, raw := range host["Ulimits"].([]any) { + entry := raw.(map[string]any) + limits[entry["Name"].(string)] = entry["Soft"].(float64) + } + if limits["rtprio"] != 99 { + t.Errorf("want rtprio 99, got %v", limits["rtprio"]) + } + if limits["memlock"] != -1 { + t.Errorf("want memlock unlimited, got %v", limits["memlock"]) + } +} + +func TestContainerSpecTellsTheRuntimeItIsSidecarManaged(t *testing.T) { + // This is what makes /api/capabilities report updatePolicy "self". Only our + // sidecar sets it, which is what makes the answer trustworthy -- an + // orchestrator vPLC never gets it and so reports "managed". + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1", SidecarPort: 8445} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + + var sawPolicy, sawPort bool + for _, raw := range spec["Env"].([]any) { + switch raw.(string) { + case "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self": + sawPolicy = true + case "OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT=8445": + sawPort = true + } + } + if !sawPolicy { + t.Error("the runtime must be told it is sidecar-managed") + } + if !sawPort { + t.Error("the runtime must be told where the sidecar listens") + } +} + +func TestExtraBindsAreAppendedNotSubstituted(t *testing.T) { + // An operator may add mounts; they must never be able to drop /dev or the + // data directory by supplying their own list. + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1", ExtraBinds: []string{"/lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro"}} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + binds := spec["HostConfig"].(map[string]any)["Binds"].([]any) + + if len(binds) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("want /dev, data dir and the extra bind, got %v", binds) + } +} + +// --- persistence --------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestSaveThenLoadRoundTrips(t *testing.T) { + // The sidecar rewrites version on a successful update; that choice has to + // survive a reboot or the device would revert on next boot. + path := writeSpec(t, `{"version": "v4.2.0"}`) + cfg, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("load: %v", err) + } + cfg.Version = "v4.2.1" + if err := cfg.Save(path); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("save: %v", err) + } + reloaded, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reload: %v", err) + } + if reloaded.Version != "v4.2.1" { + t.Fatalf("want the saved version back, got %q", reloaded.Version) + } +} + +func TestSaveLeavesNoTempFileBehind(t *testing.T) { + path := writeSpec(t, `{"version": "v4.2.0"}`) + cfg, err := Load(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("load: %v", err) + } + if err := cfg.Save(path); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("save: %v", err) + } + entries, err := os.ReadDir(filepath.Dir(path)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reading dir: %v", err) + } + for _, entry := range entries { + if strings.HasPrefix(entry.Name(), ".runtime-spec-") { + t.Fatalf("temp file %q left behind", entry.Name()) + } + } +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go b/sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a6fd2917 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +package supervisor + +import ( + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Defaults mirror webserver/runtimemanager.py's MAX_RAPID_CRASHES / +// RAPID_CRASH_WINDOW one layer up. That module already does this for +// plc_main: restart it, count crashes in a window, and stop restarting when +// the fault is clearly not transient. The sidecar applies the same shape to +// the container, so the two layers behave predictably alike and neither +// masks the other's failure. +const ( + DefaultMaxCrashes = 3 + DefaultCrashWindow = 5 * time.Minute + DefaultRestartDelay = 2 * time.Second + // Restart backoff is capped so a persistent fault does not stretch to an + // interval where an operator concludes the sidecar has given up quietly. + // It reaches the crash ceiling well inside the window either way. + MaxRestartDelay = 30 * time.Second +) + +// crashWindow counts unexpected container exits inside a sliding window. +// +// Only UNEXPECTED exits belong here. A runtime that exits because we asked it +// to -- an update handshake, a stop we issued -- is not evidence of a fault, +// and counting those would make the first update look like a crash-loop and +// drop a perfectly healthy device into recovery. Callers gate on +// Supervisor.expectStop rather than filtering by exit code, because a +// deliberate stop and a genuine crash can both exit non-zero. +type crashWindow struct { + mu sync.Mutex + times []time.Time + max int + window time.Duration + // now is injectable so tests can drive the clock instead of sleeping + // through a five-minute window. + now func() time.Time +} + +func newCrashWindow(max int, window time.Duration) *crashWindow { + return &crashWindow{max: max, window: window, now: time.Now} +} + +// record adds a crash and reports whether the window is now full, meaning the +// runtime should be considered bad rather than restarted again. +func (w *crashWindow) record() bool { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + now := w.now() + w.prune(now) + w.times = append(w.times, now) + return len(w.times) >= w.max +} + +// count returns the number of crashes currently inside the window. +func (w *crashWindow) count() int { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + w.prune(w.now()) + return len(w.times) +} + +// reset clears the history. Called once a runtime has been confirmed healthy, +// so an isolated crash weeks apart never accumulates into a false loop. +func (w *crashWindow) reset() { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + w.times = nil +} + +// prune drops entries that have aged out. Caller holds the lock. +func (w *crashWindow) prune(now time.Time) { + cutoff := now.Add(-w.window) + kept := w.times[:0] + for _, t := range w.times { + if t.After(cutoff) { + kept = append(kept, t) + } + } + w.times = kept +} + +// restartDelay backs off as crashes accumulate: a container that died once +// probably hit something transient and should come back immediately, while one +// dying repeatedly should not be hammered. Bounded by MaxRestartDelay. +func restartDelay(base time.Duration, consecutive int) time.Duration { + if consecutive <= 0 { + return 0 + } + if base <= 0 { + base = DefaultRestartDelay + } + delay := base + for i := 1; i < consecutive; i++ { + delay *= 4 + if delay >= MaxRestartDelay { + return MaxRestartDelay + } + } + return delay +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go b/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ecdec1d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go @@ -0,0 +1,628 @@ +// Package supervisor owns the runtime container's lifecycle. +// +// It is the bootloader half of RTOP-283: at boot it reconciles the runtime +// container into existence, then sits blocked on the Docker events stream and +// does nothing until something happens. When the runtime dies it restarts it, +// and when it dies repeatedly it stops trying and enters recovery so an +// operator can reach the device from the editor. +// +// Two boundaries are deliberate and easy to get wrong: +// +// - Health means the runtime WEBSERVER came up. Whether plc_main is running, +// whether a program is loaded, and whether that program errors are all the +// webserver's concern -- it already restarts plc_main and drops to safe +// mode on rapid crashes. If the sidecar looked at PLC state, a user +// uploading broken logic would trigger a runtime recovery, which would be +// a spectacular way to turn a program bug into a device outage. +// +// - There is no automatic rollback. A failed update or a crash-loop stops +// and waits for a human. Choosing a version is a decision with physical +// consequences, and guessing wrong twice is worse than stopping once. +package supervisor + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/dockerapi" +) + +// State is the supervisor's externally visible condition, reported by the +// status endpoint and used by the editor to decide what to show. +type State string + +const ( + // StateBooting is the brief window before the first reconcile finishes. + StateBooting State = "booting" + // StateStarting means a container is up but has not yet been confirmed + // healthy. + StateStarting State = "starting" + // StateHealthy is steady state: the runtime webserver is answering and the + // supervisor is idle on the events stream. + StateHealthy State = "healthy" + // StateUpdating means a version change is in progress. Exits during this + // state are expected and never count as crashes. + StateUpdating State = "updating" + // StateRecovery means the supervisor has stopped trying. The runtime + // container is stopped, UDP discovery answers with a recovery flag, and + // only recovery commands are accepted. + StateRecovery State = "recovery" +) + +// Reason explains a recovery state to an operator. Kept as prose rather than a +// code because it is displayed verbatim in the editor. +type Status struct { + State State `json:"state"` + Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` + Version string `json:"version,omitempty"` + Image string `json:"image,omitempty"` + CrashCount int `json:"crashCount"` + Since time.Time `json:"since"` + ContainerID string `json:"containerId,omitempty"` + HealthSource string `json:"healthSource,omitempty"` +} + +// DockerClient is the slice of the Docker API the supervisor uses. +// +// An interface rather than *dockerapi.Client so the state machine can be +// tested directly. The subtle logic here is crash accounting -- distinguishing +// an exit we asked for from one we did not -- and that is exactly the kind of +// thing that is wrong in a way no integration test notices until a device +// drops into recovery during its first successful update. +type DockerClient interface { + Ping(ctx context.Context) error + InspectContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) (*dockerapi.ContainerInspect, error) + CreateContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, spec any) (*dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse, error) + StartContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) error + StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Duration) error + RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) error + StreamEvents(ctx context.Context, name string, handle func(dockerapi.Event)) error +} + +// SpecProvider supplies the container definition to create the runtime from. +// An interface so the supervisor never has to know how the spec was assembled +// or where the board-specific mounts came from. +type SpecProvider interface { + // ContainerSpec returns a Docker create payload for the given image ref. + ContainerSpec(imageRef string) any + // ImageRef returns the image the runtime should be running right now. + ImageRef() string +} + +// HealthProber reports whether the runtime webserver is answering. Separate +// from the container's own healthcheck so the supervisor still has an opinion +// on images built before the HEALTHCHECK landed. +type HealthProber interface { + Probe(ctx context.Context) error +} + +// Config tunes the supervisor. Zero values fall back to the package defaults. +type Config struct { + ContainerName string + MaxCrashes int + CrashWindow time.Duration + // StartTimeout bounds how long a freshly started container has to report + // healthy before the attempt is treated as a failure. + StartTimeout time.Duration + // StopGrace is handed to Docker's stop. The runtime flushes retained + // variables on SIGTERM, so this must not be stingy. + StopGrace time.Duration + // RestartDelayBase is the first backoff step after an unexpected exit. + // Configurable so tests do not sleep through real backoff. + RestartDelayBase time.Duration +} + +const ( + DefaultContainerName = "openplc-runtime" + DefaultStartTimeout = 90 * time.Second + DefaultStopGrace = 30 * time.Second +) + +func (c *Config) withDefaults() Config { + out := *c + if out.ContainerName == "" { + out.ContainerName = DefaultContainerName + } + if out.MaxCrashes <= 0 { + out.MaxCrashes = DefaultMaxCrashes + } + if out.CrashWindow <= 0 { + out.CrashWindow = DefaultCrashWindow + } + if out.StartTimeout <= 0 { + out.StartTimeout = DefaultStartTimeout + } + if out.StopGrace <= 0 { + out.StopGrace = DefaultStopGrace + } + if out.RestartDelayBase <= 0 { + out.RestartDelayBase = DefaultRestartDelay + } + return out +} + +// Supervisor reconciles and watches one runtime container. +type Supervisor struct { + docker DockerClient + spec SpecProvider + health HealthProber + cfg Config + log *slog.Logger + + crashes *crashWindow + + mu sync.Mutex + // status is the current externally visible condition. + status Status + // expectStop suppresses crash accounting while we are deliberately taking + // the container down. Counted rather than boolean: an update stops the + // container and a concurrent reconcile must not clear the suppression + // early, which would make our own stop look like a crash. + expectStop int + // consecutiveFailures drives restart backoff, reset by a healthy start. + consecutiveFailures int + // onRecovery is invoked when the supervisor enters recovery, so the UDP + // discovery responder can be switched on without this package importing it. + onRecovery func(Status) + // onHealthy is the mirror, used to switch discovery back off. + onHealthy func(Status) +} + +// New builds a supervisor. Nothing is started until Run. +func New( + docker DockerClient, + spec SpecProvider, + health HealthProber, + cfg Config, + log *slog.Logger, +) *Supervisor { + resolved := cfg.withDefaults() + return &Supervisor{ + docker: docker, + spec: spec, + health: health, + cfg: resolved, + log: log, + crashes: newCrashWindow(resolved.MaxCrashes, resolved.CrashWindow), + status: Status{State: StateBooting, Since: time.Now()}, + } +} + +// OnRecovery and OnHealthy register transition hooks. Set before Run. +func (s *Supervisor) OnRecovery(fn func(Status)) { s.onRecovery = fn } +func (s *Supervisor) OnHealthy(fn func(Status)) { s.onHealthy = fn } + +// Status returns a snapshot of the current condition. +func (s *Supervisor) Status() Status { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + status := s.status + status.CrashCount = s.crashes.count() + return status +} + +// setState records a transition and fires the matching hook. Hooks run outside +// the lock: they touch the discovery responder, and holding the supervisor +// lock across that would invite a deadlock the moment either side grows. +func (s *Supervisor) setState(state State, reason string) { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.status.State == state && s.status.Reason == reason { + s.mu.Unlock() + return + } + previous := s.status.State + s.status.State = state + s.status.Reason = reason + s.status.Since = time.Now() + snapshot := s.status + s.mu.Unlock() + + s.log.Info("state change", "from", previous, "to", state, "reason", reason) + + switch state { + case StateRecovery: + if s.onRecovery != nil { + s.onRecovery(snapshot) + } + case StateHealthy: + if s.onHealthy != nil { + s.onHealthy(snapshot) + } + } +} + +// Run reconciles the runtime container, then watches it until ctx is +// cancelled. It returns only on cancellation: a broken events stream is +// reconnected, because losing the watch is not a reason to stop supervising. +func (s *Supervisor) Run(ctx context.Context) error { + if err := s.docker.Ping(ctx); err != nil { + // Without the socket the sidecar cannot do its job at all, and saying + // so plainly beats failing later inside a container create. + return fmt.Errorf("docker socket unreachable at start-up: %w", err) + } + + if err := s.Reconcile(ctx); err != nil { + // A failed reconcile is not fatal to the process: recovery mode exists + // precisely so an operator can reach a device whose runtime will not + // come up. Log it, enter recovery, and keep serving. + s.log.Error("initial reconcile failed", "error", err) + s.enterRecovery(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("runtime could not be started: %v", err)) + } + + return s.watch(ctx) +} + +// watch consumes the events stream, reconnecting on failure. +// +// Every reconnect re-reconciles. The stream can only report what happened +// while it was open, so a gap -- most often the daemon restarting -- may hide +// a container exit. Re-inspecting is the only way to be sure the world still +// matches what we believe. +func (s *Supervisor) watch(ctx context.Context) error { + const reconnectDelay = 2 * time.Second + for { + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return ctx.Err() + } + + err := s.docker.StreamEvents(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, func(event dockerapi.Event) { + s.handleEvent(ctx, event) + }) + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return ctx.Err() + } + s.log.Warn("events stream ended, reconnecting", "error", err) + + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(reconnectDelay): + } + + // Re-sync before trusting the new stream. + if err := s.Reconcile(ctx); err != nil { + s.log.Error("reconcile after events reconnect failed", "error", err) + } + } +} + +// handleEvent reacts to one container event. +func (s *Supervisor) handleEvent(ctx context.Context, event dockerapi.Event) { + if event.ContainerName() != s.cfg.ContainerName { + return + } + + switch { + case event.Action == "die": + code, _ := event.ExitCode() + s.handleDeath(ctx, code) + + case event.HealthStatus() == "unhealthy": + // The container is alive but the webserver stopped answering. Without + // this the supervisor would idle forever beside a wedged runtime: a + // hung process never emits a die event. + s.log.Warn("runtime reported unhealthy") + s.handleWedged(ctx) + + case event.HealthStatus() == "healthy": + s.markHealthy("docker healthcheck") + } +} + +// handleDeath restarts the runtime, or gives up if it keeps dying. +func (s *Supervisor) handleDeath(ctx context.Context, exitCode int) { + if s.consumeExpectedStop() { + s.log.Info("runtime stopped as expected", "exitCode", exitCode) + return + } + + s.mu.Lock() + state := s.status.State + s.mu.Unlock() + if state == StateRecovery || state == StateUpdating { + // Already handled by whoever put us here. + return + } + + looping := s.crashes.record() + s.mu.Lock() + s.consecutiveFailures++ + failures := s.consecutiveFailures + s.mu.Unlock() + + s.log.Warn("runtime exited unexpectedly", + "exitCode", exitCode, "crashesInWindow", s.crashes.count()) + + if looping { + s.enterRecovery(ctx, fmt.Sprintf( + "runtime exited %d times within %s (last exit code %d); "+ + "not restarting again", + s.cfg.MaxCrashes, s.cfg.CrashWindow, exitCode)) + return + } + + delay := restartDelay(s.cfg.RestartDelayBase, failures) + s.setState(StateStarting, "restarting after unexpected exit") + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return + case <-time.After(delay): + } + + if err := s.startAndConfirm(ctx); err != nil { + s.log.Error("restart failed", "error", err) + // Do not enter recovery here: the crash window is the authority on + // when to give up, and a single failed restart is not it. The next die + // event advances the count. + } +} + +// handleWedged deals with a container that is running but not answering. +// Stopping it converts an invisible hang into a die event, which then flows +// through the ordinary crash-loop accounting rather than needing a parallel +// code path with its own thresholds. +func (s *Supervisor) handleWedged(ctx context.Context) { + s.mu.Lock() + state := s.status.State + s.mu.Unlock() + if state == StateRecovery || state == StateUpdating { + return + } + if err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace); err != nil { + s.log.Error("stopping wedged runtime failed", "error", err) + } +} + +// Reconcile brings the runtime container to the desired state and is safe to +// call at any time. +// +// Adoption is the important property: a running healthy container is left +// exactly as it is. The sidecar restarts (its own crash, a self-update) far +// more often than the runtime does, and a reconcile that recreated or bounced +// a working runtime would turn a sidecar hiccup into a plant outage. +func (s *Supervisor) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error { + inspect, err := s.docker.InspectContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName) + switch { + case err == nil: + // Exists. Adopt, or start it if it is down. + case dockerapi.IsNotFound(err): + s.log.Info("runtime container absent, creating", "name", s.cfg.ContainerName) + if err := s.create(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + return s.startAndConfirm(ctx) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("inspecting %s: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, err) + } + + s.mu.Lock() + s.status.ContainerID = inspect.ID + s.status.Image = inspect.Config.Image + s.mu.Unlock() + + if !inspect.State.Running { + s.log.Info("runtime container present but not running", + "status", inspect.State.Status, "exitCode", inspect.State.ExitCode) + return s.startAndConfirm(ctx) + } + + // Running. Trust Docker's healthcheck when the image declares one; + // otherwise probe the webserver ourselves so an image built before the + // HEALTHCHECK landed is still supervised rather than assumed fine. + switch inspect.HealthStatus() { + case "healthy": + s.markHealthy("docker healthcheck") + return nil + case "unhealthy": + s.handleWedged(ctx) + return nil + case "starting": + s.setState(StateStarting, "waiting for healthcheck") + return s.awaitHealthy(ctx) + default: + return s.confirmByProbe(ctx) + } +} + +// create makes the container from the current spec. A stale container under +// the same name is removed first: create fails with a name conflict otherwise, +// and by the time we are creating we have already decided the existing one is +// not usable. +func (s *Supervisor) create(ctx context.Context) error { + imageRef := s.spec.ImageRef() + if err := s.docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, true); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("removing stale container %s: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, err) + } + created, err := s.docker.CreateContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.spec.ContainerSpec(imageRef)) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating %s from %s: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, imageRef, err) + } + for _, warning := range created.Warnings { + s.log.Warn("docker create warning", "warning", warning) + } + s.mu.Lock() + s.status.ContainerID = created.ID + s.status.Image = imageRef + s.mu.Unlock() + return nil +} + +// startAndConfirm starts the container and waits for it to report healthy. +func (s *Supervisor) startAndConfirm(ctx context.Context) error { + s.setState(StateStarting, "starting runtime") + if err := s.docker.StartContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName); err != nil && !dockerapi.IsConflict(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("starting %s: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, err) + } + return s.awaitHealthy(ctx) +} + +// awaitHealthy polls until the runtime is healthy or StartTimeout elapses. +// +// Polling, not events: a container that never becomes healthy emits no event +// to wait for, so a timeout is the only way to notice. The poll is on the +// sidecar's own clock and touches nothing in the scan path. +func (s *Supervisor) awaitHealthy(ctx context.Context) error { + deadline := time.Now().Add(s.cfg.StartTimeout) + const pollInterval = 2 * time.Second + + for { + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return ctx.Err() + } + inspect, err := s.docker.InspectContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName) + if err != nil { + if dockerapi.IsNotFound(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("container %s vanished while starting", s.cfg.ContainerName) + } + return fmt.Errorf("inspecting %s while starting: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, err) + } + + if !inspect.State.Running { + // Exited during start-up. The die event drives crash accounting; + // reporting the exit code here is what makes the failure legible. + return fmt.Errorf("container %s exited during start-up with code %d", + s.cfg.ContainerName, inspect.State.ExitCode) + } + + switch inspect.HealthStatus() { + case "healthy": + s.markHealthy("docker healthcheck") + return nil + case "unhealthy": + return fmt.Errorf("container %s reported unhealthy during start-up", + s.cfg.ContainerName) + case "": + // No healthcheck in this image: fall back to our own probe. + if err := s.health.Probe(ctx); err == nil { + s.markHealthy("api probe") + return nil + } + } + + if time.Now().After(deadline) { + return fmt.Errorf("container %s did not become healthy within %s", + s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StartTimeout) + } + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(pollInterval): + } + } +} + +// confirmByProbe validates an already-running container that declares no +// healthcheck. +func (s *Supervisor) confirmByProbe(ctx context.Context) error { + if err := s.health.Probe(ctx); err != nil { + s.setState(StateStarting, "runtime running but not yet answering") + return s.awaitHealthy(ctx) + } + s.markHealthy("api probe") + return nil +} + +// markHealthy records steady state and clears the restart backoff. +// +// It deliberately does NOT clear the crash window. A crash-loop is a runtime +// that dies, comes back up fine, and dies again -- which is the common shape, +// because a program that faults on load lets the webserver start before it +// takes the process down. Resetting the count on every healthy start would +// zero the evidence between each crash, so the loop could never reach the +// threshold and the supervisor would restart forever instead of handing the +// device to an operator. The window forgets by aging entries out, which is all +// the forgetting that is wanted: crashes weeks apart never accumulate. +func (s *Supervisor) markHealthy(source string) { + s.mu.Lock() + s.consecutiveFailures = 0 + s.status.HealthSource = source + s.mu.Unlock() + s.setState(StateHealthy, "") +} + +// enterRecovery stops the runtime and switches to recovery mode. +// +// Stopping first is what makes UDP discovery exclusive: only one service on +// the host may answer the broadcast, and recovery is defined as "the runtime +// is not running", so the responder can be switched on without ever racing +// the runtime's own. +func (s *Supervisor) enterRecovery(ctx context.Context, reason string) { + s.markExpectedStop() + if err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace); err != nil { + // Log and continue: recovery must be reachable even if the stop + // failed, and a container we could not stop is all the more reason to + // let an operator in. + s.log.Error("stopping runtime for recovery failed", "error", err) + s.consumeExpectedStop() + } + s.setState(StateRecovery, reason) +} + +// EnterRecovery is the exported entry point for other packages (the update +// executor) to hand control to an operator after a failure. +func (s *Supervisor) EnterRecovery(ctx context.Context, reason string) { + s.enterRecovery(ctx, reason) +} + +// BeginUpdate claims the supervisor for a version change, suppressing crash +// accounting for the stop that is about to happen. It returns an error when an +// update is already running: two concurrent swaps of the same container is not +// a situation worth trying to make safe. +func (s *Supervisor) BeginUpdate() error { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if s.status.State == StateUpdating { + return errors.New("an update is already in progress") + } + s.status.State = StateUpdating + s.status.Reason = "version change in progress" + s.status.Since = time.Now() + s.expectStop++ + return nil +} + +// EndUpdate releases the claim taken by BeginUpdate without asserting an +// outcome; the caller decides whether to reconcile or enter recovery. +func (s *Supervisor) EndUpdate() { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.expectStop > 0 { + s.expectStop-- + } + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// markExpectedStop suppresses crash accounting for one upcoming exit. +func (s *Supervisor) markExpectedStop() { + s.mu.Lock() + s.expectStop++ + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// consumeExpectedStop reports whether the exit we just saw was one we asked +// for, decrementing the suppression if so. +func (s *Supervisor) consumeExpectedStop() bool { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + if s.expectStop > 0 { + s.expectStop-- + return true + } + return false +} + +// Stop takes the runtime down deliberately, without it counting as a crash. +func (s *Supervisor) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { + s.markExpectedStop() + if err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace); err != nil { + s.consumeExpectedStop() + return err + } + return nil +} + +// ContainerName is what this supervisor manages. +func (s *Supervisor) ContainerName() string { return s.cfg.ContainerName } diff --git a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go b/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1c34b889 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +package supervisor + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net/http" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/dockerapi" +) + +// --- fakes --------------------------------------------------------------- + +// fakeDocker is a scriptable stand-in for the Docker daemon. Container state +// is a small struct rather than a full inspect so a test can say "running and +// healthy" in one line. +type fakeDocker struct { + mu sync.Mutex + + exists bool + running bool + health string // "", "starting", "healthy", "unhealthy" + exit int + + created int + started int + stopped int + removed int + startErr error + + // startMakesHealthy models the normal case: starting the container brings + // the webserver up. + startMakesHealthy bool +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) Ping(context.Context) error { return nil } + +func (f *fakeDocker) InspectContainer(_ context.Context, _ string) (*dockerapi.ContainerInspect, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + if !f.exists { + return nil, &dockerapi.APIError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Path: "/containers/x/json"} + } + inspect := &dockerapi.ContainerInspect{ID: "deadbeef"} + inspect.State.Running = f.running + inspect.State.ExitCode = f.exit + if f.health != "" { + inspect.State.Health = &struct { + Status string `json:"Status"` + }{Status: f.health} + } + return inspect, nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) CreateContainer(_ context.Context, _ string, _ any) (*dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.created++ + f.exists = true + f.running = false + return &dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse{ID: "deadbeef"}, nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) StartContainer(context.Context, string) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.started++ + if f.startErr != nil { + return f.startErr + } + f.running = true + if f.startMakesHealthy { + f.health = "healthy" + } + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) StopContainer(context.Context, string, time.Duration) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.stopped++ + f.running = false + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) RemoveContainer(context.Context, string, bool) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.removed++ + f.exists = false + f.running = false + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) StreamEvents(ctx context.Context, _ string, _ func(dockerapi.Event)) error { + <-ctx.Done() + return ctx.Err() +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) counts() (created, started, stopped int) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return f.created, f.started, f.stopped +} + +type fakeSpec struct{} + +func (fakeSpec) ContainerSpec(string) any { return map[string]string{"Image": "test:1"} } +func (fakeSpec) ImageRef() string { return "test:1" } + +type fakeProbe struct { + mu sync.Mutex + err error +} + +func (p *fakeProbe) Probe(context.Context) error { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + return p.err +} + +func (p *fakeProbe) set(err error) { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + p.err = err +} + +func quietLogger() *slog.Logger { + return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)) +} + +// newTestSupervisor wires a supervisor with fast timings so tests do not sleep +// through real start-up windows. +func newTestSupervisor(docker DockerClient, probe HealthProber) *Supervisor { + return New(docker, fakeSpec{}, probe, Config{ + ContainerName: "test-runtime", + StartTimeout: 200 * time.Millisecond, + StopGrace: time.Second, + RestartDelayBase: time.Millisecond, + }, quietLogger()) +} + +func dieEvent(code string) dockerapi.Event { + event := dockerapi.Event{Type: "container", Action: "die"} + event.Actor.Attributes = map[string]string{"name": "test-runtime", "exitCode": code} + return event +} + +// --- reconcile ----------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestReconcileCreatesAndStartsAMissingContainer(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{startMakesHealthy: true} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + created, started, _ := docker.counts() + if created != 1 || started != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want 1 create and 1 start, got create=%d start=%d", created, started) + } + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateHealthy { + t.Fatalf("want %q, got %q", StateHealthy, got) + } +} + +func TestReconcileAdoptsAHealthyRunningContainer(t *testing.T) { + // The sidecar restarts far more often than the runtime does -- its own + // crash, a self-update. A reconcile that recreated or bounced a working + // runtime would turn a sidecar hiccup into a plant outage. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + created, started, stopped := docker.counts() + if created != 0 || started != 0 || stopped != 0 { + t.Fatalf("adoption must not touch the container, got create=%d start=%d stop=%d", + created, started, stopped) + } + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateHealthy { + t.Fatalf("want %q, got %q", StateHealthy, got) + } +} + +func TestReconcileStartsAnExistingStoppedContainer(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: false, startMakesHealthy: true} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + created, started, _ := docker.counts() + if created != 0 { + t.Fatalf("an existing container must be reused, not recreated (created=%d)", created) + } + if started != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want 1 start, got %d", started) + } +} + +func TestReconcileFallsBackToTheProbeWhenTheImageHasNoHealthcheck(t *testing.T) { + // Images built before the HEALTHCHECK landed report no health status. They + // must still be supervised rather than assumed fine. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: ""} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + status := sup.Status() + if status.State != StateHealthy { + t.Fatalf("want %q, got %q", StateHealthy, status.State) + } + if status.HealthSource != "api probe" { + t.Fatalf("want health from the api probe, got %q", status.HealthSource) + } +} + +// --- crash accounting ---------------------------------------------------- + +func TestAnExpectedStopIsNotCountedAsACrash(t *testing.T) { + // This is the bug that would make the first successful update look like a + // crash-loop: the runtime exits because we asked it to, and if that counts, + // a perfectly healthy device drops into recovery. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + ctx := context.Background() + + if err := sup.Stop(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("stop: %v", err) + } + sup.handleEvent(ctx, dieEvent("143")) // SIGTERM + + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a stop we asked for must not count as a crash, got %d", got) + } + if got := sup.Status().State; got == StateRecovery { + t.Fatal("an expected stop must never enter recovery") + } +} + +func TestRepeatedUnexpectedExitsEnterRecovery(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + sup := New(docker, fakeSpec{}, &fakeProbe{}, Config{ + ContainerName: "test-runtime", + MaxCrashes: 3, + CrashWindow: 5 * time.Minute, + StartTimeout: 50 * time.Millisecond, + StopGrace: time.Second, + RestartDelayBase: time.Millisecond, + }, quietLogger()) + ctx := context.Background() + + for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { + sup.handleEvent(ctx, dieEvent("1")) + } + + status := sup.Status() + if status.State != StateRecovery { + t.Fatalf("want %q after 3 crashes, got %q", StateRecovery, status.State) + } + if status.Reason == "" { + t.Fatal("recovery must carry a reason an operator can read") + } +} + +func TestRecoveryStopsTheRuntimeSoDiscoveryStaysExclusive(t *testing.T) { + // Only one service on the host may answer the UDP discovery broadcast. + // Recovery is defined as "the runtime is not running", which is what lets + // the sidecar's responder switch on without ever racing the runtime's. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + sup.EnterRecovery(context.Background(), "test") + + if _, _, stopped := docker.counts(); stopped != 1 { + t.Fatalf("entering recovery must stop the runtime, stop calls=%d", stopped) + } + if docker.running { + t.Fatal("runtime must not be running in recovery") + } +} + +func TestASuccessfulRestartDoesNotEraseTheCrashHistory(t *testing.T) { + // The common crash-loop shape is: die, come back up fine, die again -- a + // program that faults on load lets the webserver start before it takes the + // process down. If a healthy start cleared the count, the evidence would be + // zeroed between every crash, the threshold could never be reached, and the + // supervisor would restart forever instead of handing the device over. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + ctx := context.Background() + + sup.handleEvent(ctx, dieEvent("1")) + + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateHealthy { + t.Fatalf("the runtime came back up, want %q, got %q", StateHealthy, got) + } + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got != 1 { + t.Fatalf("the crash must still be on record after a healthy restart, got %d", got) + } +} + +func TestTheCrashHistoryIsForgottenByAgeNotByRecovery(t *testing.T) { + // Forgetting still has to happen, or crashes weeks apart would accumulate + // into a false loop. The sliding window does it by aging entries out, which + // is the only forgetting that is wanted. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + now := time.Now() + sup.crashes.now = func() time.Time { return now } + + sup.handleEvent(context.Background(), dieEvent("1")) + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want 1 crash on record, got %d", got) + } + + now = now.Add(DefaultCrashWindow + time.Minute) + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a crash older than the window must be forgotten, got %d", got) + } +} + +func TestAnUnhealthyEventStopsTheWedgedRuntime(t *testing.T) { + // A hung webserver never emits a die event, so without acting on the + // healthcheck the supervisor would idle forever beside a dead runtime. + // Stopping it converts the hang into a die, which then flows through the + // ordinary crash accounting. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + event := dockerapi.Event{Type: "container", Action: "health_status: unhealthy"} + event.Actor.Attributes = map[string]string{"name": "test-runtime"} + sup.handleEvent(context.Background(), event) + + if _, _, stopped := docker.counts(); stopped != 1 { + t.Fatalf("an unhealthy runtime must be stopped, stop calls=%d", stopped) + } +} + +func TestEventsForOtherContainersAreIgnored(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + event := dockerapi.Event{Type: "container", Action: "die"} + event.Actor.Attributes = map[string]string{"name": "somebody-elses-plc", "exitCode": "1"} + sup.handleEvent(context.Background(), event) + + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got != 0 { + t.Fatalf("another container's death is not ours to count, got %d", got) + } +} + +// --- update claim -------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestBeginUpdateRefusesASecondConcurrentUpdate(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.BeginUpdate(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first BeginUpdate: %v", err) + } + if err := sup.BeginUpdate(); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a second concurrent update must be refused") + } +} + +func TestExitsDuringAnUpdateAreNotCrashes(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.BeginUpdate(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("BeginUpdate: %v", err) + } + sup.handleEvent(context.Background(), dieEvent("143")) + + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got != 0 { + t.Fatalf("an exit during an update is expected, got crashCount=%d", got) + } +} + +// --- crash window ------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestCrashWindowForgetsEntriesThatAgedOut(t *testing.T) { + now := time.Now() + window := newCrashWindow(3, 5*time.Minute) + window.now = func() time.Time { return now } + + if looping := window.record(); looping { + t.Fatal("one crash is not a loop") + } + if looping := window.record(); looping { + t.Fatal("two crashes is not a loop") + } + + // Six minutes later both have aged out, so the next crash starts over. + now = now.Add(6 * time.Minute) + if looping := window.record(); looping { + t.Fatal("crashes outside the window must not count") + } + if got := window.count(); got != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want 1 crash in window, got %d", got) + } +} + +func TestCrashWindowTripsAtTheThreshold(t *testing.T) { + window := newCrashWindow(3, 5*time.Minute) + if window.record() || window.record() { + t.Fatal("must not trip before the threshold") + } + if !window.record() { + t.Fatal("must trip on the third crash inside the window") + } +} + +func TestRestartDelayBacksOffAndIsCapped(t *testing.T) { + base := DefaultRestartDelay + if got := restartDelay(base, 0); got != 0 { + t.Fatalf("no failures means no delay, got %s", got) + } + if got := restartDelay(base, 1); got != base { + t.Fatalf("want %s, got %s", base, got) + } + if restartDelay(base, 2) <= restartDelay(base, 1) { + t.Fatal("delay must grow with consecutive failures") + } + if got := restartDelay(base, 50); got != MaxRestartDelay { + t.Fatalf("delay must be capped at %s, got %s", MaxRestartDelay, got) + } +} + +// --- start-up failures --------------------------------------------------- + +func TestStartTimeoutIsReportedRatherThanHanging(t *testing.T) { + // A container that never becomes healthy emits no event to wait for, so a + // timeout is the only way to notice. + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: false, health: "starting"} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{err: errors.New("connection refused")}) + + err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("a runtime that never becomes healthy must surface an error") + } +} + +func TestRunEntersRecoveryWhenTheRuntimeCannotStart(t *testing.T) { + // Recovery must be reachable precisely when the runtime will not come up: + // that is the case RTOP-283 exists for. + docker := &fakeDocker{startErr: errors.New("no such image")} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{err: errors.New("down")}) + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 400*time.Millisecond) + defer cancel() + _ = sup.Run(ctx) + + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateRecovery { + t.Fatalf("want %q when the runtime cannot start, got %q", StateRecovery, got) + } +} diff --git a/sidecar/main.go b/sidecar/main.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b68e5d1c --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +// Command openplc-sidecar is the bootloader and update manager for one local +// OpenPLC runtime container (RTOP-283). +// +// It is always resident and, in steady state, does nothing: after confirming +// the runtime came up it blocks on the Docker events stream with no timers, no +// polling and no listening socket beyond its own control API. It exists so a +// device whose runtime will not start is still reachable from the editor, which +// is the whole point -- many vendors do not allow SSH. +// +// Docker is the only dependency. The sidecar itself is started by Docker's own +// restart policy, so nothing of ours goes into systemd. +package main + +import ( + "context" + "flag" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "os/signal" + "path/filepath" + "syscall" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/health" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/runtimespec" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/supervisor" +) + +// version is stamped at build time via -ldflags. The sidecar has its own +// version line, independent of the runtime's: it changes rarely, and coupling +// it to every runtime release would produce a long series of identical images. +var version = "dev" + +// DefaultStateDir is the sidecar's own volume -- separate from the runtime's +// data directory on purpose. "Erase all data" wipes the runtime's volume, and +// the board's device mounts must survive that; a board that came back with no +// SPI after a data wipe would be a miserable failure mode. +const DefaultStateDir = "/var/lib/openplc-sidecar" + +func main() { + var ( + stateDir = flag.String("state-dir", DefaultStateDir, "sidecar state directory") + socket = flag.String("docker-socket", dockerapi.DefaultSocket, "docker socket path") + probeURL = flag.String("probe-url", health.DefaultURL, "runtime health probe URL") + showVer = flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit") + logLevel = flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level: debug, info, warn, error") + maxCrashes = flag.Int("max-crashes", supervisor.DefaultMaxCrashes, + "unexpected runtime exits within the window before entering recovery") + crashWindow = flag.Duration("crash-window", supervisor.DefaultCrashWindow, + "sliding window for crash-loop detection") + ) + flag.Parse() + + if *showVer { + fmt.Println(version) + return + } + + log := newLogger(*logLevel) + log.Info("openplc-sidecar starting", "version", version, "stateDir", *stateDir) + + if err := run(log, *stateDir, *socket, *probeURL, *maxCrashes, *crashWindow); err != nil { + log.Error("sidecar exiting", "error", err) + os.Exit(1) + } +} + +func run( + log *slog.Logger, + stateDir, socket, probeURL string, + maxCrashes int, + crashWindow time.Duration, +) error { + if err := os.MkdirAll(stateDir, 0o750); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating state dir %s: %w", stateDir, err) + } + + specPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, "runtime-spec.json") + spec, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) + if err != nil { + // Without a spec the sidecar does not know which image to run or which + // board mounts this device needs. Guessing would risk starting a + // runtime with no access to its own hardware, so this is fatal and + // install.sh is responsible for writing the file. + return fmt.Errorf("%w (install.sh writes this file)", err) + } + log.Info("loaded runtime spec", + "image", spec.ImageRef(), "dataDir", spec.DataDir, "extraBinds", len(spec.ExtraBinds)) + + docker := dockerapi.New(socket) + prober := health.New(probeURL, 5*time.Second) + + sup := supervisor.New(docker, spec, prober, supervisor.Config{ + MaxCrashes: maxCrashes, + CrashWindow: crashWindow, + }, log.With("component", "supervisor")) + + // Signals: a container stop must not be read as a reason to tear the + // runtime down. The sidecar going away leaves the runtime running, which + // is correct -- losing the manager should never stop the plant. + ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) + defer stop() + + if err := sup.Run(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { + return err + } + log.Info("sidecar stopped; runtime container left running") + return nil +} + +func newLogger(level string) *slog.Logger { + var lvl slog.Level + switch level { + case "debug": + lvl = slog.LevelDebug + case "warn": + lvl = slog.LevelWarn + case "error": + lvl = slog.LevelError + default: + lvl = slog.LevelInfo + } + // Text, not JSON: the primary reader is a person running `docker logs` + // against a device that is misbehaving. + return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: lvl})) +} From cd72d0bc18b2301cb0d7f5303577b34952f316f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 15:58:02 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 03/22] feat(sidecar): authenticate against the runtime's own credentials The sidecar must be able to authenticate a caller while the runtime is DOWN -- cold recovery after a reboot is exactly when there is no runtime to ask -- so it reads the runtime's .env and restapi.db directly, mounted read-only. No second user database: one set of accounts on the device, nothing to keep in sync or forget to revoke. It can read accounts and never write them, so first-user bootstrap stays in the runtime alone. That means reimplementing two formats Python owns, which is the same hazard as the ctypes mirror in shared/plugin_runtime_args.py -- silent drift whose symptom is every login failing on a device nobody can log into to diagnose. Both sides now pin one shared vector, generated by werkzeug and flask_jwt_extended themselves: the Go tests verify it, and test_sidecar_auth_vector.py asserts those libraries still produce and accept the identical bytes, so an upgrade breaks a test on the side that changed. modernc.org/sqlite is the sidecar's first dependency and the reason the "no third-party dependencies" note in go.mod is now qualified rather than absolute; reading the users table is what cold recovery needs, and a second credential store would have been the worse trade. Pure Go, so CGO stays off and the image stays on scratch. That pulled the toolchain to Go 1.25, which also let the hand-rolled PBKDF2 go in favour of stdlib crypto/pbkdf2. The JWT code never reads "alg" from the header -- HS256 is a constant, so a token asking for "none" simply fails the HMAC. Unknown user and wrong password return the same error and spend comparable time, since answering differently for the two enumerates valid accounts. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- sidecar/Dockerfile | 2 +- sidecar/go.mod | 34 +- sidecar/go.sum | 50 ++ sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go | 119 +++++ .../internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go | 436 ++++++++++++++++++ sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go | 77 ++++ sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go | 187 ++++++++ sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go | 172 +++++++ .../restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py | 109 +++++ 9 files changed, 1180 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 sidecar/go.sum create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go create mode 100644 sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go create mode 100644 tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py diff --git a/sidecar/Dockerfile b/sidecar/Dockerfile index 49befaa8..58593824 100644 --- a/sidecar/Dockerfile +++ b/sidecar/Dockerfile @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # will not start, and every byte in the image is a byte that could stop it # starting. There is no shell to debug with, which is the intended trade -- the # sidecar's job is to report over HTTP, not to be poked at over exec. -FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.23-alpine AS build +FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.25-alpine AS build ARG TARGETOS ARG TARGETARCH diff --git a/sidecar/go.mod b/sidecar/go.mod index c1d5d597..fd521466 100644 --- a/sidecar/go.mod +++ b/sidecar/go.mod @@ -1,7 +1,31 @@ -// The sidecar deliberately has no third-party dependencies. It is the -// component that recovers a device when the runtime will not start, so every -// dependency is a way for that recovery to fail. The Docker Engine API is -// plain HTTP over a unix socket, which net/http speaks natively. +// The sidecar keeps its dependencies to the minimum the job actually needs. +// It is the component that recovers a device when the runtime will not start, +// so every dependency is a way for that recovery to fail: the Docker Engine +// API is plain HTTP over a unix socket, JWT is an HMAC over two base64 +// segments, and PBKDF2 is twenty lines of RFC 8018 -- all of which net/http +// and crypto/* already cover -- PBKDF2 is crypto/pbkdf2 as of Go 1.24. +// +// The one exception is modernc.org/sqlite. Authenticating a caller while the +// runtime is DOWN means reading the runtime's own users table, and cold +// recovery after a reboot is exactly when there is no runtime to ask. A +// second credential store in the sidecar would have avoided the dependency at +// the cost of another thing that can be forgotten when an account is revoked, +// which is the worse trade. Pure Go, so it still cross-compiles with CGO off +// and still runs on scratch. module github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar -go 1.23 +go 1.25.0 + +require modernc.org/sqlite v1.58.0 + +require ( + github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect + github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect + github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.24 // indirect + github.com/ncruces/go-strftime v1.0.0 // indirect + github.com/remyoudompheng/bigfft v0.0.0-20230129092748-24d4a6f8daec // indirect + golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 // indirect + modernc.org/libc v1.75.6 // indirect + modernc.org/mathutil v1.7.1 // indirect + modernc.org/memory v1.12.1 // indirect +) diff --git a/sidecar/go.sum b/sidecar/go.sum new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7ad7cda6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/go.sum @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY= +github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto= +github.com/google/pprof 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h1:UGzOrNV1mAFSEB63lOFHIpNRUVMvYTc6yu1SMY/XTDM= diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f7ca592 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "crypto/pbkdf2" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/hex" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + "strconv" + "strings" +) + +// Werkzeug's generate_password_hash writes +// +// pbkdf2:sha256:$$ +// +// with the salt used as raw bytes of the ASCII string, not decoded. The runtime +// pins iterations at 600000 (User.derivation_method) but the count is read from +// the stored hash rather than assumed, so a future change on the Python side +// keeps verifying instead of silently rejecting every password. +const ( + pbkdf2Prefix = "pbkdf2:" + // maxIterations bounds work from a malformed or hostile hash: 600k is the + // real value, and anything past this would be a denial of service against + // the recovery component rather than a legitimate cost. + maxIterations = 5_000_000 +) + +// ErrUnsupportedHash means the stored hash is not one this code can check. It +// is reported rather than treated as a mismatch so an operator sees "this +// runtime hashes differently" instead of "wrong password". +var ErrUnsupportedHash = errors.New("unsupported password hash format") + +// VerifyPassword checks password against a Werkzeug PBKDF2 hash. +// +// The pepper is appended before hashing, exactly as User.set_password does +// (“password = password + PEPPER“). Getting the order wrong would fail every +// login while looking entirely reasonable, which is why the shared test vector +// exists. +func VerifyPassword(storedHash, password, pepper string) (bool, error) { + if !strings.HasPrefix(storedHash, pbkdf2Prefix) { + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrUnsupportedHash, firstField(storedHash)) + } + method, salt, digest, err := splitHash(storedHash) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + algorithm, iterations, err := parseMethod(method) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + + want, err := hex.DecodeString(digest) + if err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: digest is not hex", ErrUnsupportedHash) + } + + // crypto/pbkdf2 (Go 1.24+). The salt is the raw bytes of the ASCII string + // Werkzeug stored, not a decoded value -- decoding it would silently + // derive a different key and fail every login. + got, err := pbkdf2.Key(algorithm, password+pepper, []byte(salt), iterations, len(want)) + if err != nil { + return false, fmt.Errorf("deriving key: %w", err) + } + // Constant time so a wrong password cannot be distinguished by how long + // the comparison took. + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1, nil +} + +// splitHash breaks "method$salt$digest" apart. SplitN with 3 so a salt or +// digest containing '$' cannot shift the fields. +func splitHash(storedHash string) (method, salt, digest string, err error) { + parts := strings.SplitN(storedHash, "$", 3) + if len(parts) != 3 { + return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("%w: expected method$salt$digest", ErrUnsupportedHash) + } + return parts[0], parts[1], parts[2], nil +} + +// parseMethod reads "pbkdf2:sha256:600000", tolerating the older +// "pbkdf2:sha256" form that Werkzeug wrote with an implicit iteration count. +func parseMethod(method string) (func() hash.Hash, int, error) { + fields := strings.Split(method, ":") + if len(fields) < 2 || fields[0] != "pbkdf2" { + return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrUnsupportedHash, method) + } + if fields[1] != "sha256" { + // Only sha256 is in use. Naming the digest we found makes a future + // migration obvious from the log rather than a mystery. + return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: pbkdf2 with %s", ErrUnsupportedHash, fields[1]) + } + + iterations := 260000 // Werkzeug's historical default when unstated + if len(fields) >= 3 { + parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(fields[2]) + if err != nil || parsed <= 0 { + return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: iteration count %q", ErrUnsupportedHash, fields[2]) + } + iterations = parsed + } + if iterations > maxIterations { + return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %d iterations exceeds the cap", ErrUnsupportedHash, iterations) + } + return sha256.New, iterations, nil +} + +// firstField is the leading colon-separated token, for error messages that +// name the offending scheme without echoing an entire hash into a log. +func firstField(s string) string { + if idx := strings.IndexAny(s, ":$"); idx >= 0 { + return s[:idx] + } + if len(s) > 16 { + return s[:16] + } + return s +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f413ffb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,436 @@ +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" +) + +// Shared test vector, generated by the runtime's OWN libraries (werkzeug +// generate_password_hash and flask_jwt_extended create_access_token) and +// pinned here verbatim. +// +// The Go side of the sidecar reimplements two formats the Python side owns. +// That is the same hazard as the ctypes mirror in shared/plugin_runtime_args.py: +// the two can drift apart silently, and the symptom is every login failing on a +// device nobody can log into to diagnose. The identical values are asserted +// from Python in tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py, so a +// werkzeug or PyJWT upgrade that changes either format breaks a test on the +// side that changed rather than a device in the field. +const ( + vectorPepper = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + vectorPassword = "correct horse battery staple" + vectorHash = "pbkdf2:sha256:600000$WCXqtZujfdFXqzAB$" + + "4be2d44037a7d62f2483d1a189bd2dacb66871b323871f185a73a8e2d3230611" + + vectorSecret = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb" + // Minted for user id 7. Its exp is a fixed timestamp, so tests assert the + // signature and the decoded claims directly rather than routing it through + // VerifyToken -- otherwise the result would depend on how long ago the + // vector happened to be generated. + vectorToken = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9." + + "eyJmcmVzaCI6ZmFsc2UsImlhdCI6MTc4ODQ2NTIwMCwianRpIjoiNWYwNjVlOTctM2M2NC00" + + "ZGU0LWFlYmYtMDMyZjdjNDM5M2M3IiwidHlwZSI6ImFjY2VzcyIsInN1YiI6IjciLCJuYmYi" + + "OjE3ODg0NjUyMDAsImNzcmYiOiJjMThiMDFiMy05NmVjLTQwZDQtYjJmZS1jNjVhYTNiZjUx" + + "NTciLCJleHAiOjE3ODg0NjYxMDB9." + + "xM9AVtdXVFd5mU6gWm842aHwVQpYybL4A3EMyEWSLjc" +) + +// --- passwords ----------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestVerifiesAHashWerkzeugProduced(t *testing.T) { + ok, err := VerifyPassword(vectorHash, vectorPassword, vectorPepper) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("verifying the shared vector: %v", err) + } + if !ok { + t.Fatal("the shared vector must verify; Go and Python have drifted apart") + } +} + +func TestTheWrongPasswordIsRejected(t *testing.T) { + ok, err := VerifyPassword(vectorHash, "not the password", vectorPepper) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err) + } + if ok { + t.Fatal("a wrong password must not verify") + } +} + +func TestThePepperIsRequired(t *testing.T) { + // User.set_password appends the pepper before hashing. Dropping it, or + // prepending instead of appending, fails every login while looking + // perfectly reasonable in review -- hence an explicit test. + ok, _ := VerifyPassword(vectorHash, vectorPassword, "") + if ok { + t.Fatal("verification must fail without the pepper") + } + ok, _ = VerifyPassword(vectorHash, vectorPepper+vectorPassword, "") + if ok { + t.Fatal("the pepper is appended, not prepended") + } +} + +func TestAnUnknownHashSchemeIsReportedNotTreatedAsAMismatch(t *testing.T) { + // An operator needs to see "this runtime hashes differently", not + // "wrong password", or they will chase the wrong problem. + _, err := VerifyPassword("scrypt:32768:8:1$salt$abcd", "x", "") + if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsupportedHash) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrUnsupportedHash, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestAnAbsurdIterationCountIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + // A hostile or corrupt hash must not be able to spend unbounded CPU in the + // component that exists to recover the device. + _, err := VerifyPassword("pbkdf2:sha256:999999999$salt$abcd", "x", "") + if !errors.Is(err, ErrUnsupportedHash) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrUnsupportedHash for a huge iteration count, got %v", err) + } +} + +// --- tokens -------------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestARealFlaskTokenSignatureVerifies(t *testing.T) { + // The cross-language check: our HMAC over the signing input must equal the + // signature PyJWT produced, which proves the base64url variant and the + // "header.payload" framing agree. Asserted directly rather than through + // VerifyToken because the vector's exp is a fixed timestamp -- routing it + // through the time checks would make this test pass or fail depending on + // how long ago the vector was generated. + parts := strings.Split(vectorToken, ".") + if len(parts) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("vector token is malformed: %d segments", len(parts)) + } + if got := sign(vectorSecret, parts[0]+"."+parts[1]); got != parts[2] { + t.Fatalf("signature mismatch with PyJWT:\n want %s\n got %s", parts[2], got) + } +} + +func TestARealFlaskTokenDecodesToTheExpectedIdentity(t *testing.T) { + // sub is str(user.id), per the runtime's user_identity_lookup. A username + // here would yield a token the runtime accepts structurally and then fails + // to resolve to a user. + parts := strings.Split(vectorToken, ".") + raw, err := decodeSegment(parts[1]) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("decoding vector payload: %v", err) + } + var claims Claims + if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &claims); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unmarshalling vector claims: %v", err) + } + if claims.Subject != "7" { + t.Fatalf("want subject 7, got %q", claims.Subject) + } + if claims.Type != TokenType { + t.Fatalf("want type %q, got %q", TokenType, claims.Type) + } +} + +// signedToken hand-builds a correctly signed token with the given claims, so +// a test can exercise a claim state IssueToken will not produce (it clamps a +// non-positive TTL to the default, on purpose). +func signedToken(t *testing.T, secret string, claims Claims) string { + t.Helper() + header, err := json.Marshal(jwtHeader{Alg: "HS256", Typ: "JWT"}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("encoding header: %v", err) + } + payload, err := json.Marshal(claims) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("encoding claims: %v", err) + } + input := encodeSegment(header) + "." + encodeSegment(payload) + return input + "." + sign(secret, input) +} + +func TestAnExpiredTokenIsReportedAsExpiredNotInvalid(t *testing.T) { + // The distinction is what lets the API tell a caller that logging in again + // will help, instead of leaving them to guess. + past := time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Unix() + expired := signedToken(t, vectorSecret, Claims{ + Subject: "7", Type: TokenType, + IssuedAt: past, NotBefore: past, Expires: past + 60, JTI: "test", + }) + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, expired); !errors.Is(err, ErrTokenExpired) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrTokenExpired, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestATokenFromTheFutureIsRejected(t *testing.T) { + future := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour).Unix() + notYet := signedToken(t, vectorSecret, Claims{ + Subject: "7", Type: TokenType, + IssuedAt: future, NotBefore: future, Expires: future + 3600, JTI: "test", + }) + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, notYet); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrInvalidToken for a not-yet-valid token, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestATamperedTokenIsRejected(t *testing.T) { + tampered := vectorToken[:len(vectorToken)-4] + "AAAA" + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, tampered); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrInvalidToken for a tampered signature, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestTheWrongSecretIsRejected(t *testing.T) { + if _, err := VerifyToken(strings.Repeat("c", 64), vectorToken); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrInvalidToken for the wrong secret, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestAlgNoneIsNotHonoured(t *testing.T) { + // The classic JWT vulnerability. The algorithm is never read from the + // header here, so a token asking for "none" simply fails the HMAC check. + // eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 = {"alg":"none"} + forged := "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwidHlwZSI6ImFjY2VzcyJ9." + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, forged); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { + t.Fatalf("alg=none must be refused, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestIssuedTokensRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { + token, err := IssueToken(vectorSecret, "42", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing: %v", err) + } + claims, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, token) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("verifying our own token: %v", err) + } + if claims.Subject != "42" { + t.Fatalf("want subject 42, got %q", claims.Subject) + } + if claims.Type != TokenType { + t.Fatalf("want type %q, got %q", TokenType, claims.Type) + } +} + +func TestAnIssuedTokenCarriesTheClaimsTheRuntimeChecks(t *testing.T) { + // The runtime must accept a token the sidecar minted during recovery, so + // the claim set has to match what flask_jwt_extended requires. + token, err := IssueToken(vectorSecret, "7", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing: %v", err) + } + claims, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, token) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("verifying: %v", err) + } + if claims.JTI == "" || claims.IssuedAt == 0 || claims.Expires == 0 || claims.NotBefore == 0 { + t.Fatalf("missing a required claim: %+v", claims) + } +} + +func TestARefreshTokenIsNotAcceptedAsAnAccessToken(t *testing.T) { + // Hand-build a token whose type is wrong but whose signature is valid. + token, err := IssueToken(vectorSecret, "1", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing: %v", err) + } + // Flip the type claim and re-sign so only the type is at fault. + parts := strings.Split(token, ".") + payload, err := decodeSegment(parts[1]) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("decoding payload: %v", err) + } + swapped := strings.Replace(string(payload), `"type":"access"`, `"type":"refresh"`, 1) + if swapped == string(payload) { + t.Fatal("test could not find the type claim to swap") + } + rebuilt := parts[0] + "." + encodeSegment([]byte(swapped)) + forged := rebuilt + "." + sign(vectorSecret, rebuilt) + + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, forged); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { + t.Fatalf("a refresh token must not authenticate, got %v", err) + } +} + +// --- secrets ------------------------------------------------------------- + +func writeEnv(t *testing.T, body string) string { + t.Helper() + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".env") + if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("writing env: %v", err) + } + return path +} + +func TestLoadsTheRuntimeSecrets(t *testing.T) { + path := writeEnv(t, "FLASK_ENV=development\n"+ + "SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI=sqlite:////var/lib/openplc-runtime/restapi.db\n"+ + "JWT_SECRET_KEY="+vectorSecret+"\nPEPPER="+vectorPepper+"\n") + secrets, err := LoadSecrets(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("loading: %v", err) + } + if secrets.JWTSecret != vectorSecret || secrets.Pepper != vectorPepper { + t.Fatal("secrets did not round-trip") + } +} + +func TestAMissingSecretIsFatalRatherThanEmpty(t *testing.T) { + // An empty signing key would accept tokens signed with an empty key -- + // strictly worse than refusing to start. + path := writeEnv(t, "PEPPER="+vectorPepper+"\n") + if _, err := LoadSecrets(path); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a .env with no JWT_SECRET_KEY must be refused") + } +} + +// --- user store ---------------------------------------------------------- + +// seedDB builds a database shaped like the runtime's and returns its path. +func seedDB(t *testing.T, withTable bool, rows ...[4]string) string { + t.Helper() + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "restapi.db") + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("creating db: %v", err) + } + defer db.Close() + + if withTable { + if _, err := db.Exec(`CREATE TABLE users ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, + username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, + password_hash TEXT NOT NULL, + role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'admin')`); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("creating table: %v", err) + } + for _, row := range rows { + if _, err := db.Exec( + "INSERT INTO users (id, username, password_hash, role) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)", + row[0], row[1], row[2], row[3]); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("seeding user: %v", err) + } + } + } else { + // A runtime that never started leaves a file with no schema. + if _, err := db.Exec("CREATE TABLE placeholder (x INTEGER)"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("creating placeholder: %v", err) + } + } + return path +} + +func TestAuthenticatesAgainstTheRuntimeDatabase(t *testing.T) { + path := seedDB(t, true, [4]string{"7", "operator", vectorHash, "admin"}) + store, err := OpenUserStore(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("opening store: %v", err) + } + defer store.Close() + + user, err := store.Authenticate(context.Background(), "operator", vectorPassword, vectorPepper) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("authenticating: %v", err) + } + if user.ID != "7" { + t.Fatalf("want id 7, got %q", user.ID) + } + if user.Role != "admin" { + t.Fatalf("want role admin, got %q", user.Role) + } +} + +func TestAnUnknownUserAndABadPasswordAreIndistinguishable(t *testing.T) { + // Answering differently for the two enumerates valid usernames. + path := seedDB(t, true, [4]string{"1", "operator", vectorHash, "admin"}) + store, err := OpenUserStore(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("opening store: %v", err) + } + defer store.Close() + ctx := context.Background() + + _, unknownErr := store.Authenticate(ctx, "nobody", vectorPassword, vectorPepper) + _, badPassErr := store.Authenticate(ctx, "operator", "wrong", vectorPepper) + + if !errors.Is(unknownErr, ErrNoSuchUser) || !errors.Is(badPassErr, ErrNoSuchUser) { + t.Fatalf("both must report ErrNoSuchUser, got %v and %v", unknownErr, badPassErr) + } +} + +func TestCountUsersDrivesTheBootstrapRefusal(t *testing.T) { + // With no accounts the sidecar accepts nothing: first-user bootstrap + // belongs to the runtime alone. + empty := seedDB(t, true) + store, err := OpenUserStore(empty) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("opening store: %v", err) + } + defer store.Close() + + count, err := store.CountUsers(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("counting: %v", err) + } + if count != 0 { + t.Fatalf("want 0 users, got %d", count) + } +} + +func TestADatabaseWithNoSchemaCountsAsNoUsers(t *testing.T) { + // A runtime that has never started leaves the file present but empty. + // That is the no-users case, not a broken database. + path := seedDB(t, false) + store, err := OpenUserStore(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("opening store: %v", err) + } + defer store.Close() + + count, err := store.CountUsers(context.Background()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("an unschema'd database must not be an error: %v", err) + } + if count != 0 { + t.Fatalf("want 0 users, got %d", count) + } +} + +func TestAMissingRoleColumnValueDefaultsToAdmin(t *testing.T) { + // Databases predating RBAC are migrated in place; until then the column + // can be NULL, and the pre-RBAC runtime treated every account as admin. + path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "restapi.db") + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("creating db: %v", err) + } + if _, err := db.Exec(`CREATE TABLE users ( + id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, username TEXT, password_hash TEXT, role TEXT)`); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("creating table: %v", err) + } + if _, err := db.Exec( + "INSERT INTO users (id, username, password_hash, role) VALUES (3, 'old', ?, NULL)", + vectorHash); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("seeding: %v", err) + } + db.Close() + + store, err := OpenUserStore(path) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("opening store: %v", err) + } + defer store.Close() + + user, err := store.FindUser(context.Background(), "old") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("finding user: %v", err) + } + if user.Role != "admin" { + t.Fatalf("a NULL role must resolve to admin, got %q", user.Role) + } +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a793aee8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// Package runtimeauth authenticates callers against the runtime's own +// credentials. +// +// The sidecar deliberately does not keep a second user database. It reads the +// runtime's “.env“ and “restapi.db“ from the shared data directory -- +// mounted read-only, because it only ever needs to read them -- so there is +// exactly one set of accounts on the device and no second thing to keep in +// sync or forget to revoke. +// +// The formats here mirror the runtime's and must stay byte-compatible with it, +// the same hazard as the ctypes mirror in shared/plugin_runtime_args.py. Both +// sides are pinned by a shared test vector: tests/pytest/restapi generates a +// hash and a token, and the Go tests verify the identical values. +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "bufio" + "fmt" + "os" + "strings" +) + +// Secrets are the two values the runtime generates once, in +// webserver/config.py::generate_env_file, and never rotates: changing either +// invalidates every stored password hash, which is why that function deletes +// the database when it writes a new .env. +type Secrets struct { + // JWTSecret signs and verifies access tokens (HS256). + JWTSecret string + // Pepper is appended to a password before hashing. + Pepper string +} + +// LoadSecrets reads the runtime's .env. +// +// A hand-rolled parser rather than a dotenv library: the file is written by +// generate_env_file with four fixed KEY=VALUE lines and no quoting, expansion +// or multi-line values, so a dependency would buy nothing in the component +// that most wants none. +func LoadSecrets(path string) (*Secrets, error) { + file, err := os.Open(path) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading runtime secrets from %s: %w", path, err) + } + defer file.Close() + + values := map[string]string{} + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(file) + for scanner.Scan() { + line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text()) + if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") { + continue + } + key, value, found := strings.Cut(line, "=") + if !found { + continue + } + values[strings.TrimSpace(key)] = strings.TrimSpace(value) + } + if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading %s: %w", path, err) + } + + secrets := &Secrets{ + JWTSecret: values["JWT_SECRET_KEY"], + Pepper: values["PEPPER"], + } + // Both are required. Proceeding with an empty secret would accept tokens + // signed with an empty key, which is worse than refusing to start. + if secrets.JWTSecret == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s has no JWT_SECRET_KEY", path) + } + if secrets.Pepper == "" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s has no PEPPER", path) + } + return secrets, nil +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..005bfdc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// Tokens are HS256 JWTs interchangeable with the runtime's. +// +// Both sides sign with JWT_SECRET_KEY from the shared .env, so a token minted +// by either is accepted by both. That matters in one direction in particular: +// a token issued during recovery, when the runtime was down, keeps working +// against the runtime once it comes back, so the editor is not forced to log +// in twice around an update. +// +// Only the claims flask_jwt_extended actually checks are produced -- "sub", +// "type", "iat", "nbf", "exp" and "jti". A hand-rolled implementation rather +// than a JWT library because HS256 is an HMAC over two base64url segments, and +// the library-shaped risk here (accepting "alg": "none", or letting the token +// choose its own algorithm) is precisely what an explicit implementation +// avoids: the algorithm below is a constant, never read from the header. +const ( + // TokenType is flask_jwt_extended's discriminator. A refresh token + // presented as an access token must not be accepted. + TokenType = "access" + // DefaultTokenTTL is deliberately longer than the runtime's 15-minute + // default: a version change involves an image pull that can run for many + // minutes on a plant link, and having the caller's token expire midway + // through would strand a device mid-update. + DefaultTokenTTL = 2 * time.Hour + // clockSkew tolerates a small disagreement between the editor's clock and + // the device's, which on an industrial box without NTP is routine. + clockSkew = 60 * time.Second +) + +var ( + // ErrInvalidToken covers every rejection reason. The cause is logged but + // never returned to the caller: telling an unauthenticated client whether + // a token was expired, mis-signed or malformed is free reconnaissance. + ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("invalid token") + // ErrTokenExpired is separated ONLY so the API can answer 401 with a hint + // that re-authenticating will help, which is genuinely useful and reveals + // nothing an attacker could not learn by waiting. + ErrTokenExpired = errors.New("token expired") +) + +// Claims is the payload the sidecar reads and writes. +type Claims struct { + Subject string `json:"sub"` + Type string `json:"type"` + IssuedAt int64 `json:"iat"` + NotBefore int64 `json:"nbf"` + Expires int64 `json:"exp"` + JTI string `json:"jti"` +} + +type jwtHeader struct { + Alg string `json:"alg"` + Typ string `json:"typ"` +} + +// IssueToken mints an access token for the given user id. +// +// The subject is the user's numeric id rendered as a string, matching the +// runtime's user_identity_lookup (“return str(user.id)“). A username here +// would produce a token the runtime accepts structurally but then fails to +// resolve to a user, which is a confusing way to be broken. +func IssueToken(secret, userID string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) { + if secret == "" { + return "", errors.New("cannot issue a token without a signing secret") + } + if ttl <= 0 { + ttl = DefaultTokenTTL + } + jti, err := randomJTI() + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + + now := time.Now().UTC() + claims := Claims{ + Subject: userID, + Type: TokenType, + IssuedAt: now.Unix(), + NotBefore: now.Unix(), + Expires: now.Add(ttl).Unix(), + JTI: jti, + } + + header, err := json.Marshal(jwtHeader{Alg: "HS256", Typ: "JWT"}) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("encoding token header: %w", err) + } + payload, err := json.Marshal(claims) + if err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("encoding token claims: %w", err) + } + + signingInput := encodeSegment(header) + "." + encodeSegment(payload) + return signingInput + "." + sign(secret, signingInput), nil +} + +// VerifyToken checks a token's signature and time claims and returns them. +func VerifyToken(secret, token string) (*Claims, error) { + if secret == "" { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + parts := strings.Split(token, ".") + if len(parts) != 3 { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + signingInput := parts[0] + "." + parts[1] + + // The algorithm is NOT taken from the header. Trusting the header is the + // classic JWT vulnerability: a token claiming "alg": "none" or "HS256" + // against an RSA key gets verified against attacker-chosen rules. Here + // HS256 is the only thing that is ever computed, so a header saying + // otherwise simply fails the comparison below. + expected := sign(secret, signingInput) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(expected), []byte(parts[2])) != 1 { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + + raw, err := decodeSegment(parts[1]) + if err != nil { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + var claims Claims + if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &claims); err != nil { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + + if claims.Type != TokenType { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + if claims.Subject == "" { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + + now := time.Now().UTC() + if claims.Expires > 0 && now.After(time.Unix(claims.Expires, 0).Add(clockSkew)) { + return nil, ErrTokenExpired + } + if claims.NotBefore > 0 && now.Add(clockSkew).Before(time.Unix(claims.NotBefore, 0)) { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } + return &claims, nil +} + +func sign(secret, signingInput string) string { + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret)) + mac.Write([]byte(signingInput)) + return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) +} + +// encodeSegment is base64url without padding, as JWS requires. +func encodeSegment(raw []byte) string { + return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw) +} + +// decodeSegment accepts padded input too: PyJWT emits unpadded, but a +// hand-assembled token from a test or another client may not, and rejecting a +// structurally valid token over padding would be a pointless +// incompatibility. +func decodeSegment(segment string) ([]byte, error) { + if decoded, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(segment); err == nil { + return decoded, nil + } + return base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(segment) +} + +func randomJTI() (string, error) { + buf := make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil { + return "", fmt.Errorf("generating token id: %w", err) + } + return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil +} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..77527a4f --- /dev/null +++ b/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "context" + "database/sql" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/url" + "strings" + + _ "modernc.org/sqlite" // pure-Go SQLite driver: no cgo, cross-compiles +) + +// The runtime's users table, from webserver/restapi.py::User. +// +// Read-only, and opened read-only. The sidecar authenticates against these +// accounts but must never create, modify or promote one -- user management +// stays entirely in the runtime, including the first-user bootstrap. A sidecar +// that could write here would be a second, less-reviewed path to an admin +// account on the device. +const ( + usersTable = "users" + openTimeout = 5 * 1000 // busy_timeout, milliseconds +) + +// ErrNoSuchUser is returned when the username is absent. Callers must answer +// the same 401 they would for a bad password: distinguishing the two tells an +// unauthenticated caller which usernames exist. +var ErrNoSuchUser = errors.New("no such user") + +// ErrNoUsers means the runtime has never had an account created. +// +// The sidecar refuses every command in that state, deliberately. First-user +// bootstrap is a sensitive flow and it lives in the runtime alone; duplicating +// it here would mean two places that can mint the first admin on a device. +// The practical consequence is narrow: it only bites if the very first runtime +// start fails before anyone has logged in, and install.sh runs with shell +// access anyway. +var ErrNoUsers = errors.New("no users have been created yet") + +// User is the subset of an account the sidecar needs. +type User struct { + ID string + Username string + PasswordHash string + Role string +} + +// UserStore reads accounts from the runtime's SQLite database. +type UserStore struct { + db *sql.DB +} + +// OpenUserStore opens the runtime database read-only. +// +// mode=ro is what makes a read-only bind mount work: SQLite would otherwise +// want to create a rollback journal beside the file and fail on the mount +// rather than on the query. immutable is NOT set -- the runtime writes to this +// database while we read it, and immutable would tell SQLite the file can +// never change, which would serve stale pages after a password change. +func OpenUserStore(dbPath string) (*UserStore, error) { + dsn := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=ro&_pragma=busy_timeout(%d)", + url.PathEscape(dbPath), openTimeout) + db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening runtime database %s: %w", dbPath, err) + } + // A single connection: the read volume is one query per login, and + // SQLite's concurrency story is better served by not opening several + // readers against a file another process is writing. + db.SetMaxOpenConns(1) + return &UserStore{db: db}, nil +} + +// Close releases the database handle. +func (s *UserStore) Close() error { + if s == nil || s.db == nil { + return nil + } + return s.db.Close() +} + +// CountUsers reports how many accounts exist. +// +// Used to answer "is this device bootstrapped". A missing table counts as +// zero rather than an error: a runtime that has never started leaves the file +// present but empty, and that is the no-users case, not a broken database. +func (s *UserStore) CountUsers(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + var count int + query := "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM " + usersTable + if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query).Scan(&count); err != nil { + if isMissingTable(err) { + return 0, nil + } + return 0, fmt.Errorf("counting users: %w", err) + } + return count, nil +} + +// FindUser looks up an account by username. +func (s *UserStore) FindUser(ctx context.Context, username string) (*User, error) { + query := "SELECT id, username, password_hash, role FROM " + usersTable + " WHERE username = ?" + row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, username) + + var user User + // role is nullable in databases that predate the RBAC column, which the + // runtime migrates in place; scanning into a NullString keeps a + // half-migrated device usable instead of failing every login. + var role sql.NullString + if err := row.Scan(&user.ID, &user.Username, &user.PasswordHash, &role); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + return nil, ErrNoSuchUser + } + if isMissingTable(err) { + return nil, ErrNoUsers + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("looking up user: %w", err) + } + // The runtime defaults this column to admin precisely because the + // pre-RBAC runtime treated every account as an admin; matching that + // avoids silently demoting an existing operator. + user.Role = role.String + if user.Role == "" { + user.Role = "admin" + } + return &user, nil +} + +// Authenticate verifies a username and password, returning the account. +// +// Both a missing user and a bad password come back as ErrNoSuchUser so the +// caller cannot accidentally answer differently for the two. The password is +// still hashed for an unknown user -- see below -- so the two paths cost +// roughly the same time. +func (s *UserStore) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*User, error) { + user, err := s.FindUser(ctx, username) + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, ErrNoSuchUser) { + // Hash against a throwaway value so an unknown username does not + // return noticeably faster than a known one with a wrong password. + // Without this, response timing enumerates valid accounts. + _, _ = VerifyPassword(dummyHash, password, pepper) + } + return nil, err + } + + ok, verifyErr := VerifyPassword(user.PasswordHash, password, pepper) + if verifyErr != nil { + // A hash we cannot parse is a deployment problem, not a wrong + // password, and saying so is what makes it fixable. + return nil, verifyErr + } + if !ok { + return nil, ErrNoSuchUser + } + return user, nil +} + +// dummyHash is a real 600k-iteration PBKDF2 hash of a value nobody knows, +// used only to spend comparable time on an unknown username. +const dummyHash = "pbkdf2:sha256:600000$KMV1LlY0aXBhZGRpbmc$" + + "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + +// isMissingTable spots the driver's "no such table" error. Matched on the +// message because modernc's SQLite maps it to a generic error value rather +// than a distinguishable sentinel. +func isMissingTable(err error) bool { + if err == nil { + return false + } + return strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(err.Error()), "no such table") +} diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f19af048 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +"""Python half of the sidecar's shared authentication vector (RTOP-283). + +The sidecar is written in Go and reimplements two formats this codebase owns: +Werkzeug's PBKDF2 password hash and Flask-JWT-Extended's HS256 access token. +It has to, because it authenticates callers while the runtime is DOWN -- cold +recovery after a reboot is exactly when there is no runtime to ask. + +That makes it the same class of hazard as the ctypes mirror in +``shared/plugin_runtime_args.py``: two implementations of one format, in two +languages, that can drift apart silently. The failure mode is nasty -- every +login on the device stops working, on a device nobody can log in to in order +to find out why. + +So both sides pin the identical constants. The Go half asserts them in +``sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go``; this half asserts that +the libraries here still produce and accept them. If a Werkzeug or PyJWT +upgrade changes either format, the test on the side that changed fails, and +the fix is to regenerate the vector in BOTH files together -- never in one. +""" + +import jwt as pyjwt +from werkzeug.security import check_password_hash + +# --- the vector ----------------------------------------------------------- +# Keep byte-identical with the consts at the top of runtimeauth_test.go. + +PEPPER = "a" * 64 +PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple" +STORED_HASH = ( + "pbkdf2:sha256:600000$WCXqtZujfdFXqzAB$" + "4be2d44037a7d62f2483d1a189bd2dacb66871b323871f185a73a8e2d3230611" +) + +JWT_SECRET = "b" * 64 +# Minted by create_access_token(identity="7"). +VECTOR_TOKEN = ( + "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9." + "eyJmcmVzaCI6ZmFsc2UsImlhdCI6MTc4ODQ2NTIwMCwianRpIjoiNWYwNjVlOTctM2M2NC00" + "ZGU0LWFlYmYtMDMyZjdjNDM5M2M3IiwidHlwZSI6ImFjY2VzcyIsInN1YiI6IjciLCJuYmYi" + "OjE3ODg0NjUyMDAsImNzcmYiOiJjMThiMDFiMy05NmVjLTQwZDQtYjJmZS1jNjVhYTNiZjUx" + "NTciLCJleHAiOjE3ODg0NjYxMDB9." + "xM9AVtdXVFd5mU6gWm842aHwVQpYybL4A3EMyEWSLjc" +) + + +# --- password hash -------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_werkzeug_still_accepts_the_vector_hash(): + # The Go side derives this same key with crypto/pbkdf2. If Werkzeug changes + # its default parameters or its serialisation, this fails here first. + assert check_password_hash(STORED_HASH, PASSWORD + PEPPER) + + +def test_the_pepper_is_appended_not_prepended(): + # User.set_password does ``password = password + PEPPER``. The Go side has + # to match exactly; reversing the order fails every login while looking + # entirely reasonable in review. + assert not check_password_hash(STORED_HASH, PEPPER + PASSWORD) + + +def test_the_hash_advertises_the_parameters_the_sidecar_parses(): + # The Go side reads the iteration count out of the hash rather than + # assuming 600000, but it only understands pbkdf2/sha256. + method, _salt, _digest = STORED_HASH.split("$", 2) + assert method == "pbkdf2:sha256:600000", method + + +# --- access token --------------------------------------------------------- + + +def test_pyjwt_verifies_the_vector_token_signature(): + # Signature only: the vector's exp is a fixed timestamp, so asserting + # freshness would make this pass or fail depending on the clock. + decoded = pyjwt.decode( + VECTOR_TOKEN, + JWT_SECRET, + algorithms=["HS256"], + options={"verify_exp": False, "verify_nbf": False}, + ) + assert decoded["sub"] == "7" + assert decoded["type"] == "access" + + +def test_the_identity_claim_is_the_user_id_as_a_string(): + # user_identity_lookup returns str(user.id). The sidecar mints tokens with + # the same shape so the runtime can consume one it did not issue. + decoded = pyjwt.decode( + VECTOR_TOKEN, + JWT_SECRET, + algorithms=["HS256"], + options={"verify_exp": False, "verify_nbf": False}, + ) + assert isinstance(decoded["sub"], str) + + +def test_a_token_signed_with_another_secret_is_rejected(): + # Pins the property the whole scheme rests on: both sides share + # JWT_SECRET_KEY, and nothing else can mint an acceptable token. + try: + pyjwt.decode( + VECTOR_TOKEN, + "c" * 64, + algorithms=["HS256"], + options={"verify_exp": False, "verify_nbf": False}, + ) + except pyjwt.InvalidSignatureError: + return + raise AssertionError("a token signed with a different secret must not verify") From fb6f370c6aefca6cf1768380cff148a9dbdda3ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 16:03:45 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 04/22] refactor: rename the sidecar to bootloader "Sidecar" describes where the container sits; "bootloader" describes what it does, and the embedded analogy is exact. A bootloader is the small, rarely-changed program that starts the real firmware and stays reachable to flash a new image when that firmware is broken or missing -- which is precisely this component's job and its reason to exist, since many vendors do not allow SSH and without something that outlives a bad runtime there is no way back onto the device. The name also carries the constraint, which is why it is worth the churn: a bootloader is kept deliberately dumb because it is the one thing no other mechanism can recover. That is already the design -- no program uploads, no PLC control, no opinion on PLC state -- and the name now says so at every call site instead of only in a comment. Mechanical throughout: directory, Go module path, binary, image name, independent version line (bootloader-vN), state directory, the OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT variable and the bootloaderPort field on /api/capabilities. Renaming that field is free today because nothing consumes it yet -- it has not shipped. Two things came out in the wash rather than being pure substitution: resolve_update_policy and resolve_bootloader_port are now public, since the resolution rules are what the tests need to pin and a decision this security-relevant should be callable directly rather than reached through a module reload; and the package docs no longer describe the component by its position in the deployment. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- .github/workflows/docker.yml | 32 +++++------ {sidecar => bootloader}/Dockerfile | 24 ++++----- bootloader/VERSION | 1 + {sidecar => bootloader}/go.mod | 6 +-- {sidecar => bootloader}/go.sum | 0 .../internal/dockerapi/client.go | 8 +-- .../internal/dockerapi/containers.go | 2 +- .../internal/dockerapi/events.go | 0 .../internal/health/prober.go | 2 +- .../internal/runtimeauth/password.go | 0 .../internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go | 8 +-- .../internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go | 2 +- .../internal/runtimeauth/token.go | 2 +- .../internal/runtimeauth/users.go | 8 +-- .../internal/runtimespec/spec.go | 30 +++++------ .../internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go | 20 +++---- .../internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go | 4 +- .../internal/supervisor/supervisor.go | 24 +++++---- .../internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go | 8 +-- {sidecar => bootloader}/main.go | 54 +++++++++++-------- sidecar/VERSION | 1 - ...ctor.py => test_bootloader_auth_vector.py} | 10 ++-- tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py | 54 +++++++++---------- webserver/restapi.py | 8 +-- webserver/runtime_info.py | 4 +- webserver/update_policy.py | 46 +++++++++------- 26 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/Dockerfile (75%) create mode 100644 bootloader/VERSION rename {sidecar => bootloader}/go.mod (85%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/go.sum (100%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/dockerapi/client.go (97%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/dockerapi/containers.go (98%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/dockerapi/events.go (100%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/health/prober.go (96%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimeauth/password.go (100%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go (97%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go (96%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimeauth/token.go (99%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimeauth/users.go (96%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimespec/spec.go (91%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go (92%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go (95%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go (95%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go (98%) rename {sidecar => bootloader}/main.go (57%) delete mode 100644 sidecar/VERSION rename tests/pytest/restapi/{test_sidecar_auth_vector.py => test_bootloader_auth_vector.py} (91%) diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker.yml b/.github/workflows/docker.yml index 763f9941..58cac285 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/docker.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/docker.yml @@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ on: push: tags: - 'v*' - # The sidecar has its own version line, so it also builds from a branch + # The bootloader has its own version line, so it also builds from a branch # push without waiting for a runtime tag. Deliberately no `paths` filter: # GitHub applies it to tag pushes as well, which would make the runtime - # release build conditional on sidecar files having changed. The jobs below + # release build conditional on bootloader files having changed. The jobs below # gate themselves instead. branches: - development @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ on: jobs: build: - # Release tags and manual runs only -- unchanged from before the sidecar + # Release tags and manual runs only -- unchanged from before the bootloader # job was added. A branch push produces no semver tag for the metadata # step, so letting it through would fail with an empty tag list. if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' @@ -80,13 +80,13 @@ jobs: build-args: | RUNTIME_VERSION=${{ inputs.release_tag != '' && inputs.release_tag || github.ref_name }} - # The sidecar is versioned independently of the runtime (sidecar/VERSION). + # The bootloader is versioned independently of the runtime (bootloader/VERSION). # Tying it to every runtime tag would publish a long run of byte-identical - # images and make "which sidecar is on this device" a meaningless question. - sidecar: + # images and make "which bootloader is on this device" a meaningless question. + bootloader: runs-on: ubuntu-latest # Runs on release tags AND branch pushes: it is a seconds-long - # cross-compile, and re-pushing an unchanged sidecar/VERSION is an + # cross-compile, and re-pushing an unchanged bootloader/VERSION is an # idempotent overwrite. permissions: contents: read @@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ jobs: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@v4 - - name: Read sidecar version - id: sidecar_version - run: echo "version=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < sidecar/VERSION)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + - name: Read bootloader version + id: bootloader_version + run: echo "version=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < bootloader/VERSION)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - name: Set up Docker Buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 @@ -110,17 +110,17 @@ jobs: username: ${{ secrets.GHCR_USERNAME }} password: ${{ secrets.GHCR_TOKEN }} - # No QEMU step, unlike the runtime build: the sidecar is pure Go and + # No QEMU step, unlike the runtime build: the bootloader is pure Go and # cross-compiles from the native runner for every target, which takes # seconds instead of the many minutes emulation costs. - - name: Build and Push Sidecar + - name: Build and Push Bootloader uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 with: - context: ./sidecar + context: ./bootloader push: true platforms: ${{ inputs.platforms || 'linux/amd64,linux/arm64,linux/arm/v7' }} build-args: | - SIDECAR_VERSION=${{ steps.sidecar_version.outputs.version }} + BOOTLOADER_VERSION=${{ steps.bootloader_version.outputs.version }} tags: | - ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-sidecar:${{ steps.sidecar_version.outputs.version }} - ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-sidecar:latest + ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader:${{ steps.bootloader_version.outputs.version }} + ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader:latest diff --git a/sidecar/Dockerfile b/bootloader/Dockerfile similarity index 75% rename from sidecar/Dockerfile rename to bootloader/Dockerfile index 58593824..8cf75551 100644 --- a/sidecar/Dockerfile +++ b/bootloader/Dockerfile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 -# Sidecar image: a single static binary on scratch. +# Bootloader image: a single static binary on scratch. # # Cross-compiled rather than emulated. Go targets every architecture we ship # from one native builder, so buildx needs no QEMU here -- BUILDPLATFORM pins @@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ # scratch, not alpine: this is the component that has to work when the runtime # will not start, and every byte in the image is a byte that could stop it # starting. There is no shell to debug with, which is the intended trade -- the -# sidecar's job is to report over HTTP, not to be poked at over exec. +# bootloader's job is to report over HTTP, not to be poked at over exec. FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.25-alpine AS build ARG TARGETOS ARG TARGETARCH -# Sidecar version, independent of the runtime's. It changes rarely, so tying it +# Bootloader version, independent of the runtime's. It changes rarely, so tying it # to every runtime release would produce a long run of identical images. -ARG SIDECAR_VERSION=dev +ARG BOOTLOADER_VERSION=dev WORKDIR /src @@ -35,30 +35,30 @@ COPY . . RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=${TARGETOS} GOARCH=${TARGETARCH} \ go build \ -trimpath \ - -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=${SIDECAR_VERSION}" \ - -o /out/openplc-sidecar . + -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=${BOOTLOADER_VERSION}" \ + -o /out/openplc-bootloader . -# Fail the build rather than ship an untested sidecar. Tests run on the build +# Fail the build rather than ship an untested bootloader. Tests run on the build # platform, which is where they are meaningful -- the logic under test is a # state machine, not anything architecture-specific. RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./... FROM scratch -ARG SIDECAR_VERSION=dev -LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="OpenPLC Runtime Sidecar" \ +ARG BOOTLOADER_VERSION=dev +LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="OpenPLC Runtime Bootloader" \ org.opencontainers.image.description="Bootloader and update manager for a local OpenPLC runtime" \ org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime" \ - org.opencontainers.image.version="${SIDECAR_VERSION}" + org.opencontainers.image.version="${BOOTLOADER_VERSION}" # CA roots for any future outbound HTTPS. Nothing needs them today -- image # pulls go through the Docker daemon, which has its own -- but a missing root # store fails in a way that is genuinely hard to diagnose from a scratch image. COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt -COPY --from=build /out/openplc-sidecar /openplc-sidecar +COPY --from=build /out/openplc-bootloader /openplc-bootloader # Control API. 8445 keeps to the odd numbers alongside the runtime's 8443. EXPOSE 8445 -ENTRYPOINT ["/openplc-sidecar"] +ENTRYPOINT ["/openplc-bootloader"] diff --git a/bootloader/VERSION b/bootloader/VERSION new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e035d61 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/VERSION @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +bootloader-v1.0.0 diff --git a/sidecar/go.mod b/bootloader/go.mod similarity index 85% rename from sidecar/go.mod rename to bootloader/go.mod index fd521466..f397a664 100644 --- a/sidecar/go.mod +++ b/bootloader/go.mod @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -// The sidecar keeps its dependencies to the minimum the job actually needs. +// The bootloader keeps its dependencies to the minimum the job actually needs. // It is the component that recovers a device when the runtime will not start, // so every dependency is a way for that recovery to fail: the Docker Engine // API is plain HTTP over a unix socket, JWT is an HMAC over two base64 @@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ // The one exception is modernc.org/sqlite. Authenticating a caller while the // runtime is DOWN means reading the runtime's own users table, and cold // recovery after a reboot is exactly when there is no runtime to ask. A -// second credential store in the sidecar would have avoided the dependency at +// second credential store in the bootloader would have avoided the dependency at // the cost of another thing that can be forgotten when an account is revoked, // which is the worse trade. Pure Go, so it still cross-compiles with CGO off // and still runs on scratch. -module github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar +module github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader go 1.25.0 diff --git a/sidecar/go.sum b/bootloader/go.sum similarity index 100% rename from sidecar/go.sum rename to bootloader/go.sum diff --git a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go similarity index 97% rename from sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go rename to bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go index 90876421..ddb453e7 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/client.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // Package dockerapi is a minimal client for the Docker Engine API over the // host's unix socket. // -// Hand-rolled rather than using the official SDK on purpose: the sidecar needs +// Hand-rolled rather than using the official SDK on purpose: the bootloader needs // eight calls, and the SDK brings a dependency tree into the one component // whose job is to still work when everything else is broken. The Engine API is // JSON over HTTP; the only unusual part is dialing a unix socket instead of a @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ import ( ) // DefaultSocket is where the Docker daemon listens on a standard install. The -// sidecar bind-mounts it read-write; there is no read-only mode for a socket, -// which is why the sidecar stays small enough to audit. +// bootloader bind-mounts it read-write; there is no read-only mode for a socket, +// which is why the bootloader stays small enough to audit. const DefaultSocket = "/var/run/docker.sock" // apiVersion is pinned low enough to work on the oldest engine we support. @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ func (c *Client) Version(ctx context.Context) (Version, error) { return v, err } -// Version is the subset of /version the sidecar reports. +// Version is the subset of /version the bootloader reports. type Version struct { Version string `json:"Version"` APIVersion string `json:"ApiVersion"` diff --git a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go similarity index 98% rename from sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go rename to bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go index b377a00a..edd791ff 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/containers.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ func (c *Client) RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) e } // ContainerLogs returns the tail of a container's combined output. Used by the -// sidecar's status endpoint so an operator can see why a runtime would not +// bootloader's status endpoint so an operator can see why a runtime would not // start without needing shell access -- which is the entire point of RTOP-283. func (c *Client) ContainerLogs(ctx context.Context, name string, tail int) (string, error) { params := url.Values{} diff --git a/sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/events.go similarity index 100% rename from sidecar/internal/dockerapi/events.go rename to bootloader/internal/dockerapi/events.go diff --git a/sidecar/internal/health/prober.go b/bootloader/internal/health/prober.go similarity index 96% rename from sidecar/internal/health/prober.go rename to bootloader/internal/health/prober.go index 2d32d0be..af9b66a4 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/health/prober.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/health/prober.go @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import ( // Prober checks the runtime's unauthenticated version endpoint. // // /api/version, not /api/ping: ping sits behind @jwt_required(), so the -// sidecar has no credentials for it and a probe there would report a healthy +// bootloader has no credentials for it and a probe there would report a healthy // runtime as dead. (The healthcheck example in docs/DOCKER.md has this wrong // and always gets a 401.) type Prober struct { diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/password.go similarity index 100% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/password.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/password.go diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go similarity index 97% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go index f413ffb9..653e3761 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go @@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ import ( // generate_password_hash and flask_jwt_extended create_access_token) and // pinned here verbatim. // -// The Go side of the sidecar reimplements two formats the Python side owns. +// The Go side of the bootloader reimplements two formats the Python side owns. // That is the same hazard as the ctypes mirror in shared/plugin_runtime_args.py: // the two can drift apart silently, and the symptom is every login failing on a // device nobody can log into to diagnose. The identical values are asserted -// from Python in tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py, so a +// from Python in tests/pytest/restapi/test_bootloader_auth_vector.py, so a // werkzeug or PyJWT upgrade that changes either format breaks a test on the // side that changed rather than a device in the field. const ( @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func TestIssuedTokensRoundTrip(t *testing.T) { } func TestAnIssuedTokenCarriesTheClaimsTheRuntimeChecks(t *testing.T) { - // The runtime must accept a token the sidecar minted during recovery, so + // The runtime must accept a token the bootloader minted during recovery, so // the claim set has to match what flask_jwt_extended requires. token, err := IssueToken(vectorSecret, "7", time.Hour) if err != nil { @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ func TestAnUnknownUserAndABadPasswordAreIndistinguishable(t *testing.T) { } func TestCountUsersDrivesTheBootstrapRefusal(t *testing.T) { - // With no accounts the sidecar accepts nothing: first-user bootstrap + // With no accounts the bootloader accepts nothing: first-user bootstrap // belongs to the runtime alone. empty := seedDB(t, true) store, err := OpenUserStore(empty) diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go similarity index 96% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go index a793aee8..1e2c2114 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ // Package runtimeauth authenticates callers against the runtime's own // credentials. // -// The sidecar deliberately does not keep a second user database. It reads the +// The bootloader deliberately does not keep a second user database. It reads the // runtime's “.env“ and “restapi.db“ from the shared data directory -- // mounted read-only, because it only ever needs to read them -- so there is // exactly one set of accounts on the device and no second thing to keep in diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go similarity index 99% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go index 005bfdc7..5bf29219 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/token.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ var ( ErrTokenExpired = errors.New("token expired") ) -// Claims is the payload the sidecar reads and writes. +// Claims is the payload the bootloader reads and writes. type Claims struct { Subject string `json:"sub"` Type string `json:"type"` diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go similarity index 96% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go index 77527a4f..6d55ff52 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/users.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go @@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ import ( // The runtime's users table, from webserver/restapi.py::User. // -// Read-only, and opened read-only. The sidecar authenticates against these +// Read-only, and opened read-only. The bootloader authenticates against these // accounts but must never create, modify or promote one -- user management -// stays entirely in the runtime, including the first-user bootstrap. A sidecar +// stays entirely in the runtime, including the first-user bootstrap. A bootloader // that could write here would be a second, less-reviewed path to an admin // account on the device. const ( @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ var ErrNoSuchUser = errors.New("no such user") // ErrNoUsers means the runtime has never had an account created. // -// The sidecar refuses every command in that state, deliberately. First-user +// The bootloader refuses every command in that state, deliberately. First-user // bootstrap is a sensitive flow and it lives in the runtime alone; duplicating // it here would mean two places that can mint the first admin on a device. // The practical consequence is narrow: it only bites if the very first runtime @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ var ErrNoSuchUser = errors.New("no such user") // access anyway. var ErrNoUsers = errors.New("no users have been created yet") -// User is the subset of an account the sidecar needs. +// User is the subset of an account the bootloader needs. type User struct { ID string Username string diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go similarity index 91% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go index bd2a2e98..6dddb7b6 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ // also restart it would race the crash-loop accounting and hide exactly // the signal recovery mode depends on. // -// Board-specific additions come from a JSON file in the sidecar's own volume, +// Board-specific additions come from a JSON file in the bootloader's own volume, // written by install.sh. That file may only ADD binds and environment; it can // never remove privilege, change the network mode, or introduce a CPU limit. // Validation is strict because the file is the one operator-supplied input to @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ type CreatePayload struct { type Config struct { // Repository is the image repository, without a tag. Repository string `json:"repository"` - // Version is the tag currently desired. The sidecar rewrites this when an + // Version is the tag currently desired. The bootloader rewrites this when an // update succeeds, which is what makes the choice survive a reboot. Version string `json:"version"` // DataDir is the host path holding the runtime's persistent data. Bound @@ -97,21 +97,21 @@ type Config struct { ExtraBinds []string `json:"extraBinds,omitempty"` // ExtraEnv are additional KEY=VALUE pairs. ExtraEnv []string `json:"extraEnv,omitempty"` - // SidecarPort is advertised to the runtime so /api/capabilities can tell + // BootloaderPort is advertised to the runtime so /api/capabilities can tell // the editor where to send an update request. - SidecarPort int `json:"sidecarPort,omitempty"` + BootloaderPort int `json:"bootloaderPort,omitempty"` } const ( - DefaultRepository = "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime" - DefaultDataDir = "/var/lib/openplc-runtime" - DefaultSidecarPort = 8445 + DefaultRepository = "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime" + DefaultDataDir = "/var/lib/openplc-runtime" + DefaultBootloaderPort = 8445 ) // forbiddenBindTargets are host paths that must never be handed to the runtime // container. The docker socket is the important one: mounting it would give // the runtime's HTTP API control of every container on the host, which is -// precisely the privilege the sidecar exists to keep away from it. +// precisely the privilege the bootloader exists to keep away from it. var forbiddenBindSources = []string{ "/var/run/docker.sock", "/run/docker.sock", @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) { } // Save writes the config back, atomically, so a crash mid-write cannot leave -// the sidecar unable to parse its own spec on the next boot. +// the bootloader unable to parse its own spec on the next boot. func (c *Config) Save(path string) error { encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(c, "", " ") if err != nil { @@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ func (c *Config) applyDefaults() { if c.DataDir == "" { c.DataDir = DefaultDataDir } - if c.SidecarPort == 0 { - c.SidecarPort = DefaultSidecarPort + if c.BootloaderPort == 0 { + c.BootloaderPort = DefaultBootloaderPort } } @@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error { if !filepath.IsAbs(c.DataDir) { return fmt.Errorf("dataDir %q must be an absolute path", c.DataDir) } - if c.SidecarPort < 1 || c.SidecarPort > 65535 { - return fmt.Errorf("sidecarPort %d is out of range", c.SidecarPort) + if c.BootloaderPort < 1 || c.BootloaderPort > 65535 { + return fmt.Errorf("bootloaderPort %d is out of range", c.BootloaderPort) } for _, bind := range c.ExtraBinds { if err := validateBind(bind); err != nil { @@ -265,9 +265,9 @@ func (c *Config) ContainerSpec(imageRef string) any { env := []string{ // Tells /api/capabilities to report updatePolicy "self". Only our - // sidecar sets this, which is what makes the answer trustworthy. + // bootloader sets this, which is what makes the answer trustworthy. "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self", - fmt.Sprintf("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT=%d", c.SidecarPort), + fmt.Sprintf("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT=%d", c.BootloaderPort), } env = append(env, c.ExtraEnv...) diff --git a/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go similarity index 92% rename from sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go rename to bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go index 7fba7164..3f00c336 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ func TestLoadAppliesDefaults(t *testing.T) { if cfg.DataDir != DefaultDataDir { t.Fatalf("want default data dir, got %q", cfg.DataDir) } - if cfg.SidecarPort != DefaultSidecarPort { - t.Fatalf("want default sidecar port, got %d", cfg.SidecarPort) + if cfg.BootloaderPort != DefaultBootloaderPort { + t.Fatalf("want default bootloader port, got %d", cfg.BootloaderPort) } } @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ func TestLoadRequiresAVersion(t *testing.T) { // --- bind validation ----------------------------------------------------- func TestTheDockerSocketCannotBeMountedIntoTheRuntime(t *testing.T) { - // This is the whole security argument for the split: the sidecar holds the + // This is the whole security argument for the split: the bootloader holds the // socket, the runtime never does. Mounting it into the runtime would give // its HTTP API control of every container on the host. for _, bind := range []string{ @@ -219,11 +219,11 @@ func TestContainerSpecSetsTheRealTimeUlimits(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestContainerSpecTellsTheRuntimeItIsSidecarManaged(t *testing.T) { +func TestContainerSpecTellsTheRuntimeItIsBootloaderManaged(t *testing.T) { // This is what makes /api/capabilities report updatePolicy "self". Only our - // sidecar sets it, which is what makes the answer trustworthy -- an + // bootloader sets it, which is what makes the answer trustworthy -- an // orchestrator vPLC never gets it and so reports "managed". - cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1", SidecarPort: 8445} + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1", BootloaderPort: 8445} cfg.applyDefaults() spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) @@ -232,15 +232,15 @@ func TestContainerSpecTellsTheRuntimeItIsSidecarManaged(t *testing.T) { switch raw.(string) { case "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self": sawPolicy = true - case "OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT=8445": + case "OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT=8445": sawPort = true } } if !sawPolicy { - t.Error("the runtime must be told it is sidecar-managed") + t.Error("the runtime must be told it is bootloader-managed") } if !sawPort { - t.Error("the runtime must be told where the sidecar listens") + t.Error("the runtime must be told where the bootloader listens") } } @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ func TestExtraBindsAreAppendedNotSubstituted(t *testing.T) { // --- persistence --------------------------------------------------------- func TestSaveThenLoadRoundTrips(t *testing.T) { - // The sidecar rewrites version on a successful update; that choice has to + // The bootloader rewrites version on a successful update; that choice has to // survive a reboot or the device would revert on next boot. path := writeSpec(t, `{"version": "v4.2.0"}`) cfg, err := Load(path) diff --git a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go similarity index 95% rename from sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go rename to bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go index a6fd2917..43e565c8 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import ( // Defaults mirror webserver/runtimemanager.py's MAX_RAPID_CRASHES / // RAPID_CRASH_WINDOW one layer up. That module already does this for // plc_main: restart it, count crashes in a window, and stop restarting when -// the fault is clearly not transient. The sidecar applies the same shape to +// the fault is clearly not transient. The bootloader applies the same shape to // the container, so the two layers behave predictably alike and neither // masks the other's failure. const ( @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ const ( DefaultCrashWindow = 5 * time.Minute DefaultRestartDelay = 2 * time.Second // Restart backoff is capped so a persistent fault does not stretch to an - // interval where an operator concludes the sidecar has given up quietly. + // interval where an operator concludes the bootloader has given up quietly. // It reaches the crash ceiling well inside the window either way. MaxRestartDelay = 30 * time.Second ) diff --git a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go similarity index 95% rename from sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go rename to bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go index ecdec1d6..2cbc55ed 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go @@ -1,17 +1,19 @@ // Package supervisor owns the runtime container's lifecycle. // -// It is the bootloader half of RTOP-283: at boot it reconciles the runtime -// container into existence, then sits blocked on the Docker events stream and -// does nothing until something happens. When the runtime dies it restarts it, -// and when it dies repeatedly it stops trying and enters recovery so an -// operator can reach the device from the editor. +// This is the part of the bootloader that decides what the runtime container +// should be doing: at boot it reconciles that container into existence, then +// sits blocked on the Docker events stream and does nothing until something +// happens. When the runtime dies it restarts it, and when it dies repeatedly +// it stops trying and enters recovery, so an operator can reach the device +// from the editor instead of the bootloader hammering a runtime that will +// never come up. // // Two boundaries are deliberate and easy to get wrong: // // - Health means the runtime WEBSERVER came up. Whether plc_main is running, // whether a program is loaded, and whether that program errors are all the // webserver's concern -- it already restarts plc_main and drops to safe -// mode on rapid crashes. If the sidecar looked at PLC state, a user +// mode on rapid crashes. If the bootloader looked at PLC state, a user // uploading broken logic would trigger a runtime recovery, which would be // a spectacular way to turn a program bug into a device outage. // @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ import ( "sync" "time" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" ) // State is the supervisor's externally visible condition, reported by the @@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ func (s *Supervisor) setState(state State, reason string) { // reconnected, because losing the watch is not a reason to stop supervising. func (s *Supervisor) Run(ctx context.Context) error { if err := s.docker.Ping(ctx); err != nil { - // Without the socket the sidecar cannot do its job at all, and saying + // Without the socket the bootloader cannot do its job at all, and saying // so plainly beats failing later inside a container create. return fmt.Errorf("docker socket unreachable at start-up: %w", err) } @@ -381,9 +383,9 @@ func (s *Supervisor) handleWedged(ctx context.Context) { // call at any time. // // Adoption is the important property: a running healthy container is left -// exactly as it is. The sidecar restarts (its own crash, a self-update) far +// exactly as it is. The bootloader restarts (its own crash, a self-update) far // more often than the runtime does, and a reconcile that recreated or bounced -// a working runtime would turn a sidecar hiccup into a plant outage. +// a working runtime would turn a bootloader hiccup into a plant outage. func (s *Supervisor) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error { inspect, err := s.docker.InspectContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName) switch { @@ -464,7 +466,7 @@ func (s *Supervisor) startAndConfirm(ctx context.Context) error { // // Polling, not events: a container that never becomes healthy emits no event // to wait for, so a timeout is the only way to notice. The poll is on the -// sidecar's own clock and touches nothing in the scan path. +// bootloader's own clock and touches nothing in the scan path. func (s *Supervisor) awaitHealthy(ctx context.Context) error { deadline := time.Now().Add(s.cfg.StartTimeout) const pollInterval = 2 * time.Second diff --git a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go similarity index 98% rename from sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go rename to bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go index 1c34b889..72b53b33 100644 --- a/sidecar/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import ( "testing" "time" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" ) // --- fakes --------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -169,9 +169,9 @@ func TestReconcileCreatesAndStartsAMissingContainer(t *testing.T) { } func TestReconcileAdoptsAHealthyRunningContainer(t *testing.T) { - // The sidecar restarts far more often than the runtime does -- its own + // The bootloader restarts far more often than the runtime does -- its own // crash, a self-update. A reconcile that recreated or bounced a working - // runtime would turn a sidecar hiccup into a plant outage. + // runtime would turn a bootloader hiccup into a plant outage. docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ func TestRepeatedUnexpectedExitsEnterRecovery(t *testing.T) { func TestRecoveryStopsTheRuntimeSoDiscoveryStaysExclusive(t *testing.T) { // Only one service on the host may answer the UDP discovery broadcast. // Recovery is defined as "the runtime is not running", which is what lets - // the sidecar's responder switch on without ever racing the runtime's. + // the bootloader's responder switch on without ever racing the runtime's. docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) diff --git a/sidecar/main.go b/bootloader/main.go similarity index 57% rename from sidecar/main.go rename to bootloader/main.go index b68e5d1c..9070123b 100644 --- a/sidecar/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -1,14 +1,24 @@ -// Command openplc-sidecar is the bootloader and update manager for one local -// OpenPLC runtime container (RTOP-283). +// Command openplc-bootloader brings up and maintains one local OpenPLC runtime +// container (RTOP-283). // -// It is always resident and, in steady state, does nothing: after confirming -// the runtime came up it blocks on the Docker events stream with no timers, no -// polling and no listening socket beyond its own control API. It exists so a -// device whose runtime will not start is still reachable from the editor, which -// is the whole point -- many vendors do not allow SSH. +// It plays the same role a bootloader plays on an embedded target, and the name +// is meant literally. A bootloader is the small, rarely-changed program that +// starts the real firmware, and that stays reachable to flash a new image when +// the firmware is broken or missing. This does exactly that for the runtime: it +// starts the runtime container, and when the runtime will not run it remains +// available so a new version can be installed from the editor. That is the +// whole reason it exists -- many vendors do not allow SSH, so without something +// that survives a bad runtime there is no way back onto the device. // -// Docker is the only dependency. The sidecar itself is started by Docker's own -// restart policy, so nothing of ours goes into systemd. +// The analogy holds on the other axis too. A bootloader is kept deliberately +// dumb and stable because it is the one thing that cannot be recovered by any +// other means, so it does the minimum: it does not accept programs, control the +// PLC, or look at PLC state. It is always resident and, in steady state, does +// nothing at all -- after confirming the runtime came up it blocks on the +// Docker events stream, with no timers and no polling. +// +// Docker is the only dependency. Docker's own restart policy starts this +// process, so nothing of ours goes into systemd. package main import ( @@ -22,26 +32,26 @@ import ( "syscall" "time" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/dockerapi" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/health" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/runtimespec" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/sidecar/internal/supervisor" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/health" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimespec" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" ) -// version is stamped at build time via -ldflags. The sidecar has its own +// version is stamped at build time via -ldflags. The bootloader has its own // version line, independent of the runtime's: it changes rarely, and coupling // it to every runtime release would produce a long series of identical images. var version = "dev" -// DefaultStateDir is the sidecar's own volume -- separate from the runtime's +// DefaultStateDir is the bootloader's own volume -- separate from the runtime's // data directory on purpose. "Erase all data" wipes the runtime's volume, and // the board's device mounts must survive that; a board that came back with no // SPI after a data wipe would be a miserable failure mode. -const DefaultStateDir = "/var/lib/openplc-sidecar" +const DefaultStateDir = "/var/lib/openplc-bootloader" func main() { var ( - stateDir = flag.String("state-dir", DefaultStateDir, "sidecar state directory") + stateDir = flag.String("state-dir", DefaultStateDir, "bootloader state directory") socket = flag.String("docker-socket", dockerapi.DefaultSocket, "docker socket path") probeURL = flag.String("probe-url", health.DefaultURL, "runtime health probe URL") showVer = flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit") @@ -59,10 +69,10 @@ func main() { } log := newLogger(*logLevel) - log.Info("openplc-sidecar starting", "version", version, "stateDir", *stateDir) + log.Info("openplc-bootloader starting", "version", version, "stateDir", *stateDir) if err := run(log, *stateDir, *socket, *probeURL, *maxCrashes, *crashWindow); err != nil { - log.Error("sidecar exiting", "error", err) + log.Error("bootloader exiting", "error", err) os.Exit(1) } } @@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ func run( specPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, "runtime-spec.json") spec, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) if err != nil { - // Without a spec the sidecar does not know which image to run or which + // Without a spec the bootloader does not know which image to run or which // board mounts this device needs. Guessing would risk starting a // runtime with no access to its own hardware, so this is fatal and // install.sh is responsible for writing the file. @@ -98,7 +108,7 @@ func run( }, log.With("component", "supervisor")) // Signals: a container stop must not be read as a reason to tear the - // runtime down. The sidecar going away leaves the runtime running, which + // runtime down. The bootloader going away leaves the runtime running, which // is correct -- losing the manager should never stop the plant. ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) defer stop() @@ -106,7 +116,7 @@ func run( if err := sup.Run(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { return err } - log.Info("sidecar stopped; runtime container left running") + log.Info("bootloader stopped; runtime container left running") return nil } diff --git a/sidecar/VERSION b/sidecar/VERSION deleted file mode 100644 index c59a658f..00000000 --- a/sidecar/VERSION +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -sidecar-v1.0.0 diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_bootloader_auth_vector.py similarity index 91% rename from tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py rename to tests/pytest/restapi/test_bootloader_auth_vector.py index f19af048..3470b33f 100644 --- a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_sidecar_auth_vector.py +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_bootloader_auth_vector.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -"""Python half of the sidecar's shared authentication vector (RTOP-283). +"""Python half of the bootloader's shared authentication vector (RTOP-283). -The sidecar is written in Go and reimplements two formats this codebase owns: +The bootloader is written in Go and reimplements two formats this codebase owns: Werkzeug's PBKDF2 password hash and Flask-JWT-Extended's HS256 access token. It has to, because it authenticates callers while the runtime is DOWN -- cold recovery after a reboot is exactly when there is no runtime to ask. @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ to find out why. So both sides pin the identical constants. The Go half asserts them in -``sidecar/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go``; this half asserts that +``bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go``; this half asserts that the libraries here still produce and accept them. If a Werkzeug or PyJWT upgrade changes either format, the test on the side that changed fails, and the fix is to regenerate the vector in BOTH files together -- never in one. @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ def test_the_pepper_is_appended_not_prepended(): assert not check_password_hash(STORED_HASH, PEPPER + PASSWORD) -def test_the_hash_advertises_the_parameters_the_sidecar_parses(): +def test_the_hash_advertises_the_parameters_the_bootloader_parses(): # The Go side reads the iteration count out of the hash rather than # assuming 600000, but it only understands pbkdf2/sha256. method, _salt, _digest = STORED_HASH.split("$", 2) @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ def test_pyjwt_verifies_the_vector_token_signature(): def test_the_identity_claim_is_the_user_id_as_a_string(): - # user_identity_lookup returns str(user.id). The sidecar mints tokens with + # user_identity_lookup returns str(user.id). The bootloader mints tokens with # the same shape so the runtime can consume one it did not issue. decoded = pyjwt.decode( VECTOR_TOKEN, diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py index 1de9909d..c5177c33 100644 --- a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ from conftest import auth, create_user from webserver import update_policy -from webserver.update_policy import SIDECAR_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY +from webserver.update_policy import BOOTLOADER_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION _VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$") @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ def test_capabilities_reports_runtime_version_and_editor_floor(client): "minEditorVersion": MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, "projectSnapshot": True, "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, - "sidecarPort": SIDECAR_PORT, + "bootloaderPort": BOOTLOADER_PORT, } @@ -92,17 +92,17 @@ def test_update_policy_is_one_of_the_published_values(client): def test_explicit_override_wins_over_detection(monkeypatch): - # The sidecar sets this when it creates the runtime container. It has to - # beat detection, because a sidecar-managed runtime IS containerized and + # The bootloader sets this when it creates the runtime container. It has to + # beat detection, because a bootloader-managed runtime IS containerized and # would otherwise be mistaken for somebody else's vPLC. monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "self") monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) - assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_SELF + assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_SELF def test_override_is_case_insensitive(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", " NONE ") - assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_NONE + assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_NONE def test_container_without_an_override_is_managed(monkeypatch): @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ def test_container_without_an_override_is_managed(monkeypatch): # chose the image tag, which is the version. We must not offer to update it. monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", raising=False) monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) - assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED + assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED def test_native_install_without_an_override_is_manual(monkeypatch): monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", raising=False) monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: False) - assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL + assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL def test_an_unrecognised_override_falls_through_to_detection(monkeypatch): @@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ def test_an_unrecognised_override_falls_through_to_detection(monkeypatch): # reverse. monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "yes-please") monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) - assert update_policy._resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED + assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED -# --- sidecar port --------------------------------------------------------- +# --- bootloader port --------------------------------------------------------- -def test_sidecar_port_is_absent_unless_the_policy_is_self(): +def test_bootloader_port_is_absent_unless_the_policy_is_self(): # Publishing a port nothing answers on would send clients somewhere # useless, so every non-self policy reports None. for policy in ( @@ -139,31 +139,31 @@ def test_sidecar_port_is_absent_unless_the_policy_is_self(): update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL, update_policy.POLICY_NONE, ): - assert update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(policy) is None, policy + assert update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(policy) is None, policy -def test_sidecar_port_defaults_when_the_policy_is_self(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", raising=False) +def test_bootloader_port_defaults_when_the_policy_is_self(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", raising=False) assert ( - update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) - == update_policy.DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) + == update_policy.DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT ) -def test_sidecar_port_honours_an_explicit_value(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", "9445") - assert update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) == 9445 +def test_bootloader_port_honours_an_explicit_value(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", "9445") + assert update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) == 9445 -def test_an_unusable_sidecar_port_falls_back_to_the_default(monkeypatch): - # Garbage or an out-of-range port means the sidecar is still there on the +def test_an_unusable_bootloader_port_falls_back_to_the_default(monkeypatch): + # Garbage or an out-of-range port means the bootloader is still there on the # port it almost certainly used; refusing to report one at all would hide - # a working sidecar behind a config typo. + # a working bootloader behind a config typo. for raw in ("not-a-port", "0", "70000", "-1"): - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", raw) + monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", raw) assert ( - update_policy._resolve_sidecar_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) - == update_policy.DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) + == update_policy.DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT ), raw @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ def test_device_info_reports_host_facts(client, admin_token): "system", "containerized", "updatePolicy", - "sidecarPort", + "bootloaderPort", } assert body["hostname"] assert body["architecture"] @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ def test_device_info_agrees_with_capabilities_on_the_policy(client, admin_token) capabilities = client.get("/api/capabilities").get_json() info = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)).get_json() assert info["updatePolicy"] == capabilities["updatePolicy"] - assert info["sidecarPort"] == capabilities["sidecarPort"] + assert info["bootloaderPort"] == capabilities["bootloaderPort"] def test_device_info_is_not_swallowed_by_the_command_catch_all(client, admin_token): diff --git a/webserver/restapi.py b/webserver/restapi.py index 1ee3fb9f..89367d84 100644 --- a/webserver/restapi.py +++ b/webserver/restapi.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import webserver.config from webserver import project_snapshot from webserver.logger import get_logger -from webserver.update_policy import SIDECAR_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY +from webserver.update_policy import BOOTLOADER_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION logger, buffer = get_logger("logger", use_buffer=True) @@ -116,9 +116,9 @@ def restapi_capabilities(): type: string enum: [self, managed, manual, none] description: Which mechanism may change this runtime's version - sidecarPort: + bootloaderPort: type: integer - description: Port of the managing sidecar; null unless updatePolicy is "self" + description: Port of the managing bootloader; null unless updatePolicy is "self" """ return ( jsonify( @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ def restapi_capabilities(): # because the editor picks its actions before it has # credentials. Resolution order: webserver/update_policy.py. "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, - "sidecarPort": SIDECAR_PORT, + "bootloaderPort": BOOTLOADER_PORT, } ), 200, diff --git a/webserver/runtime_info.py b/webserver/runtime_info.py index 1da9a17b..130471d9 100644 --- a/webserver/runtime_info.py +++ b/webserver/runtime_info.py @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ def restapi_device_info(): type: string enum: [self, managed, manual, none] description: Which mechanism may change this runtime's version - sidecarPort: + bootloaderPort: type: integer - description: Port of the managing sidecar; null unless updatePolicy is "self" + description: Port of the managing bootloader; null unless updatePolicy is "self" 401: description: Missing or invalid token """ diff --git a/webserver/update_policy.py b/webserver/update_policy.py index 45488235..d0544cb3 100644 --- a/webserver/update_policy.py +++ b/webserver/update_policy.py @@ -5,16 +5,16 @@ job, so a client can offer the right action instead of a button that cannot work. Resolution order: - 1. ``OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY`` -- explicit, and wins outright. The sidecar - bootloader sets ``self`` when it creates the runtime container. An OEM - shipping a vendor-managed device sets ``none``. + 1. ``OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY`` -- explicit, and wins outright. The bootloader + sets ``self`` when it creates the runtime container. An OEM shipping a + vendor-managed device sets ``none``. 2. Running in a container with no override -> ``managed``. Something else created this container, and whatever created it chose the image tag -- which IS the version. An orchestrator-managed vPLC lands here. 3. Otherwise -> ``manual``. A native source install, updated from a shell. This is deliberately capability-based rather than identity-based: we report -what the deployment CAN do, never a guess at what it IS. Only our own sidecar +what the deployment CAN do, never a guess at what it IS. Only our own bootloader sets ``self``, so a false positive is impossible -- an orchestrator vPLC never runs our installer and never receives that variable. Getting this backwards (sniffing for orchestrator-shaped networks or cgroup patterns) would be a @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ from webserver.config import is_running_in_container -# The sidecar owns the container spec and may replace the image (RTOP-283). +# The bootloader owns the container spec and may replace the image (RTOP-283). POLICY_SELF: str = "self" # Some other supervisor owns the container; it must perform the swap. POLICY_MANAGED: str = "managed" @@ -44,13 +44,19 @@ {POLICY_SELF, POLICY_MANAGED, POLICY_MANUAL, POLICY_NONE} ) -# Port the sidecar's control API listens on. Reported so a client does not -# have to hard-code it; the sidecar passes the real value when it differs. -DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT: int = 8445 +# Port the bootloader's control API listens on. Reported so a client does not +# have to hard-code it; the bootloader passes the real value when it differs. +DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT: int = 8445 -def _resolve_update_policy() -> str: - """Return the update policy for this deployment. See module docstring.""" +def resolve_update_policy() -> str: + """Return the update policy for this deployment. See module docstring. + + Public rather than private because the resolution rules -- not the cached + constant below -- are what the tests need to pin, and a decision this + security-relevant should be callable directly rather than reached through + a module reload. + """ override = os.getenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "").strip().lower() if override in VALID_POLICIES: return override @@ -63,30 +69,30 @@ def _resolve_update_policy() -> str: return POLICY_MANUAL -def _resolve_sidecar_port(policy: str) -> Optional[int]: - """Port of the managing sidecar, or ``None`` when there is not one. +def resolve_bootloader_port(policy: str) -> Optional[int]: + """Port of the managing bootloader, or ``None`` when there is not one. - Only meaningful under ``self``: every other policy means no sidecar of + Only meaningful under ``self``: every other policy means no bootloader of ours is listening, and publishing a port nothing answers on would send clients somewhere useless. """ if policy != POLICY_SELF: return None - raw = os.getenv("OPENPLC_SIDECAR_PORT", "").strip() + raw = os.getenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", "").strip() if not raw: - return DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + return DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT try: port = int(raw) except ValueError: - return DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + return DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT if not 1 <= port <= 65535: - return DEFAULT_SIDECAR_PORT + return DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT return port -UPDATE_POLICY: str = _resolve_update_policy() -SIDECAR_PORT: Optional[int] = _resolve_sidecar_port(UPDATE_POLICY) +UPDATE_POLICY: str = resolve_update_policy() +BOOTLOADER_PORT: Optional[int] = resolve_bootloader_port(UPDATE_POLICY) def device_info() -> dict[str, object]: @@ -108,5 +114,5 @@ def device_info() -> dict[str, object]: "system": platform.system(), "containerized": is_running_in_container(), "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, - "sidecarPort": SIDECAR_PORT, + "bootloaderPort": BOOTLOADER_PORT, } From aef0e66f35c4e3c373608a582634996b5a4bd2a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 16:12:57 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 05/22] feat(bootloader): control API on 8445 The interface to the component that recovers a device, kept to the shortest list that does the job: say what state you are in, show the runtime's logs, restart it. No program uploads and no PLC control -- those belong to the runtime, and a bootloader that could do them would be a second, less-reviewed path to the same capability. A test pins their absence so adding one has to be a decision rather than a route somebody dropped in. Capabilities is unauthenticated, for the same reason the runtime's is: a client must be able to tell what it reached, and whether the device is in recovery, before it has credentials. Everything else needs a token from the runtime's own account set -- and with no accounts on the device the bootloader accepts nothing at all, since first-user bootstrap belongs to the runtime alone. Its own TLS certificate, persisted in the bootloader's state directory. The runtime generates its certificate inside its image, so there is nothing to share, and it could not serve TLS before the runtime had ever started -- which is precisely the case recovery exists for. Persisting rather than regenerating keeps the fingerprint stable across reboots, because a fingerprint that changes on every boot just trains operators to click through warnings. ECDSA P-256: RSA keygen on a Pi-class CPU is slow enough to notice at first boot. Wiring the API into main surfaced a genuine crash path, now fixed and tested: openRuntimeCredentials legitimately returns a nil *UserStore on a device whose runtime has never started, and a typed nil in an interface is not nil at the call site, so the first request would have dereferenced nil and panicked the bootloader into a Docker restart loop -- on exactly the device that most needs a way in. Every UserStore method now tolerates a nil receiver and reports ErrNoDatabase, which the API answers as 503 with a message about the account database rather than a 401 blaming the caller's credentials. Verified against a live Docker daemon with a deliberately nonexistent image tag: the bootloader generated its certificate, served capabilities over HTTPS, got a real 404 from the daemon, entered recovery, and answered 503 on the authenticated route instead of crashing. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/api/server.go | 394 +++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go | 448 ++++++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/api/tls.go | 163 +++++++ bootloader/internal/api/tls_test.go | 103 ++++ .../internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go | 25 + bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go | 19 + bootloader/main.go | 119 ++++- 7 files changed, 1255 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/server.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/tls.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/tls_test.go diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c80d8995 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +// Package api is the bootloader's control API on port 8445. +// +// Deliberately small. This is the interface to the component that recovers a +// device, so its surface is the shortest list that does the job: say what +// state you are in, show me the runtime's logs, restart it, change its +// version, wipe its data. It accepts no programs and does not control the PLC +// -- those belong to the runtime, and a bootloader that could do them would be +// a second, less-reviewed path to the same capability. +// +// Every route except login and capabilities requires a token from the +// runtime's own account set. Capabilities is unauthenticated for the same +// reason the runtime's is: a client has to be able to tell what it is talking +// to before it has credentials. +package api + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/tls" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "net" + "net/http" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" +) + +// DefaultPort is the bootloader's control port. 8445 keeps to the odd numbers +// alongside the runtime's 8443, and being a separate port avoids any handoff +// race with the runtime over a shared one. +const DefaultPort = 8445 + +// Supervisor is what the API can ask of the runtime container. Narrow on +// purpose: the API must not be able to do anything to the runtime that is not +// on this list. +type Supervisor interface { + Status() supervisor.Status + Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error + Stop(ctx context.Context) error + ContainerName() string +} + +// LogReader fetches the runtime container's recent output, so an operator can +// see why a runtime would not start without shell access. +type LogReader interface { + ContainerLogs(ctx context.Context, name string, tail int) (string, error) +} + +// Authenticator resolves credentials against the runtime's account set. +type Authenticator interface { + Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*runtimeauth.User, error) + CountUsers(ctx context.Context) (int, error) +} + +// Config wires the server. +type Config struct { + Port int + StateDir string + // Version of the bootloader binary, reported by capabilities. + Version string + // RuntimeVersion is the image tag the bootloader intends to run, which is + // not necessarily what is running right now (mid-update, or in recovery). + RuntimeVersion func() string + Secrets *runtimeauth.Secrets + Users Authenticator + Supervisor Supervisor + Logs LogReader + Log *slog.Logger +} + +// Server is the bootloader's HTTPS control API. +type Server struct { + cfg Config + http *http.Server +} + +// New builds the server, generating a TLS certificate on first use. +func New(cfg Config) (*Server, error) { + if cfg.Port == 0 { + cfg.Port = DefaultPort + } + if cfg.Log == nil { + return nil, errors.New("api: a logger is required") + } + cert, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(cfg.StateDir) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + server := &Server{cfg: cfg} + mux := http.NewServeMux() + server.routes(mux) + + server.http = &http.Server{ + Addr: ":" + strconv.Itoa(cfg.Port), + Handler: mux, + TLSConfig: &tls.Config{ + Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}, + MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, + }, + // A slow or dead client must not be able to hold a connection open + // forever against the recovery component. + ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second, + ReadTimeout: 30 * time.Second, + // Generous: a log tail can be large, and an update's progress stream + // is polled rather than held open. + WriteTimeout: 60 * time.Second, + IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second, + } + return server, nil +} + +func (s *Server) routes(mux *http.ServeMux) { + // Unauthenticated: a client must be able to identify what it reached and + // obtain a token. + mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/capabilities", s.handleCapabilities) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/login", s.handleLogin) + + // Authenticated. + mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/status", s.authenticated(s.handleStatus)) + mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/logs", s.authenticated(s.handleLogs)) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/restart", s.authenticated(s.handleRestart)) +} + +// ListenAndServe blocks until ctx is cancelled or the listener fails. +func (s *Server) ListenAndServe(ctx context.Context) error { + listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", s.http.Addr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("listening on %s: %w", s.http.Addr, err) + } + s.cfg.Log.Info("control API listening", "addr", s.http.Addr) + + errCh := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + errCh <- s.http.ServeTLS(listener, "", "") + }() + + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := s.http.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Warn("control API shutdown", "error", err) + } + return ctx.Err() + case err := <-errCh: + if errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) { + return nil + } + return fmt.Errorf("control API: %w", err) + } +} + +// --- middleware ---------------------------------------------------------- + +// authenticated wraps a handler with bearer-token verification. +// +// It also enforces the no-users rule: with no accounts on the device the +// bootloader accepts nothing at all. First-user bootstrap is a sensitive flow +// that lives in the runtime alone, and a bootloader that could mint the first +// admin would be a second path to owning the device. +func (s *Server) authenticated(next func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)) http.HandlerFunc { + return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + count, err := s.cfg.Users.CountUsers(r.Context()) + if err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Error("counting users", "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, + "cannot read the runtime's account database") + return + } + if count == 0 { + writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, + "no accounts exist on this device yet; create the first one through "+ + "the runtime before using the bootloader") + return + } + + token, ok := bearerToken(r) + if !ok { + writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "a bearer token is required") + return + } + claims, err := runtimeauth.VerifyToken(s.cfg.Secrets.JWTSecret, token) + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, runtimeauth.ErrTokenExpired) { + writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token expired; log in again") + return + } + writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid token") + return + } + s.cfg.Log.Debug("authenticated request", + "path", r.URL.Path, "subject", claims.Subject) + next(w, r) + } +} + +func bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) { + header := r.Header.Get("Authorization") + // Case-insensitive scheme: RFC 7235 says the scheme is case-insensitive + // and clients do vary. + if len(header) < 7 || !strings.EqualFold(header[:7], "bearer ") { + return "", false + } + token := strings.TrimSpace(header[7:]) + return token, token != "" +} + +// --- handlers ------------------------------------------------------------ + +func (s *Server) handleCapabilities(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + status := s.cfg.Supervisor.Status() + // Enough for a client to know what it reached and whether the runtime is + // usable, and nothing more: this is served without authentication. + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{ + "service": "openplc-bootloader", + "bootloaderVersion": s.cfg.Version, + "runtimeVersion": s.cfg.RuntimeVersion(), + "state": status.State, + "recovery": status.State == supervisor.StateRecovery, + }) +} + +// loginRequest mirrors the runtime's /api/login body so the editor can reuse +// the same request shape against either port. +type loginRequest struct { + Username string `json:"username"` + Password string `json:"password"` +} + +func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + var body loginRequest + // A bounded read: an unauthenticated caller must not be able to make the + // bootloader buffer an arbitrary amount. + if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, 4*1024); err != nil { + return + } + if body.Username == "" || body.Password == "" { + writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "username and password are required") + return + } + + count, err := s.cfg.Users.CountUsers(r.Context()) + if err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Error("counting users", "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, + "cannot read the runtime's account database") + return + } + if count == 0 { + writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, + "no accounts exist on this device yet; create the first one through the runtime") + return + } + + user, err := s.cfg.Users.Authenticate(r.Context(), body.Username, body.Password, s.cfg.Secrets.Pepper) + if err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, runtimeauth.ErrUnsupportedHash) { + // A deployment problem, not a wrong password. Saying so is what + // makes it fixable; the alternative is an operator convinced they + // have forgotten their own password. + s.cfg.Log.Error("stored password hash is unreadable", "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, + "this runtime's password hashes are in a format the bootloader cannot verify") + return + } + // Unknown user and wrong password answer identically; distinguishing + // them enumerates valid accounts. + s.cfg.Log.Warn("failed login", "username", body.Username) + writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "wrong username or password") + return + } + + token, err := runtimeauth.IssueToken(s.cfg.Secrets.JWTSecret, user.ID, runtimeauth.DefaultTokenTTL) + if err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Error("issuing token", "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not issue a token") + return + } + s.cfg.Log.Info("login", "username", user.Username, "role", user.Role) + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{ + "access_token": token, + "role": user.Role, + }) +} + +func (s *Server) handleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + status := s.cfg.Supervisor.Status() + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{ + "state": status.State, + "reason": status.Reason, + "since": status.Since, + "crashCount": status.CrashCount, + "healthSource": status.HealthSource, + "containerId": status.ContainerID, + "containerName": s.cfg.Supervisor.ContainerName(), + "image": status.Image, + "runtimeVersion": s.cfg.RuntimeVersion(), + "recovery": status.State == supervisor.StateRecovery, + }) +} + +// maxLogTail bounds a log request so a caller cannot ask the daemon for an +// entire container's history. +const ( + defaultLogTail = 200 + maxLogTail = 5000 +) + +func (s *Server) handleLogs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + tail := defaultLogTail + if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("tail"); raw != "" { + parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(raw) + if err != nil || parsed <= 0 { + writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "tail must be a positive integer") + return + } + tail = min(parsed, maxLogTail) + } + + logs, err := s.cfg.Logs.ContainerLogs(r.Context(), s.cfg.Supervisor.ContainerName(), tail) + if err != nil { + // A missing container is the interesting case, not an error: it is + // what a device looks like before its first successful start. + s.cfg.Log.Warn("reading runtime logs", "error", err) + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{ + "logs": "", + "available": false, + "reason": err.Error(), + }) + return + } + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{ + "logs": logs, + "available": true, + "tail": tail, + }) +} + +func (s *Server) handleRestart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + // Stop then reconcile, rather than a "restart" call: reconcile is the one + // path that knows how to create the container if it is missing, so this + // works identically on a device that has never started one. + if err := s.cfg.Supervisor.Stop(r.Context()); err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Warn("stopping runtime for restart", "error", err) + } + if err := s.cfg.Supervisor.Reconcile(r.Context()); err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Error("restarting runtime", "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, + fmt.Sprintf("the runtime did not come back up: %v", err)) + return + } + status := s.cfg.Supervisor.Status() + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{ + "state": status.State, + "reason": status.Reason, + }) +} + +// --- helpers ------------------------------------------------------------- + +func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body any) { + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + // No caching: every response here is a live device state. + w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store") + w.WriteHeader(status) + if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body); err != nil { + // The status line is already sent, so there is nothing to correct -- + // only something to record. + return + } +} + +// writeError uses one shape for every failure so a client has exactly one +// thing to parse. The message is written for a person: it says what went +// wrong and, where there is one, what to do about it. +func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, message string) { + writeJSON(w, status, map[string]any{"error": message}) +} + +func decodeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, out any, limit int64) error { + decoder := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, limit)) + decoder.DisallowUnknownFields() + if err := decoder.Decode(out); err != nil { + writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "request body is not the expected JSON") + return err + } + return nil +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9ee1f698 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,448 @@ +package api + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" +) + +const ( + testSecret = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb" + testPepper = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" +) + +// --- fakes --------------------------------------------------------------- + +type fakeSupervisor struct { + status supervisor.Status + reconcileErr error + stopErr error + reconcileHits int + stopHits int +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) Status() supervisor.Status { return f.status } +func (f *fakeSupervisor) Reconcile(context.Context) error { + f.reconcileHits++ + return f.reconcileErr +} +func (f *fakeSupervisor) Stop(context.Context) error { + f.stopHits++ + return f.stopErr +} +func (f *fakeSupervisor) ContainerName() string { return "openplc-runtime" } + +type fakeLogs struct { + out string + err error +} + +func (f *fakeLogs) ContainerLogs(context.Context, string, int) (string, error) { + return f.out, f.err +} + +type fakeUsers struct { + count int + countErr error + user *runtimeauth.User + authErr error +} + +func (f *fakeUsers) CountUsers(context.Context) (int, error) { return f.count, f.countErr } +func (f *fakeUsers) Authenticate(context.Context, string, string, string) (*runtimeauth.User, error) { + if f.authErr != nil { + return nil, f.authErr + } + return f.user, nil +} + +// newTestServer builds a server with an httptest mux, bypassing TLS: the +// certificate path is covered separately, and routing plus auth is what these +// tests are about. +func newTestServer(t *testing.T, users *fakeUsers, sup *fakeSupervisor, logs *fakeLogs) *httptest.Server { + t.Helper() + srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ + Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", + RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, + Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, + Users: users, + Supervisor: sup, + Logs: logs, + Log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), + }} + mux := http.NewServeMux() + srv.routes(mux) + httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(mux) + t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close) + return httpSrv +} + +func healthySupervisor() *fakeSupervisor { + return &fakeSupervisor{status: supervisor.Status{ + State: supervisor.StateHealthy, Since: time.Now(), HealthSource: "docker healthcheck", + }} +} + +func validToken(t *testing.T) string { + t.Helper() + token, err := runtimeauth.IssueToken(testSecret, "1", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing token: %v", err) + } + return token +} + +func get(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server, path, token string) (*http.Response, map[string]any) { + t.Helper() + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+path, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("building request: %v", err) + } + if token != "" { + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token) + } + resp, err := srv.Client().Do(req) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("requesting %s: %v", path, err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { resp.Body.Close() }) + var body map[string]any + _ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body) + return resp, body +} + +func postJSON(t *testing.T, srv *httptest.Server, path, token, payload string) (*http.Response, map[string]any) { + t.Helper() + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, srv.URL+path, strings.NewReader(payload)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("building request: %v", err) + } + req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + if token != "" { + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token) + } + resp, err := srv.Client().Do(req) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("requesting %s: %v", path, err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { resp.Body.Close() }) + var body map[string]any + _ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&body) + return resp, body +} + +// --- capabilities -------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestCapabilitiesIsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) { + // A client has to be able to tell what it reached before it has + // credentials, exactly as with the runtime's own /api/capabilities. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/capabilities", "") + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if body["service"] != "openplc-bootloader" { + t.Fatalf("want a service identifier, got %v", body["service"]) + } + if body["recovery"] != false { + t.Fatalf("a healthy device is not in recovery, got %v", body["recovery"]) + } +} + +func TestCapabilitiesFlagsRecovery(t *testing.T) { + // The editor keys its recovery panel off this, so it has to be truthful + // without needing a token. + sup := &fakeSupervisor{status: supervisor.Status{ + State: supervisor.StateRecovery, Reason: "runtime exited 3 times", + }} + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, sup, &fakeLogs{}) + _, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/capabilities", "") + if body["recovery"] != true { + t.Fatalf("want recovery true, got %v", body["recovery"]) + } +} + +// --- authentication ------------------------------------------------------ + +func TestProtectedRoutesRejectAMissingToken(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + for _, path := range []string{"/api/bootloader/status", "/api/bootloader/logs"} { + resp, _ := get(t, srv, path, "") + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("%s without a token: want 401, got %d", path, resp.StatusCode) + } + } +} + +func TestProtectedRoutesRejectATokenSignedWithAnotherSecret(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + forged, err := runtimeauth.IssueToken(strings.Repeat("c", 64), "1", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing: %v", err) + } + resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", forged) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("want 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestARuntimeIssuedTokenIsAccepted(t *testing.T) { + // The point of sharing JWT_SECRET_KEY: the editor logs into the runtime + // and uses that token here, without a second login. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestEverythingIsRefusedWhenNoAccountsExist(t *testing.T) { + // First-user bootstrap belongs to the runtime alone. A bootloader that + // could mint the first admin would be a second path to owning the device. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 0}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("want 403 with no accounts, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if msg, _ := body["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "runtime") { + t.Fatalf("the refusal must point the operator at the runtime, got %q", msg) + } + + resp, _ = postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", + `{"username":"admin","password":"x"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("login must be refused too, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestAnUnreadableAccountDatabaseIsReportedAsUnavailable(t *testing.T) { + // Not 401: the caller's credentials are not the problem, and telling them + // they are would send them chasing the wrong thing. + srv := newTestServer(t, + &fakeUsers{countErr: errors.New("disk error")}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusServiceUnavailable { + t.Fatalf("want 503, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestTheBearerSchemeIsCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, srv.URL+"/api/bootloader/status", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("building request: %v", err) + } + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "bearer "+validToken(t)) + resp, err := srv.Client().Do(req) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("requesting: %v", err) + } + defer resp.Body.Close() + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200 for a lowercase scheme, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// --- login --------------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestLoginIssuesAUsableToken(t *testing.T) { + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, user: &runtimeauth.User{ID: "7", Username: "op", Role: "admin"}} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", + `{"username":"op","password":"op"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d (%v)", resp.StatusCode, body) + } + token, _ := body["access_token"].(string) + if token == "" { + t.Fatal("login must return an access token") + } + // The token it issued must actually work on a protected route -- a token + // that parses but is rejected would be a maddening thing to debug. + statusResp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", token) + if statusResp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("the issued token was refused: %d", statusResp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestLoginRejectsBadCredentialsWithoutRevealingWhy(t *testing.T) { + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, authErr: runtimeauth.ErrNoSuchUser} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", + `{"username":"nobody","password":"x"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("want 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + msg, _ := body["error"].(string) + // One message for both an unknown user and a wrong password. + if !strings.Contains(msg, "wrong username or password") { + t.Fatalf("want an indistinguishable message, got %q", msg) + } +} + +func TestAnUnverifiableHashIsNotReportedAsABadPassword(t *testing.T) { + // Otherwise an operator is left convinced they have forgotten their own + // password when the real problem is a hash format we cannot read. + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, authErr: runtimeauth.ErrUnsupportedHash} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", + `{"username":"op","password":"op"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError { + t.Fatalf("want 500 for an unreadable hash, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestLoginRequiresBothFields(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", `{"username":"op"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("want 400, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestAnUnknownFieldInTheLoginBodyIsRejected(t *testing.T) { + // DisallowUnknownFields: a client sending "user" instead of "username" + // should be told, not silently treated as sending nothing. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", + `{"username":"op","password":"op","extra":1}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("want 400, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// --- status and logs ----------------------------------------------------- + +func TestStatusReportsTheSupervisorState(t *testing.T) { + sup := &fakeSupervisor{status: supervisor.Status{ + State: supervisor.StateRecovery, Reason: "runtime exited 3 times", CrashCount: 3, + }} + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, sup, &fakeLogs{}) + _, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", validToken(t)) + + if body["state"] != string(supervisor.StateRecovery) { + t.Fatalf("want recovery, got %v", body["state"]) + } + if body["reason"] != "runtime exited 3 times" { + t.Fatalf("the reason must reach the operator verbatim, got %v", body["reason"]) + } + if body["crashCount"].(float64) != 3 { + t.Fatalf("want crashCount 3, got %v", body["crashCount"]) + } +} + +func TestLogsReturnTheRuntimeTail(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), + &fakeLogs{out: "starting OpenPLC\nready\n"}) + _, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/logs", validToken(t)) + if body["available"] != true { + t.Fatalf("want available true, got %v", body["available"]) + } + if !strings.Contains(body["logs"].(string), "ready") { + t.Fatalf("logs did not come through: %v", body["logs"]) + } +} + +func TestMissingLogsAreNotAnError(t *testing.T) { + // A device before its first successful start has no container to read, and + // that is a state to report rather than a failure. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), + &fakeLogs{err: errors.New("no such container")}) + resp, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/logs", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if body["available"] != false { + t.Fatalf("want available false, got %v", body["available"]) + } +} + +func TestAnAbsurdLogTailIsClamped(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{out: "x"}) + _, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/logs?tail=999999", validToken(t)) + if body["tail"].(float64) != float64(maxLogTail) { + t.Fatalf("want the tail clamped to %d, got %v", maxLogTail, body["tail"]) + } +} + +func TestANonNumericLogTailIsRejected(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/logs?tail=lots", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("want 400, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// --- restart ------------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestRestartStopsThenReconciles(t *testing.T) { + // Reconcile rather than a docker restart: it is the only path that also + // creates the container when it is missing, so restart works identically + // on a device that has never started one. + sup := healthySupervisor() + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, sup, &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/restart", validToken(t), `{}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if sup.stopHits != 1 || sup.reconcileHits != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want one stop and one reconcile, got stop=%d reconcile=%d", + sup.stopHits, sup.reconcileHits) + } +} + +func TestRestartReportsAFailureToComeBackUp(t *testing.T) { + sup := healthySupervisor() + sup.reconcileErr = errors.New("no such image") + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, sup, &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/restart", validToken(t), `{}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError { + t.Fatalf("want 500, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if msg, _ := body["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "no such image") { + t.Fatalf("the underlying cause must reach the operator, got %q", msg) + } +} + +func TestRestartIsNotReachableWithoutAToken(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/restart", "", `{}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("want 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// --- surface ------------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestTheApiOffersNoProgramOrPlcControl(t *testing.T) { + // The bootloader is deliberately dumb: programs and PLC control belong to + // the runtime. This pins that, so a future addition has to be a conscious + // decision rather than a route somebody added in passing. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + token := validToken(t) + for _, path := range []string{ + "/api/bootloader/upload-file", + "/api/bootloader/start-plc", + "/api/bootloader/stop-plc", + "/api/bootloader/compile", + } { + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, path, token, `{}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound { + t.Fatalf("%s must not exist, got %d", path, resp.StatusCode) + } + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/tls.go b/bootloader/internal/api/tls.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f64c4f6b --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/tls.go @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +package api + +import ( + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/pem" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "net" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "time" +) + +// The bootloader serves HTTPS with its own self-signed certificate, generated +// once into its state directory and reused thereafter. +// +// Its own, rather than the runtime's: the runtime generates its certificate +// inside its image (webserver/certOPENPLC.pem), so it is not in the shared +// volume and there is nothing to share. Reusing it would also mean the +// bootloader could not serve TLS at all before the runtime had ever started, +// which is exactly the case recovery exists for. +// +// Self-signed is the same posture the runtime already has, so the editor's +// handling is unchanged. Persisting it matters: regenerating on every boot +// would change the fingerprint each time the device restarted, training +// operators to click through certificate warnings. +const ( + certFileName = "bootloader-cert.pem" + keyFileName = "bootloader-key.pem" + // Ten years. This certificate identifies a device on a plant LAN, and an + // expiry that stops recovery working on a machine nobody has touched in + // three years would be a self-inflicted outage. + certValidity = 10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour +) + +// LoadOrCreateCertificate returns the bootloader's TLS certificate, generating +// and persisting one on first use. +func LoadOrCreateCertificate(stateDir string) (tls.Certificate, error) { + certPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, certFileName) + keyPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, keyFileName) + + cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certPath, keyPath) + if err == nil { + return cert, nil + } + if !os.IsNotExist(err) { + // A present but unreadable or corrupt pair is worth replacing rather + // than refusing to start: without TLS the bootloader cannot be + // reached, and being unreachable is the one failure it must not have. + // The old files are overwritten below. + if removeErr := os.Remove(certPath); removeErr != nil && !os.IsNotExist(removeErr) { + return tls.Certificate{}, fmt.Errorf("replacing unusable certificate: %w", removeErr) + } + _ = os.Remove(keyPath) + } + + if err := generateSelfSigned(certPath, keyPath); err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + cert, err = tls.LoadX509KeyPair(certPath, keyPath) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, fmt.Errorf("loading freshly generated certificate: %w", err) + } + return cert, nil +} + +// generateSelfSigned writes a new P-256 certificate and key. +// +// ECDSA rather than RSA: a 2048-bit RSA keygen on a Pi-class CPU takes long +// enough to notice at first boot, and P-256 is both faster and universally +// supported by anything that will talk to this port. +func generateSelfSigned(certPath, keyPath string) error { + key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("generating key: %w", err) + } + + serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128)) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("generating serial: %w", err) + } + + hostname, err := os.Hostname() + if err != nil || hostname == "" { + hostname = "openplc-bootloader" + } + + template := x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: serial, + Subject: pkix.Name{ + CommonName: hostname, + Organization: []string{"OpenPLC Bootloader"}, + }, + NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), + NotAfter: time.Now().Add(certValidity), + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageCertSign, + ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{ + x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, + }, + BasicConstraintsValid: true, + IsCA: true, + DNSNames: []string{hostname, "localhost"}, + // Loopback covers a local probe; the device's LAN addresses are not + // enumerated because they change with DHCP and a SAN mismatch on a + // self-signed certificate the client is not verifying anyway would be + // noise rather than protection. + IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), net.ParseIP("::1")}, + } + + der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &template, &template, &key.PublicKey, key) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating certificate: %w", err) + } + + if err := writePEM(certPath, "CERTIFICATE", der, 0o644); err != nil { + return err + } + + keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("marshalling key: %w", err) + } + // 0600: the private key must not be world-readable even inside a + // container whose volume an operator may inspect from the host. + return writePEM(keyPath, "EC PRIVATE KEY", keyDER, 0o600) +} + +// writePEM writes a PEM block atomically, so an interrupted first boot cannot +// leave a half-written certificate that fails to parse forever after. +func writePEM(path, blockType string, der []byte, mode os.FileMode) error { + encoded := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: blockType, Bytes: der}) + if encoded == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("encoding %s for %s", blockType, path) + } + + tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(path), ".pem-*") + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating temp file for %s: %w", path, err) + } + tmpName := tmp.Name() + defer os.Remove(tmpName) + + if _, err := tmp.Write(encoded); err != nil { + tmp.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("writing %s: %w", path, err) + } + if err := tmp.Chmod(mode); err != nil { + tmp.Close() + return fmt.Errorf("setting mode on %s: %w", path, err) + } + if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("closing temp file for %s: %w", path, err) + } + if err := os.Rename(tmpName, path); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("installing %s: %w", path, err) + } + return nil +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/tls_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/tls_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2466c7ea --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/tls_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +package api + +import ( + "crypto/x509" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" +) + +func TestACertificateIsGeneratedOnFirstUse(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + cert, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first use: %v", err) + } + if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 { + t.Fatal("no certificate returned") + } + for _, name := range []string{certFileName, keyFileName} { + if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, name)); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("%s was not persisted: %v", name, err) + } + } +} + +func TestTheCertificateIsReusedOnSubsequentBoots(t *testing.T) { + // Regenerating on every boot would change the fingerprint each time the + // device restarted, which trains operators to click through certificate + // warnings -- the opposite of what a certificate is for. + dir := t.TempDir() + first, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first use: %v", err) + } + second, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("second use: %v", err) + } + if string(first.Certificate[0]) != string(second.Certificate[0]) { + t.Fatal("the certificate must be stable across boots") + } +} + +func TestACorruptCertificateIsReplacedRatherThanFatal(t *testing.T) { + // Being unreachable is the one failure the bootloader must not have, so a + // damaged key pair is worth replacing rather than refusing to start over. + dir := t.TempDir() + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, certFileName), []byte("not a pem"), 0o644); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("seeding corrupt cert: %v", err) + } + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, keyFileName), []byte("nor this"), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("seeding corrupt key: %v", err) + } + + cert, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("a corrupt pair must be replaced, got: %v", err) + } + if len(cert.Certificate) == 0 { + t.Fatal("no certificate returned") + } +} + +func TestThePrivateKeyIsNotWorldReadable(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + if _, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(dir); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("generating: %v", err) + } + info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, keyFileName)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("stat: %v", err) + } + if mode := info.Mode().Perm(); mode&0o077 != 0 { + t.Fatalf("key mode %04o is readable beyond its owner", mode) + } +} + +func TestTheCertificateIsUsableForServerAuth(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + cert, err := LoadOrCreateCertificate(dir) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("generating: %v", err) + } + parsed, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0]) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("parsing: %v", err) + } + + var serverAuth bool + for _, usage := range parsed.ExtKeyUsage { + if usage == x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth { + serverAuth = true + } + } + if !serverAuth { + t.Error("the certificate must be valid for server authentication") + } + // A certificate that expires would stop recovery working on a device + // nobody has touched in years. + if parsed.NotAfter.Sub(parsed.NotBefore) < 5*365*24*3600*1e9 { + t.Errorf("validity is too short: %s", parsed.NotAfter.Sub(parsed.NotBefore)) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go index 653e3761..8a713f86 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go @@ -434,3 +434,28 @@ func TestAMissingRoleColumnValueDefaultsToAdmin(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("a NULL role must resolve to admin, got %q", user.Role) } } + +// --- absent database ----------------------------------------------------- + +func TestANilStoreReportsRatherThanPanics(t *testing.T) { + // On a device whose runtime has never started there is no restapi.db, and + // the bootloader still has to come up so an operator can find out why. A + // typed nil assigned to an interface is not nil at the call site, so + // without these guards the first request would panic the process into a + // Docker restart loop -- on precisely the device that most needs a way in. + var store *UserStore + ctx := context.Background() + + if _, err := store.CountUsers(ctx); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoDatabase) { + t.Fatalf("CountUsers: want ErrNoDatabase, got %v", err) + } + if _, err := store.FindUser(ctx, "op"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoDatabase) { + t.Fatalf("FindUser: want ErrNoDatabase, got %v", err) + } + if _, err := store.Authenticate(ctx, "op", "pw", vectorPepper); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoDatabase) { + t.Fatalf("Authenticate: want ErrNoDatabase, got %v", err) + } + if err := store.Close(); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("Close on a nil store must be a no-op, got %v", err) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go index 6d55ff52..4434a607 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go @@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ var ErrNoSuchUser = errors.New("no such user") // access anyway. var ErrNoUsers = errors.New("no users have been created yet") +// ErrNoDatabase means there is no account database to read. +// +// A nil UserStore is a legitimate state, not a programming error: on a device +// whose runtime has never started there is no restapi.db yet, and the +// bootloader must still come up so an operator can find out why. Every method +// below tolerates a nil receiver, because a typed nil assigned to an interface +// is NOT nil at the call site -- without these guards the first request on +// such a device would panic the bootloader into a restart loop. +var ErrNoDatabase = errors.New("the runtime account database is not available") + // User is the subset of an account the bootloader needs. type User struct { ID string @@ -86,6 +96,9 @@ func (s *UserStore) Close() error { // zero rather than an error: a runtime that has never started leaves the file // present but empty, and that is the no-users case, not a broken database. func (s *UserStore) CountUsers(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + if s == nil || s.db == nil { + return 0, ErrNoDatabase + } var count int query := "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM " + usersTable if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query).Scan(&count); err != nil { @@ -99,6 +112,9 @@ func (s *UserStore) CountUsers(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { // FindUser looks up an account by username. func (s *UserStore) FindUser(ctx context.Context, username string) (*User, error) { + if s == nil || s.db == nil { + return nil, ErrNoDatabase + } query := "SELECT id, username, password_hash, role FROM " + usersTable + " WHERE username = ?" row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, username) @@ -133,6 +149,9 @@ func (s *UserStore) FindUser(ctx context.Context, username string) (*User, error // still hashed for an unknown user -- see below -- so the two paths cost // roughly the same time. func (s *UserStore) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*User, error) { + if s == nil || s.db == nil { + return nil, ErrNoDatabase + } user, err := s.FindUser(ctx, username) if err != nil { if errors.Is(err, ErrNoSuchUser) { diff --git a/bootloader/main.go b/bootloader/main.go index 9070123b..a167805f 100644 --- a/bootloader/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ import ( "syscall" "time" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/api" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/health" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimespec" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" ) @@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ func main() { probeURL = flag.String("probe-url", health.DefaultURL, "runtime health probe URL") showVer = flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit") logLevel = flag.String("log-level", "info", "log level: debug, info, warn, error") + port = flag.Int("port", api.DefaultPort, "control API port") maxCrashes = flag.Int("max-crashes", supervisor.DefaultMaxCrashes, "unexpected runtime exits within the window before entering recovery") crashWindow = flag.Duration("crash-window", supervisor.DefaultCrashWindow, @@ -71,23 +74,36 @@ func main() { log := newLogger(*logLevel) log.Info("openplc-bootloader starting", "version", version, "stateDir", *stateDir) - if err := run(log, *stateDir, *socket, *probeURL, *maxCrashes, *crashWindow); err != nil { + if err := run(log, runConfig{ + stateDir: *stateDir, + socket: *socket, + probeURL: *probeURL, + port: *port, + maxCrashes: *maxCrashes, + crashWindow: *crashWindow, + }); err != nil { log.Error("bootloader exiting", "error", err) os.Exit(1) } } -func run( - log *slog.Logger, - stateDir, socket, probeURL string, - maxCrashes int, - crashWindow time.Duration, -) error { - if err := os.MkdirAll(stateDir, 0o750); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("creating state dir %s: %w", stateDir, err) +// runConfig groups what run needs, so adding a knob does not keep widening a +// positional parameter list. +type runConfig struct { + stateDir string + socket string + probeURL string + port int + maxCrashes int + crashWindow time.Duration +} + +func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { + if err := os.MkdirAll(cfg.stateDir, 0o750); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating state dir %s: %w", cfg.stateDir, err) } - specPath := filepath.Join(stateDir, "runtime-spec.json") + specPath := filepath.Join(cfg.stateDir, "runtime-spec.json") spec, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) if err != nil { // Without a spec the bootloader does not know which image to run or which @@ -99,27 +115,98 @@ func run( log.Info("loaded runtime spec", "image", spec.ImageRef(), "dataDir", spec.DataDir, "extraBinds", len(spec.ExtraBinds)) - docker := dockerapi.New(socket) - prober := health.New(probeURL, 5*time.Second) + docker := dockerapi.New(cfg.socket) + prober := health.New(cfg.probeURL, 5*time.Second) sup := supervisor.New(docker, spec, prober, supervisor.Config{ - MaxCrashes: maxCrashes, - CrashWindow: crashWindow, + MaxCrashes: cfg.maxCrashes, + CrashWindow: cfg.crashWindow, }, log.With("component", "supervisor")) + // Authentication reads the runtime's own credentials out of the shared data + // directory. Missing or unreadable is not fatal: the control API still + // needs to come up so an operator can see WHY, and every authenticated + // route refuses cleanly until the files appear. + secrets, users := openRuntimeCredentials(log, spec.DataDir) + if users != nil { + defer users.Close() + } + + server, err := api.New(api.Config{ + Port: cfg.port, + StateDir: cfg.stateDir, + Version: version, + RuntimeVersion: func() string { return spec.Version }, + Secrets: secrets, + Users: users, + Supervisor: sup, + Logs: docker, + Log: log.With("component", "api"), + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // Signals: a container stop must not be read as a reason to tear the // runtime down. The bootloader going away leaves the runtime running, which // is correct -- losing the manager should never stop the plant. ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) defer stop() - if err := sup.Run(ctx); err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { - return err + // The control API and the supervisor run concurrently, and the API must + // outlive a supervisor that has given up: recovery mode is precisely the + // state where the supervisor has stopped trying and an operator needs to + // reach the device. + apiErr := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { apiErr <- server.ListenAndServe(ctx) }() + + supErr := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { supErr <- sup.Run(ctx) }() + + select { + case err := <-apiErr: + // Losing the control API is fatal to the process: without it the + // device is unmanageable, which is the one thing this binary exists + // to prevent. Docker's restart policy brings us back. + if err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { + return err + } + case err := <-supErr: + if err != nil && ctx.Err() == nil { + return err + } + case <-ctx.Done(): } + log.Info("bootloader stopped; runtime container left running") return nil } +// openRuntimeCredentials loads the runtime's secrets and user database. +// +// Both live in the runtime's data directory, which the bootloader mounts +// read-only. Failure returns nils rather than an error on purpose: a device +// whose runtime has never started has neither file yet, and refusing to boot +// would leave nothing listening on the very device that most needs a way in. +func openRuntimeCredentials( + log *slog.Logger, dataDir string, +) (*runtimeauth.Secrets, *runtimeauth.UserStore) { + secrets, err := runtimeauth.LoadSecrets(filepath.Join(dataDir, ".env")) + if err != nil { + log.Warn("runtime secrets unavailable; authenticated routes will refuse", + "error", err) + return &runtimeauth.Secrets{}, nil + } + + users, err := runtimeauth.OpenUserStore(filepath.Join(dataDir, "restapi.db")) + if err != nil { + log.Warn("runtime account database unavailable; authenticated routes will refuse", + "error", err) + return secrets, nil + } + return secrets, users +} + func newLogger(level string) *slog.Logger { var lvl slog.Level switch level { From 9b93cb953c8606ceaf2d30d16c17350497d09ca8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 16:24:05 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 06/22] feat(bootloader): version change executor, and a runtime HEALTHCHECK The order is the safety property: pull new -> stop old -> start new -> health-gate -> remove old Pull first because `docker pull` is non-destructive. Until the explicit removal at the end the device still has a working image on disk, so a link that dies mid-pull or a new version that will not start leaves something to fall back to -- and it costs nothing, since only one image remains afterwards and you cannot start a version you have not downloaded anyway. Tests pin the sequence, and pin that a failed pull never stops the running runtime. Upgrade and downgrade are one operation with no version floor. Reinstalling the version already running is allowed too: it is the only repair an operator can perform from the editor when an image is damaged. The spec records the new version BEFORE the container is recreated, so a power cut mid-swap boots the version it was moving to -- whose image is by then on disk -- rather than silently reverting to one the operator was told had been replaced. No automatic rollback. A failure stops and hands the device to recovery, because choosing a version has physical consequences and guessing wrong twice is worse than stopping once. Failing to remove the OLD image is the one exception: the new version is running, disk was merely not reclaimed, and rolling back a working runtime over that would be absurd. Version strings are validated against Docker's tag grammar before use. The reference is built as repository + ":" + version, so a slash, colon or '@' could otherwise redirect the pull to another repository, another registry, or a digest. The pull carries a STALL timeout rather than a total one. Docker's streaming pull takes no timeout at all, so a half-open registry connection parks the decoder forever -- the failure orchestrator-agent documents, where an entry stuck in "pulling" refused every retry for the life of the process. A total timeout would instead punish a slow-but-working link, which is the normal case: the SLM-RP4 measured 461 KB/s with 48% iowait and took 59 minutes for a 974 MB image without ever stalling. The disk pre-check is advisory. It measures the bootloader's own filesystem, which is Docker's only on a default layout -- a device with a moved data-root (as the AM62xx Yocto board has) would otherwise be blocked by a measurement of the wrong disk. Also adds the runtime HEALTHCHECK the bootloader reads off the events stream, and fixes the three /api/ping examples in docs/DOCKER.md: ping is JWT-gated, so `curl -f` against it always returned 401 and that healthcheck could never have passed. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- Dockerfile | 21 + bootloader/internal/api/server.go | 55 ++ bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go | 139 +++++ bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images.go | 250 +++++++++ bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images_test.go | 170 +++++++ bootloader/internal/updater/disk_linux.go | 29 ++ bootloader/internal/updater/disk_other.go | 14 + bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go | 349 +++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go | 501 +++++++++++++++++++ bootloader/main.go | 11 + docs/DOCKER.md | 13 +- 11 files changed, 1548 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images_test.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/updater/disk_linux.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/updater/disk_other.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index ea41723e..12bd8cab 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -30,5 +30,26 @@ RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* # Expose webserver port EXPOSE 8443 +# Liveness for the bootloader (RTOP-283), which reads Docker's health state off +# the events stream instead of polling the runtime itself. +# +# /api/version, NOT /api/ping: ping sits behind @jwt_required(), so a +# healthcheck against it always gets a 401 and `curl -f` always fails. (The +# example in docs/DOCKER.md had exactly that bug.) +# +# Scope is deliberately "the webserver answers" and nothing more. Whether +# plc_main is running, whether a program is loaded, and whether that program +# is in ERROR are the webserver's own business -- runtimemanager._monitor() +# already restarts plc_main and drops it into safe mode on rapid crashes. If +# this probe cared about PLC state, a user uploading broken logic would make +# the container unhealthy and trigger a runtime recovery, turning a program +# bug into a device outage. +# +# start-period is generous because a cold start compiles nothing but does load +# plugin venvs, and a runtime marked unhealthy before it has finished booting +# would be restarted for no reason. +HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=90s --retries=3 \ + CMD curl -kfsS https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/version >/dev/null || exit 1 + # Default execution - Start OpenPLC Runtime CMD ["bash", "./start_openplc.sh"] diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go index c80d8995..b5b20026 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import ( "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/updater" ) // DefaultPort is the bootloader's control port. 8445 keeps to the odd numbers @@ -51,6 +52,14 @@ type LogReader interface { ContainerLogs(ctx context.Context, name string, tail int) (string, error) } +// Updater changes which runtime version the device runs. Start returns as +// soon as the work is under way; a pull can run for many minutes on a plant +// link, so the caller polls Progress rather than holding a request open. +type Updater interface { + Start(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) error + Progress() updater.Progress +} + // Authenticator resolves credentials against the runtime's account set. type Authenticator interface { Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*runtimeauth.User, error) @@ -70,6 +79,7 @@ type Config struct { Users Authenticator Supervisor Supervisor Logs LogReader + Updater Updater Log *slog.Logger } @@ -125,6 +135,8 @@ func (s *Server) routes(mux *http.ServeMux) { mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/status", s.authenticated(s.handleStatus)) mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/logs", s.authenticated(s.handleLogs)) mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/restart", s.authenticated(s.handleRestart)) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdate)) + mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdateProgress)) } // ListenAndServe blocks until ctx is cancelled or the listener fails. @@ -362,6 +374,49 @@ func (s *Server) handleRestart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { }) } +// updateRequest asks for a specific version. Upgrade and downgrade are the +// same request: there is no separate direction, because there is no version +// floor and nothing about the mechanism cares which way the number moves. +type updateRequest struct { + Version string `json:"version"` +} + +func (s *Server) handleUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + var body updateRequest + if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, 4*1024); err != nil { + return + } + + // No PLC-stopped gate: an authenticated request is sufficient, whether + // the PLC is running or not. The runtime flushes retained variables on + // SIGTERM and the stop grace period is sized for it. + if err := s.cfg.Updater.Start(r.Context(), body.Version); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, updater.ErrInProgress) { + // 409, with the current progress attached so a second editor can + // simply follow along instead of guessing. + writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, map[string]any{ + "error": err.Error(), + "progress": s.cfg.Updater.Progress(), + }) + return + } + writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error()) + return + } + + s.cfg.Log.Info("update requested", "version", body.Version) + // 202: accepted and running, not finished. The client polls GET on the + // same path. + writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{ + "accepted": true, + "progress": s.cfg.Updater.Progress(), + }) +} + +func (s *Server) handleUpdateProgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.cfg.Updater.Progress()) +} + // --- helpers ------------------------------------------------------------- func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body any) { diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go index 9ee1f698..34c85bbf 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import ( "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/updater" ) const ( @@ -446,3 +447,141 @@ func TestTheApiOffersNoProgramOrPlcControl(t *testing.T) { } } } + +// --- update -------------------------------------------------------------- + +type fakeUpdater struct { + startErr error + started []string + progress updater.Progress +} + +func (f *fakeUpdater) Start(_ context.Context, version string) error { + if f.startErr != nil { + return f.startErr + } + f.started = append(f.started, version) + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeUpdater) Progress() updater.Progress { return f.progress } + +// newTestServerWithUpdater is newTestServer plus an updater, kept separate so +// the existing tests keep exercising the routes that do not need one. +func newTestServerWithUpdater(t *testing.T, up Updater) *httptest.Server { + t.Helper() + srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ + Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", + RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, + Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, + Users: &fakeUsers{count: 1}, + Supervisor: healthySupervisor(), + Logs: &fakeLogs{}, + Updater: up, + Log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), + }} + mux := http.NewServeMux() + srv.routes(mux) + httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(mux) + t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close) + return httpSrv +} + +func TestAnUpdateIsAcceptedAndRunsInTheBackground(t *testing.T) { + // 202, not 200: a pull can run for many minutes on a plant link, so the + // request returns as soon as the work is under way and the client polls. + up := &fakeUpdater{} + srv := newTestServerWithUpdater(t, up) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"v4.2.2"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("want 202, got %d (%v)", resp.StatusCode, body) + } + if len(up.started) != 1 || up.started[0] != "v4.2.2" { + t.Fatalf("want the requested version started, got %v", up.started) + } +} + +func TestDowngradeUsesTheSameRequestAsUpgrade(t *testing.T) { + // There is no separate direction and no version floor: a user may + // deliberately pair an older runtime with an older editor. + up := &fakeUpdater{} + srv := newTestServerWithUpdater(t, up) + + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"v4.1.10"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("a downgrade must be accepted like any other version, got %d", + resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestASecondUpdateAnswers409WithTheProgressAttached(t *testing.T) { + // Attaching the progress lets a second editor follow along rather than + // guess what the first one asked for. + up := &fakeUpdater{ + startErr: updater.ErrInProgress, + progress: updater.Progress{State: updater.StatePulling, To: "v4.2.2"}, + } + srv := newTestServerWithUpdater(t, up) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"v4.2.3"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusConflict { + t.Fatalf("want 409, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + progress, ok := body["progress"].(map[string]any) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("the in-flight progress must be attached, got %v", body) + } + if progress["to"] != "v4.2.2" { + t.Fatalf("want the in-flight target, got %v", progress["to"]) + } +} + +func TestAnInvalidVersionIsRefusedWithTheReason(t *testing.T) { + up := &fakeUpdater{startErr: errors.New(`"evil.example.com/x:v1" is not a valid version tag`)} + srv := newTestServerWithUpdater(t, up) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"evil.example.com/x:v1"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("want 400, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if msg, _ := body["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "not a valid version tag") { + t.Fatalf("the reason must reach the operator, got %q", msg) + } +} + +func TestUpdateProgressIsPollable(t *testing.T) { + fifty := 50 + up := &fakeUpdater{progress: updater.Progress{ + State: updater.StatePulling, From: "v4.2.1", To: "v4.2.2", + Phase: "Downloading", Percent: &fifty, + }} + srv := newTestServerWithUpdater(t, up) + + resp, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if body["state"] != string(updater.StatePulling) { + t.Fatalf("want pulling, got %v", body["state"]) + } + if body["percent"].(float64) != 50 { + t.Fatalf("want 50%%, got %v", body["percent"]) + } +} + +func TestUpdateRoutesRequireAToken(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServerWithUpdater(t, &fakeUpdater{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", "", `{"version":"v4.2.2"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("want 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + resp, _ = get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", "") + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("want 401 on progress too, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1297a9ad --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images.go @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +package dockerapi + +import ( + "context" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io" + "net/http" + "net/url" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// PullProgress is a snapshot of an in-flight image pull. +type PullProgress struct { + // Phase is the daemon's own wording ("Downloading", "Extracting", ...), + // passed through rather than translated: it is what a user sees in every + // other Docker tool, and inventing our own vocabulary would only make the + // two disagree. + Phase string + // Percent is 0-100 across all layers, or nil when the daemon has given no + // size information to work from -- which happens for layers it already + // has, and for the brief window before any size is known. + Percent *int + // Current and Total are the aggregate byte counts behind Percent. + Current int64 + Total int64 +} + +// pullEvent is one line of the daemon's /images/create stream. +type pullEvent struct { + Status string `json:"status"` + ID string `json:"id"` + Error string `json:"error"` + ProgressDetail struct { + Current int64 `json:"current"` + Total int64 `json:"total"` + } `json:"progressDetail"` + ErrorDetail *struct { + Message string `json:"message"` + } `json:"errorDetail"` +} + +// StallTimeout is how long a pull may go without any progress before it is +// abandoned. +// +// A stall timeout rather than a total timeout, deliberately. The Docker +// client's streaming pull takes no timeout at all, so a half-open connection +// to the registry leaves the decoder parked forever -- the failure +// orchestrator-agent documents in pull_runtime_image.py, where the entry stuck +// in "pulling" refused every retry for the life of the process. A total +// timeout would instead punish a slow-but-working link, which on a plant +// network is the normal case: a 1.4 GB image over a poor connection can +// legitimately take a very long time while never stalling. +const StallTimeout = 5 * time.Minute + +// PullImage pulls ref, reporting progress until it completes. +// +// onProgress is called from the reading goroutine and must not block for long. +// It may be nil. +func (c *Client) PullImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(PullProgress)) error { + name, tag := splitImageRef(ref) + params := url.Values{} + params.Set("fromImage", name) + params.Set("tag", tag) + + // A cancellable child context so the stall watchdog can abort the read. + pullCtx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx) + defer cancel() + + body, err := c.stream(pullCtx, http.MethodPost, "/images/create"+encodeQuery(params), nil) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("pulling %s: %w", ref, err) + } + defer body.Close() + + watchdog := newStallWatchdog(StallTimeout, cancel) + defer watchdog.stop() + + // Per-layer byte counts, so the aggregate percentage is over the whole + // image rather than whichever layer reported last. + layers := map[string]struct{ current, total int64 }{} + + decoder := json.NewDecoder(body) + for { + var event pullEvent + if err := decoder.Decode(&event); err != nil { + if err == io.EOF { + return nil + } + // Distinguish our own stall abort from a genuine transport error: + // "context canceled" on its own would send an operator looking for + // a network fault that did not happen. + if watchdog.fired() { + return fmt.Errorf( + "pulling %s: no progress for %s, giving up", ref, StallTimeout) + } + if ctx.Err() != nil { + return ctx.Err() + } + return fmt.Errorf("pulling %s: %w", ref, err) + } + watchdog.beat() + + // The daemon reports failures inside the stream with a 200 status, so + // this is the only place a bad tag or an auth problem surfaces. + if event.Error != "" { + return fmt.Errorf("pulling %s: %s", ref, event.Error) + } + if event.ErrorDetail != nil && event.ErrorDetail.Message != "" { + return fmt.Errorf("pulling %s: %s", ref, event.ErrorDetail.Message) + } + + if onProgress == nil { + continue + } + if event.ID != "" && event.ProgressDetail.Total > 0 { + layers[event.ID] = struct{ current, total int64 }{ + current: event.ProgressDetail.Current, + total: event.ProgressDetail.Total, + } + } + onProgress(aggregate(event.Status, layers)) + } +} + +// aggregate sums the per-layer counters into one progress report. +func aggregate(phase string, layers map[string]struct{ current, total int64 }) PullProgress { + var current, total int64 + for _, layer := range layers { + current += layer.current + total += layer.total + } + progress := PullProgress{Phase: phase, Current: current, Total: total} + if total > 0 { + percent := int(current * 100 / total) + // Clamp: the daemon occasionally reports current slightly above total + // for a layer, and a progress bar reading 103% looks like a bug. + if percent > 100 { + percent = 100 + } + if percent < 0 { + percent = 0 + } + progress.Percent = &percent + } + return progress +} + +// stallWatchdog cancels a context when beat() has not been called for the +// configured duration. +type stallWatchdog struct { + mu sync.Mutex + timer *time.Timer + timeout time.Duration + tripped bool + stopped bool + onExpire func() +} + +func newStallWatchdog(timeout time.Duration, onExpire func()) *stallWatchdog { + w := &stallWatchdog{timeout: timeout, onExpire: onExpire} + w.timer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, w.expire) + return w +} + +func (w *stallWatchdog) expire() { + w.mu.Lock() + if w.stopped { + w.mu.Unlock() + return + } + w.tripped = true + w.mu.Unlock() + w.onExpire() +} + +func (w *stallWatchdog) beat() { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + if w.stopped || w.tripped { + return + } + w.timer.Reset(w.timeout) +} + +func (w *stallWatchdog) fired() bool { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + return w.tripped +} + +func (w *stallWatchdog) stop() { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + w.stopped = true + w.timer.Stop() +} + +// ImageInfo is the subset of an image inspect the bootloader uses. +type ImageInfo struct { + ID string `json:"Id"` + RepoTags []string `json:"RepoTags"` + Size int64 `json:"Size"` +} + +// InspectImage reports whether an image is present locally, and its size. +// A missing image yields an error satisfying IsNotFound. +func (c *Client) InspectImage(ctx context.Context, ref string) (*ImageInfo, error) { + var out ImageInfo + path := "/images/" + url.PathEscape(ref) + "/json" + if err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, nil, &out); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &out, nil +} + +// RemoveImage deletes an image by reference. +// +// A missing image is success: the goal is "not present". A conflict is NOT +// swallowed -- it means a container still references the image, and silently +// ignoring that would leave an operator believing disk was reclaimed when it +// was not. +func (c *Client) RemoveImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, force bool) error { + params := url.Values{} + if force { + params.Set("force", "true") + } + path := "/images/" + url.PathEscape(ref) + encodeQuery(params) + if err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodDelete, path, nil, nil); err != nil && !IsNotFound(err) { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// splitImageRef separates a reference into name and tag. +// +// Only the last colon counts as the tag separator, and only when it appears +// after the final slash: a registry with a port ("host:5000/image") puts a +// colon in the name, and splitting on the first would produce nonsense. +func splitImageRef(ref string) (name, tag string) { + lastSlash := strings.LastIndex(ref, "/") + lastColon := strings.LastIndex(ref, ":") + if lastColon > lastSlash { + return ref[:lastColon], ref[lastColon+1:] + } + // An untagged reference means latest, the same default docker itself uses. + return ref, "latest" +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images_test.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1daecc9c --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/images_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +package dockerapi + +import ( + "sync" + "testing" + "time" +) + +func TestSplitImageRefUsesTheLastColonAfterTheLastSlash(t *testing.T) { + // A registry with a port puts a colon in the NAME. Splitting on the first + // colon would turn "host:5000/openplc:v1" into name "host" and tag + // "5000/openplc:v1", and the pull would go somewhere that does not exist. + cases := []struct { + ref string + wantName string + wantTag string + rationale string + }{ + { + "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime:v4.2.1", + "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime", "v4.2.1", + "the ordinary case", + }, + { + "registry.local:5000/openplc-runtime:v4.2.1", + "registry.local:5000/openplc-runtime", "v4.2.1", + "a registry port must not be mistaken for the tag", + }, + { + "registry.local:5000/openplc-runtime", + "registry.local:5000/openplc-runtime", "latest", + "an untagged reference on a ported registry defaults to latest", + }, + { + "openplc-runtime", + "openplc-runtime", "latest", + "a bare name defaults to latest, as docker itself does", + }, + } + for _, c := range cases { + name, tag := splitImageRef(c.ref) + if name != c.wantName || tag != c.wantTag { + t.Errorf("%s: splitImageRef(%q) = (%q, %q), want (%q, %q)", + c.rationale, c.ref, name, tag, c.wantName, c.wantTag) + } + } +} + +func TestProgressAggregatesAcrossLayers(t *testing.T) { + // Reporting whichever layer spoke last would make the bar jump around; + // the figure a user watches has to be over the whole image. + layers := map[string]struct{ current, total int64 }{ + "a": {current: 50, total: 100}, + "b": {current: 25, total: 100}, + } + progress := aggregate("Downloading", layers) + if progress.Percent == nil { + t.Fatal("want a percentage when totals are known") + } + if *progress.Percent != 37 { + t.Fatalf("want 37%% across both layers, got %d", *progress.Percent) + } + if progress.Current != 75 || progress.Total != 200 { + t.Fatalf("want 75/200, got %d/%d", progress.Current, progress.Total) + } +} + +func TestProgressHasNoPercentageWithoutTotals(t *testing.T) { + // The daemon gives no size for layers it already has, and for the window + // before any size is known. Reporting 0% there would look like a stall. + progress := aggregate("Pulling fs layer", map[string]struct{ current, total int64 }{}) + if progress.Percent != nil { + t.Fatalf("want no percentage, got %d", *progress.Percent) + } + if progress.Phase != "Pulling fs layer" { + t.Fatalf("the daemon's own wording must pass through, got %q", progress.Phase) + } +} + +func TestProgressIsClampedTo100(t *testing.T) { + // The daemon occasionally reports a layer's current slightly above its + // total, and a progress bar reading 103% looks like a bug. + layers := map[string]struct{ current, total int64 }{ + "a": {current: 110, total: 100}, + } + progress := aggregate("Extracting", layers) + if *progress.Percent != 100 { + t.Fatalf("want the percentage clamped to 100, got %d", *progress.Percent) + } +} + +// --- stall watchdog ------------------------------------------------------ + +func TestTheStallWatchdogFiresWhenProgressStops(t *testing.T) { + // Docker's streaming pull takes no timeout, so a half-open connection to + // the registry parks the decoder forever. This is what turns that into a + // reported failure instead of a permanently "pulling" device. + var ( + mu sync.Mutex + fired bool + ) + w := newStallWatchdog(20*time.Millisecond, func() { + mu.Lock() + fired = true + mu.Unlock() + }) + defer w.stop() + + time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond) + mu.Lock() + got := fired + mu.Unlock() + + if !got { + t.Fatal("the watchdog must fire after the stall timeout") + } + if !w.fired() { + t.Fatal("fired() must report the trip, so the error can say 'no progress' " + + "rather than blaming the transport") + } +} + +func TestABeatKeepsTheWatchdogQuiet(t *testing.T) { + // A slow but progressing pull must not be aborted: on a plant link a + // large image can legitimately take a very long time. + var ( + mu sync.Mutex + fired bool + ) + w := newStallWatchdog(60*time.Millisecond, func() { + mu.Lock() + fired = true + mu.Unlock() + }) + defer w.stop() + + for i := 0; i < 6; i++ { + time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond) + w.beat() + } + + mu.Lock() + got := fired + mu.Unlock() + if got { + t.Fatal("a pull that keeps reporting progress must not be abandoned") + } +} + +func TestStoppingTheWatchdogPreventsALateFire(t *testing.T) { + // Without this, a completed pull could still have its context cancelled a + // moment later, and the next operation would fail for no reason. + var ( + mu sync.Mutex + fired bool + ) + w := newStallWatchdog(20*time.Millisecond, func() { + mu.Lock() + fired = true + mu.Unlock() + }) + w.stop() + + time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond) + mu.Lock() + defer mu.Unlock() + if fired { + t.Fatal("a stopped watchdog must not fire") + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/disk_linux.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/disk_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..803e672e --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/disk_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +//go:build linux + +package updater + +import ( + "fmt" + "syscall" +) + +// freeBytes reports free space on the filesystem holding path. +// +// Statfs on the bootloader's own state directory, not the Docker data root: +// the bootloader has no mount of /var/lib/docker, and Docker's API exposes +// image sizes but no free-space figure at all. On the layout install.sh +// creates both live under /var/lib, so this is the same filesystem. That +// assumption is why the pre-check is a warning-with-a-number rather than a +// hard gate -- an operator who has moved Docker's data-root elsewhere (as the +// AM62xx Yocto board does, to /persist) would otherwise be blocked by a +// measurement of the wrong disk. +// +// Bavail, not Bfree: Bfree counts blocks reserved for root that an ordinary +// write cannot use, so it would overstate what is actually available. +func freeBytes(path string) (int64, error) { + var stat syscall.Statfs_t + if err := syscall.Statfs(path, &stat); err != nil { + return 0, fmt.Errorf("checking free space on %s: %w", path, err) + } + return int64(stat.Bavail) * int64(stat.Bsize), nil +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/disk_other.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/disk_other.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91de40f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/disk_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +//go:build !linux + +package updater + +// freeBytes has no non-Linux implementation. +// +// The bootloader only ever runs on Linux -- it manages Linux containers +// through a Linux daemon. This file exists purely so the package still builds +// and its tests still run on a developer's machine; returning 0 makes the +// pre-check skip rather than fail, which is the right behaviour when the +// measurement is simply unavailable. +func freeBytes(_ string) (int64, error) { + return 0, nil +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6d5f530d --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +// Package updater changes which runtime version a device runs. +// +// The whole flow, and the reasoning behind its order: +// +// pull new -> stop old -> start new -> health-gate -> remove old +// +// Pull first because `docker pull` is non-destructive: it does not touch the +// existing image, so until the explicit removal at the end the device still +// has a working version on disk. That costs nothing in the steady state -- +// only one image remains afterwards -- and it means a link that dies mid-pull, +// or a new image that will not start, leaves something to fall back to. +// Removing first would save nothing at the moment that matters, since you +// cannot start the new version without having downloaded it anyway. +// +// Upgrade and downgrade are the same operation. There is no version floor: a +// user may deliberately pair an older runtime with an older editor, and the +// bootloader stays reachable either way, so nothing is gained by refusing. +// +// There is no automatic rollback. A failure stops and hands the device to an +// operator in recovery mode, because choosing a version has physical +// consequences and guessing wrong twice is worse than stopping once. +package updater + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimespec" +) + +// State is where an update has got to. +type State string + +const ( + StateIdle State = "idle" + StatePulling State = "pulling" + StateSwapping State = "swapping" + StateVerifying State = "verifying" + StateSuccess State = "success" + StateFailed State = "failed" +) + +// Progress is the update's externally visible state, polled by the editor. +type Progress struct { + State State `json:"state"` + // From and To are image tags, so the editor can label the operation + // without having to remember what it asked for. + From string `json:"from,omitempty"` + To string `json:"to,omitempty"` + // Phase is the daemon's own wording during a pull. + Phase string `json:"phase,omitempty"` + Percent *int `json:"percent,omitempty"` + // Error is written for a person: what failed and, where there is one, + // what to do about it. + Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` + StartedAt time.Time `json:"startedAt,omitempty"` + FinishedAt *time.Time `json:"finishedAt,omitempty"` +} + +// ErrInProgress is returned when an update is already running. +var ErrInProgress = errors.New("an update is already in progress") + +// DockerClient is the slice of the Docker API an update needs. +type DockerClient interface { + PullImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error + InspectImage(ctx context.Context, ref string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) + RemoveImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, force bool) error +} + +// Supervisor is what an update needs of the runtime container's owner. +type Supervisor interface { + // BeginUpdate claims the supervisor and suppresses crash accounting for + // the stop that is about to happen. + BeginUpdate() error + EndUpdate() + Stop(ctx context.Context) error + Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error + EnterRecovery(ctx context.Context, reason string) +} + +// Config wires an Updater. +type Config struct { + Docker DockerClient + Supervisor Supervisor + Spec *runtimespec.Config + SpecPath string + // StateDir is measured for the disk pre-check. + StateDir string + Log *slog.Logger +} + +// Updater performs one version change at a time. +type Updater struct { + cfg Config + + mu sync.Mutex + progress Progress + running bool +} + +// New builds an Updater. +func New(cfg Config) *Updater { + return &Updater{cfg: cfg, progress: Progress{State: StateIdle}} +} + +// Progress returns a snapshot for the editor to poll. +func (u *Updater) Progress() Progress { + u.mu.Lock() + defer u.mu.Unlock() + return u.progress +} + +// Start begins a version change and returns immediately. +// +// Asynchronous because a pull routinely runs for minutes on a plant link -- +// far longer than any sensible HTTP timeout. The caller polls Progress. +func (u *Updater) Start(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) error { + if err := validateVersion(targetVersion); err != nil { + return err + } + + u.mu.Lock() + if u.running { + u.mu.Unlock() + // Two concurrent swaps of one container is not a state worth trying + // to make safe, so it is refused with a clear message rather than + // queued. + return ErrInProgress + } + // Claim the supervisor before the goroutine starts, so a second caller + // cannot slip between the check and the claim. + if err := u.cfg.Supervisor.BeginUpdate(); err != nil { + u.mu.Unlock() + return err + } + u.running = true + u.progress = Progress{ + State: StatePulling, + From: u.cfg.Spec.Version, + To: targetVersion, + StartedAt: time.Now(), + } + u.mu.Unlock() + + // Detached from the request context on purpose: an editor that closes its + // connection mid-update must not abort a swap that is already underway + // and leave the device between versions. + go u.run(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), targetVersion) + return nil +} + +func (u *Updater) run(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) { + previousVersion := u.cfg.Spec.Version + defer u.cfg.Supervisor.EndUpdate() + + err := u.execute(ctx, previousVersion, targetVersion) + + u.mu.Lock() + u.running = false + finished := time.Now() + u.progress.FinishedAt = &finished + if err != nil { + u.progress.State = StateFailed + u.progress.Error = err.Error() + } else { + u.progress.State = StateSuccess + u.progress.Percent = nil + u.progress.Phase = "" + } + u.mu.Unlock() + + if err != nil { + u.cfg.Log.Error("update failed", "from", previousVersion, "to", targetVersion, "error", err) + // Recovery, not rollback: the operator decides what to install next. + u.cfg.Supervisor.EnterRecovery(ctx, fmt.Sprintf( + "update from %s to %s failed: %v", previousVersion, targetVersion, err)) + return + } + u.cfg.Log.Info("update complete", "from", previousVersion, "to", targetVersion) +} + +func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion string) error { + if previousVersion == targetVersion { + // Not an error: re-installing the running version is a legitimate way + // to recover a damaged image, and refusing would remove the only + // repair an operator can perform from the editor. + u.cfg.Log.Info("reinstalling the current version", "version", targetVersion) + } + + targetRef := u.cfg.Spec.ImageRefFor(targetVersion) + previousRef := u.cfg.Spec.ImageRefFor(previousVersion) + + if err := u.checkDiskSpace(ctx, targetRef); err != nil { + return err + } + + // 1. Pull. Non-destructive: the running version stays on disk. + u.setPhase(StatePulling, "", nil) + err := u.cfg.Docker.PullImage(ctx, targetRef, func(p dockerapi.PullProgress) { + u.setPhase(StatePulling, p.Phase, p.Percent) + }) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("could not download %s: %w", targetRef, err) + } + + // 2. Swap. The spec is written BEFORE the container is recreated, so a + // power cut mid-swap leaves the device booting the version it was moving + // to rather than silently reverting -- and the image for it is already on + // disk by now. + u.setPhase(StateSwapping, "", nil) + u.cfg.Spec.Version = targetVersion + if err := u.cfg.Spec.Save(u.cfg.SpecPath); err != nil { + u.cfg.Spec.Version = previousVersion + return fmt.Errorf("could not record the new version: %w", err) + } + + if err := u.cfg.Supervisor.Stop(ctx); err != nil { + u.cfg.Log.Warn("stopping the old runtime", "error", err) + } + + // 3. Start and health-gate. Reconcile removes the old container, creates + // one from the new image and waits for it to report healthy. + u.setPhase(StateVerifying, "", nil) + if err := u.cfg.Supervisor.Reconcile(ctx); err != nil { + // Leave the spec pointing at the target: the operator is about to be + // shown recovery mode, and reverting the file behind their back would + // make the next boot disagree with what the editor just told them. + return fmt.Errorf("%s did not start: %w", targetRef, err) + } + + // 4. Only now retire the old image. Doing this last is what makes the + // whole sequence recoverable. + if previousVersion != targetVersion { + if err := u.cfg.Docker.RemoveImage(ctx, previousRef, false); err != nil { + // Not a failure of the update: the new version is running. Disk + // was not reclaimed, which is worth a log and not a rollback. + u.cfg.Log.Warn("could not remove the previous image", + "image", previousRef, "error", err) + } else { + u.cfg.Log.Info("removed the previous image", "image", previousRef) + } + } + return nil +} + +// checkDiskSpace warns, with numbers, when the target is unlikely to fit. +// +// Advisory rather than blocking. The measurement is of the bootloader's own +// filesystem, which is the same one Docker uses on a default install but not +// on a device whose data-root has been moved; blocking on a figure that can be +// about the wrong disk would refuse updates that would have worked. Docker's +// own pull will fail with a clear ENOSPC if the estimate was wrong, so the +// cost of being permissive is a legible failure rather than a silent one. +func (u *Updater) checkDiskSpace(ctx context.Context, targetRef string) error { + free, err := freeBytes(u.cfg.StateDir) + if err != nil { + u.cfg.Log.Warn("could not measure free space", "error", err) + return nil + } + if free == 0 { + return nil // measurement unavailable on this platform + } + + // Estimate the target's size from the image already installed: successive + // runtime versions are within a few percent of each other, and there is + // no way to ask a registry for a decompressed size before pulling. + var estimate int64 + if info, err := u.cfg.Docker.InspectImage(ctx, u.cfg.Spec.ImageRef()); err == nil { + estimate = info.Size + } + if estimate == 0 { + u.cfg.Log.Info("no local image to estimate from; skipping the disk pre-check", + "free", free) + return nil + } + + if free < estimate { + return fmt.Errorf( + "not enough free space to download %s: about %s needed, %s available", + targetRef, humanBytes(estimate), humanBytes(free)) + } + u.cfg.Log.Info("disk pre-check passed", + "free", humanBytes(free), "estimate", humanBytes(estimate)) + return nil +} + +func (u *Updater) setPhase(state State, phase string, percent *int) { + u.mu.Lock() + defer u.mu.Unlock() + u.progress.State = state + u.progress.Phase = phase + u.progress.Percent = percent +} + +// validateVersion rejects a tag the daemon would refuse or that could be used +// to reach an image other than the one intended. +// +// The reference is always built as repository + ":" + version by +// runtimespec.ImageRefFor, so a version containing a slash or a colon could +// otherwise redirect the pull to a different repository or registry entirely. +func validateVersion(version string) error { + if version == "" { + return errors.New("a version is required") + } + if len(version) > 128 { + return errors.New("version is too long to be an image tag") + } + if strings.ContainsAny(version, " \t\n/:@") { + return fmt.Errorf( + "%q is not a valid version tag: it must not contain spaces, slashes, "+ + "colons or '@'", version) + } + // Docker's own tag grammar: [A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9._-]* + for i, r := range version { + valid := (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || + (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '.' || r == '-' + if !valid { + return fmt.Errorf("%q is not a valid version tag", version) + } + if i == 0 && (r == '.' || r == '-') { + return fmt.Errorf("%q is not a valid version tag: it may not start with %q", + version, string(r)) + } + } + return nil +} + +// humanBytes renders a size the way an error message should read. +func humanBytes(n int64) string { + const unit = 1024 + if n < unit { + return fmt.Sprintf("%d B", n) + } + value := float64(n) + units := []string{"KiB", "MiB", "GiB", "TiB"} + for _, suffix := range units { + value /= unit + if value < unit { + return fmt.Sprintf("%.1f %s", value, suffix) + } + } + return fmt.Sprintf("%.1f PiB", value/unit) +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a21ef315 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,501 @@ +package updater + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "strings" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimespec" +) + +// --- fakes --------------------------------------------------------------- + +type fakeDocker struct { + mu sync.Mutex + + pullErr error + pulled []string + removed []string + removeErr error + inspectSize int64 + inspectErr error + // pullSteps are progress reports the fake emits before finishing. + pullSteps []dockerapi.PullProgress +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) PullImage(_ context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error { + f.mu.Lock() + f.pulled = append(f.pulled, ref) + steps, err := f.pullSteps, f.pullErr + f.mu.Unlock() + + for _, step := range steps { + if onProgress != nil { + onProgress(step) + } + } + return err +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) InspectImage(context.Context, string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) { + if f.inspectErr != nil { + return nil, f.inspectErr + } + return &dockerapi.ImageInfo{Size: f.inspectSize}, nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) RemoveImage(_ context.Context, ref string, _ bool) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.removed = append(f.removed, ref) + return f.removeErr +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) pulls() []string { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return append([]string(nil), f.pulled...) +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) removals() []string { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return append([]string(nil), f.removed...) +} + +type fakeSupervisor struct { + mu sync.Mutex + + beginErr error + reconcileErr error + begins int + ends int + stops int + reconciles int + recoveryCalls []string + // order records the sequence of operations, which is the property that + // actually matters for safety. + order []string +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) BeginUpdate() error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.begins++ + f.order = append(f.order, "begin") + return f.beginErr +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) EndUpdate() { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.ends++ + f.order = append(f.order, "end") +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) Stop(context.Context) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.stops++ + f.order = append(f.order, "stop") + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) Reconcile(context.Context) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.reconciles++ + f.order = append(f.order, "reconcile") + return f.reconcileErr +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) EnterRecovery(_ context.Context, reason string) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.recoveryCalls = append(f.recoveryCalls, reason) + f.order = append(f.order, "recovery") +} + +func (f *fakeSupervisor) snapshot() ([]string, []string) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return append([]string(nil), f.order...), append([]string(nil), f.recoveryCalls...) +} + +func newTestUpdater(t *testing.T, docker DockerClient, sup Supervisor) (*Updater, *runtimespec.Config, string) { + t.Helper() + dir := t.TempDir() + specPath := filepath.Join(dir, "runtime-spec.json") + if err := os.WriteFile(specPath, []byte(`{"version":"v4.2.0"}`), 0o600); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("seeding spec: %v", err) + } + spec, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("loading spec: %v", err) + } + u := New(Config{ + Docker: docker, + Supervisor: sup, + Spec: spec, + SpecPath: specPath, + StateDir: dir, + Log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), + }) + return u, spec, specPath +} + +// waitFor polls until cond holds or the deadline passes. The update runs in a +// goroutine, so tests observe it rather than drive it. +func waitFor(t *testing.T, cond func() bool) { + t.Helper() + deadline := time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second) + for time.Now().Before(deadline) { + if cond() { + return + } + time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond) + } + t.Fatal("timed out waiting for the update to reach the expected state") +} + +func waitForState(t *testing.T, u *Updater, want State) Progress { + t.Helper() + waitFor(t, func() bool { return u.Progress().State == want }) + return u.Progress() +} + +// --- happy path ---------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestASuccessfulUpdateFollowsTheSafeOrder(t *testing.T) { + // The order IS the safety property: pull before stopping anything, and + // remove the old image only after the new one is confirmed running. Any + // other order leaves a window where the device has no usable image. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) + + order, _ := sup.snapshot() + // begin, stop, reconcile, end -- the pull happens between begin and stop. + want := []string{"begin", "stop", "reconcile", "end"} + if strings.Join(order, ",") != strings.Join(want, ",") { + t.Fatalf("want order %v, got %v", want, order) + } + if got := docker.pulls(); len(got) != 1 || !strings.HasSuffix(got[0], ":v4.2.1") { + t.Fatalf("want a single pull of the target, got %v", got) + } + if got := docker.removals(); len(got) != 1 || !strings.HasSuffix(got[0], ":v4.2.0") { + t.Fatalf("want the previous image removed, got %v", got) + } +} + +func TestTheNewVersionIsRecordedBeforeTheContainerIsRecreated(t *testing.T) { + // A power cut mid-swap must leave the device booting the version it was + // moving to -- the image for which is already on disk by then -- rather + // than silently reverting to one the operator was told was replaced. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, specPath := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) + + reloaded, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reloading spec: %v", err) + } + if reloaded.Version != "v4.2.1" { + t.Fatalf("the spec must persist the new version, got %q", reloaded.Version) + } +} + +func TestProgressIsReportedDuringThePull(t *testing.T) { + fifty := 50 + docker := &fakeDocker{ + inspectSize: 100, + pullSteps: []dockerapi.PullProgress{ + {Phase: "Downloading", Percent: &fifty}, + }, + } + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, &fakeSupervisor{}) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) + + // The final snapshot clears the percentage, so this checks the labels + // that survive: from and to. + final := u.Progress() + if final.From != "v4.2.0" || final.To != "v4.2.1" { + t.Fatalf("want from v4.2.0 to v4.2.1, got %q -> %q", final.From, final.To) + } + if final.FinishedAt == nil { + t.Fatal("a finished update must carry a finish time") + } +} + +func TestReinstallingTheCurrentVersionIsAllowed(t *testing.T) { + // Re-pulling the running version is the only repair an operator can + // perform from the editor when an image is damaged, so refusing it would + // remove a genuinely useful action. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.0"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reinstalling the current version must be allowed: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) + + // Nothing may be removed: the "previous" image IS the running one. + if got := docker.removals(); len(got) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a reinstall must not delete the image it just installed, got %v", got) + } +} + +// --- failures ------------------------------------------------------------ + +func TestAFailedPullEntersRecoveryAndTouchesNothing(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100, pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown")} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, specPath := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v9.9.9"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + progress := waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + + if !strings.Contains(progress.Error, "manifest unknown") { + t.Fatalf("the underlying cause must reach the operator, got %q", progress.Error) + } + order, reasons := sup.snapshot() + // The runtime must not have been stopped: the pull never succeeded, so + // there was never a reason to interrupt a working PLC. + for _, step := range order { + if step == "stop" { + t.Fatalf("a failed pull must not stop the running runtime: %v", order) + } + } + if len(reasons) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want one recovery call, got %v", reasons) + } + // And the recorded version must be unchanged. + reloaded, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reloading spec: %v", err) + } + if reloaded.Version != "v4.2.0" { + t.Fatalf("a failed pull must not change the recorded version, got %q", reloaded.Version) + } +} + +func TestANewVersionThatWillNotStartEntersRecoveryWithTheOldImageIntact(t *testing.T) { + // This is the case the pull-first ordering exists for: the operator is + // handed a device in recovery that still has the previous image on disk, + // so reinstalling it needs no network. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{reconcileErr: errors.New("exited during start-up with code 1")} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + progress := waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + + if !strings.Contains(progress.Error, "did not start") { + t.Fatalf("want a start failure, got %q", progress.Error) + } + if got := docker.removals(); len(got) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("the previous image must survive a failed start, got %v", got) + } + _, reasons := sup.snapshot() + if len(reasons) != 1 || !strings.Contains(reasons[0], "v4.2.1") { + t.Fatalf("recovery must name the version that failed, got %v", reasons) + } +} + +func TestFailingToRemoveTheOldImageDoesNotFailTheUpdate(t *testing.T) { + // The new version is running; disk was simply not reclaimed. Rolling back + // a working runtime over that would be absurd. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100, removeErr: errors.New("image is in use")} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + progress := waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) + if progress.Error != "" { + t.Fatalf("a failed cleanup must not surface as an update error: %q", progress.Error) + } + _, reasons := sup.snapshot() + if len(reasons) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("must not enter recovery, got %v", reasons) + } +} + +func TestTheSupervisorClaimIsAlwaysReleased(t *testing.T) { + // Leaking the claim would suppress crash accounting forever, so a runtime + // that started crash-looping after a failed update would never reach + // recovery. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100, pullErr: errors.New("boom")} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + waitFor(t, func() bool { + sup.mu.Lock() + defer sup.mu.Unlock() + return sup.ends == sup.begins && sup.begins == 1 + }) +} + +// --- single flight ------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestASecondConcurrentUpdateIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + // Two concurrent swaps of one container is not a state worth trying to + // make safe. + release := make(chan struct{}) + docker := &blockingDocker{release: release} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, &fakeSupervisor{}) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("first start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StatePulling) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.2"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInProgress) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrInProgress, got %v", err) + } + close(release) + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) +} + +func TestARefusedClaimFromTheSupervisorIsSurfaced(t *testing.T) { + // The supervisor is the other party that can say no -- for instance if it + // is already mid-update from another path. + sup := &fakeSupervisor{beginErr: errors.New("an update is already in progress")} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100}, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err == nil { + t.Fatal("want the supervisor's refusal to propagate") + } + if got := u.Progress().State; got != StateIdle { + t.Fatalf("a refused start must leave the state idle, got %q", got) + } +} + +type blockingDocker struct { + release chan struct{} +} + +func (b *blockingDocker) PullImage(_ context.Context, _ string, _ func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error { + <-b.release + return nil +} +func (b *blockingDocker) InspectImage(context.Context, string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) { + return &dockerapi.ImageInfo{Size: 100}, nil +} +func (b *blockingDocker) RemoveImage(context.Context, string, bool) error { return nil } + +// --- disk pre-check ------------------------------------------------------ + +func TestAnImpossiblyLargeImageIsRefusedBeforeAnythingIsTouched(t *testing.T) { + // Refusing up front with a number is far better than a half-finished + // pull and an ENOSPC an operator has to interpret. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 1 << 62} // larger than any real disk + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + progress := waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + + // Only meaningful where free space can actually be measured. + if free, err := freeBytes(t.TempDir()); err != nil || free == 0 { + t.Skip("free space is not measurable on this platform") + } + if !strings.Contains(progress.Error, "not enough free space") { + t.Fatalf("want a free-space refusal, got %q", progress.Error) + } + if got := docker.pulls(); len(got) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("nothing may be pulled after the pre-check fails, got %v", got) + } +} + +func TestNoLocalImageSkipsTheDiskPreCheck(t *testing.T) { + // A first install has nothing to estimate from, and refusing on that + // basis would block the very first deployment. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectErr: errors.New("no such image")} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, &fakeSupervisor{}) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) +} + +// --- version validation -------------------------------------------------- + +func TestAVersionThatCouldRedirectThePullIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + // The reference is built as repository + ":" + version, so a slash, colon + // or '@' in the version could point the pull at another repository, + // another registry, or a digest entirely. + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100}, &fakeSupervisor{}) + for _, version := range []string{ + "v1/../../evil", + "evil.example.com/openplc:v1", + "v4.2.1@sha256:deadbeef", + "v4.2.1 --privileged", + "", + ".leading-dot", + "-leading-dash", + } { + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), version); err == nil { + t.Fatalf("version %q must be refused", version) + } + } +} + +func TestOrdinaryVersionTagsAreAccepted(t *testing.T) { + for _, version := range []string{"v4.2.1", "v4.1.0-rc.1", "latest", "v4.1.10"} { + if err := validateVersion(version); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("version %q must be accepted: %v", version, err) + } + } +} + +// --- helpers ------------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestHumanBytesReadsLikeAnErrorMessage(t *testing.T) { + cases := map[int64]string{ + 512: "512 B", + 1536: "1.5 KiB", + 974 * 1024 * 1024: "974.0 MiB", + 3 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024: "3.0 GiB", + } + for input, want := range cases { + if got := humanBytes(input); got != want { + t.Errorf("humanBytes(%d) = %q, want %q", input, got, want) + } + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/main.go b/bootloader/main.go index a167805f..06592c29 100644 --- a/bootloader/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ import ( "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimespec" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/updater" ) // version is stamped at build time via -ldflags. The bootloader has its own @@ -132,6 +133,15 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { defer users.Close() } + upd := updater.New(updater.Config{ + Docker: docker, + Supervisor: sup, + Spec: spec, + SpecPath: specPath, + StateDir: cfg.stateDir, + Log: log.With("component", "updater"), + }) + server, err := api.New(api.Config{ Port: cfg.port, StateDir: cfg.stateDir, @@ -141,6 +151,7 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { Users: users, Supervisor: sup, Logs: docker, + Updater: upd, Log: log.With("component", "api"), }) if err != nil { diff --git a/docs/DOCKER.md b/docs/DOCKER.md index 035a6e36..28101784 100644 --- a/docs/DOCKER.md +++ b/docs/DOCKER.md @@ -248,11 +248,13 @@ services: - TZ=America/New_York restart: unless-stopped healthcheck: - test: ["CMD", "curl", "-k", "-f", "https://localhost:8443/api/ping"] + # /api/version, not /api/ping: ping is behind @jwt_required(), so a + # healthcheck against it always gets a 401 and `curl -f` always fails. + test: ["CMD", "curl", "-k", "-f", "https://localhost:8443/api/version"] interval: 30s timeout: 10s retries: 3 - start_period: 10s + start_period: 90s volumes: openplc-runtime-data: @@ -494,9 +496,12 @@ docker port openplc-runtime **Test connectivity:** ```bash -curl -k https://localhost:8443/api/ping +curl -k https://localhost:8443/api/version ``` +`/api/version` is unauthenticated; `/api/ping` requires a token and will +answer `401` even on a perfectly healthy runtime. + ### Real-Time Performance Issues **Solutions:** @@ -607,7 +612,7 @@ jobs: - uses: actions/checkout@v2 - name: Test API run: | - curl -k https://localhost:8443/api/ping + curl -k https://localhost:8443/api/version ``` ## Related Documentation From d18ee937d4e024b5ce03a0346c526f8d0f0da054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 16:43:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 07/22] fix(bootloader): point the runtime at the mounted data directory Found on hardware, and it would have silently defeated the entire point of keeping runtime data outside the container. The bind mount alone is not enough. The runtime resolves its persistent data directory by DETECTION, not by what is mounted: config.py::get_persistent_data_dir() returns /var/run/runtime whenever is_running_in_container() is true. So the containerized runtime wrote a fresh .env and restapi.db inside the container and never touched the mounted ones -- observed directly on the SLM-RP4, with the container's own .env under /var/run/runtime while the mounted restapi.db, project_snapshot/ and retain.bin sat unused beside it. Every version swap would therefore have discarded users, credentials, the stored project, retained variables and any VPP licenses, while appearing to work. It surfaced as the bootloader's token being rejected by the runtime with "Signature verification failed" -- two services, two different .env files, two different JWT secrets. Fixed by setting OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR to the bound path, which config.py already honours. Only the persistent directory is redirected; RUNTIME_DIR keeps its default so the command and log sockets stay container-internal, which is correct since they are ephemeral and both endpoints live in the same container. Verified after the fix: /var/run/runtime holds only the two sockets, and both services now log in the same operator against the same database. Also drops the claim that tokens are interchangeable between the two services. They are not, and they do not need to be: what is shared is the credential database, not a session. The editor keeps the user's credentials after login and logs in to the bootloader separately when it needs to, so each service owns its own sessions. The claim set still mirrors flask_jwt_extended's, so VerifyToken can read a runtime-issued token if one is ever presented -- it is simply no longer a promise. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go | 8 +-- bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go | 4 ++ bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go | 33 +++++++------ bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go | 21 ++++++++ bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go index 34c85bbf..25775a44 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go @@ -197,9 +197,11 @@ func TestProtectedRoutesRejectATokenSignedWithAnotherSecret(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestARuntimeIssuedTokenIsAccepted(t *testing.T) { - // The point of sharing JWT_SECRET_KEY: the editor logs into the runtime - // and uses that token here, without a second login. +func TestATokenTheBootloaderIssuedIsAccepted(t *testing.T) { + // The bootloader owns its own sessions: the editor logs in here with the + // credentials it already holds, and this token is only ever presented + // back to the bootloader. Cross-service acceptance is deliberately not a + // contract -- the two services may resolve different .env files. srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", validToken(t)) if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go index 1e2c2114..717d388e 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/secrets.go @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ import ( // webserver/config.py::generate_env_file, and never rotates: changing either // invalidates every stored password hash, which is why that function deletes // the database when it writes a new .env. +// +// The pepper is what the bootloader genuinely needs, since it is required to +// verify a password against a stored hash. The JWT secret is used only to sign +// the bootloader's own tokens -- the two services do not share sessions. type Secrets struct { // JWTSecret signs and verifies access tokens (HS256). JWTSecret string diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go index 5bf29219..80d548a5 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go @@ -14,28 +14,33 @@ import ( "time" ) -// Tokens are HS256 JWTs interchangeable with the runtime's. +// Tokens are HS256 JWTs in the same shape as the runtime's. // -// Both sides sign with JWT_SECRET_KEY from the shared .env, so a token minted -// by either is accepted by both. That matters in one direction in particular: -// a token issued during recovery, when the runtime was down, keeps working -// against the runtime once it comes back, so the editor is not forced to log -// in twice around an update. +// The bootloader issues and verifies its OWN tokens. What the two services +// share is the credential database, not a session: the editor keeps the +// user's credentials after login and logs in to the bootloader separately +// when it needs to. Tokens are deliberately NOT treated as interchangeable, +// because that would couple the two services' session handling for no gain -- +// and it cannot be relied on anyway, since the two may hold different +// JWT_SECRET_KEY values depending on which .env each resolved. // -// Only the claims flask_jwt_extended actually checks are produced -- "sub", -// "type", "iat", "nbf", "exp" and "jti". A hand-rolled implementation rather -// than a JWT library because HS256 is an HMAC over two base64url segments, and -// the library-shaped risk here (accepting "alg": "none", or letting the token -// choose its own algorithm) is precisely what an explicit implementation -// avoids: the algorithm below is a constant, never read from the header. +// The claim set still mirrors flask_jwt_extended's -- "sub", "type", "iat", +// "nbf", "exp", "jti" -- so the two are recognisable to the same tooling and +// so VerifyToken can read a runtime-issued token when one is presented. A +// hand-rolled implementation rather than a JWT library because HS256 is an +// HMAC over two base64url segments, and the library-shaped risk here +// (accepting "alg": "none", or letting the token choose its own algorithm) is +// precisely what an explicit implementation avoids: the algorithm below is a +// constant, never read from the header. const ( // TokenType is flask_jwt_extended's discriminator. A refresh token // presented as an access token must not be accepted. TokenType = "access" // DefaultTokenTTL is deliberately longer than the runtime's 15-minute // default: a version change involves an image pull that can run for many - // minutes on a plant link, and having the caller's token expire midway - // through would strand a device mid-update. + // minutes on a slow device, and having the caller's token expire midway + // through would strand a device mid-update. The bootloader owns its own + // sessions, so this does not have to match the runtime's. DefaultTokenTTL = 2 * time.Hour // clockSkew tolerates a small disagreement between the editor's clock and // the device's, which on an industrial box without NTP is routine. diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go index 6dddb7b6..cd45c2d5 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go @@ -268,6 +268,27 @@ func (c *Config) ContainerSpec(imageRef string) any { // bootloader sets this, which is what makes the answer trustworthy. "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self", fmt.Sprintf("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT=%d", c.BootloaderPort), + // Point the runtime's persistent data at the bind mount. + // + // This is load-bearing and NOT redundant with the bind. The runtime + // resolves its own data directory by DETECTION, not by what is + // mounted: webserver/config.py::get_persistent_data_dir() returns + // /var/run/runtime whenever is_running_in_container() is true. Without + // this override the runtime writes a fresh .env and restapi.db inside + // the container and never touches the mounted ones -- so users, + // credentials, the stored project, retained variables and any VPP + // licenses would all be discarded on every single version swap, which + // is precisely what persisting them outside the container is for. + // + // Confirmed on hardware before this line existed: the container held + // its own .env under /var/run/runtime while the mounted restapi.db, + // project_snapshot/ and retain.bin sat unused beside it. + // + // Only the PERSISTENT dir is redirected. RUNTIME_DIR keeps its default + // so the command and log sockets stay container-internal, which is + // correct -- they are ephemeral and both endpoints live in the same + // container. + "OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR=" + c.DataDir, } env = append(env, c.ExtraEnv...) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go index 3f00c336..f2693a03 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go @@ -299,3 +299,55 @@ func TestSaveLeavesNoTempFileBehind(t *testing.T) { } } } + +func TestTheRuntimeIsPointedAtTheMountedDataDirectory(t *testing.T) { + // The bind alone is not enough, and this is the bug that proved it on + // hardware. The runtime resolves its persistent data directory by + // DETECTION -- config.py returns /var/run/runtime whenever it thinks it + // is containerized -- so without this override it writes a fresh .env and + // restapi.db inside the container and ignores the mounted ones. Every + // version swap would then discard users, credentials, the stored project, + // retained variables and any VPP licenses. + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1", DataDir: "/var/lib/openplc-runtime"} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + + var found bool + for _, raw := range spec["Env"].([]any) { + if raw.(string) == "OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR=/var/lib/openplc-runtime" { + found = true + } + } + if !found { + t.Fatalf("the runtime must be told to use the mounted data directory, got %v", + spec["Env"]) + } + + // And the same path must actually be bound, or the override would point at + // a directory that only exists inside the container. + var bound bool + for _, raw := range spec["HostConfig"].(map[string]any)["Binds"].([]any) { + if raw.(string) == "/var/lib/openplc-runtime:/var/lib/openplc-runtime" { + bound = true + } + } + if !bound { + t.Fatal("the data directory must be bind-mounted at the same path") + } +} + +func TestTheSocketDirectoryIsNotRedirected(t *testing.T) { + // The command and log sockets are ephemeral and both endpoints live in the + // same container, so they belong inside it. Redirecting them into the + // shared volume would export container-internal plumbing onto the host + // for no reason. + cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1"} + cfg.applyDefaults() + spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) + + for _, raw := range spec["Env"].([]any) { + if strings.HasPrefix(raw.(string), "OPENPLC_RUNTIME_DIR=") { + t.Fatalf("the socket directory must keep its default, got %v", raw) + } + } +} From 367c1e70ac3a5a780cbaad3e8d7fff58041b3c92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 17:08:36 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/22] feat(bootloader): answer LAN discovery while in recovery A device that cannot be found cannot be repaired. The runtime owns UDP 33333 normally, so when it is down nothing answers and a failed update makes the device vanish from the editor's list at exactly the moment somebody needs to reach it. The responder runs ONLY in recovery mode, which is what keeps the two from ever competing: recovery is defined as "the runtime container is stopped" -- the supervisor stops it before entering that state -- so exclusivity holds by construction rather than by coordination. Wired to the supervisor's existing recovery and healthy transitions, so the port goes back to the runtime as soon as it is up. The protocol is the runtime's byte for byte, and the constants are pinned by a test: a drift in the magic string or the port would mean the editor simply does not see a device in recovery, which is a silent failure. The reply says service "openplc-bootloader" rather than impersonating the runtime, and states recovery as its own field so a client keys off data rather than inferring meaning from a name. It carries the bootloader's port -- handing that over is the whole reason the reply exists -- plus the version that was being installed and the supervisor's own reason, so a device list can say why without anyone logging in first. The cost is that an editor predating this field will not show a device in recovery; it could not have done anything about one either, and the alternative is a client that believes it found a working runtime and then fails against every endpoint. Unknown payloads, oversized packets and repeat probes inside the rate-limit window are dropped in silence, matching the runtime and keeping this from becoming an amplification target. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go | 231 ++++++++++++++++++ .../internal/discovery/responder_test.go | 222 +++++++++++++++++ bootloader/main.go | 18 ++ 3 files changed, 471 insertions(+) create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/discovery/responder_test.go diff --git a/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go b/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4a4d2379 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +// Package discovery answers the editor's LAN discovery probe while the runtime +// is not running. +// +// The runtime has its own responder (webserver/discovery/network_discovery.py) +// and normally owns this port. The bootloader's exists for one situation: the +// runtime is down, so nothing is answering, and a device that cannot be found +// cannot be repaired. Without this, a failed update makes a device vanish from +// the editor's list at exactly the moment somebody needs to reach it. +// +// It runs ONLY in recovery mode, which is what keeps the two responders from +// ever competing. Recovery is defined as "the runtime container is stopped" -- +// the supervisor stops it before entering that state -- so exclusivity holds +// by construction rather than by coordination. Two services answering the same +// broadcast would give the editor two different answers for one device. +// +// The protocol is the runtime's, byte for byte: a fixed magic string in, one +// JSON datagram back, unicast to the sender. +package discovery + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "log/slog" + "net" + "os" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Wire constants, mirrored from webserver/discovery/network_discovery.py. +// They must match exactly or the editor will not see the device at all. +const ( + Port = 33333 + Magic = "OPENPLC_DISCOVER_V1" + ProtocolVer = 1 + RuntimeAPIPort = 8443 + + // maxRequestBytes drops oversized packets without parsing them. The magic + // string is 19 bytes; the slack is for a future protocol revision, not for + // inviting amplification probes. + maxRequestBytes = 64 + + // perIPRateLimit matches the runtime's. Discovery is a user-driven action, + // so a generous floor still feels instant while a spamming probe gets + // dropped. + perIPRateLimit = 100 * time.Millisecond +) + +// Reply is what a probing editor receives. +// +// service says "openplc-bootloader", not "openplc-runtime". Being honest here +// costs an older editor the ability to see a device in recovery -- but an +// older editor could not have done anything about it either, and the +// alternative is a client that thinks it is talking to a working runtime and +// then fails against every endpoint it tries. +type Reply struct { + Service string `json:"service"` + ProtocolVersion int `json:"protocol_version"` + Hostname string `json:"hostname"` + // Recovery is always true: this responder only runs in recovery mode. + // It is stated explicitly so a client keys off a field rather than + // inferring meaning from the service name. + Recovery bool `json:"recovery"` + // BootloaderPort is where to go next. The whole reply exists to hand the + // editor this number. + BootloaderPort int `json:"bootloader_port"` + // RuntimeVersion is the version the device INTENDS to run, which is not + // running right now. Shown so an operator can see what was attempted. + RuntimeVersion string `json:"runtime_version,omitempty"` + // Reason is the supervisor's own wording, so the device list can say why + // without anyone having to log in first. + Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"` + // APIPort is included for symmetry with the runtime's reply; nothing is + // listening on it in recovery. + APIPort int `json:"api_port"` +} + +// ReplyProvider supplies the current answer. A function rather than a struct +// so the responder never holds stale state: recovery reasons change, and a +// cached reason is worse than none. +type ReplyProvider func() Reply + +// Responder answers discovery probes while enabled. +type Responder struct { + provider ReplyProvider + log *slog.Logger + port int + + mu sync.Mutex + conn *net.UDPConn + lastSeen map[string]time.Time +} + +// New builds a Responder. It is not listening until Enable. +func New(port int, provider ReplyProvider, log *slog.Logger) *Responder { + if port == 0 { + port = Port + } + return &Responder{ + provider: provider, + log: log, + port: port, + lastSeen: map[string]time.Time{}, + } +} + +// Enable starts answering probes. Safe to call when already enabled. +// +// A bind failure is logged and swallowed. Discovery is a convenience: losing +// it must not stop the bootloader serving its control API, which is the +// primary way in. The most likely cause is the runtime still holding the port, +// and in that case the device is findable anyway. +func (r *Responder) Enable() { + r.mu.Lock() + if r.conn != nil { + r.mu.Unlock() + return + } + conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", &net.UDPAddr{Port: r.port}) + if err != nil { + r.mu.Unlock() + r.log.Warn("discovery responder could not bind; the device will not "+ + "answer LAN discovery while in recovery", + "port", r.port, "error", err) + return + } + r.conn = conn + r.mu.Unlock() + + r.log.Info("discovery responder enabled", "port", r.port) + go r.serve(conn) +} + +// Disable stops answering. Called when the runtime comes back healthy, so the +// runtime's own responder can have the port again. +func (r *Responder) Disable() { + r.mu.Lock() + conn := r.conn + r.conn = nil + r.lastSeen = map[string]time.Time{} + r.mu.Unlock() + + if conn == nil { + return + } + // Closing is what unblocks the ReadFromUDP in serve. + if err := conn.Close(); err != nil { + r.log.Debug("closing the discovery socket", "error", err) + } + r.log.Info("discovery responder disabled") +} + +// Enabled reports whether the responder is listening. +func (r *Responder) Enabled() bool { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + return r.conn != nil +} + +func (r *Responder) serve(conn *net.UDPConn) { + buf := make([]byte, maxRequestBytes+1) + for { + n, addr, err := conn.ReadFromUDP(buf) + if err != nil { + // A closed socket is the normal way this loop ends, via Disable. + if errors.Is(err, net.ErrClosed) { + return + } + r.log.Debug("discovery read", "error", err) + continue + } + // Oversized, or not the magic string: dropped in silence, exactly as + // the runtime does. Answering unknown payloads would make this an + // amplification target. + if n > maxRequestBytes || string(buf[:n]) != Magic { + continue + } + if !r.allow(addr) { + continue + } + r.respond(conn, addr) + } +} + +// allow applies the per-source-IP rate limit. +func (r *Responder) allow(addr *net.UDPAddr) bool { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + key := addr.IP.String() + now := time.Now() + if last, seen := r.lastSeen[key]; seen && now.Sub(last) < perIPRateLimit { + return false + } + r.lastSeen[key] = now + // Garbage-collect so a long-running bootloader does not accumulate state + // from drive-by probes, matching the runtime's own bound. + if len(r.lastSeen) > 1024 { + cutoff := now.Add(-time.Minute) + for ip, ts := range r.lastSeen { + if ts.Before(cutoff) { + delete(r.lastSeen, ip) + } + } + } + return true +} + +func (r *Responder) respond(conn *net.UDPConn, addr *net.UDPAddr) { + reply := r.provider() + reply.Service = "openplc-bootloader" + reply.ProtocolVersion = ProtocolVer + reply.Recovery = true + reply.APIPort = RuntimeAPIPort + if reply.Hostname == "" { + if hostname, err := os.Hostname(); err == nil { + reply.Hostname = hostname + } + } + + payload, err := json.Marshal(reply) + if err != nil { + r.log.Warn("encoding a discovery reply", "error", err) + return + } + // Unicast back to the sender: that is the authoritative way for the + // editor to learn a reachable address, since a multi-homed device does + // not reliably know its own outward-facing IP. + if _, err := conn.WriteToUDP(payload, addr); err != nil { + r.log.Debug("discovery reply", "to", addr.String(), "error", err) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder_test.go b/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..efde5ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +package discovery + +import ( + "encoding/json" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net" + "testing" + "time" +) + +func quietLogger() *slog.Logger { + return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)) +} + +// freePort picks an unused UDP port so tests never collide with the real +// 33333, which a developer machine may well have something on. +func freePort(t *testing.T) int { + t.Helper() + conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reserving a port: %v", err) + } + port := conn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port + conn.Close() + return port +} + +// probe sends payload and returns the reply, or nil when nothing answered. +func probe(t *testing.T, port int, payload string) []byte { + t.Helper() + conn, err := net.DialUDP("udp", nil, &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1), Port: port}) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("dialling: %v", err) + } + defer conn.Close() + + if _, err := conn.Write([]byte(payload)); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("writing probe: %v", err) + } + if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("setting deadline: %v", err) + } + buf := make([]byte, 2048) + n, err := conn.Read(buf) + if err != nil { + return nil + } + return buf[:n] +} + +func newTestResponder(t *testing.T, reply Reply) (*Responder, int) { + t.Helper() + port := freePort(t) + r := New(port, func() Reply { return reply }, quietLogger()) + t.Cleanup(r.Disable) + return r, port +} + +func TestTheResponderIsSilentUntilEnabled(t *testing.T) { + // It must never answer outside recovery. The runtime owns this port + // normally, and two services answering one broadcast would give the editor + // two different answers for the same device. + _, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + if got := probe(t, port, Magic); got != nil { + t.Fatalf("a disabled responder must not answer, got %q", got) + } +} + +func TestAnEnabledResponderAnswersTheMagicString(t *testing.T) { + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{ + RuntimeVersion: "v4.2.1", + Reason: "runtime exited 3 times within 5m0s", + BootloaderPort: 8445, + }) + r.Enable() + + raw := probe(t, port, Magic) + if raw == nil { + t.Fatal("no reply to the discovery magic") + } + var reply Reply + if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &reply); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reply is not JSON: %v (%q)", err, raw) + } + + if reply.Service != "openplc-bootloader" { + t.Errorf("the reply must identify the bootloader, got %q", reply.Service) + } + if !reply.Recovery { + t.Error("recovery must be stated explicitly, not inferred from the service name") + } + if reply.BootloaderPort != 8445 { + t.Errorf("the reply exists to hand over this port, got %d", reply.BootloaderPort) + } + if reply.ProtocolVersion != ProtocolVer { + t.Errorf("want protocol version %d, got %d", ProtocolVer, reply.ProtocolVersion) + } + if reply.Hostname == "" { + t.Error("the hostname must be filled in so a device list can name the device") + } + if reply.Reason == "" { + t.Error("the reason must travel with the reply, so a device list can say " + + "why without anyone logging in") + } +} + +func TestAnythingOtherThanTheMagicStringIsDropped(t *testing.T) { + // Answering unknown payloads would make this an amplification target. + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + r.Enable() + + for _, payload := range []string{ + "", + "hello", + "OPENPLC_DISCOVER_V2", + "openplc_discover_v1", // case matters + Magic + "x", + } { + if got := probe(t, port, payload); got != nil { + t.Errorf("payload %q must be dropped, got a reply %q", payload, got) + } + } +} + +func TestAnOversizedPacketIsDroppedWithoutParsing(t *testing.T) { + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + r.Enable() + + oversized := Magic + for len(oversized) <= maxRequestBytes { + oversized += "A" + } + if got := probe(t, port, oversized); got != nil { + t.Fatalf("an oversized packet must be dropped, got %q", got) + } +} + +func TestDisablingStopsTheResponder(t *testing.T) { + // The runtime's own responder needs the port back once it is healthy. + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + r.Enable() + if probe(t, port, Magic) == nil { + t.Fatal("expected a reply while enabled") + } + + r.Disable() + if r.Enabled() { + t.Fatal("Enabled() must report the responder as off") + } + if got := probe(t, port, Magic); got != nil { + t.Fatalf("a disabled responder must not answer, got %q", got) + } +} + +func TestEnableIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) { + // The supervisor's transition hooks can fire more than once for the same + // state; a second Enable must not fail or leak a second socket. + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + r.Enable() + r.Enable() + if probe(t, port, Magic) == nil { + t.Fatal("expected a reply after a repeated Enable") + } +} + +func TestTheResponderCanBeCycled(t *testing.T) { + // A device can go healthy, fail again, and need discovery a second time. + // Re-binding the same port after a close is the part that breaks if the + // socket was not released properly. + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + for i := 0; i < 3; i++ { + r.Enable() + if probe(t, port, Magic) == nil { + t.Fatalf("cycle %d: expected a reply", i) + } + r.Disable() + if got := probe(t, port, Magic); got != nil { + t.Fatalf("cycle %d: expected silence, got %q", i, got) + } + } +} + +func TestTheRateLimitDropsARepeatedProbe(t *testing.T) { + r, port := newTestResponder(t, Reply{}) + r.Enable() + + if probe(t, port, Magic) == nil { + t.Fatal("the first probe must be answered") + } + // Immediately again from the same source: inside the window, so dropped. + if got := probe(t, port, Magic); got != nil { + t.Fatalf("a probe inside the rate-limit window must be dropped, got %q", got) + } + // And allowed again once the window passes, or a user pressing "scan" + // twice would think the device had disappeared. + time.Sleep(perIPRateLimit + 50*time.Millisecond) + if probe(t, port, Magic) == nil { + t.Fatal("a probe after the window must be answered again") + } +} + +func TestTheWireConstantsMatchTheRuntime(t *testing.T) { + // These are mirrored from webserver/discovery/network_discovery.py. If + // they drift, the editor simply will not see a device in recovery -- a + // silent failure, so it is pinned here. + if Port != 33333 { + t.Errorf("discovery port must be 33333, got %d", Port) + } + if Magic != "OPENPLC_DISCOVER_V1" { + t.Errorf("magic string must match the runtime's, got %q", Magic) + } + if ProtocolVer != 1 { + t.Errorf("protocol version must be 1, got %d", ProtocolVer) + } + if maxRequestBytes != 64 { + t.Errorf("request cap must match the runtime's 64, got %d", maxRequestBytes) + } + if perIPRateLimit != 100*time.Millisecond { + t.Errorf("rate limit must match the runtime's 0.1s, got %s", perIPRateLimit) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/main.go b/bootloader/main.go index 06592c29..a6307465 100644 --- a/bootloader/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import ( "time" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/api" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/discovery" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/health" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" @@ -133,6 +134,23 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { defer users.Close() } + // LAN discovery, answered ONLY while in recovery. A device that cannot be + // found cannot be repaired, and without this a failed update makes the + // device vanish from the editor's list at exactly the wrong moment. The + // runtime owns this port the rest of the time; exclusivity holds because + // entering recovery stops the runtime first. + responder := discovery.New(discovery.Port, func() discovery.Reply { + status := sup.Status() + return discovery.Reply{ + BootloaderPort: spec.BootloaderPort, + RuntimeVersion: spec.Version, + Reason: status.Reason, + } + }, log.With("component", "discovery")) + + sup.OnRecovery(func(supervisor.Status) { responder.Enable() }) + sup.OnHealthy(func(supervisor.Status) { responder.Disable() }) + upd := updater.New(updater.Config{ Docker: docker, Supervisor: sup, From f466d0106bce0d8ad1e3deba9b77c5612b05b356 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 17:13:12 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 09/22] feat(install): Docker install by default, and let the bootloader fetch the runtime `sudo ./install.sh` now installs no toolchain and compiles nothing: it ensures a container engine, writes the bootloader's spec, and starts the bootloader. `--native` keeps today's source build verbatim for MSYS2 and for targets that cannot host an engine -- a supported path, not a deprecated one. MSYS2 is forced to native regardless of what was asked, since failing later inside a docker command would be worse than saying so up front. Docker is the only dependency this path adds. We install no unit of our own: Docker's `--restart always` starts the bootloader at boot and the bootloader starts the runtime. The engine's OWN unit is enabled explicitly even when the daemon is already running, because an engine that is up now but disabled leaves the device dead after a power cycle -- the kind of failure nobody notices until it matters. Re-running is safe and is the intended way to add a board mount: it rewrites the spec and replaces the bootloader without touching the runtime container, so it never interrupts a running PLC. The new bootloader adopts whatever it finds healthy. The spec is written atomically, since a half-written one would stop the bootloader parsing it at all. The integration suite then caught the piece that made this incomplete: the supervisor never pulled the image it was told to run. install.sh writes the spec without pulling anything, so a fresh install went straight to recovery with "No such image" -- and so did any device whose spec named a version whose image had been retired. The supervisor now pulls when, and only when, the image is absent; re-pulling on every restart would turn each one into a network round trip and, on a slow link, minutes of delay before a working PLC came back. Download progress goes into the status reason as it happens, so the editor shows "downloading 50%" rather than an apparently hung device. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go | 46 ++ .../internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go | 155 ++++- install.sh | 31 +- scripts/install-docker.sh | 338 ++++++++++ tests/integration/Dockerfile.testhost | 54 ++ tests/integration/entrypoint.sh | 42 ++ tests/integration/harness.sh | 192 ++++++ tests/integration/stubruntime/Dockerfile | 30 + tests/integration/stubruntime/go.mod | 3 + tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go | 174 +++++ tests/integration/test_bootloader.py | 629 ++++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 1678 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/install-docker.sh create mode 100644 tests/integration/Dockerfile.testhost create mode 100644 tests/integration/entrypoint.sh create mode 100755 tests/integration/harness.sh create mode 100644 tests/integration/stubruntime/Dockerfile create mode 100644 tests/integration/stubruntime/go.mod create mode 100644 tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go create mode 100644 tests/integration/test_bootloader.py diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go index 2cbc55ed..47a88bf2 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go @@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ type DockerClient interface { StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Duration) error RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) error StreamEvents(ctx context.Context, name string, handle func(dockerapi.Event)) error + // Image access, so the supervisor can fetch a runtime it has been told to + // run but does not have. Needed on a fresh install -- install.sh writes + // the spec and starts the bootloader without pulling anything -- and + // after a data wipe or an operator editing the spec by hand. + InspectImage(ctx context.Context, ref string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) + PullImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error } // SpecProvider supplies the container definition to create the runtime from. @@ -436,6 +442,9 @@ func (s *Supervisor) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error { // not usable. func (s *Supervisor) create(ctx context.Context) error { imageRef := s.spec.ImageRef() + if err := s.ensureImage(ctx, imageRef); err != nil { + return err + } if err := s.docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, true); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("removing stale container %s: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, err) } @@ -453,6 +462,43 @@ func (s *Supervisor) create(ctx context.Context) error { return nil } +// ensureImage pulls imageRef when it is not already present. +// +// The bootloader is what fetches the runtime on a fresh device: install.sh +// writes the spec and starts the bootloader without pulling anything, so +// without this a brand-new install would go straight to recovery with "No +// such image". It also covers a spec that names a version whose image was +// retired, or one an operator edited by hand. +// +// Only pulls when the image is absent. A present image is never re-pulled -- +// that would turn every restart into a network round trip, and on a slow link +// into minutes of delay before a PLC that was working comes back. +func (s *Supervisor) ensureImage(ctx context.Context, imageRef string) error { + if _, err := s.docker.InspectImage(ctx, imageRef); err == nil { + return nil + } else if !dockerapi.IsNotFound(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("checking for image %s: %w", imageRef, err) + } + + s.log.Info("runtime image not present locally, pulling", "image", imageRef) + // The reason is surfaced so the editor shows "downloading" rather than a + // silent wait: on a slow device this pull can run for many minutes. + s.setState(StateStarting, fmt.Sprintf("downloading %s", imageRef)) + + err := s.docker.PullImage(ctx, imageRef, func(p dockerapi.PullProgress) { + if p.Percent == nil { + return + } + s.setState(StateStarting, + fmt.Sprintf("downloading %s (%d%%)", imageRef, *p.Percent)) + }) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("downloading %s: %w", imageRef, err) + } + s.log.Info("runtime image pulled", "image", imageRef) + return nil +} + // startAndConfirm starts the container and waits for it to report healthy. func (s *Supervisor) startAndConfirm(ctx context.Context) error { s.setState(StateStarting, "starting runtime") diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go index 72b53b33..8d367894 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import ( "io" "log/slog" "net/http" + "strings" "sync" "testing" "time" @@ -35,6 +36,16 @@ type fakeDocker struct { // startMakesHealthy models the normal case: starting the container brings // the webserver up. startMakesHealthy bool + + // imagePresent models the local image store. false means the supervisor + // has to pull before it can create anything -- the fresh-install case. + imagePresent bool + pullErr error + pulls []string + // onPullProgress runs from inside the pull's progress callback, so a test + // can observe supervisor state at that instant rather than afterwards. + onPullProgress func() + observed Status } func (f *fakeDocker) Ping(context.Context) error { return nil } @@ -101,6 +112,43 @@ func (f *fakeDocker) StreamEvents(ctx context.Context, _ string, _ func(dockerap return ctx.Err() } +func (f *fakeDocker) InspectImage(_ context.Context, ref string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + if !f.imagePresent { + return nil, &dockerapi.APIError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Path: "/images/" + ref + "/json"} + } + return &dockerapi.ImageInfo{ID: "sha256:image", Size: 1000}, nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) PullImage(_ context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error { + f.mu.Lock() + f.pulls = append(f.pulls, ref) + err := f.pullErr + f.mu.Unlock() + + if err != nil { + return err + } + if onProgress != nil { + half := 50 + onProgress(dockerapi.PullProgress{Phase: "Downloading", Percent: &half}) + if f.onPullProgress != nil { + f.onPullProgress() + } + } + f.mu.Lock() + f.imagePresent = true + f.mu.Unlock() + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) pullCount() int { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return len(f.pulls) +} + func (f *fakeDocker) counts() (created, started, stopped int) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() @@ -153,7 +201,7 @@ func dieEvent(code string) dockerapi.Event { // --- reconcile ----------------------------------------------------------- func TestReconcileCreatesAndStartsAMissingContainer(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{startMakesHealthy: true} + docker := &fakeDocker{startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { @@ -172,7 +220,7 @@ func TestReconcileAdoptsAHealthyRunningContainer(t *testing.T) { // The bootloader restarts far more often than the runtime does -- its own // crash, a self-update. A reconcile that recreated or bounced a working // runtime would turn a bootloader hiccup into a plant outage. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { @@ -189,7 +237,7 @@ func TestReconcileAdoptsAHealthyRunningContainer(t *testing.T) { } func TestReconcileStartsAnExistingStoppedContainer(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: false, startMakesHealthy: true} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: false, startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { @@ -207,7 +255,7 @@ func TestReconcileStartsAnExistingStoppedContainer(t *testing.T) { func TestReconcileFallsBackToTheProbeWhenTheImageHasNoHealthcheck(t *testing.T) { // Images built before the HEALTHCHECK landed report no health status. They // must still be supervised rather than assumed fine. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: ""} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { @@ -228,7 +276,7 @@ func TestAnExpectedStopIsNotCountedAsACrash(t *testing.T) { // This is the bug that would make the first successful update look like a // crash-loop: the runtime exits because we asked it to, and if that counts, // a perfectly healthy device drops into recovery. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) ctx := context.Background() @@ -246,7 +294,7 @@ func TestAnExpectedStopIsNotCountedAsACrash(t *testing.T) { } func TestRepeatedUnexpectedExitsEnterRecovery(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} sup := New(docker, fakeSpec{}, &fakeProbe{}, Config{ ContainerName: "test-runtime", MaxCrashes: 3, @@ -274,7 +322,7 @@ func TestRecoveryStopsTheRuntimeSoDiscoveryStaysExclusive(t *testing.T) { // Only one service on the host may answer the UDP discovery broadcast. // Recovery is defined as "the runtime is not running", which is what lets // the bootloader's responder switch on without ever racing the runtime's. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) sup.EnterRecovery(context.Background(), "test") @@ -293,7 +341,7 @@ func TestASuccessfulRestartDoesNotEraseTheCrashHistory(t *testing.T) { // process down. If a healthy start cleared the count, the evidence would be // zeroed between every crash, the threshold could never be reached, and the // supervisor would restart forever instead of handing the device over. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) ctx := context.Background() @@ -311,7 +359,7 @@ func TestTheCrashHistoryIsForgottenByAgeNotByRecovery(t *testing.T) { // Forgetting still has to happen, or crashes weeks apart would accumulate // into a false loop. The sliding window does it by aging entries out, which // is the only forgetting that is wanted. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) now := time.Now() sup.crashes.now = func() time.Time { return now } @@ -332,7 +380,7 @@ func TestAnUnhealthyEventStopsTheWedgedRuntime(t *testing.T) { // healthcheck the supervisor would idle forever beside a dead runtime. // Stopping it converts the hang into a die, which then flows through the // ordinary crash accounting. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) event := dockerapi.Event{Type: "container", Action: "health_status: unhealthy"} @@ -345,7 +393,7 @@ func TestAnUnhealthyEventStopsTheWedgedRuntime(t *testing.T) { } func TestEventsForOtherContainersAreIgnored(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) event := dockerapi.Event{Type: "container", Action: "die"} @@ -360,7 +408,7 @@ func TestEventsForOtherContainersAreIgnored(t *testing.T) { // --- update claim -------------------------------------------------------- func TestBeginUpdateRefusesASecondConcurrentUpdate(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) if err := sup.BeginUpdate(); err != nil { @@ -372,7 +420,7 @@ func TestBeginUpdateRefusesASecondConcurrentUpdate(t *testing.T) { } func TestExitsDuringAnUpdateAreNotCrashes(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) if err := sup.BeginUpdate(); err != nil { @@ -440,7 +488,7 @@ func TestRestartDelayBacksOffAndIsCapped(t *testing.T) { func TestStartTimeoutIsReportedRatherThanHanging(t *testing.T) { // A container that never becomes healthy emits no event to wait for, so a // timeout is the only way to notice. - docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: false, health: "starting"} + docker := &fakeDocker{exists: true, running: false, health: "starting", imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{err: errors.New("connection refused")}) err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()) @@ -452,7 +500,7 @@ func TestStartTimeoutIsReportedRatherThanHanging(t *testing.T) { func TestRunEntersRecoveryWhenTheRuntimeCannotStart(t *testing.T) { // Recovery must be reachable precisely when the runtime will not come up: // that is the case RTOP-283 exists for. - docker := &fakeDocker{startErr: errors.New("no such image")} + docker := &fakeDocker{startErr: errors.New("no such image"), imagePresent: true} sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{err: errors.New("down")}) ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 400*time.Millisecond) @@ -463,3 +511,80 @@ func TestRunEntersRecoveryWhenTheRuntimeCannotStart(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("want %q when the runtime cannot start, got %q", StateRecovery, got) } } + +// --- image acquisition --------------------------------------------------- + +func TestAFreshInstallPullsTheRuntimeImage(t *testing.T) { + // The bootloader is what fetches the runtime on a new device: install.sh + // writes the spec and starts the bootloader without pulling anything. + // Without this the very first boot goes straight to recovery with + // "No such image", which is what the integration suite caught. + docker := &fakeDocker{startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: false} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + if docker.pullCount() != 1 { + t.Fatalf("want the image pulled once, got %d pulls", docker.pullCount()) + } + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateHealthy { + t.Fatalf("want %q after pulling and starting, got %q", StateHealthy, got) + } +} + +func TestAPresentImageIsNotRePulled(t *testing.T) { + // Re-pulling on every restart would turn each one into a network round + // trip, and on a slow link into minutes of delay before a PLC that was + // working comes back. + docker := &fakeDocker{startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + if docker.pullCount() != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a present image must not be re-pulled, got %d pulls", docker.pullCount()) + } +} + +func TestAFailedImagePullIsReportedWithTheImageName(t *testing.T) { + // An operator seeing "downloading X failed" can check the tag or the + // network; "reconcile failed" sends them nowhere. + docker := &fakeDocker{imagePresent: false, pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown")} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("a failed pull must surface an error") + } + if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "test:1") || + !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "manifest unknown") { + t.Fatalf("the error must name the image and the cause, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestTheDownloadIsVisibleInTheStatusWhileItRuns(t *testing.T) { + // On a slow device this pull runs for minutes. The difference between + // "downloading 50%" and an apparently hung device is whether the editor + // has anything to show, so the reason has to be updated DURING the pull, + // not merely at the end. Captured from inside the progress callback, + // because by the time Reconcile returns the state is already healthy. + docker := &fakeDocker{startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: false} + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + docker.onPullProgress = func() { docker.observed = sup.Status() } + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + + if docker.observed.State != StateStarting { + t.Fatalf("want %q while downloading, got %q", StateStarting, docker.observed.State) + } + if !strings.Contains(docker.observed.Reason, "downloading") { + t.Fatalf("the reason must say what is happening, got %q", docker.observed.Reason) + } + if !strings.Contains(docker.observed.Reason, "50%") { + t.Fatalf("the reason must carry the percentage, got %q", docker.observed.Reason) + } +} diff --git a/install.sh b/install.sh index f97fc861..0edd3fd7 100755 --- a/install.sh +++ b/install.sh @@ -137,7 +137,36 @@ EOF # Ensure we're in the project directory cd "$OPENPLC_DIR" -echo "OpenPLC Runtime Installation" +# Dispatch: Docker install by default, source build behind --native (RTOP-283). +# +# The Docker path installs no toolchain and compiles nothing, which is what +# makes a version change from the editor possible at all -- and what removes +# the failure this ticket exists to fix, where a half-finished source rebuild +# leaves a device with no build/ and no way in. +# +# --native keeps today's behaviour verbatim for MSYS2 and for targets that +# cannot host a container engine. It is a supported path, not a deprecated one. +INSTALL_MODE="docker" +declare -a DOCKER_INSTALL_ARGS=() +for arg in "$@"; do + case "$arg" in + --native) INSTALL_MODE="native" ;; + *) DOCKER_INSTALL_ARGS+=("$arg") ;; + esac +done + +# MSYS2 has no container engine, so it is always a source build regardless of +# what was asked for. Saying so beats failing later inside a docker command. +if is_msys2 && [ "$INSTALL_MODE" = "docker" ]; then + echo "Platform: MSYS2/Windows - installing from source (Docker is not available here)" + INSTALL_MODE="native" +fi + +if [ "$INSTALL_MODE" = "docker" ]; then + exec bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/install-docker.sh" "$OPENPLC_DIR" "${DOCKER_INSTALL_ARGS[@]}" +fi + +echo "OpenPLC Runtime Installation (source build)" echo "Project directory: $OPENPLC_DIR" echo "Working directory: $(pwd)" diff --git a/scripts/install-docker.sh b/scripts/install-docker.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..ae7077b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/install-docker.sh @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Docker-based install of the OpenPLC Runtime (RTOP-283). +# +# This is what `sudo ./install.sh` does by default. It installs no build +# toolchain and compiles nothing: it ensures a container engine, writes the +# bootloader's spec, and starts the bootloader. The bootloader then pulls the +# runtime image and brings it up. +# +# Docker is the ONLY dependency this path adds. Nothing of ours goes into +# systemd -- Docker's own restart policy starts the bootloader at boot, and the +# bootloader starts the runtime. That is deliberate: the fewer moving parts +# between power-on and a running PLC, the fewer ways it fails. +# +# `sudo ./install.sh --native` keeps the source build for MSYS2 and for targets +# that cannot host a container engine. +set -euo pipefail + +RED='\033[0;31m'; GREEN='\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\033[1;33m'; BLUE='\033[0;34m'; NC='\033[0m' +log_info() { echo -e "${BLUE}[INFO]${NC} $1"; } +log_success() { echo -e "${GREEN}[SUCCESS]${NC} $1"; } +log_warning() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARNING]${NC} $1"; } +log_error() { echo -e "${RED}[ERROR]${NC} $1" >&2; } + +# --- defaults ------------------------------------------------------------ + +RUNTIME_REPOSITORY="${RUNTIME_REPOSITORY:-ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime}" +BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY="${BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY:-ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader}" +RUNTIME_VERSION="${RUNTIME_VERSION:-}" +BOOTLOADER_VERSION="${BOOTLOADER_VERSION:-latest}" + +# Two directories, deliberately separate. +# +# The runtime's holds everything a version change must preserve: .env, +# restapi.db, retain.bin, vpp/ licences and the stored project. +# +# The bootloader's holds the container spec, including this board's device +# mounts. It is separate because "erase all data" wipes the runtime's +# directory, and a board that came back from a data wipe with no SPI would be +# a miserable failure mode. +RUNTIME_DATA_DIR="${RUNTIME_DATA_DIR:-/var/lib/openplc-runtime}" +BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR="${BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR:-/var/lib/openplc-bootloader}" + +BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER=openplc-bootloader +RUNTIME_CONTAINER=openplc-runtime +BOOTLOADER_PORT="${BOOTLOADER_PORT:-8445}" + +# Extra bind mounts and env for the runtime container, gathered from --mount +# and --env. Board-specific needs land here rather than in a rebuilt image. +declare -a EXTRA_MOUNTS=() +declare -a EXTRA_ENV=() + +usage() { + cat <<'EOF' +Usage: sudo ./install.sh [options] + + --native Build and install from source instead (today's path) + --runtime-version VERSION Runtime image tag to install (default: the VERSION file) + --bootloader-version VER Bootloader image tag (default: latest) + --mount HOST:CONTAINER[:ro] Extra bind mount for the runtime; repeatable + --env KEY=VALUE Extra environment variable for the runtime; repeatable + --data-dir PATH Runtime persistent data directory + --port PORT Bootloader control port (default: 8445) + -h, --help Show this help + +Re-running is safe: it rewrites the spec and restarts the bootloader without +touching runtime data, so adding a mount does not mean reinstalling anything. +EOF +} + +parse_args() { + while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + --runtime-version) RUNTIME_VERSION="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --bootloader-version) BOOTLOADER_VERSION="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --mount) EXTRA_MOUNTS+=("$2"); shift 2 ;; + --env) EXTRA_ENV+=("$2"); shift 2 ;; + --data-dir) RUNTIME_DATA_DIR="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --port) BOOTLOADER_PORT="$2"; shift 2 ;; + -h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;; + *) log_error "unknown option: $1"; usage; exit 1 ;; + esac + done +} + +# --- engine -------------------------------------------------------------- + +detect_engine() { + if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then + return 0 + fi + return 1 +} + +install_engine() { + log_info "Docker not found; installing it" + + # Docker's own convenience script rather than distro packages: it covers + # every distro this runtime targets and always installs a version new + # enough for the API the bootloader uses. Distro packages vary wildly -- + # Debian bookworm's docker.io is old enough to matter. + if ! command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log_error "curl is required to install Docker. Install curl, or install" + log_error "Docker yourself and re-run this script." + exit 1 + fi + + local script + script="$(mktemp)" + if ! curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com -o "$script"; then + rm -f "$script" + log_error "Could not download the Docker installer." + log_error "Install Docker manually, or use --native to build from source." + exit 1 + fi + sh "$script" + rm -f "$script" + + command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || { + log_error "Docker installation did not produce a working 'docker' command." + exit 1 + } + log_success "Docker installed" +} + +# start_engine brings the daemon up using whatever init this system has. +# +# We install no unit of our own, but the ENGINE's unit does have to be enabled, +# or nothing starts at boot and the whole design falls over. +start_engine() { + if docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log_info "Docker daemon is running" + elif command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then + log_info "Starting the Docker daemon" + systemctl enable --now docker + else + log_error "The Docker daemon is not running and this system has no systemd." + log_error "Start Docker, then re-run this script." + exit 1 + fi + + local waited=0 + while ! docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; do + sleep 1 + waited=$((waited + 1)) + if [ "$waited" -ge 60 ]; then + log_error "The Docker daemon did not become ready." + exit 1 + fi + done + + # Enable at boot even when it was already running: an engine that is up now + # but disabled would leave the device dead after a power cycle, which is + # exactly the failure nobody notices until it matters. + if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then + systemctl enable docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ + log_warning "Could not enable Docker at boot; check 'systemctl enable docker'." + fi +} + +# --- spec ---------------------------------------------------------------- + +resolve_runtime_version() { + if [ -n "$RUNTIME_VERSION" ]; then + return 0 + fi + # The repo's VERSION file, so a plain checkout installs the matching + # runtime rather than whatever "latest" happens to be that day. + local version_file="$1/VERSION" + if [ -f "$version_file" ]; then + RUNTIME_VERSION="$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$version_file")" + fi + if [ -z "$RUNTIME_VERSION" ]; then + RUNTIME_VERSION="latest" + log_warning "No VERSION file found; installing the 'latest' runtime tag." + fi +} + +# json_array renders arguments as a JSON string array. +json_array() { + local first=1 item + printf '[' + for item in "$@"; do + [ $first -eq 1 ] || printf ', ' + first=0 + # Escape backslashes and quotes; paths should contain neither, but a + # malformed spec would stop the bootloader from starting at all. + printf '"%s"' "$(printf '%s' "$item" | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g; s/"/\\"/g')" + done + printf ']' +} + +write_spec() { + mkdir -p "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" + chmod 750 "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" + mkdir -p "$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR" + chmod 755 "$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR" + + local spec="$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR/runtime-spec.json" + local tmp="$spec.tmp" + + { + printf '{\n' + printf ' "repository": "%s",\n' "$RUNTIME_REPOSITORY" + printf ' "version": "%s",\n' "$RUNTIME_VERSION" + printf ' "dataDir": "%s",\n' "$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR" + printf ' "bootloaderPort": %s' "$BOOTLOADER_PORT" + if [ ${#EXTRA_MOUNTS[@]} -gt 0 ]; then + printf ',\n "extraBinds": %s' "$(json_array "${EXTRA_MOUNTS[@]}")" + fi + if [ ${#EXTRA_ENV[@]} -gt 0 ]; then + printf ',\n "extraEnv": %s' "$(json_array "${EXTRA_ENV[@]}")" + fi + printf '\n}\n' + } > "$tmp" + + # Atomic, so an interrupted install cannot leave a spec the bootloader + # refuses to parse -- which would stop it starting at all. + mv "$tmp" "$spec" + log_success "Wrote $spec" +} + +# --- bootloader ---------------------------------------------------------- + +start_bootloader() { + local image="$BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY:$BOOTLOADER_VERSION" + + log_info "Pulling $image" + if ! docker pull "$image"; then + log_error "Could not pull the bootloader image." + log_error "Check the device's internet access, or use --native." + exit 1 + fi + + # Replace any previous bootloader. The RUNTIME container is deliberately + # left alone: a re-run must not interrupt a running PLC, and the new + # bootloader adopts whatever it finds healthy. + if docker inspect "$BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log_info "Replacing the existing bootloader container" + docker rm -f "$BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER" >/dev/null + fi + + log_info "Starting the bootloader" + # --restart always is what makes this survive a reboot with no systemd + # unit of ours. The bootloader must never exit on its own for that reason. + # + # The runtime data directory is mounted READ-ONLY here: the bootloader + # authenticates against the runtime's accounts and must never be able to + # create or modify one. + docker run -d \ + --name "$BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER" \ + --restart always \ + --network host \ + -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \ + -v "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR:$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" \ + -v "$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR:$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR:ro" \ + "$image" \ + -state-dir "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" \ + -port "$BOOTLOADER_PORT" >/dev/null + + log_success "Bootloader started" +} + +wait_for_runtime() { + log_info "Waiting for the runtime to come up (this pulls the image on first install)" + local waited=0 + local state="" + while [ "$waited" -lt 900 ]; do + state="$(curl -sk "https://127.0.0.1:$BOOTLOADER_PORT/api/bootloader/capabilities" \ + 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/.*"state":"\([a-z]*\)".*/\1/p')" + case "$state" in + healthy) + log_success "Runtime is up" + return 0 + ;; + recovery) + log_warning "The bootloader is in recovery mode: the runtime did not start." + log_warning "Connect the OpenPLC Editor to port $BOOTLOADER_PORT to see why" + log_warning "and to install a different version." + return 0 + ;; + esac + sleep 5 + waited=$((waited + 5)) + done + log_warning "The runtime has not reported healthy yet. Check:" + log_warning " docker logs $BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER" + return 0 +} + +print_summary() { + cat <:8443 + Bootloader API https://:$BOOTLOADER_PORT + Runtime data $RUNTIME_DATA_DIR + Bootloader state $BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR + +Useful commands: + docker logs -f $BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER Bootloader activity + docker logs -f $RUNTIME_CONTAINER Runtime output + docker ps Both containers + +The runtime version is changed from the OpenPLC Editor. Nothing needs to be +run on the device by hand. +EOF +} + +main() { + local repo_root="$1"; shift + parse_args "$@" + + if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then + log_error "This script must run as root (sudo ./install.sh)" + exit 1 + fi + + resolve_runtime_version "$repo_root" + + log_info "Installing the OpenPLC Runtime with Docker" + log_info " runtime: $RUNTIME_REPOSITORY:$RUNTIME_VERSION" + log_info " bootloader: $BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY:$BOOTLOADER_VERSION" + if [ ${#EXTRA_MOUNTS[@]} -gt 0 ]; then + log_info " extra mounts: ${EXTRA_MOUNTS[*]}" + fi + + detect_engine || install_engine + start_engine + write_spec + start_bootloader + wait_for_runtime + print_summary +} + +main "$@" diff --git a/tests/integration/Dockerfile.testhost b/tests/integration/Dockerfile.testhost new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b3056c39 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/Dockerfile.testhost @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 + +# A Debian host that runs its own Docker daemon, so the bootloader can be +# exercised end to end without a physical device (RTOP-283). +# +# Debian bookworm rather than the official docker:dind image on purpose: this +# stands in for a real target, and install.sh's package-manager detection, +# engine install and container wiring are part of what needs testing. An +# Alpine dind image would test none of that. +# +# What this CANNOT test, and what the SLM-RP4 round is still for: real +# hardware access. There is no /dev/spidev6.0 or /dev/gpiochip0 in here, so +# VPP plugin behaviour and genuine SCHED_FIFO latency have to be validated on +# the device. Everything about the update mechanism itself -- pull, swap, +# health-gate, recovery, discovery, auth -- is testable here. +FROM debian:bookworm-slim + +# ca-certificates + gnupg for the Docker apt repository; iproute2 and procps +# for the diagnostics the tests assert on; python3 for the assertion script. +RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ + ca-certificates \ + curl \ + gnupg \ + iproute2 \ + iptables \ + procps \ + python3 \ + uidmap \ + xz-utils \ + && install -m 0755 -d /etc/apt/keyrings \ + && curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/debian/gpg \ + -o /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc \ + && chmod a+r /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc \ + && echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc] \ +https://download.docker.com/linux/debian bookworm stable" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list \ + && apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ + docker-ce \ + docker-ce-cli \ + containerd.io \ + && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* + +# vfs rather than overlay2: an overlay-on-overlay mount is refused by the +# kernel when the outer container's filesystem is already overlayfs, which it +# is under Docker Desktop. vfs is slower and uses more disk, which for a test +# harness is a fair trade against not working at all. +RUN mkdir -p /etc/docker \ + && printf '{\n "storage-driver": "vfs",\n "iptables": false,\n "ip6tables": false\n}\n' \ + > /etc/docker/daemon.json + +COPY entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh +RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh + +ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh"] +CMD ["sleep", "infinity"] diff --git a/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh b/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh new file mode 100644 index 00000000..82643259 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Start the inner Docker daemon, then hand over to the command. +# +# The daemon has to be up before anything else runs, and "up" means the socket +# answers -- not merely that dockerd was spawned. Racing it is the classic way +# an integration harness fails intermittently and gets blamed on the code under +# test. +set -euo pipefail + +log() { printf '[testhost] %s\n' "$*" >&2; } + +if [ ! -w /var/run ]; then + log "ERROR: /var/run is not writable; the container needs --privileged" + exit 1 +fi + +log "starting dockerd" +dockerd >/var/log/dockerd.log 2>&1 & +DOCKERD_PID=$! + +# Wait for the socket to actually respond. 60s: a cold vfs daemon on a laptop +# under load takes longer than the couple of seconds it usually needs. +for _ in $(seq 1 120); do + if docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log "dockerd ready ($(docker version --format '{{.Server.Version}}'))" + break + fi + if ! kill -0 "$DOCKERD_PID" 2>/dev/null; then + log "ERROR: dockerd exited during start-up. Last lines:" + tail -30 /var/log/dockerd.log >&2 || true + exit 1 + fi + sleep 0.5 +done + +if ! docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log "ERROR: dockerd did not become ready. Last lines:" + tail -30 /var/log/dockerd.log >&2 || true + exit 1 +fi + +exec "$@" diff --git a/tests/integration/harness.sh b/tests/integration/harness.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..2fc8eee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/harness.sh @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Integration harness for the RTOP-283 bootloader. +# +# Runs a Debian container with its own Docker daemon (see Dockerfile.testhost), +# stands up a registry inside it, and seeds that registry with runtime images. +# The bootloader then does real pulls over a real registry, so the update path +# -- including progress streaming and layer reuse -- is exercised rather than +# stubbed. +# +# What this harness cannot cover, and what the device round is for: hardware. +# There is no /dev/spidev6.0 or /dev/gpiochip0 here, so VPP plugin behaviour +# and real SCHED_FIFO latency must be validated on an SLM-RP4. +# +# Usage: +# ./harness.sh up # build and start the test host +# ./harness.sh seed # load images and fill the inner registry +# ./harness.sh shell # interactive shell on the test host +# ./harness.sh down # tear everything down +set -euo pipefail + +HOST_CONTAINER=openplc-testhost +HOST_IMAGE=openplc-testhost:latest +DOCKER_VOLUME=openplc-testhost-docker +REGISTRY=localhost:5000 + +# Repository the bootloader pulls from inside the harness. +STUB_REPO="$REGISTRY/openplc-stub" +REAL_REPO="$REGISTRY/openplc-runtime" + +# The real runtime image on the developer's machine, used as the base for the +# end-to-end case. Any locally built runtime image works. +REAL_BASE="${REAL_BASE:-openplc-runtime:retain-gate-final}" + +SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" + +log() { printf '\033[0;34m[harness]\033[0m %s\n' "$*"; } +die() { printf '\033[0;31m[harness]\033[0m %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; } + +# inner runs a command on the test host's Docker daemon. +inner() { docker exec "$HOST_CONTAINER" "$@"; } + +# inner_stdin is inner for commands that read from a pipe. `docker exec` +# does not forward stdin unless it is given -i, so without this a piped +# `docker load` silently reads an empty stream and reports +# "invalid archive: does not contain a manifest.json". +inner_stdin() { docker exec -i "$HOST_CONTAINER" "$@"; } + +cmd_up() { + log "building the test host image" + docker build -q -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/Dockerfile.testhost" -t "$HOST_IMAGE" "$SCRIPT_DIR" >/dev/null + + docker rm -f "$HOST_CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + docker volume create "$DOCKER_VOLUME" >/dev/null + + log "starting the test host" + # Privileged because it runs a Docker daemon. The repo is mounted + # read-only so image builds inside can use it as a build context without + # any risk of a test writing to the working tree. + docker run -d --name "$HOST_CONTAINER" --privileged \ + -v "$DOCKER_VOLUME":/var/lib/docker \ + -v "$REPO_ROOT":/workspace:ro \ + "$HOST_IMAGE" sleep infinity >/dev/null + + log "waiting for the inner daemon" + for _ in $(seq 1 120); do + if inner docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log "inner daemon ready: $(inner docker version --format '{{.Server.Version}}')" + return 0 + fi + sleep 0.5 + done + docker logs "$HOST_CONTAINER" | tail -30 + die "the inner daemon did not come up" +} + +# transfer pipes an EXISTING image from the host daemon into the inner one, +# skipping the work when it is already there. The real runtime image is ~1 GB, +# and re-piping it on every run would dominate the suite's runtime. +transfer() { + local image="$1" + if inner docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log "already inside: $image" + return 0 + fi + docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || die "$image is not present on this machine" + log "transferring $image into the test host" + docker save "$image" | inner_stdin docker load >/dev/null +} + +# build_into_host builds an image from this repo and loads it into the inner +# daemon, ALWAYS fresh -- these are the artefacts under test, so a stale copy +# would quietly test the previous commit. +# +# buildx with `--output type=docker` rather than `docker build` + `docker save`: +# Docker 29 exports a buildx-built image as an OCI layout, and the inner +# daemon rejects that with "does not contain a manifest.json". This output type +# writes the legacy docker-archive both daemons agree on. +build_into_host() { + local image="$1" context="$2" dockerfile="$3" + shift 3 + local tar + tar="$(mktemp -t openplc-img-XXXXXX).tar" + log "building $image" + docker buildx build \ + --output "type=docker,dest=$tar" \ + -f "$dockerfile" \ + -t "$image" \ + "$@" \ + "$context" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || { rm -f "$tar"; die "building $image failed"; } + inner_stdin docker load < "$tar" >/dev/null + rm -f "$tar" +} + +cmd_seed() { + inner docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "run './harness.sh up' first" + + transfer registry:2 + build_into_host openplc-bootloader:test \ + "$REPO_ROOT/bootloader" "$REPO_ROOT/bootloader/Dockerfile" \ + --build-arg BOOTLOADER_VERSION=bootloader-v1.0.0-test + build_into_host openplc-stubruntime:build \ + "$SCRIPT_DIR/stubruntime" "$SCRIPT_DIR/stubruntime/Dockerfile" + + log "starting the inner registry" + inner docker rm -f registry >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + # --network host so the bootloader, which also uses host networking, can + # reach it on localhost:5000. Docker treats localhost registries as + # insecure by default, so no daemon configuration is needed. + inner docker run -d --name registry --restart always --network host registry:2 >/dev/null + + for _ in $(seq 1 60); do + if inner curl -fsS "http://$REGISTRY/v2/" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi + sleep 0.5 + done + inner curl -fsS "http://$REGISTRY/v2/" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || die "the inner registry did not come up" + + log "seeding stub runtime versions" + # Several tags of the same tiny image. Behaviour is chosen at RUN time by + # environment, not baked per tag, so one image covers every failure mode + # and the pulls stay fast. + for tag in v1.0.0 v1.0.1 v1.0.2 v0.9.0; do + inner docker tag openplc-stubruntime:build "$STUB_REPO:$tag" + inner docker push -q "$STUB_REPO:$tag" >/dev/null + done + + log "building the real runtime image with the RTOP-283 changes" + # A thin layer over a locally built runtime, carrying the webserver files + # this ticket touches. Deriving rather than rebuilding from source keeps + # this to seconds instead of the full install.sh build. + transfer "$REAL_BASE" + inner sh -c "cat > /tmp/real.Dockerfile <<'EOF' +FROM $REAL_BASE +COPY webserver/update_policy.py webserver/runtime_info.py webserver/restapi.py webserver/app.py /workdir/webserver/ +HEALTHCHECK --interval=10s --timeout=10s --start-period=90s --retries=3 \\ + CMD curl -kfsS https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/version >/dev/null || exit 1 +EOF +docker build -q -f /tmp/real.Dockerfile -t $REAL_REPO:v4.2.1 /workspace >/dev/null" + inner docker push -q "$REAL_REPO:v4.2.1" >/dev/null + + log "registry contents:" + inner curl -fsS "http://$REGISTRY/v2/_catalog" | tr -d '\n'; echo + for repo in openplc-stub openplc-runtime; do + printf ' %s: ' "$repo" + inner curl -fsS "http://$REGISTRY/v2/$repo/tags/list" | tr -d '\n'; echo + done +} + +cmd_shell() { + exec docker exec -it "$HOST_CONTAINER" bash +} + +cmd_down() { + log "tearing down" + docker rm -f "$HOST_CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + if [ "${KEEP_VOLUME:-0}" != "1" ]; then + docker volume rm -f "$DOCKER_VOLUME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + else + log "keeping $DOCKER_VOLUME (KEEP_VOLUME=1)" + fi +} + +case "${1:-}" in + up) cmd_up ;; + seed) cmd_seed ;; + shell) cmd_shell ;; + down) cmd_down ;; + *) die "usage: $0 {up|seed|shell|down}" ;; +esac diff --git a/tests/integration/stubruntime/Dockerfile b/tests/integration/stubruntime/Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1a769445 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/stubruntime/Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1 + +# Stub runtime for integration tests. See main.go for what it is and is not. +FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM golang:1.25-alpine AS build + +ARG TARGETOS +ARG TARGETARCH + +WORKDIR /src +COPY go.mod ./ +COPY main.go ./ +RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=${TARGETOS} GOARCH=${TARGETARCH} \ + go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" -o /out/stubruntime . + +FROM scratch +COPY --from=build /out/stubruntime /stubruntime + +EXPOSE 8443 + +# Same shape as the real runtime's healthcheck: an unauthenticated probe of +# /api/version. Exec form because there is no shell on scratch, and the probe +# lives in the binary so the image needs no curl either. +# +# Intervals are much tighter than the real image's. The real one allows 90s of +# start-period because a cold runtime loads plugin venvs; the stub is ready in +# milliseconds, and waiting 90s per case would make the suite unusable. +HEALTHCHECK --interval=2s --timeout=3s --start-period=2s --retries=2 \ + CMD ["/stubruntime", "-probe"] + +ENTRYPOINT ["/stubruntime"] diff --git a/tests/integration/stubruntime/go.mod b/tests/integration/stubruntime/go.mod new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc831c4f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/stubruntime/go.mod @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +module stubruntime + +go 1.25 diff --git a/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go b/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b228620a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +// Command stubruntime stands in for the OpenPLC runtime in integration tests. +// +// It serves the two endpoints the bootloader actually depends on -- an +// unauthenticated /api/version and a healthcheck -- and nothing else. The +// point is not to emulate the runtime; it is to make the runtime's FAILURE +// modes reproducible on demand, which the real image cannot be asked to do. +// A real runtime cannot be told "exit 1 during start-up" or "come up healthy +// then die three times", and those are exactly the paths where the +// bootloader's crash accounting and recovery transitions live. +// +// The real image is exercised separately in the same harness for the +// does-it-actually-come-up case, and hardware behaviour (SPI, GPIO, VPP +// plugins, real SCHED_FIFO latency) is validated on a device, which no +// container on a developer machine can stand in for. +package main + +import ( + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/tls" + "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "flag" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "math/big" + "net" + "net/http" + "os" + "strconv" + "time" +) + +const listenAddr = ":8443" + +func main() { + probe := flag.Bool("probe", false, "probe the local endpoint and exit (used as HEALTHCHECK)") + flag.Parse() + + if *probe { + os.Exit(runProbe()) + } + + version := envOr("STUB_VERSION", "v0.0.0-stub") + failMode := os.Getenv("STUB_FAIL") + + switch failMode { + case "exit": + // A runtime whose image is broken: it dies during start-up and never + // serves anything. Drives the "did not start" path. + log.Printf("stub %s: STUB_FAIL=exit, exiting 1 immediately", version) + os.Exit(1) + case "hang": + // Alive but never answering. This is the case Docker's events stream + // cannot report on its own -- no die event is ever emitted -- so the + // healthcheck is the only thing that notices. + log.Printf("stub %s: STUB_FAIL=hang, listening on nothing", version) + select {} + } + + if failMode == "crash-loop" { + after := envDuration("STUB_CRASH_AFTER", 3*time.Second) + // Serve first, THEN die. This is the shape that matters: a program + // that faults on load lets the webserver come up before it takes the + // process down, which is why a healthy start must not clear the + // bootloader's crash window. + go func() { + time.Sleep(after) + log.Printf("stub %s: crash-loop mode, exiting 1 after %s", version, after) + os.Exit(1) + }() + } + + mux := http.NewServeMux() + mux.HandleFunc("/api/version", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + w.Header().Set("X-OpenPLC-Runtime-Version", version) + fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"version":%q}`, version) + }) + mux.HandleFunc("/api/capabilities", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + policy := envOr("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "manual") + port := envOr("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", "null") + dataDir := os.Getenv("OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR") + w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") + // dataDir is echoed so a test can assert the bootloader passed it -- + // the bug where the runtime ignored the mounted directory was invisible + // from outside until something reported what it had been told. + fmt.Fprintf(w, + `{"runtimeVersion":%q,"updatePolicy":%q,"bootloaderPort":%s,"dataDir":%q}`, + version, policy, port, dataDir) + }) + + cert, err := selfSigned() + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("stub: generating certificate: %v", err) + } + server := &http.Server{ + Addr: listenAddr, + Handler: mux, + TLSConfig: &tls.Config{Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}}, + ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, + } + + log.Printf("stub %s: listening on %s (fail=%q)", version, listenAddr, failMode) + if err := server.ListenAndServeTLS("", ""); err != nil { + log.Fatalf("stub: %v", err) + } +} + +// runProbe is the HEALTHCHECK. It lives in the same binary so the image needs +// no shell and no curl, which keeps it on scratch. +func runProbe() int { + client := &http.Client{ + Timeout: 3 * time.Second, + Transport: &http.Transport{ + TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // loopback + }, + } + resp, err := client.Get("https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/version") + if err != nil { + return 1 + } + defer resp.Body.Close() + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + return 1 + } + return 0 +} + +func selfSigned() (tls.Certificate, error) { + key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + template := x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), + Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "stubruntime"}, + NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), + NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * 365 * time.Hour), + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageCertSign, + ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, + BasicConstraintsValid: true, + IsCA: true, + DNSNames: []string{"localhost"}, + IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}, + } + der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &template, &template, &key.PublicKey, key) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + return tls.Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{der}, PrivateKey: key}, nil +} + +func envOr(name, fallback string) string { + if value := os.Getenv(name); value != "" { + return value + } + return fallback +} + +func envDuration(name string, fallback time.Duration) time.Duration { + raw := os.Getenv(name) + if raw == "" { + return fallback + } + seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(raw) + if err != nil || seconds <= 0 { + return fallback + } + return time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second +} diff --git a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac4d9835 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py @@ -0,0 +1,629 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""End-to-end tests for the RTOP-283 bootloader, run inside the test host. + +These drive the real thing: a real Docker daemon, a real registry, real image +pulls with real progress streaming, and the bootloader binary that ships. The +runtime under management is usually a stub (see stubruntime/main.go) because +the failure modes are the interesting part and a real runtime cannot be asked +to exit 1 during start-up on demand. One case swaps in the real runtime image +to prove it actually comes up and reports the right policy. + +What is deliberately NOT covered here, and is what the SLM-RP4 round is for: +hardware. There is no /dev/spidev6.0 or /dev/gpiochip0 in a container on a +developer machine, so VPP plugin behaviour and genuine SCHED_FIFO latency have +to be validated on a device. + +Standard library only -- the test host has python3 and nothing else. +""" + +import json +import os +import shutil +import sqlite3 +import ssl +import subprocess +import sys +import time +import urllib.error +import urllib.request + +REGISTRY = "localhost:5000" +STUB_REPO = f"{REGISTRY}/openplc-stub" +REAL_REPO = f"{REGISTRY}/openplc-runtime" + +BOOTLOADER_IMAGE = "openplc-bootloader:test" +BOOTLOADER_NAME = "openplc-bootloader" +RUNTIME_NAME = "openplc-runtime" + +STATE_DIR = "/var/lib/openplc-bootloader" +DATA_DIR = "/var/lib/openplc-runtime" +BOOTLOADER_URL = "https://127.0.0.1:8445" + +# From the shared auth vector (bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go +# and tests/pytest/restapi/test_bootloader_auth_vector.py). Reusing it here +# means the data directory can be seeded with a genuine werkzeug hash without +# werkzeug being installed in the test host -- and it cross-checks the vector +# in a real integration setting rather than only in unit tests. +PEPPER = "a" * 64 +JWT_SECRET = "b" * 64 +USERNAME = "operator" +PASSWORD = "correct horse battery staple" +PASSWORD_HASH = ( + "pbkdf2:sha256:600000$WCXqtZujfdFXqzAB$" + "4be2d44037a7d62f2483d1a189bd2dacb66871b323871f185a73a8e2d3230611" +) + +_TLS = ssl.create_default_context() +_TLS.check_hostname = False +_TLS.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE + + +# --- plumbing ------------------------------------------------------------- + + +class Failure(Exception): + """A test assertion failed.""" + + +def sh(*args: str, check: bool = True) -> str: + """Run a command and return its stdout.""" + result = subprocess.run( + args, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, timeout=600 + ) + if check and result.returncode != 0: + raise Failure( + f"command failed: {' '.join(args)}\n" + f"stdout: {result.stdout.strip()}\nstderr: {result.stderr.strip()}" + ) + return result.stdout.strip() + + +def http( + path: str, method: str = "GET", body: dict | None = None, token: str | None = None +) -> tuple[int, dict]: + """Call the bootloader API, returning (status, decoded body).""" + data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None + request = urllib.request.Request( + BOOTLOADER_URL + path, data=data, method=method + ) + if data is not None: + request.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json") + if token: + request.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}") + try: + with urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=_TLS, timeout=30) as response: + raw = response.read().decode() + return response.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else {} + except urllib.error.HTTPError as err: + raw = err.read().decode() + try: + return err.code, json.loads(raw) if raw else {} + except json.JSONDecodeError: + return err.code, {"raw": raw} + + +def wait_for(description: str, predicate, timeout: float = 90.0, interval: float = 0.5): + """Poll until predicate returns a truthy value, or fail with context.""" + deadline = time.time() + timeout + last = None + while time.time() < deadline: + try: + last = predicate() + if last: + return last + except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - a transient failure is expected while polling + last = err + time.sleep(interval) + raise Failure(f"timed out waiting for {description} (last observed: {last!r})") + + +def seed_data_dir() -> None: + """Create the runtime data directory the bootloader authenticates against. + + A real .env and a real users row, so login exercises the actual PBKDF2 and + SQLite paths rather than a mock. + """ + shutil.rmtree(DATA_DIR, ignore_errors=True) + os.makedirs(DATA_DIR, exist_ok=True) + with open(os.path.join(DATA_DIR, ".env"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + handle.write("FLASK_ENV=development\n") + handle.write(f"SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI=sqlite:///{DATA_DIR}/restapi.db\n") + handle.write(f"JWT_SECRET_KEY={JWT_SECRET}\n") + handle.write(f"PEPPER={PEPPER}\n") + + db_path = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "restapi.db") + connection = sqlite3.connect(db_path) + try: + connection.execute( + "CREATE TABLE users (" + "id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, username TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, " + "password_hash TEXT NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'admin')" + ) + connection.execute( + "INSERT INTO users (id, username, password_hash, role) VALUES (?,?,?,?)", + (1, USERNAME, PASSWORD_HASH, "admin"), + ) + connection.commit() + finally: + connection.close() + + +def write_spec(repository: str, version: str, extra_env: list[str] | None = None) -> None: + """Write the bootloader's runtime spec, as install.sh would.""" + os.makedirs(STATE_DIR, exist_ok=True) + spec = { + "repository": repository, + "version": version, + "dataDir": DATA_DIR, + "bootloaderPort": 8445, + } + if extra_env: + spec["extraEnv"] = extra_env + with open(os.path.join(STATE_DIR, "runtime-spec.json"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: + json.dump(spec, handle, indent=2) + + +def start_bootloader(extra_args: list[str] | None = None) -> None: + sh("docker", "rm", "-f", BOOTLOADER_NAME, check=False) + args = [ + "docker", "run", "-d", "--name", BOOTLOADER_NAME, + "--restart", "always", "--network", "host", + "-v", "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", + "-v", f"{STATE_DIR}:{STATE_DIR}", + "-v", f"{DATA_DIR}:{DATA_DIR}:ro", + BOOTLOADER_IMAGE, + ] + args += extra_args or ["-log-level=debug"] + sh(*args) + + +def reset(repository: str = STUB_REPO, version: str = "v1.0.0", + extra_env: list[str] | None = None) -> None: + """Return the host to a known state and start the bootloader.""" + sh("docker", "rm", "-f", BOOTLOADER_NAME, check=False) + sh("docker", "rm", "-f", RUNTIME_NAME, check=False) + shutil.rmtree(STATE_DIR, ignore_errors=True) + seed_data_dir() + write_spec(repository, version, extra_env) + start_bootloader() + + +def login() -> str: + status, body = wait_for( + "bootloader login", + lambda: (lambda r: r if r[0] == 200 else None)( + http("/api/bootloader/login", "POST", + {"username": USERNAME, "password": PASSWORD}) + ), + timeout=60, + ) + if status != 200: + raise Failure(f"login returned {status}: {body}") + return body["access_token"] + + +def container_state(name: str) -> dict: + raw = sh("docker", "inspect", name, check=False) + if not raw: + return {} + return json.loads(raw)[0] + + +def bootloader_state() -> str: + _, body = http("/api/bootloader/capabilities") + return body.get("state", "") + + +def wait_healthy(timeout: float = 120.0) -> None: + wait_for("the bootloader to report healthy", + lambda: bootloader_state() == "healthy", timeout=timeout) + + +def runtime_version_served() -> dict: + """Read the managed runtime's own /api/capabilities.""" + request = urllib.request.Request("https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/capabilities") + with urllib.request.urlopen(request, context=_TLS, timeout=15) as response: + return json.loads(response.read().decode()) + + +def image_present(reference: str) -> bool: + return sh("docker", "image", "inspect", reference, check=False) != "" + + +def run_update(token: str, version: str) -> tuple[int, dict]: + return http("/api/bootloader/update", "POST", {"version": version}, token) + + +def wait_update(token: str, expected: str, timeout: float = 180.0) -> dict: + def check(): + _, body = http("/api/bootloader/update", token=token) + if body.get("state") in ("success", "failed"): + return body + return None + + result = wait_for(f"the update to finish ({expected})", check, timeout=timeout) + if result["state"] != expected: + raise Failure(f"update ended in {result['state']}, wanted {expected}: {result}") + return result + + +# --- cases ---------------------------------------------------------------- + +CASES = [] + + +def case(fn): + CASES.append(fn) + return fn + + +@case +def test_bootstrap_creates_and_supervises_the_runtime(): + """A device with no runtime container gets one, and it comes up healthy.""" + reset() + wait_healthy() + + runtime = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME) + if not runtime: + raise Failure("the bootloader did not create a runtime container") + + host = runtime["HostConfig"] + if not host["Privileged"]: + raise Failure("the runtime must be privileged for hardware parity") + if host["NetworkMode"] != "host": + raise Failure(f"want host networking, got {host['NetworkMode']}") + if host["RestartPolicy"]["Name"] != "no": + raise Failure("the bootloader owns restarts; docker must not") + if "/dev:/dev" not in host["Binds"]: + raise Failure(f"/dev must be bound, got {host['Binds']}") + + # The trap that is not a privilege: any CPU limit enables the cgroup CPU + # controller and SCHED_FIFO then fails silently. + for field in ("NanoCpus", "CpuQuota", "CpuPeriod", "Memory", "CpuShares"): + if host.get(field): + raise Failure(f"{field} must be unset, got {host[field]}") + + limits = {u["Name"]: u["Soft"] for u in host.get("Ulimits") or []} + if limits.get("rtprio") != 99 or limits.get("memlock") != -1: + raise Failure(f"real-time ulimits are wrong: {limits}") + + +@case +def test_the_runtime_is_told_to_use_the_mounted_data_directory(): + """The bind alone is not enough: the runtime resolves its data dir by + detection, so without the env override it writes a fresh database inside + the container and every swap loses users, the project and licenses.""" + reset() + wait_healthy() + served = runtime_version_served() + if served.get("dataDir") != DATA_DIR: + raise Failure( + f"the runtime was not pointed at {DATA_DIR}, it reports {served.get('dataDir')!r}" + ) + + +@case +def test_the_runtime_is_told_it_is_bootloader_managed(): + """updatePolicy 'self' is what makes the editor offer the update action, + and only our bootloader sets it.""" + reset() + wait_healthy() + served = runtime_version_served() + if served.get("updatePolicy") != "self": + raise Failure(f"want updatePolicy self, got {served.get('updatePolicy')!r}") + if str(served.get("bootloaderPort")) != "8445": + raise Failure(f"want bootloaderPort 8445, got {served.get('bootloaderPort')!r}") + + +@case +def test_restarting_the_bootloader_adopts_the_running_runtime(): + """The bootloader restarts far more often than the runtime does. A + reconcile that recreated or bounced a working runtime would turn a + bootloader hiccup into a plant outage.""" + reset() + wait_healthy() + before = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Id"] + started_at = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["State"]["StartedAt"] + + sh("docker", "restart", BOOTLOADER_NAME) + wait_healthy() + + after = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME) + if after["Id"] != before: + raise Failure("the runtime container was recreated instead of adopted") + if after["State"]["StartedAt"] != started_at: + raise Failure("the runtime was restarted instead of adopted") + + +@case +def test_an_upgrade_pulls_swaps_and_retires_the_old_image(): + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + + status, body = run_update(token, "v1.0.1") + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"want 202 accepted, got {status}: {body}") + + wait_update(token, "success") + wait_healthy() + + if container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Config"]["Image"] != f"{STUB_REPO}:v1.0.1": + raise Failure("the runtime is not running the new image") + if image_present(f"{STUB_REPO}:v1.0.0"): + raise Failure("the previous image should have been retired") + # The choice has to survive a reboot, or the device reverts on next boot. + with open(os.path.join(STATE_DIR, "runtime-spec.json"), encoding="utf-8") as handle: + if json.load(handle)["version"] != "v1.0.1": + raise Failure("the new version was not recorded in the spec") + + +@case +def test_a_downgrade_is_the_same_operation(): + """No version floor: a user may deliberately pair an older runtime with an + older editor.""" + reset(version="v1.0.1") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + + status, _ = run_update(token, "v0.9.0") + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"a downgrade must be accepted, got {status}") + wait_update(token, "success") + wait_healthy() + + if container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Config"]["Image"] != f"{STUB_REPO}:v0.9.0": + raise Failure("the downgrade did not take effect") + + +@case +def test_a_version_that_does_not_exist_fails_without_touching_the_runtime(): + """A failed pull must never interrupt a working PLC.""" + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + running_before = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Id"] + + status, _ = run_update(token, "v6.6.6") + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"want 202, got {status}") + result = wait_update(token, "failed") + if "could not download" not in result["error"]: + raise Failure(f"want a download failure, got {result['error']!r}") + + # The old image must still be there, and the spec unchanged. + if not image_present(f"{STUB_REPO}:v1.0.0"): + raise Failure("a failed pull must not remove the working image") + with open(os.path.join(STATE_DIR, "runtime-spec.json"), encoding="utf-8") as handle: + if json.load(handle)["version"] != "v1.0.0": + raise Failure("a failed pull must not change the recorded version") + _ = running_before # the container may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine + + +@case +def test_a_new_version_that_will_not_start_enters_recovery(): + """The case pull-first ordering exists for: the operator is handed a device + in recovery that still has the previous image on disk.""" + # STUB_FAIL is injected through the spec's extraEnv, so the NEW container + # inherits it and exits immediately during start-up. + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + + write_spec(STUB_REPO, "v1.0.0", extra_env=["STUB_FAIL=exit"]) + sh("docker", "restart", BOOTLOADER_NAME) + # The running container predates the env change, so it stays healthy; the + # bootloader adopts it. + wait_healthy() + + status, _ = run_update(token, "v1.0.2") + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"want 202, got {status}") + result = wait_update(token, "failed") + if "did not start" not in result["error"]: + raise Failure(f"want a start failure, got {result['error']!r}") + + wait_for("recovery mode", lambda: bootloader_state() == "recovery", timeout=60) + _, caps = http("/api/bootloader/capabilities") + if not caps.get("recovery"): + raise Failure("capabilities must advertise recovery without a token") + if not image_present(f"{STUB_REPO}:v1.0.0"): + raise Failure("the previous image must survive a failed start") + + +@case +def test_recovery_can_install_a_working_version(): + """Recovery is only useful if something can be done from it.""" + reset(version="v1.0.0", extra_env=["STUB_FAIL=exit"]) + wait_for("recovery mode", lambda: bootloader_state() == "recovery", timeout=120) + + token = login() + # Clear the failure injection, then install a version from recovery. + write_spec(STUB_REPO, "v1.0.0") + sh("docker", "restart", BOOTLOADER_NAME) + wait_for("recovery mode after restart", + lambda: bootloader_state() in ("recovery", "healthy"), timeout=120) + + token = login() + status, _ = run_update(token, "v1.0.1") + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"want 202 from recovery, got {status}") + wait_update(token, "success") + wait_healthy() + + +@case +def test_a_crash_looping_runtime_ends_in_recovery(): + """Three unexpected exits in the window. The stub serves healthy first and + then dies, which is the shape that matters: a healthy start must not clear + the crash window, or the threshold is never reached.""" + reset(version="v1.0.0", + extra_env=["STUB_FAIL=crash-loop", "STUB_CRASH_AFTER=2"]) + wait_for("recovery after repeated crashes", + lambda: bootloader_state() == "recovery", timeout=180) + + token = login() + _, status_body = http("/api/bootloader/status", token=token) + if status_body.get("crashCount", 0) < 3: + raise Failure(f"want at least 3 crashes recorded, got {status_body}") + if "exited" not in (status_body.get("reason") or ""): + raise Failure(f"the reason must explain the crash loop: {status_body.get('reason')!r}") + + +@case +def test_a_second_concurrent_update_is_refused(): + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + + # The real runtime image is ~1 GB, so this pull takes long enough to make + # the race observable without any artificial delay. + status, _ = http("/api/bootloader/update", "POST", {"version": "v4.2.1"}, token) + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"want 202 for the first update, got {status}") + try: + second, body = run_update(token, "v1.0.1") + if second != 409: + raise Failure(f"want 409 for a concurrent update, got {second}: {body}") + if not body.get("progress"): + raise Failure("the in-flight progress must be attached to the 409") + finally: + # This update points at a repository the stub spec does not use, so it + # will fail; let it settle rather than leaving a pull running. + try: + wait_for("the first update to settle", + lambda: http("/api/bootloader/update", token=token)[1].get("state") + in ("success", "failed"), timeout=240) + except Failure: + pass + + +@case +def test_an_invalid_version_is_refused_with_a_reason(): + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + for version in ["evil.example.com/x:v1", "v1/../../etc", "v1.0.0@sha256:abc", ""]: + status, body = run_update(token, version) + if status != 400: + raise Failure(f"version {version!r} should be refused, got {status}") + if not body.get("error"): + raise Failure(f"version {version!r} was refused without a reason") + + +@case +def test_the_api_requires_authentication(): + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + for path, method in [ + ("/api/bootloader/status", "GET"), + ("/api/bootloader/logs", "GET"), + ("/api/bootloader/update", "GET"), + ("/api/bootloader/update", "POST"), + ("/api/bootloader/restart", "POST"), + ]: + body = {"version": "v1.0.1"} if method == "POST" else None + status, _ = http(path, method, body) + if status != 401: + raise Failure(f"{method} {path} must require a token, got {status}") + + # Capabilities stays open, so a client can identify the device first. + status, _ = http("/api/bootloader/capabilities") + if status != 200: + raise Failure(f"capabilities must stay unauthenticated, got {status}") + + +@case +def test_a_bad_password_is_refused(): + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + status, body = http("/api/bootloader/login", "POST", + {"username": USERNAME, "password": "wrong"}) + if status != 401: + raise Failure(f"want 401, got {status}: {body}") + status, _ = http("/api/bootloader/login", "POST", + {"username": "nobody", "password": PASSWORD}) + if status != 401: + raise Failure(f"an unknown user must also get 401, got {status}") + + +@case +def test_logs_are_readable_without_shell_access(): + """The whole point: seeing why a runtime will not start, from the editor.""" + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + _, body = http("/api/bootloader/logs?tail=50", token=token) + if not body.get("available"): + raise Failure(f"logs should be available: {body}") + if "listening" not in body.get("logs", ""): + raise Failure(f"the runtime's own output should come through: {body.get('logs')!r}") + + +@case +def test_restart_brings_the_runtime_back(): + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + before = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["State"]["StartedAt"] + + status, body = http("/api/bootloader/restart", "POST", {}, token) + if status != 200: + raise Failure(f"want 200, got {status}: {body}") + wait_healthy() + after = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["State"]["StartedAt"] + if after == before: + raise Failure("restart did not actually restart the runtime") + + +@case +def test_the_real_runtime_image_comes_up_under_the_bootloader(): + """Everything above uses the stub. This proves the real thing works: the + actual OpenPLC runtime, started by the bootloader, reaching healthy and + reporting the policy the editor keys off.""" + reset(repository=REAL_REPO, version="v4.2.1") + # Generous: the real runtime loads plugin venvs on a cold start, and the + # image's own start-period is 90s. + wait_healthy(timeout=300) + + served = runtime_version_served() + if served.get("updatePolicy") != "self": + raise Failure(f"want updatePolicy self, got {served}") + if served.get("dataDir") != DATA_DIR: + raise Failure(f"the real runtime must use the mounted data dir, got {served}") + if not served.get("runtimeVersion"): + raise Failure(f"the real runtime must report a version, got {served}") + + +# --- runner --------------------------------------------------------------- + + +def main() -> int: + only = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None + selected = [c for c in CASES if not only or only in c.__name__] + if not selected: + print(f"no cases match {only!r}") + return 2 + + passed, failed = 0, [] + for fn in selected: + name = fn.__name__ + print(f"\n\033[0;34m=== {name}\033[0m", flush=True) + started = time.time() + try: + fn() + except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - report every failure, keep going + failed.append((name, err)) + print(f"\033[0;31mFAIL\033[0m ({time.time() - started:.1f}s): {err}", flush=True) + else: + passed += 1 + print(f"\033[0;32mPASS\033[0m ({time.time() - started:.1f}s)", flush=True) + + print(f"\n{'=' * 60}\n{passed} passed, {len(failed)} failed") + for name, err in failed: + print(f" FAILED {name}: {str(err).splitlines()[0]}") + return 1 if failed else 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + sys.exit(main()) From 3b2f83429898dd083c58a331c9fe4b619dfde689 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 17:42:26 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 10/22] fix(bootloader): recreate the runtime when the spec asks for another image Found by the integration suite, and it defeated the entire feature while reporting success. A container is created from an image reference and keeps it for life, so after a version change the existing container IS the old version. Reconcile saw "exists but stopped" and simply started it again -- so the update swapped nothing, reported success, and left the device running the version it had. The tests that caught it are unambiguous once the mechanism is visible: an upgrade left the container on the old image, and a spec whose extra environment should have made the new version fail instead came up fine, because the new spec was never applied to anything. Reconcile now compares the running container's image against the spec's and recreates on a mismatch, which is what makes it a reconcile rather than "start whatever is there". It also covers an operator editing the spec by hand -- a board mount, an environment variable -- and restarting the bootloader: the container is rebuilt from the spec instead of silently keeping its old configuration. The unit tests missed this because the Docker fake did not model Config.Image, so every container looked like the one the spec wanted. It does now, and two tests pin both halves: a mismatch is recreated, and a match is still adopted untouched -- adoption being the property that stops a bootloader restart from bouncing a working PLC. Also adds the integration harness that found it: a Debian container running its own Docker daemon and a registry, so pulls, swaps, health-gates, recovery, discovery and auth are exercised against real Docker rather than fakes. Debian rather than docker:dind because install.sh's engine handling is part of what needs testing. A stub runtime with failure knobs covers the paths a real image cannot be asked to take on demand; one case runs the real runtime image. Hardware -- SPI, GPIO, VPP plugins, real SCHED_FIFO latency -- is explicitly out of scope here and stays with the device. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go | 23 ++++ .../internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go | 54 +++++++++ tests/integration/test_bootloader.py | 107 ++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go index 47a88bf2..3162b35e 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go @@ -412,6 +412,29 @@ func (s *Supervisor) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error { s.status.Image = inspect.Config.Image s.mu.Unlock() + // Does the existing container actually match what the spec now asks for? + // + // This is what makes Reconcile reconcile rather than merely "start + // whatever is there". A container is created from an image reference and + // keeps it for life, so after a version change the existing one is the OLD + // version -- and the branch below would have happily restarted it and + // reported success. The update then appeared to work while the device kept + // running the version it started with, which is precisely the bug the + // integration suite caught. + // + // It also covers an operator editing the spec by hand (a board mount, an + // env var) and restarting the bootloader: the container is rebuilt from + // the spec instead of silently keeping the old configuration. + desired := s.spec.ImageRef() + if inspect.Config.Image != desired { + s.log.Info("runtime container is on a different image, recreating", + "running", inspect.Config.Image, "desired", desired) + if err := s.create(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + return s.startAndConfirm(ctx) + } + if !inspect.State.Running { s.log.Info("runtime container present but not running", "status", inspect.State.Status, "exitCode", inspect.State.ExitCode) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go index 8d367894..5fd47f58 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ type fakeDocker struct { running bool health string // "", "starting", "healthy", "unhealthy" exit int + // configImage is the reference the container was created from, which is + // what Reconcile compares against the spec. Defaults to the spec's own + // image so existing tests keep describing a matching container. + configImage string created int started int @@ -57,6 +61,10 @@ func (f *fakeDocker) InspectContainer(_ context.Context, _ string) (*dockerapi.C return nil, &dockerapi.APIError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Path: "/containers/x/json"} } inspect := &dockerapi.ContainerInspect{ID: "deadbeef"} + inspect.Config.Image = f.configImage + if inspect.Config.Image == "" { + inspect.Config.Image = "test:1" + } inspect.State.Running = f.running inspect.State.ExitCode = f.exit if f.health != "" { @@ -73,6 +81,9 @@ func (f *fakeDocker) CreateContainer(_ context.Context, _ string, _ any) (*docke f.created++ f.exists = true f.running = false + // A freshly created container carries the spec's image, so a recreate + // resolves the mismatch rather than looping forever. + f.configImage = "test:1" return &dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse{ID: "deadbeef"}, nil } @@ -588,3 +599,46 @@ func TestTheDownloadIsVisibleInTheStatusWhileItRuns(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("the reason must carry the percentage, got %q", docker.observed.Reason) } } + +func TestAContainerOnTheWrongImageIsRecreated(t *testing.T) { + // The bug the integration suite caught. A container keeps the image + // reference it was created from for life, so after a version change the + // existing container is the OLD version. Reconcile used to see "exists but + // stopped" and simply start it again -- so the update reported success + // while the device carried on running the version it started with. + docker := &fakeDocker{ + exists: true, running: false, imagePresent: true, startMakesHealthy: true, + // fakeSpec serves "test:1"; this container was built from something else. + configImage: "test:0", + } + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + if docker.created != 1 { + t.Fatalf("a container on the wrong image must be recreated, creates=%d", docker.created) + } + if docker.removed == 0 { + t.Fatal("the stale container must be removed before recreating") + } +} + +func TestAContainerOnTheRightImageIsStillAdopted(t *testing.T) { + // The mismatch check must not cost us adoption: a healthy runtime on the + // image the spec asks for is left exactly as it is. + docker := &fakeDocker{ + exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", imagePresent: true, + configImage: "test:1", // what fakeSpec asks for + } + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + + if err := sup.Reconcile(context.Background()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + created, started, stopped := docker.counts() + if created != 0 || started != 0 || stopped != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a matching healthy container must be untouched, got create=%d start=%d stop=%d", + created, started, stopped) + } +} diff --git a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py index ac4d9835..ce2413a1 100644 --- a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py +++ b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ def write_spec(repository: str, version: str, extra_env: list[str] | None = None def start_bootloader(extra_args: list[str] | None = None) -> None: - sh("docker", "rm", "-f", BOOTLOADER_NAME, check=False) + remove_container(BOOTLOADER_NAME) args = [ "docker", "run", "-d", "--name", BOOTLOADER_NAME, "--restart", "always", "--network", "host", @@ -176,12 +176,37 @@ def start_bootloader(extra_args: list[str] | None = None) -> None: args += extra_args or ["-log-level=debug"] sh(*args) + # Wait for THIS bootloader to answer before returning. + # + # Without it a case starts polling while nothing is listening on 8445 yet, + # and the failures read as "ConnectionRefused" or -- worse -- as progress + # belonging to a different case, because a poll can land on a bootloader + # that has not been replaced yet. Confirming a fresh, responsive process + # removes both by construction. + def responsive() -> bool: + state = container_state(BOOTLOADER_NAME) + if not state.get("State", {}).get("Running"): + # A bootloader that exits is restarted by its policy, so a + # crash-loop presents as "never becomes responsive". Surface its + # own output rather than leaving a bare timeout. + return False + status, _ = http("/api/bootloader/capabilities") + return status == 200 + + try: + wait_for("the bootloader to start answering", responsive, timeout=60, interval=0.25) + except Failure as err: + logs = sh("docker", "logs", "--tail", "30", BOOTLOADER_NAME, check=False) + raise Failure(f"{err}\nbootloader logs:\n{logs}") from err + def reset(repository: str = STUB_REPO, version: str = "v1.0.0", extra_env: list[str] | None = None) -> None: """Return the host to a known state and start the bootloader.""" - sh("docker", "rm", "-f", BOOTLOADER_NAME, check=False) - sh("docker", "rm", "-f", RUNTIME_NAME, check=False) + # Bootloader first: it would otherwise notice the runtime disappearing and + # helpfully recreate it, which is exactly its job and exactly wrong here. + remove_container(BOOTLOADER_NAME) + remove_container(RUNTIME_NAME) shutil.rmtree(STATE_DIR, ignore_errors=True) seed_data_dir() write_spec(repository, version, extra_env) @@ -202,11 +227,43 @@ def login() -> str: return body["access_token"] +def remove_container(name: str) -> None: + """Remove a container and wait until it is genuinely gone. + + `docker rm -f` returns before removal completes. Starting a replacement + under the same name in that window fails with "container is marked for + removal", and -- more insidiously -- a bootloader that is still alive keeps + supervising with the spec it loaded at startup, so a later case sees + environment it never asked for. Both were real failures in this suite + before this wait existed. + """ + sh("docker", "rm", "-f", name, check=False) + deadline = time.time() + 60 + while time.time() < deadline: + if not container_exists(name): + return + time.sleep(0.2) + raise Failure(f"container {name} was still present 60s after removal") + + +def container_exists(name: str) -> bool: + """Whether a container of this exact name exists. + + `docker ps -aq -f name=^x$` rather than `docker inspect`: inspect prints + "[]" on stdout for a missing container and only signals absence through + its exit code, so a naive empty-stdout check never sees the container go + away. This filter prints an id or nothing, with no ambiguity. + """ + return sh("docker", "ps", "-aq", "-f", f"name=^{name}$", check=False) != "" + + def container_state(name: str) -> dict: raw = sh("docker", "inspect", name, check=False) if not raw: return {} - return json.loads(raw)[0] + parsed = json.loads(raw) + # A missing container inspects to an empty list, not to nothing. + return parsed[0] if parsed else {} def bootloader_state() -> str: @@ -322,10 +379,21 @@ def test_restarting_the_bootloader_adopts_the_running_runtime(): bootloader hiccup into a plant outage.""" reset() wait_healthy() - before = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Id"] - started_at = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["State"]["StartedAt"] + before_state = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME) + before, started_at = before_state["Id"], before_state["State"]["StartedAt"] + # Key off the BOOTLOADER's own start time. Trying to catch the restart + # window by polling for "not running" is a race the restart usually wins, + # and then the assertion runs against the old process having done nothing. + bootloader_started = container_state(BOOTLOADER_NAME)["State"]["StartedAt"] sh("docker", "restart", BOOTLOADER_NAME) + wait_for( + "the bootloader process to be replaced", + lambda: container_state(BOOTLOADER_NAME).get("State", {}).get("StartedAt") + not in (None, bootloader_started), + timeout=60, + interval=0.2, + ) wait_healthy() after = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME) @@ -458,7 +526,7 @@ def test_a_crash_looping_runtime_ends_in_recovery(): then dies, which is the shape that matters: a healthy start must not clear the crash window, or the threshold is never reached.""" reset(version="v1.0.0", - extra_env=["STUB_FAIL=crash-loop", "STUB_CRASH_AFTER=2"]) + extra_env=["STUB_FAIL=crash-loop", "STUB_CRASH_AFTER=15"]) wait_for("recovery after repeated crashes", lambda: bootloader_state() == "recovery", timeout=180) @@ -589,16 +657,37 @@ def test_the_real_runtime_image_comes_up_under_the_bootloader(): served = runtime_version_served() if served.get("updatePolicy") != "self": raise Failure(f"want updatePolicy self, got {served}") - if served.get("dataDir") != DATA_DIR: - raise Failure(f"the real runtime must use the mounted data dir, got {served}") if not served.get("runtimeVersion"): raise Failure(f"the real runtime must report a version, got {served}") + # The data-directory bug, checked against the real runtime rather than a + # field the stub invents. config.py resolves the persistent directory by + # container detection, so without the env override the runtime writes a + # fresh .env inside the container and ignores the mounted one -- losing + # users, the stored project, retain data and licences on every swap. + env = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Config"]["Env"] + if f"OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR={DATA_DIR}" not in env: + raise Failure(f"the runtime was not pointed at the mounted data dir: {env}") + + inside = sh("docker", "exec", RUNTIME_NAME, "ls", "-a", "/var/run/runtime", check=False) + if ".env" in inside.split(): + raise Failure( + "the real runtime wrote its .env inside the container instead of " + f"the mount, so a version swap would discard it: {inside!r}" + ) + if not os.path.exists(os.path.join(DATA_DIR, ".env")): + raise Failure("the real runtime did not write .env into the mounted data dir") + # --- runner --------------------------------------------------------------- def main() -> int: + # Leftovers from an interrupted run keep holding port 8445, and a poll that + # lands on one reports another run's progress entirely. Clear them first. + for name in (BOOTLOADER_NAME, RUNTIME_NAME): + remove_container(name) + only = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None selected = [c for c in CASES if not only or only in c.__name__] if not selected: From 0cf194c4e4a6a420f5dc498dd5721548b400b63d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 17:50:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 11/22] test(integration): make three assertions real, and the suite green `image_present` used `docker image inspect`, which prints "[]" on stdout for a missing image and signals absence only through its exit code -- so an empty-stdout check returned True for everything. That reported a false failure on the upgrade case ("the previous image should have been retired" when it had been), and, worse, made two assertions that rely on it pass no matter what happened: that a failed pull leaves the working image alone, and that a failed start leaves the previous one recoverable. Both are now real, via `docker images -q`, which prints an id or nothing. Docker was doing the right thing all along -- it untags a shared image happily even while a container runs from another of its tags, which a direct experiment in the harness confirmed before this was changed. With that, and the earlier container-existence and isolation fixes, the suite is 17/17. It found two genuine product bugs along the way that unit tests with fakes could not: the runtime ignoring its mounted data directory, and Reconcile restarting a stale container instead of recreating it on a version change. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- tests/integration/test_bootloader.py | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py index ce2413a1..1a1a40a1 100644 --- a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py +++ b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py @@ -284,7 +284,20 @@ def runtime_version_served() -> dict: def image_present(reference: str) -> bool: - return sh("docker", "image", "inspect", reference, check=False) != "" + """Whether this exact image reference resolves locally. + + `docker images -q ` prints an id or nothing. `docker image inspect` + would not do: like its container counterpart it prints "[]" on stdout for + a missing image and signals absence only through its exit code, so an + empty-stdout check returns True for everything -- which quietly made this + assertion, and two others that rely on it, pass no matter what happened. + + Note the stub versions in this harness are all tags of one image, so + "retired" here means the TAG is gone. That is exactly what the updater + removes, and Docker untags a shared image happily even while a container + is running from another of its tags. + """ + return sh("docker", "images", "-q", reference, check=False) != "" def run_update(token: str, version: str) -> tuple[int, dict]: From e004b26b67a885a5a2185e3659b81249bc96d031 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 19:18:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 12/22] feat(bootloader): replace itself with a newer version A container cannot replace itself: removing it kills the process doing the removing, halfway through. So the bootloader spawns a ONE-SHOT child from the new image and that child does the swap from outside -- the same shape orchestrator-agent's tools/upgrade_self.py uses in production. The runtime container is never touched, and a test pins that. Losing the ability to manage a device is a bad afternoon; stopping its plant is a different category of problem. It is also why the failure mode is acceptable: if the new bootloader will not start, Docker's restart policy keeps trying while the PLC carries on. The child reproduces the parent's configuration from the RUNNING container rather than from defaults, because an operator may have installed with extra mounts or a non-standard port and a swap that quietly dropped them would leave a device subtly wrong in a way nobody would connect to "the bootloader updated itself". Its command-line flags -- the state directory and port -- are carried over for the same reason. Three details that would each have been a nasty bug: The self-update environment is stripped from the replacement, or the new bootloader starts in child mode and tries to replace itself forever. PATH is dropped too, since it belongs to the image and carrying the old one forward is how a replacement ends up running with stale defaults. The helper gets RestartPolicy "no", because a container whose job is to delete its parent would re-run the swap on every daemon start. The pull happens before anything is touched, so a version that cannot be fetched leaves the running bootloader entirely alone. A parent that has already vanished is not an error -- a previous attempt may have got that far -- and recreating from defaults beats leaving a device with no bootloader at all. Identification refuses to guess: every caller is about to delete whatever it names, so a miss on both $HOSTNAME and the conventional name is reported rather than assumed. The repository is never taken from the request. A bootloader pulling its replacement from wherever a caller named would be a way to run an arbitrary image as host root; the env override exists for the integration harness, which has no route to ghcr.io, and is set at install time. Verified against real Docker: the bootloader replaced itself under its own name with a new container id while the runtime container kept the same id, the same start time, and kept running. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/api/server.go | 47 ++ bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go | 88 ++++ bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go | 24 +- bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go | 293 +++++++++++++ .../internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go | 406 ++++++++++++++++++ bootloader/main.go | 41 ++ tests/integration/harness.sh | 5 + tests/integration/test_bootloader.py | 64 +++ 8 files changed, 967 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go index b5b20026..e750422b 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go @@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ type Updater interface { Progress() updater.Progress } +// SelfUpdater replaces the bootloader with a newer version of itself. +// +// Start returns once the helper that performs the swap is running: this +// process is about to be stopped by it, so there is no completion to report +// and nothing to poll -- the client reconnects and reads the new version from +// capabilities. +type SelfUpdater interface { + Start(ctx context.Context, version string) error +} + // Authenticator resolves credentials against the runtime's account set. type Authenticator interface { Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*runtimeauth.User, error) @@ -80,6 +90,7 @@ type Config struct { Supervisor Supervisor Logs LogReader Updater Updater + SelfUpdater SelfUpdater Log *slog.Logger } @@ -137,6 +148,7 @@ func (s *Server) routes(mux *http.ServeMux) { mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/restart", s.authenticated(s.handleRestart)) mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdate)) mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdateProgress)) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/self-update", s.authenticated(s.handleSelfUpdate)) } // ListenAndServe blocks until ctx is cancelled or the listener fails. @@ -417,6 +429,41 @@ func (s *Server) handleUpdateProgress(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.cfg.Updater.Progress()) } +// handleSelfUpdate replaces the bootloader itself. +// +// Separate from the runtime update on purpose: they change different things +// and fail differently. A bootloader that will not come back costs the ability +// to manage the device; a runtime that will not come back stops the plant. The +// runtime container is untouched here, so a PLC keeps running throughout. +// +// There is no progress to poll. This process is replaced as part of the +// operation, so the client's connection ends with it -- reconnecting and +// reading /capabilities is how you learn the outcome. +func (s *Server) handleSelfUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if s.cfg.SelfUpdater == nil { + writeError(w, http.StatusNotImplemented, "this bootloader cannot update itself") + return + } + + var body updateRequest + if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, 4*1024); err != nil { + return + } + + if err := s.cfg.SelfUpdater.Start(r.Context(), body.Version); err != nil { + s.cfg.Log.Error("self-update refused", "version", body.Version, "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error()) + return + } + + s.cfg.Log.Info("self-update accepted", "version", body.Version) + writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{ + "accepted": true, + "message": "The bootloader is being replaced. It will be unreachable for a few " + + "seconds; the runtime keeps running throughout.", + }) +} + // --- helpers ------------------------------------------------------------- func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, body any) { diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go index 25775a44..5d1086d4 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go @@ -587,3 +587,91 @@ func TestUpdateRoutesRequireAToken(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("want 401 on progress too, got %d", resp.StatusCode) } } + +// --- self-update --------------------------------------------------------- + +type fakeSelfUpdater struct { + err error + requested []string +} + +func (f *fakeSelfUpdater) Start(_ context.Context, version string) error { + if f.err != nil { + return f.err + } + f.requested = append(f.requested, version) + return nil +} + +func newTestServerWithSelfUpdater(t *testing.T, self SelfUpdater) *httptest.Server { + t.Helper() + srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ + Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", + RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, + Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, + Users: &fakeUsers{count: 1}, + Supervisor: healthySupervisor(), + Logs: &fakeLogs{}, + SelfUpdater: self, + Log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), + }} + mux := http.NewServeMux() + srv.routes(mux) + httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(mux) + t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close) + return httpSrv +} + +func TestASelfUpdateIsAcceptedAndSaysWhatToExpect(t *testing.T) { + // There is nothing to poll: this process is replaced as part of the + // operation, so the response has to tell the operator what is about to + // happen instead of promising progress that will never arrive. + self := &fakeSelfUpdater{} + srv := newTestServerWithSelfUpdater(t, self) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/self-update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"bootloader-v1.1.0"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("want 202, got %d (%v)", resp.StatusCode, body) + } + if len(self.requested) != 1 || self.requested[0] != "bootloader-v1.1.0" { + t.Fatalf("want the requested version passed through, got %v", self.requested) + } + message, _ := body["message"].(string) + if !strings.Contains(message, "runtime keeps running") { + t.Fatalf("the reply must say the PLC is unaffected, got %q", message) + } +} + +func TestASelfUpdateRefusalIsSurfacedWithItsReason(t *testing.T) { + self := &fakeSelfUpdater{err: errors.New("downloading bootloader-v9.9.9: manifest unknown")} + srv := newTestServerWithSelfUpdater(t, self) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/self-update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"bootloader-v9.9.9"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("want 400, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + if msg, _ := body["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "manifest unknown") { + t.Fatalf("the cause must reach the operator, got %q", msg) + } +} + +func TestSelfUpdateRequiresAToken(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServerWithSelfUpdater(t, &fakeSelfUpdater{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/self-update", "", `{"version":"bootloader-v1.1.0"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("want 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +func TestSelfUpdateIsReportedUnavailableWhenNotConfigured(t *testing.T) { + // 501 rather than a panic on a nil interface: a bootloader built without + // this wired up should say so. + srv := newTestServer(t, &fakeUsers{count: 1}, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/self-update", validToken(t), + `{"version":"bootloader-v1.1.0"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotImplemented { + t.Fatalf("want 501, got %d", resp.StatusCode) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go index edd791ff..8f455c0e 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go @@ -24,6 +24,26 @@ type ContainerState struct { } `json:"Health"` } +// ContainerHostConfig is the part of a container's host configuration the +// bootloader needs to reproduce when it replaces itself. +// +// Captured from the RUNNING container rather than reconstructed from defaults: +// an operator may have installed with extra mounts or a different port, and +// a self-update that silently dropped them would leave a device subtly +// misconfigured in a way nobody would connect to "the bootloader updated". +type ContainerHostConfig struct { + Binds []string `json:"Binds"` + NetworkMode string `json:"NetworkMode"` + Privileged bool `json:"Privileged"` + RestartPolicy RestartPolicy `json:"RestartPolicy"` +} + +// RestartPolicy mirrors Docker's shape. +type RestartPolicy struct { + Name string `json:"Name"` + MaximumRetryCount int `json:"MaximumRetryCount,omitempty"` +} + // ContainerInspect is the subset of GET /containers/{id}/json we use. type ContainerInspect struct { ID string `json:"Id"` @@ -32,9 +52,11 @@ type ContainerInspect struct { Config struct { Image string `json:"Image"` Env []string `json:"Env"` + Cmd []string `json:"Cmd"` Labels map[string]string } `json:"Config"` - Image string `json:"Image"` // resolved image ID, not the tag + HostConfig ContainerHostConfig `json:"HostConfig"` + Image string `json:"Image"` // resolved image ID, not the tag } // HealthStatus returns the container's healthcheck verdict, or "" when the diff --git a/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..897d4487 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +// Package selfupdate replaces the bootloader with a newer version of itself. +// +// A container cannot replace itself: removing it kills the process doing the +// removing, halfway through. So the running bootloader spawns a ONE-SHOT child +// from the new image, and that child does the work from outside -- the same +// shape orchestrator-agent uses in tools/upgrade_self.py, which is proven in +// production. +// +// The runtime container is never touched. A bootloader update must not +// interrupt a running PLC: losing the ability to manage a device is a bad +// afternoon, stopping its plant is a different category of problem. That is +// also why the failure mode is acceptable -- if the new bootloader will not +// start, Docker's restart policy keeps trying while the runtime carries on. +// +// The child reproduces the parent's configuration from the RUNNING container +// rather than from defaults. An operator may have installed with extra mounts +// or a non-standard port, and a self-update that quietly dropped them would +// leave a device subtly wrong in a way nobody would connect to "the bootloader +// updated itself". +package selfupdate + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "fmt" + "log/slog" + "os" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" +) + +// Environment the parent sets on the child. Their presence is what puts the +// child into swap mode instead of ordinary bootloader operation. +const ( + EnvMode = "OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_SELFUPDATE" + EnvTarget = "OPENPLC_SELFUPDATE_TARGET" + EnvNewImage = "OPENPLC_SELFUPDATE_IMAGE" + EnvChildName = "OPENPLC_SELFUPDATE_CHILD" + + // ModeValue must match exactly. A single well-known value means an + // accidental environment variable cannot put a bootloader into a mode + // where its first act is to delete another container. + ModeValue = "replace-parent" +) + +// DefaultRepository is where bootloader images live. +const DefaultRepository = "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader" + +// settleDelay is how long the helper waits before removing the parent, so the +// parent can finish answering the request that started the update and the +// editor sees a reply rather than a dropped connection. A variable so tests do +// not spend it. +var settleDelay = 3 * time.Second + +// DockerClient is the slice of the Docker API a self-update needs. +type DockerClient interface { + InspectContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) (*dockerapi.ContainerInspect, error) + CreateContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, spec any) (*dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse, error) + StartContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) error + StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Duration) error + RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) error + InspectImage(ctx context.Context, ref string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) + PullImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error +} + +// IsChild reports whether this process was started to replace its parent. +func IsChild() bool { + return os.Getenv(EnvMode) == ModeValue +} + +// Start pulls the target bootloader image and launches the child that will +// perform the swap. It returns as soon as the child is running -- this process +// is about to be stopped by it. +func Start(ctx context.Context, docker DockerClient, repository, version string, log *slog.Logger) error { + if version == "" { + return errors.New("a bootloader version is required") + } + if repository == "" { + repository = DefaultRepository + } + newImage := repository + ":" + version + + self, err := findSelf(ctx, docker) + if err != nil { + return err + } + log.Info("self-update starting", "container", self.Name, "to", newImage) + + // Pull before touching anything. If the image cannot be fetched, nothing + // has changed and the bootloader carries on as it was. + if _, err := docker.InspectImage(ctx, newImage); err != nil { + if !dockerapi.IsNotFound(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("checking for %s: %w", newImage, err) + } + log.Info("pulling the new bootloader image", "image", newImage) + if err := docker.PullImage(ctx, newImage, nil); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("downloading %s: %w", newImage, err) + } + } + + childName := strings.TrimPrefix(self.Name, "/") + "-selfupdate" + // A leftover child from an interrupted attempt would block this one on a + // name conflict, and it has nothing worth keeping. + if err := docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, childName, true); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("clearing a previous self-update helper: %w", err) + } + + // The child needs the docker socket and nothing else. Deliberately NOT the + // parent's mounts: it does not read the spec, serve an API or touch runtime + // data -- it stops one container and creates another. + child := map[string]any{ + "Image": newImage, + "Env": []string{ + EnvMode + "=" + ModeValue, + EnvTarget + "=" + strings.TrimPrefix(self.Name, "/"), + EnvNewImage + "=" + newImage, + EnvChildName + "=" + childName, + }, + "HostConfig": map[string]any{ + "Binds": []string{"/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"}, + // Never restart: this is a one-shot. A restart policy on a + // container whose job is to delete its parent would re-run the + // swap on every daemon start, forever. + "RestartPolicy": map[string]any{"Name": "no"}, + // Removed by the next self-update rather than automatically, so + // its logs survive long enough to explain a failed swap. + "AutoRemove": false, + }, + } + + if _, err := docker.CreateContainer(ctx, childName, child); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating the self-update helper: %w", err) + } + if err := docker.StartContainer(ctx, childName); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("starting the self-update helper: %w", err) + } + + log.Info("self-update helper started; this bootloader will be replaced shortly", + "helper", childName) + return nil +} + +// Execute is the child's side: replace the parent and exit. +// +// Idempotent by design. A parent that is already gone -- because a previous +// attempt got that far before dying -- is not an error; the goal is that a +// bootloader on the new image is running when this finishes. +func Execute(ctx context.Context, docker DockerClient, log *slog.Logger) error { + target := os.Getenv(EnvTarget) + newImage := os.Getenv(EnvNewImage) + if target == "" || newImage == "" { + return fmt.Errorf("self-update helper started without %s and %s", EnvTarget, EnvNewImage) + } + log.Info("replacing the bootloader", "container", target, "image", newImage) + + // Capture the parent's configuration BEFORE removing it. Everything after + // this point depends on having it, and once the container is gone it + // cannot be recovered. + parent, err := docker.InspectContainer(ctx, target) + if err != nil && !dockerapi.IsNotFound(err) { + return fmt.Errorf("inspecting %s: %w", target, err) + } + + var spec map[string]any + if parent != nil { + spec = replacementSpec(parent, newImage) + } else { + // Nothing to copy from. Refusing here would leave a device with no + // bootloader at all, which is worse than a conventional one. + log.Warn("the bootloader container is already gone; recreating from defaults", + "container", target) + spec = defaultSpec(newImage) + } + + // Give the parent a moment to finish answering the request that started + // this, so the editor sees a reply rather than a dropped connection. + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-time.After(settleDelay): + } + + if parent != nil { + // Force: the parent's restart policy would otherwise bring it back + // between the stop and the remove, and the name would still be taken. + if err := docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, target, true); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("removing the old bootloader: %w", err) + } + log.Info("old bootloader removed", "container", target) + } + + if _, err := docker.CreateContainer(ctx, target, spec); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating the new bootloader: %w", err) + } + if err := docker.StartContainer(ctx, target); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("starting the new bootloader: %w", err) + } + + log.Info("new bootloader started", "container", target, "image", newImage) + return nil +} + +// replacementSpec rebuilds the parent's create payload with the new image. +// +// The parent's own environment is carried over except the self-update +// variables: leaving those in would put the NEW bootloader straight back into +// child mode on start-up, and it would immediately try to replace itself in a +// loop. +func replacementSpec(parent *dockerapi.ContainerInspect, newImage string) map[string]any { + env := make([]string, 0, len(parent.Config.Env)) + for _, entry := range parent.Config.Env { + if strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvMode+"=") || + strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvTarget+"=") || + strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvNewImage+"=") || + strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvChildName+"=") { + continue + } + // PATH and similar come from the image, and copying an old image's + // values onto a new one is how a replacement ends up running with + // stale defaults. + if strings.HasPrefix(entry, "PATH=") { + continue + } + env = append(env, entry) + } + + restart := parent.HostConfig.RestartPolicy.Name + if restart == "" || restart == "no" { + // A bootloader that does not come back at boot is not a bootloader. + // If the parent somehow had no policy, the replacement gets the one + // install.sh would have given it. + restart = "always" + } + + spec := map[string]any{ + "Image": newImage, + "Env": env, + "HostConfig": map[string]any{ + "Binds": parent.HostConfig.Binds, + "NetworkMode": parent.HostConfig.NetworkMode, + "Privileged": parent.HostConfig.Privileged, + "RestartPolicy": map[string]any{"Name": restart}, + }, + } + // Command-line flags -- the state directory and port an operator chose at + // install time. Dropping them would silently move the API to 8445 and the + // spec to its default path. + if len(parent.Config.Cmd) > 0 { + spec["Cmd"] = parent.Config.Cmd + } + return spec +} + +// defaultSpec is the last-resort configuration when the parent has vanished. +func defaultSpec(newImage string) map[string]any { + return map[string]any{ + "Image": newImage, + "HostConfig": map[string]any{ + "Binds": []string{ + "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", + "/var/lib/openplc-bootloader:/var/lib/openplc-bootloader", + "/var/lib/openplc-runtime:/var/lib/openplc-runtime:ro", + }, + "NetworkMode": "host", + "RestartPolicy": map[string]any{"Name": "always"}, + }, + } +} + +// findSelf identifies the container this process is running in. +// +// HOSTNAME is the container's short id under Docker's defaults, which is the +// most direct answer. It can be overridden (--hostname), so a miss falls back +// to the name install.sh uses -- and a miss on both is reported rather than +// guessed at, because every caller of this is about to delete whatever it +// names. +func findSelf(ctx context.Context, docker DockerClient) (*dockerapi.ContainerInspect, error) { + if hostname := os.Getenv("HOSTNAME"); hostname != "" { + if found, err := docker.InspectContainer(ctx, hostname); err == nil { + return found, nil + } + } + const conventional = "openplc-bootloader" + found, err := docker.InspectContainer(ctx, conventional) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf( + "could not identify this bootloader's own container (tried $HOSTNAME and %q): %w", + conventional, err) + } + return found, nil +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a8bfcbb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +package selfupdate + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net/http" + "strings" + "sync" + "testing" + "time" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" +) + +type fakeDocker struct { + mu sync.Mutex + + containers map[string]*dockerapi.ContainerInspect + imagePresent bool + pullErr error + + created map[string]any + started []string + removed []string + pulls []string + startErr error +} + +func newFake() *fakeDocker { + return &fakeDocker{ + containers: map[string]*dockerapi.ContainerInspect{}, + created: map[string]any{}, + } +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) InspectContainer(_ context.Context, name string) (*dockerapi.ContainerInspect, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + if found, ok := f.containers[name]; ok { + return found, nil + } + return nil, &dockerapi.APIError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Path: "/containers/" + name + "/json"} +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) CreateContainer(_ context.Context, name string, spec any) (*dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.created[name] = spec + return &dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse{ID: "created-" + name}, nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) StartContainer(_ context.Context, name string) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.started = append(f.started, name) + return f.startErr +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) StopContainer(context.Context, string, time.Duration) error { return nil } + +func (f *fakeDocker) RemoveContainer(_ context.Context, name string, _ bool) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.removed = append(f.removed, name) + delete(f.containers, name) + return nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) InspectImage(_ context.Context, ref string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + if !f.imagePresent { + return nil, &dockerapi.APIError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Path: "/images/" + ref + "/json"} + } + return &dockerapi.ImageInfo{ID: "sha256:x"}, nil +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) PullImage(_ context.Context, ref string, _ func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.pulls = append(f.pulls, ref) + if f.pullErr != nil { + return f.pullErr + } + f.imagePresent = true + return nil +} + +func quietLogger() *slog.Logger { return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)) } + +// The helper's settle delay exists so a real parent can finish answering an +// HTTP request. There is no request here, so tests skip the wait. +func init() { settleDelay = time.Millisecond } + +// parentContainer is a bootloader installed the way install.sh installs one, +// plus an operator's non-default port and an extra mount. +func parentContainer() *dockerapi.ContainerInspect { + inspect := &dockerapi.ContainerInspect{ID: "parentid", Name: "/openplc-bootloader"} + inspect.Config.Image = "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader:bootloader-v1.0.0" + inspect.Config.Env = []string{"PATH=/usr/bin", "TZ=America/New_York"} + inspect.Config.Cmd = []string{"-state-dir", "/opt/openplc-bootloader", "-port", "9445"} + inspect.HostConfig = dockerapi.ContainerHostConfig{ + Binds: []string{ + "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", + "/opt/openplc-bootloader:/opt/openplc-bootloader", + "/var/lib/openplc-runtime:/var/lib/openplc-runtime:ro", + }, + NetworkMode: "host", + RestartPolicy: dockerapi.RestartPolicy{Name: "always"}, + } + return inspect +} + +func hostConfig(t *testing.T, spec any) map[string]any { + t.Helper() + asMap, ok := spec.(map[string]any) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("spec is not a map: %T", spec) + } + host, ok := asMap["HostConfig"].(map[string]any) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("spec has no HostConfig: %v", asMap) + } + return host +} + +// --- parent side --------------------------------------------------------- + +func TestStartPullsAndLaunchesAHelper(t *testing.T) { + docker := newFake() + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parentContainer() + t.Setenv("HOSTNAME", "openplc-bootloader") + + if err := Start(context.Background(), docker, DefaultRepository, "bootloader-v1.1.0", quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + + if len(docker.pulls) != 1 || !strings.HasSuffix(docker.pulls[0], ":bootloader-v1.1.0") { + t.Fatalf("want the target image pulled, got %v", docker.pulls) + } + spec, ok := docker.created["openplc-bootloader-selfupdate"] + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("want a helper container created, got %v", docker.created) + } + + // The helper must not restart: a container whose job is to delete its + // parent would re-run the swap on every daemon start, forever. + host := hostConfig(t, spec) + if host["RestartPolicy"].(map[string]any)["Name"] != "no" { + t.Errorf("the helper must never restart, got %v", host["RestartPolicy"]) + } + // It needs the socket and nothing else -- it does not read the spec, + // serve an API, or touch runtime data. + binds := host["Binds"].([]string) + if len(binds) != 1 || !strings.Contains(binds[0], "docker.sock") { + t.Errorf("the helper should mount only the docker socket, got %v", binds) + } +} + +func TestStartDoesNothingWhenTheImageCannotBeFetched(t *testing.T) { + // Nothing has changed yet at this point, so a failed pull must leave the + // running bootloader entirely alone. + docker := newFake() + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parentContainer() + docker.pullErr = errors.New("manifest unknown") + t.Setenv("HOSTNAME", "openplc-bootloader") + + err := Start(context.Background(), docker, DefaultRepository, "bootloader-v9.9.9", quietLogger()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("a failed pull must surface an error") + } + if len(docker.created) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("no helper may be created after a failed pull, got %v", docker.created) + } + if len(docker.removed) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("nothing may be removed after a failed pull, got %v", docker.removed) + } +} + +func TestStartRefusesWithoutAVersion(t *testing.T) { + docker := newFake() + if err := Start(context.Background(), docker, DefaultRepository, "", quietLogger()); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a self-update needs a version") + } +} + +func TestStartFailsClearlyWhenItCannotIdentifyItself(t *testing.T) { + // Every caller of this is about to delete whatever it names, so a guess + // would be the wrong kind of helpful. + docker := newFake() + t.Setenv("HOSTNAME", "not-a-container") + + err := Start(context.Background(), docker, DefaultRepository, "bootloader-v1.1.0", quietLogger()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("want an error when the container cannot be identified") + } + if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "own container") { + t.Fatalf("the error should say what it could not find, got %v", err) + } +} + +func TestStartFallsBackToTheConventionalName(t *testing.T) { + // --hostname overrides HOSTNAME, so the id lookup can miss on a perfectly + // ordinary install. + docker := newFake() + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parentContainer() + t.Setenv("HOSTNAME", "some-custom-hostname") + + if err := Start(context.Background(), docker, DefaultRepository, "bootloader-v1.1.0", quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + if _, ok := docker.created["openplc-bootloader-selfupdate"]; !ok { + t.Fatalf("want the helper created via the fallback name, got %v", docker.created) + } +} + +// --- child side ---------------------------------------------------------- + +func setChildEnv(t *testing.T, target, image string) { + t.Helper() + t.Setenv(EnvMode, ModeValue) + t.Setenv(EnvTarget, target) + t.Setenv(EnvNewImage, image) +} + +func TestIsChildOnlyOnTheExactMarker(t *testing.T) { + // One well-known value, so a stray environment variable cannot put a + // bootloader into a mode whose first act is to delete another container. + t.Setenv(EnvMode, "true") + if IsChild() { + t.Fatal("only the exact marker may select child mode") + } + t.Setenv(EnvMode, ModeValue) + if !IsChild() { + t.Fatal("the exact marker must select child mode") + } +} + +func TestTheChildReplacesTheParentPreservingItsConfiguration(t *testing.T) { + docker := newFake() + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parentContainer() + setChildEnv(t, "openplc-bootloader", "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0") + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := Execute(ctx, docker, quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("execute: %v", err) + } + + if len(docker.removed) != 1 || docker.removed[0] != "openplc-bootloader" { + t.Fatalf("want the parent removed, got %v", docker.removed) + } + spec, ok := docker.created["openplc-bootloader"] + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("want the bootloader recreated under its own name, got %v", docker.created) + } + asMap := spec.(map[string]any) + + if asMap["Image"] != "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0" { + t.Errorf("want the new image, got %v", asMap["Image"]) + } + // An operator's chosen state directory and port live in Cmd. Dropping + // them would silently move the API and the spec back to defaults. + cmd := asMap["Cmd"].([]string) + if strings.Join(cmd, " ") != "-state-dir /opt/openplc-bootloader -port 9445" { + t.Errorf("the parent's flags must be preserved, got %v", cmd) + } + host := hostConfig(t, spec) + if len(host["Binds"].([]string)) != 3 { + t.Errorf("the parent's mounts must be preserved, got %v", host["Binds"]) + } + if host["NetworkMode"] != "host" { + t.Errorf("want host networking preserved, got %v", host["NetworkMode"]) + } + if host["RestartPolicy"].(map[string]any)["Name"] != "always" { + t.Errorf("the replacement must come back at boot, got %v", host["RestartPolicy"]) + } +} + +func TestTheReplacementDoesNotInheritSelfUpdateEnvironment(t *testing.T) { + // Otherwise the new bootloader starts in child mode and immediately tries + // to replace itself, forever. + docker := newFake() + parent := parentContainer() + parent.Config.Env = append(parent.Config.Env, + EnvMode+"="+ModeValue, + EnvTarget+"=openplc-bootloader", + EnvNewImage+"=old", + ) + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parent + setChildEnv(t, "openplc-bootloader", "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0") + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := Execute(ctx, docker, quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("execute: %v", err) + } + + env := docker.created["openplc-bootloader"].(map[string]any)["Env"].([]string) + for _, entry := range env { + if strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvMode) || strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvTarget) || + strings.HasPrefix(entry, EnvNewImage) { + t.Fatalf("self-update environment leaked into the replacement: %v", env) + } + } + // The operator's own environment must survive. + var sawTZ bool + for _, entry := range env { + if entry == "TZ=America/New_York" { + sawTZ = true + } + } + if !sawTZ { + t.Errorf("the parent's own environment must be preserved, got %v", env) + } + // PATH comes from the image; carrying the old one forward is how a + // replacement ends up running with stale defaults. + for _, entry := range env { + if strings.HasPrefix(entry, "PATH=") { + t.Errorf("PATH must come from the new image, not the old container: %v", env) + } + } +} + +func TestTheChildRecreatesEvenIfTheParentIsAlreadyGone(t *testing.T) { + // A previous attempt may have got as far as removing the parent before + // dying. Refusing here would leave a device with no bootloader at all, + // which is worse than a conventional one. + docker := newFake() + setChildEnv(t, "openplc-bootloader", "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0") + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := Execute(ctx, docker, quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("a missing parent must not be fatal: %v", err) + } + + spec, ok := docker.created["openplc-bootloader"] + if !ok { + t.Fatal("a bootloader must exist when this finishes") + } + host := hostConfig(t, spec) + if host["RestartPolicy"].(map[string]any)["Name"] != "always" { + t.Error("the fallback must still come back at boot") + } +} + +func TestTheChildRefusesWithoutItsInstructions(t *testing.T) { + docker := newFake() + t.Setenv(EnvMode, ModeValue) + t.Setenv(EnvTarget, "") + t.Setenv(EnvNewImage, "") + + if err := Execute(context.Background(), docker, quietLogger()); err == nil { + t.Fatal("the helper must refuse to act without a target and an image") + } +} + +func TestAParentWithNoRestartPolicyIsGivenOne(t *testing.T) { + // A bootloader that does not come back at boot is not a bootloader. + docker := newFake() + parent := parentContainer() + parent.HostConfig.RestartPolicy = dockerapi.RestartPolicy{Name: "no"} + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parent + setChildEnv(t, "openplc-bootloader", "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0") + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := Execute(ctx, docker, quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("execute: %v", err) + } + host := hostConfig(t, docker.created["openplc-bootloader"]) + if host["RestartPolicy"].(map[string]any)["Name"] != "always" { + t.Fatalf("want a restart policy applied, got %v", host["RestartPolicy"]) + } +} + +func TestTheRuntimeContainerIsNeverTouched(t *testing.T) { + // A bootloader update must not interrupt a running PLC: losing the ability + // to manage a device is a bad afternoon, stopping its plant is not. + docker := newFake() + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parentContainer() + runtime := &dockerapi.ContainerInspect{ID: "runtimeid", Name: "/openplc-runtime"} + docker.containers["openplc-runtime"] = runtime + setChildEnv(t, "openplc-bootloader", "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0") + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + if err := Execute(ctx, docker, quietLogger()); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("execute: %v", err) + } + + for _, name := range docker.removed { + if name == "openplc-runtime" { + t.Fatal("the runtime container must never be removed by a self-update") + } + } + if _, recreated := docker.created["openplc-runtime"]; recreated { + t.Fatal("the runtime container must never be recreated by a self-update") + } + if docker.containers["openplc-runtime"] == nil { + t.Fatal("the runtime container must still exist") + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/main.go b/bootloader/main.go index a6307465..3116630f 100644 --- a/bootloader/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ import ( "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/health" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimespec" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/selfupdate" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/updater" ) @@ -74,6 +75,26 @@ func main() { } log := newLogger(*logLevel) + + // Self-update helper mode. + // + // A container cannot replace itself, so a bootloader being updated spawns + // a one-shot child from the NEW image and that child does the swap from + // outside. This is that child: it replaces its parent and exits, and it + // must never fall through into ordinary bootloader operation -- two + // bootloaders supervising one runtime is exactly the race this design + // exists to avoid. + if selfupdate.IsChild() { + log.Info("running as a self-update helper", "version", version) + ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM) + defer stop() + if err := selfupdate.Execute(ctx, dockerapi.New(*socket), log.With("component", "selfupdate")); err != nil { + log.Error("self-update failed", "error", err) + os.Exit(1) + } + return + } + log.Info("openplc-bootloader starting", "version", version, "stateDir", *stateDir) if err := run(log, runConfig{ @@ -170,6 +191,7 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { Supervisor: sup, Logs: docker, Updater: upd, + SelfUpdater: bootloaderSelfUpdater{docker: docker, log: log.With("component", "selfupdate")}, Log: log.With("component", "api"), }) if err != nil { @@ -211,6 +233,25 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { return nil } +// bootloaderSelfUpdater adapts the selfupdate package to the API's interface. +// +// The repository is left empty so the package's default applies: a bootloader +// pulling its replacement from somewhere an API caller chose would be a way to +// run arbitrary images as host root. +type bootloaderSelfUpdater struct { + docker *dockerapi.Client + log *slog.Logger +} + +func (b bootloaderSelfUpdater) Start(ctx context.Context, version string) error { + // The repository is NOT taken from the API request: a bootloader pulling + // its replacement from wherever a caller named would be a way to run an + // arbitrary image as host root. The env override exists for the + // integration harness, which has no route to ghcr.io, and is set at + // install time rather than per request. + return selfupdate.Start(ctx, b.docker, os.Getenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY"), version, b.log) +} + // openRuntimeCredentials loads the runtime's secrets and user database. // // Both live in the runtime's data directory, which the bootloader mounts diff --git a/tests/integration/harness.sh b/tests/integration/harness.sh index 2fc8eee9..f9de077f 100755 --- a/tests/integration/harness.sh +++ b/tests/integration/harness.sh @@ -57,7 +57,12 @@ cmd_up() { # Privileged because it runs a Docker daemon. The repo is mounted # read-only so image builds inside can use it as a build context without # any risk of a test writing to the working tree. + # The runtime and bootloader run with --network host INSIDE this + # container, so publishing here is what lets a browser on the developer's + # machine reach them -- which is how the editor and web UI get tested + # against a real device without one on the desk. docker run -d --name "$HOST_CONTAINER" --privileged \ + -p 8443:8443 -p 8445:8445 \ -v "$DOCKER_VOLUME":/var/lib/docker \ -v "$REPO_ROOT":/workspace:ro \ "$HOST_IMAGE" sleep infinity >/dev/null diff --git a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py index 1a1a40a1..6a855049 100644 --- a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py +++ b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py @@ -657,6 +657,70 @@ def test_restart_brings_the_runtime_back(): raise Failure("restart did not actually restart the runtime") +@case +def test_the_bootloader_replaces_itself_without_disturbing_the_runtime(): + """A bootloader update must not interrupt a running PLC. + + Losing the ability to manage a device is a bad afternoon; stopping its + plant is a different category of problem. This is the whole reason the + swap is done by a one-shot helper from outside rather than by the + bootloader trying to remove itself. + """ + reset(version="v1.0.0") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + + runtime_before = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Id"] + started_before = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["State"]["StartedAt"] + bootloader_before = container_state(BOOTLOADER_NAME)["Id"] + + # The bootloader pulls its replacement from its own repository, so point + # that at the local registry and publish a tag there to pull. + sh("docker", "tag", BOOTLOADER_IMAGE, f"{REGISTRY}/openplc-bootloader:v2") + sh("docker", "push", "-q", f"{REGISTRY}/openplc-bootloader:v2") + # Restart the bootloader with the repository override so its self-update + # resolves inside the harness rather than reaching for ghcr.io. + remove_container(BOOTLOADER_NAME) + sh("docker", "run", "-d", "--name", BOOTLOADER_NAME, + "--restart", "always", "--network", "host", + "-e", f"OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY={REGISTRY}/openplc-bootloader", + "-v", "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock", + "-v", f"{STATE_DIR}:{STATE_DIR}", + "-v", f"{DATA_DIR}:{DATA_DIR}:ro", + BOOTLOADER_IMAGE, "-log-level=debug") + wait_healthy() + token = login() + bootloader_before = container_state(BOOTLOADER_NAME)["Id"] + + status, body = http("/api/bootloader/self-update", "POST", {"version": "v2"}, token) + if status != 202: + raise Failure(f"want 202, got {status}: {body}") + + # The bootloader is replaced, so it goes away and comes back under the + # same name with a new container id. + wait_for( + "the bootloader to be replaced", + lambda: container_state(BOOTLOADER_NAME).get("Id") not in (None, "", bootloader_before), + timeout=120, + interval=0.5, + ) + wait_healthy(timeout=120) + + runtime_after = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME) + if runtime_after["Id"] != runtime_before: + raise Failure("the runtime container was replaced by a bootloader update") + if runtime_after["State"]["StartedAt"] != started_before: + raise Failure("the runtime was restarted by a bootloader update") + if not runtime_after["State"]["Running"]: + raise Failure("the runtime must keep running throughout a bootloader update") + + # The one-shot helper must not be left with a restart policy, or it would + # re-run the swap on every daemon start. + helper = container_state(f"{BOOTLOADER_NAME}-selfupdate") + if helper and helper.get("HostConfig", {}).get("RestartPolicy", {}).get("Name") != "no": + raise Failure(f"the helper must never restart: {helper.get('HostConfig')}") + + @case def test_the_real_runtime_image_comes_up_under_the_bootloader(): """Everything above uses the stub. This proves the real thing works: the From 0f49b3989db3e5f9daa4fb879eb6228da3ae63ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 19:53:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 13/22] fix(bootloader): a refused update must not disturb a running PLC Both of these were found on the SLM-RP4, doing the thing the feature exists to do, and neither was reachable from the harness. A failed pull stopped a RUNNING PLC. Nothing had been touched -- no image fetched, no container replaced -- yet the failure path went straight to recovery, which stops the runtime. A bad version name, a full disk or an unreachable registry would each have taken a working plant offline. Failures are now split: one that happens before the swap begins leaves the runtime entirely alone, and only a failure after the container has been replaced hands the device to an operator. My own integration test had waved this through with a comment saying the container "may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine"; it was not fine, and the test now asserts the opposite. A pull failure with the image already present is not a failure. On the device a locally tagged image produced "pull access denied" and failed an update that was entirely ready to succeed -- the version was right there. That also covers an air-gapped device with a side-loaded image and a registry that is merely unreachable. Same policy as orchestrator-agent's _pull_runtime_image: only a confirmed local copy excuses a failed pull, so no local copy still fails, with the registry's own message. And a refused update left the supervisor reporting "updating" forever. BeginUpdate moves it there and EndUpdate only releases the claim, so a device that merely declined a bad version described itself as mid-update to the editor indefinitely while the PLC ran happily underneath. The before-swap path now re-derives state from the container. Verified on hardware after the fix: with the PLC RUNNING, an update to a nonexistent version failed and left it RUNNING; an update to a locally present image swapped the container to it and came back healthy; users, .env, restapi.db, retain.bin, project_snapshot and the vpp/ licence directory all survived the swap; and a re-upload rebuilt the program and the VPP plugin on the new version, ending at PLC RUNNING with the physical GPIO mode switch read as "run" and TASK0 at 1339 scans, 1 us average, 0 overruns. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go | 51 +++++++- bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go | 130 ++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go index 6d5f530d..cae7382d 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go @@ -177,6 +177,29 @@ func (u *Updater) run(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) { if err != nil { u.cfg.Log.Error("update failed", "from", previousVersion, "to", targetVersion, "error", err) + + // Only a failure that got as far as touching the container hands the + // device to an operator. A bad version name, a full disk or an + // unreachable registry changed nothing -- the runtime is still + // running the version it was, and stopping it would turn a harmless + // refusal into a plant outage. Observed on the SLM-RP4: a failed pull + // stopped a RUNNING PLC. + var beforeSwap errBeforeSwap + if errors.As(err, &beforeSwap) { + u.cfg.Log.Info("nothing was changed; leaving the runtime alone", + "version", previousVersion) + // Re-derive the supervisor's state from the container rather than + // leaving it on "updating" forever. BeginUpdate moved it there and + // EndUpdate only releases the claim, so without this a device that + // merely refused a bad version reports itself as mid-update to the + // editor for the rest of its life -- observed on the SLM-RP4. + if reconcileErr := u.cfg.Supervisor.Reconcile(ctx); reconcileErr != nil { + u.cfg.Log.Warn("could not re-check the runtime after a refused update", + "error", reconcileErr) + } + return + } + // Recovery, not rollback: the operator decides what to install next. u.cfg.Supervisor.EnterRecovery(ctx, fmt.Sprintf( "update from %s to %s failed: %v", previousVersion, targetVersion, err)) @@ -185,6 +208,13 @@ func (u *Updater) run(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) { u.cfg.Log.Info("update complete", "from", previousVersion, "to", targetVersion) } +// errBeforeSwap marks a failure that happened while the runtime was still +// untouched, so the caller knows not to enter recovery. +type errBeforeSwap struct{ err error } + +func (e errBeforeSwap) Error() string { return e.err.Error() } +func (e errBeforeSwap) Unwrap() error { return e.err } + func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion string) error { if previousVersion == targetVersion { // Not an error: re-installing the running version is a legitimate way @@ -197,7 +227,7 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st previousRef := u.cfg.Spec.ImageRefFor(previousVersion) if err := u.checkDiskSpace(ctx, targetRef); err != nil { - return err + return errBeforeSwap{err} } // 1. Pull. Non-destructive: the running version stays on disk. @@ -206,7 +236,22 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st u.setPhase(StatePulling, p.Phase, p.Percent) }) if err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("could not download %s: %w", targetRef, err) + // A pull can fail for a reason that does not matter: the image is + // already here. That covers an air-gapped device with a side-loaded + // image, a locally built one, and a registry that is merely + // unreachable right now. Refusing in that case would make a version + // the device already holds uninstallable -- which is exactly what + // happened on the SLM-RP4, where a locally tagged image produced + // "pull access denied" and failed an update that could not have + // been more ready to succeed. + // + // Same policy as orchestrator-agent's _pull_runtime_image: only a + // confirmed local copy excuses a failed pull. + if _, inspectErr := u.cfg.Docker.InspectImage(ctx, targetRef); inspectErr != nil { + return errBeforeSwap{fmt.Errorf("could not download %s: %w", targetRef, err)} + } + u.cfg.Log.Warn("pull failed but the image is already present; continuing", + "image", targetRef, "error", err) } // 2. Swap. The spec is written BEFORE the container is recreated, so a @@ -217,7 +262,7 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st u.cfg.Spec.Version = targetVersion if err := u.cfg.Spec.Save(u.cfg.SpecPath); err != nil { u.cfg.Spec.Version = previousVersion - return fmt.Errorf("could not record the new version: %w", err) + return errBeforeSwap{fmt.Errorf("could not record the new version: %w", err)} } if err := u.cfg.Supervisor.Stop(ctx); err != nil { diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go index a21ef315..fc4cd59d 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go @@ -270,8 +270,13 @@ func TestReinstallingTheCurrentVersionIsAllowed(t *testing.T) { // --- failures ------------------------------------------------------------ -func TestAFailedPullEntersRecoveryAndTouchesNothing(t *testing.T) { - docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100, pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown")} +func TestAFailedPullLeavesTheRunningRuntimeAlone(t *testing.T) { + // No local copy either, so there is genuinely nothing to install -- the + // case the local-image fallback must NOT swallow. + docker := &fakeDocker{ + inspectErr: errors.New("no such image"), + pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown"), + } sup := &fakeSupervisor{} u, _, specPath := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) @@ -284,15 +289,17 @@ func TestAFailedPullEntersRecoveryAndTouchesNothing(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("the underlying cause must reach the operator, got %q", progress.Error) } order, reasons := sup.snapshot() - // The runtime must not have been stopped: the pull never succeeded, so - // there was never a reason to interrupt a working PLC. + // Nothing was touched, so nothing may be disturbed. Observed on real + // hardware before this was fixed: a failed pull stopped a RUNNING PLC and + // dropped the device into recovery, turning a harmless refusal into an + // outage. for _, step := range order { if step == "stop" { t.Fatalf("a failed pull must not stop the running runtime: %v", order) } } - if len(reasons) != 1 { - t.Fatalf("want one recovery call, got %v", reasons) + if len(reasons) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a failure before the swap must not enter recovery, got %v", reasons) } // And the recorded version must be unchanged. reloaded, err := runtimespec.Load(specPath) @@ -353,7 +360,10 @@ func TestTheSupervisorClaimIsAlwaysReleased(t *testing.T) { // Leaking the claim would suppress crash accounting forever, so a runtime // that started crash-looping after a failed update would never reach // recovery. - docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100, pullErr: errors.New("boom")} + docker := &fakeDocker{ + inspectErr: errors.New("no such image"), + pullErr: errors.New("boom"), + } sup := &fakeSupervisor{} u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) @@ -499,3 +509,109 @@ func TestHumanBytesReadsLikeAnErrorMessage(t *testing.T) { } } } + +func TestAnImageAlreadyPresentSurvivesAFailedPull(t *testing.T) { + // A pull can fail for a reason that does not matter: the image is already + // here. That covers an air-gapped device with a side-loaded image, a + // locally built one, and a registry that is merely unreachable. Refusing + // would make a version the device already holds uninstallable -- which is + // what happened on the SLM-RP4, where a locally tagged image produced + // "pull access denied" and failed an update that was entirely ready. + docker := &fakeDocker{ + inspectSize: 100, + pullErr: errors.New("pull access denied for openplc-runtime"), + } + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) + + // And it must genuinely swap, not merely report success. + order, _ := sup.snapshot() + if strings.Join(order, ",") != "begin,stop,reconcile,end" { + t.Fatalf("want a real swap, got %v", order) + } +} + +func TestAFailedPullWithNoLocalImageStillFails(t *testing.T) { + // The fallback must not swallow the case it exists to distinguish: no + // local copy means there is genuinely nothing to install. + docker := &fakeDocker{ + inspectErr: errors.New("no such image"), + pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown"), + } + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v9.9.9"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + progress := waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + if !strings.Contains(progress.Error, "could not download") { + t.Fatalf("want a download failure, got %q", progress.Error) + } + if _, reasons := sup.snapshot(); len(reasons) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("nothing was touched, so no recovery, got %v", reasons) + } +} + +func TestAFailureAfterTheSwapBeginsDoesEnterRecovery(t *testing.T) { + // The distinction matters in both directions: once the container has been + // replaced there IS something wrong with the device, and an operator has + // to be handed the controls. + docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 100} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{reconcileErr: errors.New("exited during start-up with code 1")} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + + _, reasons := sup.snapshot() + if len(reasons) != 1 { + t.Fatalf("a failed start must enter recovery, got %v", reasons) + } +} + +func TestARefusedUpdateLeavesTheSupervisorReportingReality(t *testing.T) { + // BeginUpdate moves the supervisor to "updating" and EndUpdate only + // releases the claim, so without re-deriving state a device that merely + // refused a bad version reports itself as mid-update forever. Seen on the + // SLM-RP4: a failed pull left the bootloader stuck on "updating" while the + // PLC ran happily underneath. + docker := &fakeDocker{ + inspectErr: errors.New("no such image"), + pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown"), + } + sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) + + if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v9.9.9"); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) + } + waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + + waitFor(t, func() bool { + order, _ := sup.snapshot() + for _, step := range order { + if step == "reconcile" { + return true + } + } + return false + }) + // And still nothing stopped. + order, reasons := sup.snapshot() + for _, step := range order { + if step == "stop" { + t.Fatalf("nothing may be stopped: %v", order) + } + } + if len(reasons) != 0 { + t.Fatalf("no recovery either, got %v", reasons) + } +} From bbf57c637f2126154e4f612fe33ce50194d51ec6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 19:57:57 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 14/22] test(integration): assert a failed pull leaves the PLC running The assertion this replaces said the container "may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine". It was not fine, and writing that down is what let the bug reach hardware: on the SLM-RP4 a failed pull stopped a RUNNING PLC. The case now checks what actually matters -- same container, still running, not in recovery. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- tests/integration/test_bootloader.py | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py index 6a855049..a64c6f96 100644 --- a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py +++ b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py @@ -478,7 +478,18 @@ def test_a_version_that_does_not_exist_fails_without_touching_the_runtime(): with open(os.path.join(STATE_DIR, "runtime-spec.json"), encoding="utf-8") as handle: if json.load(handle)["version"] != "v1.0.0": raise Failure("a failed pull must not change the recorded version") - _ = running_before # the container may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine + + # And the PLC must still be running. Nothing was touched, so a bad version + # name must not take a working plant offline -- which is exactly what + # happened on the SLM-RP4 before this was fixed, and what this assertion + # previously waved through. + running_after = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME) + if running_after.get("Id") != running_before: + raise Failure("a failed pull must not replace the runtime container") + if not running_after.get("State", {}).get("Running"): + raise Failure("a failed pull must not stop the running runtime") + if bootloader_state() == "recovery": + raise Failure("a failure before the swap must not enter recovery") @case From 799e6b6c4fb706698ff7243b348469264845d72b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 20:07:02 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 15/22] fix(bootloader): let a container stop outlive the client timeout The daemon holds a stop request open for the whole grace period before it resorts to SIGKILL, and the shared unary client's fixed 30s timeout is exactly equal to the default grace -- so every swap raced it. Seen on the SLM-RP4 as "Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers" on a stop that was proceeding perfectly well, after which the runtime was killed by the force-remove path instead of being shut down cleanly. For a PLC that means skipping the SIGTERM handler that flushes retained variables. Stops now bound their own duration with a context of grace + margin, through a helper for calls the daemon legitimately holds open. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go | 18 ++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go index ddb453e7..fe26ff00 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go @@ -198,6 +198,28 @@ func checkResponse(resp *http.Response, path string) error { return &APIError{Status: resp.StatusCode, Message: message, Path: path} } +// doLongRunning issues a request whose duration the caller bounds with the +// context, rather than the shared client's fixed timeout. For calls the daemon +// legitimately holds open -- stopping a container waits out its grace period -- +// a fixed client timeout is a race the caller cannot widen. +func (c *Client) doLongRunning(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body any) error { + req, err := c.newRequest(ctx, method, path, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + resp, err := c.streamClient().Do(req) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("docker %s: %w", path, err) + } + defer resp.Body.Close() + + if err := checkResponse(resp, path); err != nil { + return err + } + _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body) + return nil +} + // Ping reports whether the daemon is reachable. Used at start-up so a missing // or unmountable socket is reported as exactly that, instead of surfacing later // as a confusing container-create failure. diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go index 8f455c0e..804c4fc2 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go @@ -115,13 +115,29 @@ func (c *Client) StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Dura params := url.Values{} params.Set("t", strconv.Itoa(int(grace.Seconds()))) path := "/containers/" + url.PathEscape(name) + "/stop" + encodeQuery(params) - err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, nil, nil) + + // The daemon holds this request open for the whole grace period before it + // resorts to SIGKILL, so the client must be allowed to wait longer than + // the grace itself. The shared unary client's fixed 30s timeout is exactly + // equal to the default grace, so every swap raced it: observed on the + // SLM-RP4 as "Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers" on a stop + // that was proceeding perfectly well, leaving the runtime to be killed by + // the force-remove path instead of shut down cleanly -- which for a PLC + // means skipping the SIGTERM handler that flushes retained variables. + stopCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, grace+stopTimeoutMargin) + defer cancel() + + err := c.doLongRunning(stopCtx, http.MethodPost, path, nil) if err != nil && (IsNotFound(err) || hasStatus(err, http.StatusNotModified)) { return nil } return err } +// stopTimeoutMargin is the slack on top of the grace period, covering the +// daemon's own teardown after the container has exited. +const stopTimeoutMargin = 30 * time.Second + // RemoveContainer deletes a container, forcing it down if still running. // A missing container is success: the goal is "not present". func (c *Client) RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) error { From 7a0a5b58cbed5aaebb63932e7e79b8e5cfd7aac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 20:23:24 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 16/22] fix(bootloader): say why a pull failed, not just that it did A device installed from a side-loaded image keeps a bare repository name in its spec ("openplc-runtime"), which Docker resolves against Docker Hub. Every pull then fails with "repository does not exist" against a tag that is perfectly real, and the message blames the tag. Report the daemon's own reason rather than the whole wrapped chain, and name the configured repository when it has no registry host -- that is the part nobody would think to check, and it is the actual cause. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go | 24 ++++++ .../internal/updater/pullfailure_test.go | 76 +++++++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go | 40 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/updater/pullfailure_test.go diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go index fe26ff00..fc04b8b9 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go @@ -250,3 +250,27 @@ func encodeQuery(params url.Values) string { } return "?" + params.Encode() } + +// Reason extracts the most useful human-readable part of a daemon error. +// +// Errors here accumulate layers on the way up -- "could not download X: +// pulling X: docker /images/create?fromImage=X&tag=Y: HTTP 500: pull access +// denied" -- and every layer but the last is machinery. The daemon's own +// message is the only part that tells an operator what to do about it, so +// that is what gets shown; the full chain still goes to the log. +func Reason(err error) string { + if err == nil { + return "" + } + var apiErr *APIError + if errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.Message != "" { + return apiErr.Message + } + // Not a daemon response (a transport failure, a stall). Keep the + // innermost segment, which is where the cause is. + message := err.Error() + if index := strings.LastIndex(message, ": "); index >= 0 && index+2 < len(message) { + return message[index+2:] + } + return message +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/pullfailure_test.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/pullfailure_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..055c19dd --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/pullfailure_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +package updater + +import ( + "errors" + "net/http" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" +) + +// The failure an operator actually hit: a device installed from a side-loaded +// image kept a bare repository name in its spec, so every pull went to Docker +// Hub. The tag was real; the message blamed the tag. +func TestDescribePullFailureNamesTheUnqualifiedRepository(t *testing.T) { + err := &dockerapi.APIError{ + Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, + Path: "/images/create?fromImage=openplc-runtime&tag=v4.1.10", + Message: "pull access denied for openplc-runtime, repository does not exist", + } + + got := describePullFailure("openplc-runtime", "openplc-runtime:v4.1.10", err) + + if !strings.Contains(got, "pull access denied") { + t.Errorf("the daemon's own reason was dropped: %q", got) + } + if !strings.Contains(got, "Docker Hub") { + t.Errorf("did not explain where the download went: %q", got) + } + // The API path is machinery, and putting it in front of an operator sends + // them looking at the wrong layer. + if strings.Contains(got, "/images/create") { + t.Errorf("leaked the Docker API path: %q", got) + } +} + +func TestDescribePullFailureStaysShortForAProperRepository(t *testing.T) { + err := &dockerapi.APIError{ + Status: http.StatusNotFound, + Path: "/images/create", + Message: "manifest unknown", + } + + got := describePullFailure( + "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime", + "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime:v9.9.9", err) + + want := "could not download ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime:v9.9.9: manifest unknown" + if got != want { + t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, want) + } +} + +func TestIsUnqualifiedRepository(t *testing.T) { + cases := map[string]bool{ + "openplc-runtime": true, + "autonomylogic/openplc-runtime": true, // a Docker Hub namespace + "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime": false, + "localhost:5000/openplc-runtime": false, + "registry.local:5000/openplc": false, + } + for repository, want := range cases { + if got := isUnqualifiedRepository(repository); got != want { + t.Errorf("%q: got %v, want %v", repository, got, want) + } + } +} + +// A transport failure carries no APIError, and the innermost segment is still +// the only part worth showing. +func TestReasonFallsBackToTheInnermostSegment(t *testing.T) { + err := errors.New("could not download x: pulling x: connection refused") + if got := dockerapi.Reason(err); got != "connection refused" { + t.Errorf("got %q", got) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go index cae7382d..d3919fde 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go @@ -248,7 +248,10 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st // Same policy as orchestrator-agent's _pull_runtime_image: only a // confirmed local copy excuses a failed pull. if _, inspectErr := u.cfg.Docker.InspectImage(ctx, targetRef); inspectErr != nil { - return errBeforeSwap{fmt.Errorf("could not download %s: %w", targetRef, err)} + // The full chain goes to the log; the operator gets one sentence. + u.cfg.Log.Error("pull failed", "image", targetRef, "error", err) + return errBeforeSwap{errors.New(describePullFailure( + u.cfg.Spec.Repository, targetRef, err))} } u.cfg.Log.Warn("pull failed but the image is already present; continuing", "image", targetRef, "error", err) @@ -392,3 +395,38 @@ func humanBytes(n int64) string { } return fmt.Sprintf("%.1f PiB", value/unit) } + +// describePullFailure turns a failed pull into a sentence an operator can act +// on. +// +// The default is the daemon's own reason, which is usually specific ("manifest +// unknown", "pull access denied"). What it cannot know is the trap behind the +// most confusing case: a device whose spec names a repository with no registry +// host -- "openplc-runtime" rather than "ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime" +// -- sends every pull to Docker Hub, where none of these images exist. That +// happens on a device installed from a side-loaded image, and the resulting +// "repository does not exist" points nowhere near the actual problem, so the +// configured repository is named explicitly. +func describePullFailure(repository, ref string, err error) string { + reason := dockerapi.Reason(err) + if isUnqualifiedRepository(repository) { + return fmt.Sprintf( + "could not download %s: %s. This device is configured to use the image "+ + "repository %q, which has no registry host, so the download went to "+ + "Docker Hub instead of the OpenPLC registry.", + ref, reason, repository) + } + return fmt.Sprintf("could not download %s: %s", ref, reason) +} + +// isUnqualifiedRepository reports whether Docker would resolve repository +// against Docker Hub. The daemon's rule: the part before the first slash is a +// registry only when it contains a dot or a colon, or is exactly "localhost". +func isUnqualifiedRepository(repository string) bool { + slash := strings.Index(repository, "/") + if slash < 0 { + return true + } + host := repository[:slash] + return host != "localhost" && !strings.ContainsAny(host, ".:") +} From 88aa212eae3845f2c999e662d5b95f76b5786935 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 21:49:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 17/22] feat(bootloader): serve device information, and drop the runtime's copy The Runtime Status header was fed by the runtime's /api/device-info, which exists only in a runtime carrying this change. Every device in the field runs one that does not, so the header was blank on exactly the devices an operator opens it to look at. The bootloader is the right source: it is present wherever an update is possible at all, and it reads these from the Docker daemon, which runs on the host and answers for it -- a runtime inside a container can only describe its own namespace, where the hostname is a container id. Report only facts that vary between machines. "Runs in a container" and "updates itself" were both there and are neither: a client that reached this handler has already learned them from the bootloader answering. The runtime side goes with it -- device-info, the update-policy resolver and the two capabilities fields nothing ever read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go | 110 +++++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/api/server.go | 55 +++++++++ bootloader/internal/dockerapi/info.go | 36 ++++++ bootloader/main.go | 1 + tests/integration/harness.sh | 2 +- tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py | 5 - tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py | 136 --------------------- webserver/app.py | 5 - webserver/restapi.py | 13 -- webserver/runtime_info.py | 62 ---------- webserver/update_policy.py | 118 ------------------ 11 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 340 deletions(-) create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/dockerapi/info.go delete mode 100644 webserver/runtime_info.py delete mode 100644 webserver/update_policy.py diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e12c9b4c --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +package api + +import ( + "context" + "errors" + "io" + "log/slog" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" +) + +type fakeHost struct { + info *dockerapi.Info + err error +} + +func (f *fakeHost) SystemInfo(context.Context) (*dockerapi.Info, error) { + return f.info, f.err +} + +func newTestServerWithHost(t *testing.T, host HostReporter) *httptest.Server { + t.Helper() + srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ + Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", + RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, + Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, + Users: &fakeUsers{count: 1}, + Supervisor: healthySupervisor(), + Host: host, + Logs: &fakeLogs{}, + Log: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), + }} + mux := http.NewServeMux() + srv.routes(mux) + httpSrv := httptest.NewServer(mux) + t.Cleanup(httpSrv.Close) + return httpSrv +} + +// The reason this endpoint moved here from the runtime: the bootloader exists +// on every device that can be updated at all, so the answer does not depend on +// which runtime version happens to be installed. +func TestDeviceInfoReportsTheHostTheDaemonRunsOn(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServerWithHost(t, &fakeHost{info: &dockerapi.Info{ + Name: "slm-rp4", + Architecture: "aarch64", + KernelVersion: "6.12.35-rt10-v8+", + OperatingSystem: "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)", + NCPU: 4, + MemTotal: 1935417344, + ServerVersion: "20.10.24+dfsg1", + }}) + + resp, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/device-info", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("got HTTP %d", resp.StatusCode) + } + + for field, want := range map[string]any{ + "hostname": "slm-rp4", + "architecture": "aarch64", + "kernel": "6.12.35-rt10-v8+", + "system": "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)", + } { + if body[field] != want { + t.Errorf("%s: got %v, want %v", field, body[field], want) + } + } + + if body["bootloaderVersion"] != "bootloader-v1.0.0-test" { + t.Errorf("bootloaderVersion: got %v", body["bootloaderVersion"]) + } + + // Nothing here may be a constant. A field that always holds the same value + // tells a reader only that this endpoint answered, which they already knew. + for _, field := range []string{"containerized", "updatePolicy"} { + if _, present := body[field]; present { + t.Errorf("%s restates that a bootloader answered; it carries no information", field) + } + } +} + +func TestDeviceInfoRequiresAToken(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServerWithHost(t, &fakeHost{info: &dockerapi.Info{Name: "x"}}) + resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/device-info", "") + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("got HTTP %d, want 401", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// A daemon that will not answer is not a fault worth failing the request over: +// the versions do not come from it, and a half-filled header beats an error. +func TestDeviceInfoSurvivesADaemonThatWillNotAnswer(t *testing.T) { + srv := newTestServerWithHost(t, &fakeHost{err: errors.New("socket gone")}) + + resp, body := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/device-info", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("got HTTP %d, want 200", resp.StatusCode) + } + if body["bootloaderVersion"] != "bootloader-v1.0.0-test" { + t.Errorf("lost what does not come from the daemon: %v", body) + } + if _, present := body["hostname"]; present { + t.Errorf("invented a hostname it could not read: %v", body["hostname"]) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go index e750422b..325199fe 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import ( "strings" "time" + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/supervisor" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/updater" @@ -70,6 +71,17 @@ type SelfUpdater interface { Start(ctx context.Context, version string) error } +// HostReporter answers for the machine the runtime runs on. +// +// The bootloader is the right place for this. It exists on every device that +// can be updated from an editor, including one running a runtime far older +// than these endpoints -- so a Runtime Status screen fed from here is +// populated regardless of which runtime version is installed, which is not +// true of anything served by the runtime itself. +type HostReporter interface { + SystemInfo(ctx context.Context) (*dockerapi.Info, error) +} + // Authenticator resolves credentials against the runtime's account set. type Authenticator interface { Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*runtimeauth.User, error) @@ -88,6 +100,7 @@ type Config struct { Secrets *runtimeauth.Secrets Users Authenticator Supervisor Supervisor + Host HostReporter Logs LogReader Updater Updater SelfUpdater SelfUpdater @@ -144,6 +157,7 @@ func (s *Server) routes(mux *http.ServeMux) { // Authenticated. mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/status", s.authenticated(s.handleStatus)) + mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/device-info", s.authenticated(s.handleDeviceInfo)) mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/logs", s.authenticated(s.handleLogs)) mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/restart", s.authenticated(s.handleRestart)) mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdate)) @@ -237,6 +251,47 @@ func bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) { // --- handlers ------------------------------------------------------------ +// handleDeviceInfo reports the machine the runtime runs on. +// +// Sourced from the Docker daemon, which runs on the host and answers for it. +// The obvious alternative -- have the runtime report on itself -- is what this +// replaces: that endpoint exists only in runtimes new enough to have it, so +// every device in the field today answered it with a catch-all body and the +// screen had nothing to show. The bootloader is present wherever an update is +// possible at all, which makes it the one source that is always there. +// +// Deliberately only facts that VARY between devices. "This runtime runs in a +// container" and "this device updates itself" were both here at one point and +// are neither: a client reaching this handler at all has already learned them +// from the bootloader answering, so reporting them again was a field that +// could only ever hold one value. +func (s *Server) handleDeviceInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + payload := map[string]any{ + "bootloaderVersion": s.cfg.Version, + "runtimeVersion": s.cfg.RuntimeVersion(), + } + + if s.cfg.Host != nil { + info, err := s.cfg.Host.SystemInfo(r.Context()) + if err != nil { + // Report the versions rather than failing the request: a daemon + // that will not answer says nothing about the bootloader, and a + // half-filled header beats an error where there is no fault. + s.cfg.Log.Warn("could not read host information", "error", err) + } else { + payload["hostname"] = info.Name + payload["architecture"] = info.Architecture + payload["kernel"] = info.KernelVersion + payload["system"] = info.OperatingSystem + payload["cpus"] = info.NCPU + payload["memoryBytes"] = info.MemTotal + payload["dockerVersion"] = info.ServerVersion + } + } + + writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, payload) +} + func (s *Server) handleCapabilities(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { status := s.cfg.Supervisor.Status() // Enough for a client to know what it reached and whether the runtime is diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/info.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/info.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..49acca31 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/info.go @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +package dockerapi + +import ( + "context" + "net/http" +) + +// Info is the subset of the daemon's /info the bootloader reports. +// +// These are HOST facts, not container ones, and that is the whole reason this +// exists. The bootloader runs in a container: its own uname reports the shared +// kernel correctly but its hostname is a container id, and reading /etc/os-release +// from the image would describe the image rather than the device. The daemon +// runs on the host and answers for it, over a socket the bootloader already +// holds -- so no extra mounts, no extra privileges, and nothing that has to be +// kept in step with how the container happens to be launched. +type Info struct { + // Name is the host's hostname. + Name string `json:"Name"` + Architecture string `json:"Architecture"` + KernelVersion string `json:"KernelVersion"` + OperatingSystem string `json:"OperatingSystem"` + OSType string `json:"OSType"` + NCPU int `json:"NCPU"` + MemTotal int64 `json:"MemTotal"` + ServerVersion string `json:"ServerVersion"` +} + +// SystemInfo reports what the daemon knows about the host it runs on. +func (c *Client) SystemInfo(ctx context.Context) (*Info, error) { + var info Info + if err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/info", nil, &info); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &info, nil +} diff --git a/bootloader/main.go b/bootloader/main.go index 3116630f..44e6ce6b 100644 --- a/bootloader/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { Secrets: secrets, Users: users, Supervisor: sup, + Host: docker, Logs: docker, Updater: upd, SelfUpdater: bootloaderSelfUpdater{docker: docker, log: log.With("component", "selfupdate")}, diff --git a/tests/integration/harness.sh b/tests/integration/harness.sh index f9de077f..d20c2849 100755 --- a/tests/integration/harness.sh +++ b/tests/integration/harness.sh @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ cmd_seed() { transfer "$REAL_BASE" inner sh -c "cat > /tmp/real.Dockerfile <<'EOF' FROM $REAL_BASE -COPY webserver/update_policy.py webserver/runtime_info.py webserver/restapi.py webserver/app.py /workdir/webserver/ +COPY webserver/restapi.py webserver/app.py /workdir/webserver/ HEALTHCHECK --interval=10s --timeout=10s --start-period=90s --retries=3 \\ CMD curl -kfsS https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/version >/dev/null || exit 1 EOF diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py index a71d74fb..b819b954 100644 --- a/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/conftest.py @@ -22,16 +22,11 @@ import pytest # noqa: E402 from webserver import restapi # noqa: E402 -from webserver.runtime_info import runtime_info_bp # noqa: E402 # The Flask app is a module-level singleton, so register the blueprint exactly # once (registering twice raises). Subsequent fixtures only reset the DB. if "restapi_blueprint" not in restapi.app_restapi.blueprints: restapi.app_restapi.register_blueprint(restapi.restapi_bp, url_prefix="/api") -# Registered here too so /api/device-info is reachable under test, mirroring -# what run_https() does in webserver/app.py. -if "runtime_info" not in restapi.app_restapi.blueprints: - restapi.app_restapi.register_blueprint(runtime_info_bp) restapi.app_restapi.config.update(TESTING=True) diff --git a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py index c5177c33..be918b47 100644 --- a/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py +++ b/tests/pytest/restapi/test_capabilities.py @@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ from conftest import auth, create_user -from webserver import update_policy -from webserver.update_policy import BOOTLOADER_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION _VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$") @@ -51,8 +49,6 @@ def test_capabilities_reports_runtime_version_and_editor_floor(client): "runtimeVersion": RUNTIME_VERSION, "minEditorVersion": MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, "projectSnapshot": True, - "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, - "bootloaderPort": BOOTLOADER_PORT, } @@ -77,135 +73,3 @@ def test_runtime_version_header_is_present_on_capabilities(client): # after_request hook must cover the new route too. resp = client.get("/api/capabilities") assert resp.headers["X-OpenPLC-Runtime-Version"] == RUNTIME_VERSION - - -# --- update policy -------------------------------------------------------- -# -# The policy tells a client WHO may change this runtime's version (RTOP-283). -# It is resolved once at import, so the resolver is exercised directly rather -# than by reloading the module: what matters is the decision, not the caching. - - -def test_update_policy_is_one_of_the_published_values(client): - body = client.get("/api/capabilities").get_json() - assert body["updatePolicy"] in update_policy.VALID_POLICIES - - -def test_explicit_override_wins_over_detection(monkeypatch): - # The bootloader sets this when it creates the runtime container. It has to - # beat detection, because a bootloader-managed runtime IS containerized and - # would otherwise be mistaken for somebody else's vPLC. - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "self") - monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) - assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_SELF - - -def test_override_is_case_insensitive(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", " NONE ") - assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_NONE - - -def test_container_without_an_override_is_managed(monkeypatch): - # An orchestrator vPLC: something else created the container and therefore - # chose the image tag, which is the version. We must not offer to update it. - monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", raising=False) - monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) - assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED - - -def test_native_install_without_an_override_is_manual(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", raising=False) - monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: False) - assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL - - -def test_an_unrecognised_override_falls_through_to_detection(monkeypatch): - # A typo must not be read as permission. Falling through means the worst - # case is "we refuse an update that was actually allowed", never the - # reverse. - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "yes-please") - monkeypatch.setattr(update_policy, "is_running_in_container", lambda: True) - assert update_policy.resolve_update_policy() == update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED - - -# --- bootloader port --------------------------------------------------------- - - -def test_bootloader_port_is_absent_unless_the_policy_is_self(): - # Publishing a port nothing answers on would send clients somewhere - # useless, so every non-self policy reports None. - for policy in ( - update_policy.POLICY_MANAGED, - update_policy.POLICY_MANUAL, - update_policy.POLICY_NONE, - ): - assert update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(policy) is None, policy - - -def test_bootloader_port_defaults_when_the_policy_is_self(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.delenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", raising=False) - assert ( - update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) - == update_policy.DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT - ) - - -def test_bootloader_port_honours_an_explicit_value(monkeypatch): - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", "9445") - assert update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) == 9445 - - -def test_an_unusable_bootloader_port_falls_back_to_the_default(monkeypatch): - # Garbage or an out-of-range port means the bootloader is still there on the - # port it almost certainly used; refusing to report one at all would hide - # a working bootloader behind a config typo. - for raw in ("not-a-port", "0", "70000", "-1"): - monkeypatch.setenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", raw) - assert ( - update_policy.resolve_bootloader_port(update_policy.POLICY_SELF) - == update_policy.DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT - ), raw - - -# --- device info ---------------------------------------------------------- - - -def test_device_info_requires_a_token(client): - # Unlike /capabilities: the policy has to be readable before login, but - # kernel and architecture are only for somebody already authenticated. - assert client.get("/api/device-info").status_code == 401 - - -def test_device_info_reports_host_facts(client, admin_token): - body = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)).get_json() - assert set(body) == { - "hostname", - "architecture", - "kernel", - "system", - "containerized", - "updatePolicy", - "bootloaderPort", - } - assert body["hostname"] - assert body["architecture"] - assert isinstance(body["containerized"], bool) - - -def test_device_info_agrees_with_capabilities_on_the_policy(client, admin_token): - # Two routes, one answer -- a client that reads either must not be able to - # reach a different conclusion about whether an update is possible. - capabilities = client.get("/api/capabilities").get_json() - info = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)).get_json() - assert info["updatePolicy"] == capabilities["updatePolicy"] - assert info["bootloaderPort"] == capabilities["bootloaderPort"] - - -def test_device_info_is_not_swallowed_by_the_command_catch_all(client, admin_token): - # restapi_bp owns a GET /api/ catch-all that forwards to the PLC - # command handler. device-info lives on a different blueprint, so this - # pins the routing precedence: a static rule must win over the converter, - # or the editor's header request would be dispatched as a PLC command. - resp = client.get("/api/device-info", headers=auth(admin_token)) - assert resp.status_code == 200 - assert resp.get_json()["hostname"] diff --git a/webserver/app.py b/webserver/app.py index 2f414198..13782175 100644 --- a/webserver/app.py +++ b/webserver/app.py @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ repair_missing_admin, restapi_bp, ) -from webserver.runtime_info import runtime_info_bp from webserver.runtimemanager import RuntimeManager logger, _ = get_logger("logger", use_buffer=True) @@ -491,10 +490,6 @@ def run_https(): # rest api register app_restapi.register_blueprint(restapi_bp, url_prefix="/api") app_restapi.register_blueprint(discovery_bp) - # Carries its own /api prefix, like discovery_bp. Its /api/device-info rule - # is static, so Werkzeug matches it ahead of restapi_bp's /api/ - # catch-all regardless of registration order. - app_restapi.register_blueprint(runtime_info_bp) register_callback_get(restapi_callback_get) register_callback_post(restapi_callback_post) diff --git a/webserver/restapi.py b/webserver/restapi.py index 89367d84..4b2b798a 100644 --- a/webserver/restapi.py +++ b/webserver/restapi.py @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import webserver.config from webserver import project_snapshot from webserver.logger import get_logger -from webserver.update_policy import BOOTLOADER_PORT, UPDATE_POLICY from webserver.version import MIN_EDITOR_VERSION, RUNTIME_VERSION logger, buffer = get_logger("logger", use_buffer=True) @@ -112,13 +111,6 @@ def restapi_capabilities(): minEditorVersion: type: string description: Oldest OpenPLC Editor version this runtime accepts programs from - updatePolicy: - type: string - enum: [self, managed, manual, none] - description: Which mechanism may change this runtime's version - bootloaderPort: - type: integer - description: Port of the managing bootloader; null unless updatePolicy is "self" """ return ( jsonify( @@ -129,11 +121,6 @@ def restapi_capabilities(): # upload and retrieve it later. Unauthenticated like the rest of # this endpoint, so a client can decide before logging in. "projectSnapshot": True, - # Who owns this runtime's version (RTOP-283) -- unauthenticated - # because the editor picks its actions before it has - # credentials. Resolution order: webserver/update_policy.py. - "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, - "bootloaderPort": BOOTLOADER_PORT, } ), 200, diff --git a/webserver/runtime_info.py b/webserver/runtime_info.py deleted file mode 100644 index 130471d9..00000000 --- a/webserver/runtime_info.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -"""Host metadata for the editor's Runtime Status header. - -Its own blueprint rather than another route in ``webserver/restapi.py``: that -module is at pylint's per-module line ceiling, and host facts are a different -concern from the PLC control and user-management surface that fills it. Mounted -under ``/api`` so the route reads ``/api/device-info`` like every other -endpoint the editor calls. - -Authenticated, unlike ``/api/capabilities``. The split is deliberate: -``updatePolicy`` has to be readable BEFORE login so a client can decide which -actions to offer, whereas kernel and architecture are only ever shown to -somebody already looking at a device they hold credentials for. -""" - -from flask import Blueprint, jsonify -from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required - -from webserver.update_policy import device_info - -runtime_info_bp = Blueprint("runtime_info", __name__, url_prefix="/api") - - -@runtime_info_bp.route("/device-info", methods=["GET"]) -@jwt_required() -def restapi_device_info(): - """Return host facts about the device this runtime is running on. - --- - tags: - - Runtime - security: - - BearerAuth: [] - responses: - 200: - description: Device information retrieved - schema: - type: object - properties: - hostname: - type: string - architecture: - type: string - description: Machine architecture reported by the kernel (e.g. aarch64) - kernel: - type: string - description: Kernel release string - system: - type: string - description: Operating system name - containerized: - type: boolean - description: Whether the runtime is running inside a container - updatePolicy: - type: string - enum: [self, managed, manual, none] - description: Which mechanism may change this runtime's version - bootloaderPort: - type: integer - description: Port of the managing bootloader; null unless updatePolicy is "self" - 401: - description: Missing or invalid token - """ - return jsonify(device_info()), 200 diff --git a/webserver/update_policy.py b/webserver/update_policy.py deleted file mode 100644 index d0544cb3..00000000 --- a/webserver/update_policy.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,118 +0,0 @@ -"""Who is allowed to change this runtime's version, published at -``GET /api/capabilities`` as ``updatePolicy``. - -The runtime never updates itself. It only reports which mechanism owns that -job, so a client can offer the right action instead of a button that cannot -work. Resolution order: - - 1. ``OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY`` -- explicit, and wins outright. The bootloader - sets ``self`` when it creates the runtime container. An OEM shipping a - vendor-managed device sets ``none``. - 2. Running in a container with no override -> ``managed``. Something else - created this container, and whatever created it chose the image tag -- - which IS the version. An orchestrator-managed vPLC lands here. - 3. Otherwise -> ``manual``. A native source install, updated from a shell. - -This is deliberately capability-based rather than identity-based: we report -what the deployment CAN do, never a guess at what it IS. Only our own bootloader -sets ``self``, so a false positive is impossible -- an orchestrator vPLC never -runs our installer and never receives that variable. Getting this backwards -(sniffing for orchestrator-shaped networks or cgroup patterns) would be a -guess that can be wrong in both directions. - -Clients that predate this field see it missing and must treat that as "no -update support", which is exactly the behaviour they had before. -""" - -import os -import platform -import socket -from typing import Optional - -from webserver.config import is_running_in_container - -# The bootloader owns the container spec and may replace the image (RTOP-283). -POLICY_SELF: str = "self" -# Some other supervisor owns the container; it must perform the swap. -POLICY_MANAGED: str = "managed" -# Native install: a human with a shell owns it. -POLICY_MANUAL: str = "manual" -# Vendor-locked. Set by an OEM that ships its own update channel. -POLICY_NONE: str = "none" - -VALID_POLICIES: frozenset[str] = frozenset( - {POLICY_SELF, POLICY_MANAGED, POLICY_MANUAL, POLICY_NONE} -) - -# Port the bootloader's control API listens on. Reported so a client does not -# have to hard-code it; the bootloader passes the real value when it differs. -DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT: int = 8445 - - -def resolve_update_policy() -> str: - """Return the update policy for this deployment. See module docstring. - - Public rather than private because the resolution rules -- not the cached - constant below -- are what the tests need to pin, and a decision this - security-relevant should be callable directly rather than reached through - a module reload. - """ - override = os.getenv("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "").strip().lower() - if override in VALID_POLICIES: - return override - - # An unrecognised override is a deployment error, not a reason to guess a - # permissive answer -- fall through to detection rather than trusting it. - if is_running_in_container(): - return POLICY_MANAGED - - return POLICY_MANUAL - - -def resolve_bootloader_port(policy: str) -> Optional[int]: - """Port of the managing bootloader, or ``None`` when there is not one. - - Only meaningful under ``self``: every other policy means no bootloader of - ours is listening, and publishing a port nothing answers on would send - clients somewhere useless. - """ - if policy != POLICY_SELF: - return None - - raw = os.getenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", "").strip() - if not raw: - return DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT - try: - port = int(raw) - except ValueError: - return DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT - if not 1 <= port <= 65535: - return DEFAULT_BOOTLOADER_PORT - return port - - -UPDATE_POLICY: str = resolve_update_policy() -BOOTLOADER_PORT: Optional[int] = resolve_bootloader_port(UPDATE_POLICY) - - -def device_info() -> dict[str, object]: - """Host facts for the editor's Runtime Status header. - - Served from an authenticated route, unlike ``updatePolicy`` itself: the - policy has to be readable before login so a client can decide what to - offer, whereas kernel and architecture are only ever shown to somebody - already looking at a device they can log in to. - - ``hostname`` is the one field that is also broadcast unauthenticated (the - discovery responder already publishes it), so nothing here widens what an - unauthenticated observer on the LAN can learn. - """ - return { - "hostname": socket.gethostname(), - "architecture": platform.machine(), - "kernel": platform.release(), - "system": platform.system(), - "containerized": is_running_in_container(), - "updatePolicy": UPDATE_POLICY, - "bootloaderPort": BOOTLOADER_PORT, - } From 1508a3245901ae48f34cab7453e8d5d409f233c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 22:36:10 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 18/22] feat(install): a one-line container install, and a way back out Updating a runtime meant SSH, a clone, and a toolchain. This makes it: curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash The script is self-contained: it installs Docker if missing, starts the bootloader and runtime, and needs no repository on disk. --native still builds from source, and still needs a checkout, which is why the one-liner cannot reach it. Stop any systemd OpenPLC it finds first. openplc.service (v3) and openplc-runtime.service (v4 source) both bind 8443, so left running the container starts, fails to bind, and the editor still reaches the OLD runtime -- a confusing failure, and the likeliest thing to go wrong on a device that has been in the field. What was stood down is recorded so --uninstall can put it back exactly as it was, started or merely enabled. Two things testing on hardware changed: The pull now happens BEFORE anything is disturbed, and a failure after that point restores the displaced runtime. With the pull inside start_bootloader, a device that could not reach the registry had already had its runtime stopped and disabled when the download failed -- a failed install left it with no PLC at all. --uninstall keeps /var/lib/openplc-runtime by default. That directory is not ours alone: webserver/config.py resolves it for native installs too, which is what makes moving a device to containers carry over its users and project -- and what made deleting it destroy the data of the runtime the uninstall had just restored. --purge deletes it, and is refused while a systemd runtime is being handed back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- README.md | 36 +++- install.sh | 2 +- scripts/install-docker.sh | 377 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 388 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 360c6f9e..d4a96ad0 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -35,7 +35,35 @@ The runtime will start and listen on port 8443 for connections from the OpenPLC ### Linux Installation -For native Linux installation: +#### Install (recommended) + +```bash +curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash +``` + +No checkout, no build toolchain, no dependencies to install first. The script +installs Docker if it is missing, then starts the runtime and a small +bootloader beside it. The bootloader is what lets the OpenPLC Editor change +the runtime version later, without SSH. + +If the device already runs an OpenPLC from systemd, the installer stops and +disables it first -- the two would otherwise fight over port 8443. Its data in +`/var/lib/openplc-runtime` is reused, so users, credentials and the stored +project carry over. + +To remove it again: + +```bash +curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash -s -- --uninstall --yes +``` + +That removes the containers and images, puts back any systemd runtime it +displaced, and leaves `/var/lib/openplc-runtime` alone. Add `--purge` to +delete that too. Docker itself is left installed. + +#### Install from source + +For a native build -- MSYS2, or a target that cannot run containers: ```bash # Clone repository @@ -44,12 +72,16 @@ cd openplc-runtime git checkout development # Install dependencies and compile -sudo ./install.sh +sudo ./install.sh --native # Start the runtime sudo ./start_openplc.sh ``` +`--native` is required here: `sudo ./install.sh` on its own takes the +container path above. The source build needs the repository on disk, which is +why it is not reachable from the one-liner. + The runtime will start and listen on port 8443. Connect to it from the OpenPLC Editor desktop application by configuring the runtime IP address and logging in from the Editor. **Supported Distributions:** Any distribution using apt, dnf, yum, pacman, zypper, or apk (Ubuntu, Debian, Fedora, CentOS, RHEL, Arch, openSUSE, Alpine, etc.) diff --git a/install.sh b/install.sh index 0edd3fd7..87199f74 100755 --- a/install.sh +++ b/install.sh @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ if is_msys2 && [ "$INSTALL_MODE" = "docker" ]; then fi if [ "$INSTALL_MODE" = "docker" ]; then - exec bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/install-docker.sh" "$OPENPLC_DIR" "${DOCKER_INSTALL_ARGS[@]}" + exec bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/install-docker.sh" --repo-root "$OPENPLC_DIR" "${DOCKER_INSTALL_ARGS[@]}" fi echo "OpenPLC Runtime Installation (source build)" diff --git a/scripts/install-docker.sh b/scripts/install-docker.sh index ae7077b1..05effc4d 100755 --- a/scripts/install-docker.sh +++ b/scripts/install-docker.sh @@ -1,18 +1,26 @@ #!/usr/bin/env bash -# Docker-based install of the OpenPLC Runtime (RTOP-283). +# OpenPLC Runtime installer -- container edition (RTOP-283). # -# This is what `sudo ./install.sh` does by default. It installs no build -# toolchain and compiles nothing: it ensures a container engine, writes the -# bootloader's spec, and starts the bootloader. The bootloader then pulls the -# runtime image and brings it up. +# Two ways in, one script: +# +# curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash no checkout, no toolchain +# sudo ./install.sh from a clone; execs this +# +# It installs no build toolchain and compiles nothing: it ensures a container +# engine, writes the bootloader's spec, and starts the bootloader. The +# bootloader then pulls the runtime image and brings it up. # # Docker is the ONLY dependency this path adds. Nothing of ours goes into # systemd -- Docker's own restart policy starts the bootloader at boot, and the # bootloader starts the runtime. That is deliberate: the fewer moving parts # between power-on and a running PLC, the fewer ways it fails. # -# `sudo ./install.sh --native` keeps the source build for MSYS2 and for targets -# that cannot host a container engine. +# `sudo ./install.sh --native` keeps the source build, for MSYS2 and for +# targets that cannot host a container engine. That path needs the repository +# on disk, so it is not reachable from the piped one-liner. +# +# `--uninstall` removes everything this script created and puts back whatever +# it displaced, so a device ends up as it started. set -euo pipefail RED='\033[0;31m'; GREEN='\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\033[1;33m'; BLUE='\033[0;34m'; NC='\033[0m' @@ -49,21 +57,62 @@ BOOTLOADER_PORT="${BOOTLOADER_PORT:-8445}" declare -a EXTRA_MOUNTS=() declare -a EXTRA_ENV=() +# Where this script lives, for the self-elevation path below. A piped run has +# no file to re-exec, so it fetches a fresh copy rather than trying to re-read +# a stdin bash has already consumed. +INSTALLER_URL="${OPENPLC_INSTALLER_URL:-https://runtime.getedge.me}" + +MODE=install +ASSUME_YES=false +KEEP_IMAGES=false +PURGE_DATA=false +REPO_ROOT="" + +# systemd units that run a pre-container OpenPLC. Two of them are real and in +# the field: openplc.service is the v3 runtime, openplc-runtime.service is a v4 +# source install. Both bind 8443, so leaving one running means the container +# starts and then fails to serve, with nothing obviously wrong on either side. +LEGACY_UNITS=(openplc-runtime.service openplc.service openplc_v3.service openplc-v3.service) + +# What we stopped, so --uninstall can put it back. Kept in the bootloader's +# state directory because that survives an "erase all data" of the runtime's. +disabled_units_file() { printf '%s/displaced-systemd-units' "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR"; } + usage() { cat <<'EOF' -Usage: sudo ./install.sh [options] +OpenPLC Runtime installer (container edition) + +Usage: + curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash + curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash -s -- --uninstall --yes + sudo ./install.sh [options] - --native Build and install from source instead (today's path) - --runtime-version VERSION Runtime image tag to install (default: the VERSION file) +Install options: + --native Build from source instead (needs a checkout) + --runtime-version VERSION Runtime image tag (default: the VERSION file, else latest) --bootloader-version VER Bootloader image tag (default: latest) --mount HOST:CONTAINER[:ro] Extra bind mount for the runtime; repeatable --env KEY=VALUE Extra environment variable for the runtime; repeatable --data-dir PATH Runtime persistent data directory --port PORT Bootloader control port (default: 8445) + --repo-root PATH Checkout to read VERSION from (set by install.sh) + +Uninstall options: + --uninstall Remove the containers, images and data this + installed, and re-enable any systemd runtime it + displaced + -y, --yes Do not ask for confirmation (required when piped) + --keep-images Leave the pulled images on disk + --purge Also delete the runtime's data directory (users, + credentials, stored project, retained variables). + Refused when a systemd runtime is being restored, + because it shares that directory + -h, --help Show this help -Re-running is safe: it rewrites the spec and restarts the bootloader without -touching runtime data, so adding a mount does not mean reinstalling anything. +Re-running the install is safe: it rewrites the spec and restarts the +bootloader without touching runtime data, so adding a mount does not mean +reinstalling anything. EOF } @@ -76,10 +125,48 @@ parse_args() { --env) EXTRA_ENV+=("$2"); shift 2 ;; --data-dir) RUNTIME_DATA_DIR="$2"; shift 2 ;; --port) BOOTLOADER_PORT="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --repo-root) REPO_ROOT="$2"; shift 2 ;; + --uninstall) MODE=uninstall; shift ;; + -y|--yes) ASSUME_YES=true; shift ;; + --keep-images) KEEP_IMAGES=true; shift ;; + --purge) PURGE_DATA=true; shift ;; -h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;; *) log_error "unknown option: $1"; usage; exit 1 ;; esac done + + if [ "$MODE" = install ] && { [ "$KEEP_IMAGES" = true ] || [ "$PURGE_DATA" = true ]; }; then + log_warning "--keep-images and --purge only apply to --uninstall; ignoring." + fi +} + +# require_root re-runs this script under sudo, or explains how to. +# +# The piped case has no file to re-exec: bash has already consumed the script +# from stdin, so re-reading it would save a truncated copy. Fetching a fresh +# one is the honest way to get a file, and when that is not possible the exact +# command to run is more use than a partial install. +require_root() { + [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] && return 0 + + if [ -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]:-}" ]; then + log_info "Root is required; re-running under sudo" + exec sudo -E bash "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "$@" + fi + + if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then + local copy + copy="$(mktemp)" + if curl -fsSL "$INSTALLER_URL" -o "$copy" 2>/dev/null && [ -s "$copy" ]; then + log_info "Root is required; re-running under sudo" + exec sudo -E bash "$copy" "$@" + fi + rm -f "$copy" + fi + + log_error "This installer must run as root. Re-run it as:" + log_error " curl -fsSL $INSTALLER_URL | sudo bash" + exit 1 } # --- engine -------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -157,6 +244,202 @@ start_engine() { fi } +# --- displaced systemd runtimes ------------------------------------------- + +have_systemd() { + command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ -d /run/systemd/system ] +} + +unit_exists() { + systemctl list-unit-files "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && + [ -n "$(systemctl list-unit-files --no-legend "$1" 2>/dev/null)" ] +} + +# stop_legacy_runtimes clears the way for the container. +# +# A source or v3 install binds 8443 from systemd. Left running, the runtime +# container starts, fails to bind, and the bootloader reports a runtime that +# will not come up -- while the editor still reaches *something* on 8443, +# because the old one answered. That is a genuinely confusing failure, and it +# is the single most likely thing to go wrong on a device that has been in the +# field, so it is handled rather than documented. +# +# The unit is stopped and disabled, never deleted: uninstall puts it back. +stop_legacy_runtimes() { + have_systemd || return 0 + + local unit displaced=() + for unit in "${LEGACY_UNITS[@]}"; do + unit_exists "$unit" || continue + + local was_active=no was_enabled=no + systemctl is-active --quiet "$unit" 2>/dev/null && was_active=yes + systemctl is-enabled --quiet "$unit" 2>/dev/null && was_enabled=yes + [ "$was_active" = no ] && [ "$was_enabled" = no ] && continue + + local state_desc="stopped" + [ "$was_active" = yes ] && state_desc="running" + [ "$was_enabled" = yes ] && state_desc="$state_desc, starts at boot" + + log_warning "Found $unit ($state_desc)" + log_info " It binds port 8443, which the runtime container needs. Standing it down." + + [ "$was_active" = yes ] && systemctl stop "$unit" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + [ "$was_enabled" = yes ] && systemctl disable "$unit" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + displaced+=("$unit:$was_active:$was_enabled") + log_success " $unit stopped and disabled" + done + + [ ${#displaced[@]} -eq 0 ] && return 0 + + mkdir -p "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" + printf '%s\n' "${displaced[@]}" > "$(disabled_units_file)" + chmod 640 "$(disabled_units_file)" +} + +# restore_legacy_runtimes undoes exactly what stop_legacy_runtimes did. +# +# Only units this installer stood down, and only to the state they were in: +# a unit that was enabled-but-stopped is re-enabled and left stopped. Guessing +# any wider than that would be inventing a configuration the device never had. +restore_legacy_runtimes() { + local record; record="$(disabled_units_file)" + [ -f "$record" ] || return 0 + have_systemd || { log_warning "No systemd here; cannot restore $record"; return 0; } + + local line unit was_active was_enabled + while IFS=: read -r unit was_active was_enabled; do + [ -n "$unit" ] || continue + unit_exists "$unit" || { log_warning " $unit is gone; nothing to restore"; continue; } + if [ "$was_enabled" = yes ]; then + systemctl enable "$unit" >/dev/null 2>&1 && log_success " re-enabled $unit" + fi + if [ "$was_active" = yes ]; then + systemctl start "$unit" >/dev/null 2>&1 && log_success " restarted $unit" + fi + done < "$record" + rm -f "$record" +} + +# rollback_on_failure puts the device back if the install dies partway. +# +# Between standing the old runtime down and the container reporting healthy +# there is a window where the device has no PLC. Anything that fails in it -- +# a spec that cannot be written, a container that will not start -- must hand +# the device back the runtime it had, rather than leaving it with neither. +INSTALL_DISPLACED_UNITS=false + +rollback_on_failure() { + local status=$? + [ "$status" -eq 0 ] && return 0 + [ "$INSTALL_DISPLACED_UNITS" = true ] || return 0 + + log_error "Install failed; restoring the runtime that was here before." + restore_legacy_runtimes || true +} + +# --- uninstall ------------------------------------------------------------- + +confirm_uninstall() { + [ "$ASSUME_YES" = true ] && return 0 + if [ ! -t 0 ]; then + log_error "Refusing to uninstall without confirmation when nothing is attached" + log_error "to answer. Re-run with --yes:" + log_error " curl -fsSL $INSTALLER_URL | sudo bash -s -- --uninstall --yes" + exit 1 + fi + echo + echo "This removes the OpenPLC bootloader and runtime containers from this device." + if [ "$PURGE_DATA" = true ]; then + echo "It also deletes $RUNTIME_DATA_DIR -- users, credentials, the stored" + echo "project, retained variables and any VPP licences." + else + echo "$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR is kept; pass --purge to delete it too." + fi + printf 'Continue? [y/N] ' + local answer; read -r answer + case "$answer" in [yY]|[yY][eE][sS]) return 0 ;; esac + echo "Nothing was changed." + exit 0 +} + +remove_container() { + local name="$1" + docker inspect "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 + # Force, because the restart policy would otherwise bring the bootloader + # back between the stop and the remove. + docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 && log_success " removed container $name" +} + +remove_installed_images() { + [ "$KEEP_IMAGES" = true ] && { log_info " keeping images (--keep-images)"; return 0; } + local ref + # Every tag of ours, not just the one currently recorded: a device that has + # been through a version change or two holds several, and leaving them + # behind is most of the disk this installer ever used. + for ref in $(docker images --format '{{.Repository}}:{{.Tag}}' 2>/dev/null | + grep -E "^(${RUNTIME_REPOSITORY}|${BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY}):" || true); do + docker rmi "$ref" >/dev/null 2>&1 && log_success " removed image $ref" + done +} + +do_uninstall() { + log_info "Uninstalling the OpenPLC Runtime" + confirm_uninstall + + if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 && docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log_info "Removing containers" + remove_container "$RUNTIME_CONTAINER" + remove_container "$BOOTLOADER_CONTAINER" + log_info "Removing images" + remove_installed_images + else + log_warning "Docker is not available; skipping container and image removal." + fi + + # Data BEFORE restoring the old runtime: restarting it first would have it + # recreate this directory, and the delete would then take out files the + # runtime we just handed back had already written. + # + # Kept by default, because it is NOT exclusively ours. A native install + # reads and writes the same path (webserver/config.py resolves + # /var/lib/openplc-runtime on native Linux), which is what makes moving a + # device to containers keep its users and project -- and what makes + # deleting it on the way out destroy the data of the very runtime this + # uninstall is about to restore. + if [ "$PURGE_DATA" = true ] && [ -f "$(disabled_units_file)" ]; then + log_warning "Not deleting $RUNTIME_DATA_DIR: a systemd runtime is being" + log_warning "restored and shares that directory. Remove it by hand if you" + log_warning "are certain nothing else needs it." + elif [ "$PURGE_DATA" = true ]; then + rm -rf "$RUNTIME_DATA_DIR" + log_success " removed $RUNTIME_DATA_DIR" + else + log_info " keeping $RUNTIME_DATA_DIR (pass --purge to delete it)" + fi + + # The bootloader's own state is unambiguously ours, so it always goes -- + # but only after the record inside it has been used to restore units. + log_info "Restoring anything this installer displaced" + restore_legacy_runtimes + rm -rf "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" + log_success " removed $BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" + + # Docker itself is left alone. It may well predate this install, and other + # things on the device may depend on it -- removing a container engine + # because one of its tenants moved out is not ours to decide. + cat </dev/null 2>&1; then + log_success "Bootloader image ready" + return 0 fi + # A local copy is a legitimate answer: an air-gapped device, or one + # side-loaded with `docker load`. Same policy the updater applies. + if docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log_warning "Could not reach the registry; using the copy already on this device." + return 0 + fi + + log_error "Could not pull $image, and no local copy is present." + log_error "Check the device's internet access, or use --native to build from source." + log_error "Nothing on this device has been changed." + exit 1 +} + +start_bootloader() { + local image="$BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY:$BOOTLOADER_VERSION" + # Replace any previous bootloader. The RUNTIME container is deliberately # left alone: a re-run must not interrupt a running PLC, and the new # bootloader adopts whatever it finds healthy. @@ -310,15 +616,27 @@ EOF } main() { - local repo_root="$1"; shift - parse_args "$@" + # Help before anything else, so `--help` never needs root and never has to + # reach the network. + for arg in "$@"; do + case "$arg" in -h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;; esac + done - if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then - log_error "This script must run as root (sudo ./install.sh)" + # After --help, so the usage text is readable from a developer machine. + if [ "${OSTYPE:-}" != "" ] && [[ ${OSTYPE} != linux-gnu* ]]; then + log_error "This installer supports Linux only." exit 1 fi - resolve_runtime_version "$repo_root" + require_root "$@" + parse_args "$@" + + if [ "$MODE" = uninstall ]; then + do_uninstall + return 0 + fi + + resolve_runtime_version "$REPO_ROOT" log_info "Installing the OpenPLC Runtime with Docker" log_info " runtime: $RUNTIME_REPOSITORY:$RUNTIME_VERSION" @@ -329,9 +647,20 @@ main() { detect_engine || install_engine start_engine + # Everything above this line is additive, and the pull below is too. The + # device keeps working throughout. + pull_bootloader_image + + # From here the old runtime is gone and the new one is not yet up, so a + # failure has to hand the device back what it had. + trap rollback_on_failure EXIT + stop_legacy_runtimes + INSTALL_DISPLACED_UNITS=true write_spec start_bootloader wait_for_runtime + trap - EXIT + print_summary } From 4703e15237d31ba7abb216cf9af82f7b9b7fef61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 22:50:50 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 19/22] ci(bootloader): do not republish a bootloader version that already exists The job existed and built from bootloader/VERSION, but it rebuilt and overwrote on every trigger. A run of runtime tags with an unchanged bootloader therefore replaced a digest devices had already installed, with no version change to show for it -- and made "which bootloader is on this device" unanswerable. It now checks the registry first. An existing version is left exactly as it is: the runtime ships, the bootloader does not move. Bumping bootloader/VERSION is the only thing that produces a new image. `latest` is what a fresh install pulls, so it only moves for a stable version from a release tag or main -- a development push publishes its own version for testing without becoming the default every new device gets. When a version was already published and later reaches main, latest is repointed with a registry-side manifest copy rather than a rebuild, so the digest stays the one that was tested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- .github/workflows/docker.yml | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker.yml b/.github/workflows/docker.yml index 58cac285..d14dc9c2 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/docker.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/docker.yml @@ -83,11 +83,16 @@ jobs: # The bootloader is versioned independently of the runtime (bootloader/VERSION). # Tying it to every runtime tag would publish a long run of byte-identical # images and make "which bootloader is on this device" a meaningless question. + # + # So a runtime release does NOT imply a bootloader release. This job reads + # bootloader/VERSION, and if that tag is already in the registry it publishes + # nothing: the runtime ships, the bootloader stays where it is. Bumping + # bootloader/VERSION is the only thing that produces a new bootloader image. bootloader: runs-on: ubuntu-latest # Runs on release tags AND branch pushes: it is a seconds-long - # cross-compile, and re-pushing an unchanged bootloader/VERSION is an - # idempotent overwrite. + # cross-compile, and the existence check below makes a run with an + # unchanged version free. permissions: contents: read packages: write @@ -96,13 +101,6 @@ jobs: - name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@v4 - - name: Read bootloader version - id: bootloader_version - run: echo "version=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < bootloader/VERSION)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - - - name: Set up Docker Buildx - uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 - - name: Login to GHCR uses: docker/login-action@v3 with: @@ -110,17 +108,103 @@ jobs: username: ${{ secrets.GHCR_USERNAME }} password: ${{ secrets.GHCR_TOKEN }} + - name: Decide what needs publishing + id: plan + run: | + set -euo pipefail + image=ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader + version="$(tr -d '[:space:]' < bootloader/VERSION)" + + if [ -z "$version" ]; then + echo "::error::bootloader/VERSION is empty" + exit 1 + fi + echo "version=$version" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + echo "image=$image" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + + # A published version is immutable. Rebuilding one would replace a + # digest that devices in the field have already installed, with no + # version change to show for it -- so an existing tag is left alone + # even when the source has drifted. + if docker manifest inspect "$image:$version" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + exists=true + else + exists=false + fi + echo "exists=$exists" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + + # `latest` is what a fresh install pulls, so it only ever moves for a + # stable version from a release tag or main. A development push can + # publish its own version for testing, but must not become the + # default every new device gets. + case "${GITHUB_REF}" in + refs/tags/v*|refs/heads/main) releasable=true ;; + *) releasable=false ;; + esac + case "$version" in + *-rc*|*-beta*|*-alpha*|*-dev*) releasable=false ;; + esac + echo "releasable=$releasable" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + + if [ "$exists" = false ]; then + echo "build=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + echo "Publishing bootloader $version (not yet in the registry)." + else + echo "build=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + echo "Bootloader $version is already published; nothing to build." + fi + + - name: Set up Docker Buildx + if: steps.plan.outputs.build == 'true' + uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 + # No QEMU step, unlike the runtime build: the bootloader is pure Go and # cross-compiles from the native runner for every target, which takes # seconds instead of the many minutes emulation costs. - name: Build and Push Bootloader + if: steps.plan.outputs.build == 'true' uses: docker/build-push-action@v6 with: context: ./bootloader push: true platforms: ${{ inputs.platforms || 'linux/amd64,linux/arm64,linux/arm/v7' }} build-args: | - BOOTLOADER_VERSION=${{ steps.bootloader_version.outputs.version }} - tags: | - ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader:${{ steps.bootloader_version.outputs.version }} - ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime-bootloader:latest + BOOTLOADER_VERSION=${{ steps.plan.outputs.version }} + # `latest` only when this build is releasable; a development push + # publishes its own version and nothing else. + tags: ${{ steps.plan.outputs.releasable == 'true' && format('{0}:{1},{0}:latest', steps.plan.outputs.image, steps.plan.outputs.version) || format('{0}:{1}', steps.plan.outputs.image, steps.plan.outputs.version) }} + + # The version was already published, but this is a release and `latest` + # may still be behind it -- a bootloader bumped on development and only + # later merged to main lands here. Repointing a tag is a registry-side + # manifest copy, not a rebuild, so the digest devices already hold stays + # exactly as it was. + - name: Point latest at the published bootloader + if: steps.plan.outputs.build == 'false' && steps.plan.outputs.releasable == 'true' + run: | + set -euo pipefail + image='${{ steps.plan.outputs.image }}' + version='${{ steps.plan.outputs.version }}' + + current="$(docker manifest inspect "$image:latest" 2>/dev/null | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1 || true)" + target="$(docker manifest inspect "$image:$version" | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)" + if [ "$current" = "$target" ]; then + echo "latest already points at $version." + exit 0 + fi + echo "Moving latest to $version." + docker buildx imagetools create --tag "$image:latest" "$image:$version" + + - name: Summary + run: | + { + echo "### Bootloader" + echo + echo "- version: \`${{ steps.plan.outputs.version }}\`" + if [ '${{ steps.plan.outputs.build }}' = 'true' ]; then + echo "- published a new image" + else + echo "- already published; no rebuild" + fi + echo "- latest updated: ${{ steps.plan.outputs.releasable }}" + } >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY" From a2018e943e197a2594c2aa9f5f28475baf135156 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 06:55:55 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 20/22] ci(windows): ask install.sh for the native build explicitly The Windows installer ships a compiled runtime inside an MSYS2 tree, and install.sh now defaults to the container path -- which installs Docker and compiles nothing. It does force native on MSYS2, so this worked, but only because of the script's own platform detection: a change there would have broken the Windows build silently, at a distance, in another file. Both callers now say --native: the workflow step and windows/provision-msys2.sh, which is what the shipped installer runs on the user's machine. The payload is assembled by copying whatever is on disk, with no idea what produced it, so add the check that closes that gap: venvs/runtime is created only by the source path, never by the container one. Without it a build that took the wrong path could package an MSYS2 tree with no runtime in it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- .github/workflows/windows-installer.yml | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- windows/provision-msys2.sh | 7 ++++-- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/windows-installer.yml b/.github/workflows/windows-installer.yml index f4622d98..c56be9e1 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/windows-installer.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/windows-installer.yml @@ -55,11 +55,37 @@ jobs: echo "Installing OpenPLC Runtime via install.sh" echo "==========================================" - # Run the install script which handles all dependencies and build - ./install.sh + # --native explicitly, even though install.sh forces it on MSYS2 anyway. + # The Windows installer ships a built runtime inside an MSYS2 tree; + # the default path installs Docker and compiles nothing, which would + # produce a payload with no runtime in it. Relying on the script's own + # platform detection means a change to that detection silently breaks + # this build, so the intent is stated here where it is needed. + ./install.sh --native echo "Installation complete!" + # The payload is assembled by copying whatever is on disk, with no idea + # what produced it. This is the check that a native build actually + # happened: venvs/runtime is created only by install.sh's source path, + # never by the container one. + - name: Verify the native install produced its artifacts + shell: msys2 {0} + run: | + missing=0 + for path in venvs/runtime webserver/app.py; do + if [ ! -e "$path" ]; then + echo "::error::$path is missing -- install.sh did not complete a native install" + missing=1 + fi + done + if [ ! -x venvs/runtime/bin/python3 ] && [ ! -x venvs/runtime/Scripts/python.exe ]; then + echo "::error::the runtime virtualenv has no interpreter" + missing=1 + fi + [ "$missing" -eq 0 ] || exit 1 + echo "Native install verified." + - name: Prepare installer payload shell: pwsh run: | diff --git a/windows/provision-msys2.sh b/windows/provision-msys2.sh index bd2ab643..f6c730a2 100644 --- a/windows/provision-msys2.sh +++ b/windows/provision-msys2.sh @@ -18,9 +18,12 @@ OPENPLC_DIR="$(dirname "$SCRIPT_DIR")" echo "OpenPLC Directory: $OPENPLC_DIR" -# Run the main install script which handles MSYS2 detection and installation +# Run the main install script. --native explicitly: install.sh defaults to a +# Docker install, which cannot work here and would compile nothing. It forces +# native on MSYS2 anyway, but this script exists to build a Windows payload and +# should say so rather than depend on that detection. cd "$OPENPLC_DIR" -./install.sh +./install.sh --native # Clean up to reduce size for the installer payload echo "Cleaning up to reduce size..." From ae34acaa332b4d4e4a35f35745629af1b298e8f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 08:14:34 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 21/22] fix(bootloader): address the review on RTOP-283 Three of these stopped a merge on their own. The release build was broken: Dockerfile and Dockerfile.dev still ran bare `./install.sh`, which now dispatches to the container path, and there is no engine to install inside a build layer. Both ask for --native, and CI now checks that every caller does. Expected-stop tokens leaked. StopContainer returned nil for a container that was already stopped, and such a container emits no `die` event, so the suppression outlived the stop and was spent on the next genuine crash -- which the supervisor then read as deliberate and did not restart, leaving the PLC down while Status() said healthy. The crash-loop path always ended there, since the third death is what enters recovery. The client reports ErrNotRunning now, the fake models the daemon's 304/404, and a regression test drives three deaths, recovery, reconcile and a fourth crash. Credentials were read once at start-up. On a fresh install the runtime writes .env and restapi.db only after the bootloader has started it, so every authenticated route answered 503 until the container was restarted -- while /capabilities answered and the editor offered the version action. A provider re-stats both files per request instead. Security: - Token spaces are disjoint. Both services read the same JWT_SECRET_KEY, so signing with it directly made a 2h bootloader token a valid runtime token, eight times the runtime's TTL and revoked by neither logout. The bootloader signs with a key derived from that secret, which the runtime cannot compute, plus an audience claim as belt and braces. - Restart, update and self-update require an admin. Any runtime account, including one the runtime treats as restricted, could change the version or self-update -- and a self-update starts a container with the Docker socket bound. The role is read per request, not carried in the token. - Login is throttled. Every attempt runs a 600k-iteration PBKDF2 by design, on host network beside a PLC with real-time deadlines: a concurrency cap bounds instantaneous CPU, per-source backoff makes guessing impractical. Correctness and safety: - The Docker client built a Transport per call, leaking a socket and two goroutines each time, fastest while reading logs in recovery. Built once. - Containers were compared by image tag, so "reinstall this version" saw a match and started the old layers. Resolved IDs now. - watch() no longer reconciles during recovery or an update: it restarted a runtime recovery had stopped, and raced the updater's own reconcile. - Spec.Version went through accessors; it was written by the updater while three other goroutines read it. - Self-update creates the replacement under a temporary name and renames, so a rejected create leaves the old bootloader running instead of none. - Recreating a running container stops it gracefully first, so retained variables are flushed and the exit is not counted as a crash. - A refused update restores the state it found instead of reconciling, which re-derived state by acting: from recovery it restarted the runtime. - The disk pre-check is advisory as its comment always claimed, reported as a warning on progress rather than refusing updates on any device whose Docker data-root had moved. - The discovery port is released before the runtime starts, not on the healthy transition, and the responder sets SO_REUSEADDR/SO_REUSEPORT. - Installer rollback acts only on units THIS run displaced; it was reading the first install's record and starting a native runtime beside a healthy container, then deleting the record --uninstall needed. Testing and packaging: - tests.yml runs on pull requests. Nothing did before, so every "tests pass" was a claim about a laptop, and a bootloader change without a VERSION bump got no automated testing at all. - The integration suite refuses to run outside its disposable host and is excluded from collection. A bare `pytest` collected it, and each case wipes /var/lib/openplc-runtime and removes the runtime container. - The harness defaults to a published base image instead of a tag that existed only on one machine; REAL_BASE=build covers the Dockerfile. - Dead OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY/OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT env removed, along with the vPLC-refusal claim that had no implementation. - go.sum pinned in the bootloader image; dead crashWindow.reset() removed; shellcheck warnings fixed; DOCKER.md no longer describes CI that never existed and documents the installer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- .github/workflows/tests.yml | 112 +++++++++++++ Dockerfile | 5 +- Dockerfile.dev | 5 +- README.md | 7 + bootloader/Dockerfile | 10 +- bootloader/internal/api/authz_test.go | 122 ++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go | 2 - bootloader/internal/api/server.go | 116 +++++++++++-- bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go | 21 ++- bootloader/internal/api/throttle.go | 154 +++++++++++++++++ bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go | 19 ++- bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_linux.go | 30 ++++ bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_other.go | 9 + bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go | 48 ++++-- bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go | 23 ++- .../internal/runtimeauth/inode_linux.go | 17 ++ .../internal/runtimeauth/inode_other.go | 10 ++ bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/provider.go | 148 ++++++++++++++++ .../internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go | 82 +++++++-- bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go | 75 +++++++-- bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go | 25 +++ bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go | 45 ++++- bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go | 47 ++++-- bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go | 26 ++- .../internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go | 73 +++++++- bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go | 8 - bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go | 158 +++++++++++++++++- .../internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go | 88 ++++++++++ bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go | 76 +++++---- bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go | 68 ++++++-- bootloader/main.go | 49 ++---- docs/DOCKER.md | 71 ++++++-- install.sh | 11 +- scripts/install-docker.sh | 68 +++++++- tests/integration/conftest.py | 15 ++ tests/integration/entrypoint.sh | 5 + tests/integration/harness.sh | 34 +++- tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go | 6 +- tests/integration/test_bootloader.py | 43 +++-- 39 files changed, 1699 insertions(+), 232 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/tests.yml create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/authz_test.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/api/throttle.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_linux.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_other.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_linux.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_other.go create mode 100644 bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/provider.go create mode 100644 tests/integration/conftest.py diff --git a/.github/workflows/tests.yml b/.github/workflows/tests.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..08f58218 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/tests.yml @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +name: Tests + +# Nothing in this repository used to run on a pull request: docker.yml fires on +# tag and branch pushes, windows-installer.yml on tags. Every "tests pass" in a +# review was therefore a claim about somebody's laptop, and a bootloader change +# without a VERSION bump got no automated testing at all -- the only `go test` +# was inside bootloader/Dockerfile, which only builds when the version is new. +on: + pull_request: + push: + branches: + - development + - main + workflow_dispatch: + +# A new push supersedes an in-flight run for the same ref. +concurrency: + group: tests-${{ github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true + +jobs: + bootloader: + name: Bootloader (Go) + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-go@v5 + with: + go-version-file: bootloader/go.mod + cache-dependency-path: bootloader/go.sum + + - name: gofmt + working-directory: bootloader + run: | + unformatted="$(gofmt -l .)" + if [ -n "$unformatted" ]; then + echo "::error::gofmt would change these files:" + echo "$unformatted" + exit 1 + fi + + - name: go vet + working-directory: bootloader + run: go vet ./... + + # -race because the bugs this package is prone to are concurrency ones: + # the spec was being written by the updater while the API read it. + - name: go test -race + working-directory: bootloader + run: go test -race -count=1 ./... + + webserver: + name: Webserver (pytest) + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: '3.11' + + - name: Install test dependencies + run: | + python -m pip install --upgrade pip + # requirements-dev.txt where present, plus what the suite imports + # directly. pytest-asyncio is named explicitly because the OPC-UA + # plugin tests fail to COLLECT without it, which takes the whole run + # down rather than skipping those files. + if [ -f requirements-dev.txt ]; then pip install -r requirements-dev.txt; fi + if [ -f requirements.txt ]; then pip install -r requirements.txt; fi + pip install pytest pytest-asyncio + + - name: pytest + run: pytest tests/pytest -q + + shell: + name: Installer scripts + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + + - name: shellcheck + run: | + sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq shellcheck + shellcheck -S warning install.sh scripts/install-docker.sh \ + windows/provision-msys2.sh tests/integration/harness.sh + + # The Windows installer ships a compiled runtime inside an MSYS2 tree, so + # its callers must ask install.sh for the source build. install.sh does + # force native on MSYS2, but relying on that made a change to its + # platform detection able to break the Windows build from another file. + - name: The Windows build asks for a native install + run: | + set -euo pipefail + fail=0 + for f in .github/workflows/windows-installer.yml windows/provision-msys2.sh; do + if grep -qE '(^|[^-])\./install\.sh[[:space:]]*$' "$f"; then + echo "::error file=$f::calls ./install.sh without --native" + fail=1 + fi + done + # The image builds are the same story: there is no engine to install + # inside a build layer. + for f in Dockerfile Dockerfile.dev; do + if ! grep -q 'install\.sh --native' "$f"; then + echo "::error file=$f::must RUN ./install.sh --native" + fail=1 + fi + done + [ "$fail" -eq 0 ] || exit 1 + echo "All installer callers ask for the build they need." diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile index 12bd8cab..28bec9e5 100644 --- a/Dockerfile +++ b/Dockerfile @@ -22,7 +22,10 @@ RUN mkdir -p /var/run/runtime && \ RUN rm -rf build/ venvs/ .venv/ 2>/dev/null || true # Run installation script -RUN ./install.sh +# --native, because install.sh now defaults to installing Docker and +# compiling nothing -- and there is no engine to install inside a build +# layer. Without this the image build fails at the installer's curl check. +RUN ./install.sh --native # Clean up apt cache to reduce image size (Docker-specific optimization) RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* diff --git a/Dockerfile.dev b/Dockerfile.dev index a5620bbc..02df854d 100644 --- a/Dockerfile.dev +++ b/Dockerfile.dev @@ -12,7 +12,10 @@ RUN mkdir -p /var/run/runtime # Clean any existing build artifacts to ensure clean Docker build RUN rm -rf build/ venvs/ 2>/dev/null || true RUN chmod +x install.sh scripts/* start_openplc.sh -RUN ./install.sh +# --native, because install.sh now defaults to installing Docker and +# compiling nothing -- and there is no engine to install inside a build +# layer. Without this the dev image build fails at the installer's curl check. +RUN ./install.sh --native # Clean up apt cache to reduce image size (Docker-specific optimization) RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index d4a96ad0..5aeb6001 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ The runtime will start and listen on port 8443 for connections from the OpenPLC curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash ``` +`runtime.getedge.me` serves `scripts/install-docker.sh` verbatim. Until that +host is published, the same one-liner works against GitHub directly: + +```bash +curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/main/scripts/install-docker.sh | sudo bash +``` + No checkout, no build toolchain, no dependencies to install first. The script installs Docker if it is missing, then starts the runtime and a small bootloader beside it. The bootloader is what lets the OpenPLC Editor change diff --git a/bootloader/Dockerfile b/bootloader/Dockerfile index 8cf75551..e4ce6053 100644 --- a/bootloader/Dockerfile +++ b/bootloader/Dockerfile @@ -22,10 +22,12 @@ ARG BOOTLOADER_VERSION=dev WORKDIR /src -# go.mod first so the dependency layer survives source-only changes. There are -# no third-party dependencies today, which keeps this honest rather than -# theatrical: `go mod download` is a no-op and the layer is a cache anchor. -COPY go.mod ./ +# Manifest and checksums first, so the dependency layer survives source-only +# changes. go.sum belongs here rather than arriving later with the source: +# without it `go mod download` fetches modernc.org/sqlite (the one third-party +# dependency, for reading the runtime's user database) unverified, and the +# pinning only happens by accident when COPY . . brings the real go.sum in. +COPY go.mod go.sum ./ RUN go mod download COPY . . diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/authz_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/authz_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..edb25d89 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/authz_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +package api + +import ( + "net" + "net/http" + "strconv" + "testing" + + "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" +) + +// The routes that can change what this device runs are admin-only. +// +// The runtime treats `user` as a restricted role, but the bootloader checked +// only the signature: any runtime account could change the runtime version or +// self-update the bootloader -- and a self-update starts a container with the +// Docker socket bound, which is host root. +func TestARestrictedAccountCannotChangeWhatTheDeviceRuns(t *testing.T) { + cases := []struct { + name, method, path, body string + }{ + {"restart", http.MethodPost, "/api/bootloader/restart", "{}"}, + {"update", http.MethodPost, "/api/bootloader/update", `{"version":"v4.2.1"}`}, + {"self-update", http.MethodPost, "/api/bootloader/self-update", `{"version":"bootloader-v1.0.1"}`}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, role: "user"} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, body := postJSON(t, srv, tc.path, validToken(t), tc.body) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("a `user` account got HTTP %d on %s, want 403", resp.StatusCode, tc.path) + } + if body["error"] == "" { + t.Error("no explanation was returned") + } + }) + } +} + +func TestAnAdminCanStillChangeWhatTheDeviceRuns(t *testing.T) { + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, role: RoleAdmin} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/restart", validToken(t), "{}") + if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatal("an admin was refused") + } +} + +// A token outliving its account must not keep its privileges. +func TestATokenWhoseAccountIsGoneIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, roleErr: runtimeauth.ErrNoSuchUser} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/update", validToken(t), `{"version":"v4.2.1"}`) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Fatalf("got HTTP %d, want 403 when the role cannot be confirmed", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// Reads stay open to any account: seeing why a device is unhealthy is not a +// privileged act, and locking it down would make a broken device harder to +// diagnose for no security gain. +func TestARestrictedAccountCanStillReadStatus(t *testing.T) { + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, role: "user"} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + resp, _ := get(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/status", validToken(t)) + if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { + t.Fatalf("a `user` account got HTTP %d reading status, want 200", resp.StatusCode) + } +} + +// --- login throttling ---------------------------------------------------- + +func TestRepeatedFailuresFromOneSourceAreBackedOff(t *testing.T) { + // The endpoint runs a 600k-iteration PBKDF2 per attempt, by design, on a + // host-network service beside a PLC with real-time deadlines. Unbounded, + // that is both a brute-force path and a cheap denial of service. + users := &fakeUsers{count: 1, authErr: runtimeauth.ErrNoSuchUser} + srv := newTestServer(t, users, healthySupervisor(), &fakeLogs{}) + + var last int + for attempt := 0; attempt < failuresBeforeBackoff+1; attempt++ { + resp, _ := postJSON(t, srv, "/api/bootloader/login", "", + `{"username":"op","password":"wrong"}`) + last = resp.StatusCode + } + if last != http.StatusTooManyRequests { + t.Fatalf("after %d failures the source still got HTTP %d, want 429", + failuresBeforeBackoff+1, last) + } +} + +func TestASuccessfulLoginClearsTheBackoff(t *testing.T) { + throttle := newLoginThrottle() + for attempt := 0; attempt < failuresBeforeBackoff-1; attempt++ { + throttle.recordFailure("10.0.0.1") + } + throttle.recordSuccess("10.0.0.1") + throttle.recordFailure("10.0.0.1") + + if wait := throttle.blockedFor("10.0.0.1"); wait > 0 { + t.Errorf("a source that proved it knows a password is still backed off for %s", wait) + } +} + +func TestTheSourceMapCannotGrowWithoutBound(t *testing.T) { + // The tracking must not become the memory exhaustion it prevents. + throttle := newLoginThrottle() + for i := 0; i < maxTrackedSources*2; i++ { + throttle.recordFailure(net.JoinHostPort("10.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(i))) + } + throttle.mu.Lock() + size := len(throttle.sources) + throttle.mu.Unlock() + if size > maxTrackedSources { + t.Errorf("tracking %d sources, cap is %d", size, maxTrackedSources) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go index e12c9b4c..2aebcfec 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/deviceinfo_test.go @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import ( "testing" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" - "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth" ) type fakeHost struct { @@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ func newTestServerWithHost(t *testing.T, host HostReporter) *httptest.Server { srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, - Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, Users: &fakeUsers{count: 1}, Supervisor: healthySupervisor(), Host: host, diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go index 325199fe..030636c8 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server.go @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import ( "net/http" "strconv" "strings" + "sync" "time" "github.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/bootloader/internal/dockerapi" @@ -82,10 +83,18 @@ type HostReporter interface { SystemInfo(ctx context.Context) (*dockerapi.Info, error) } -// Authenticator resolves credentials against the runtime's account set. +// Authenticator resolves credentials against the runtime's account set, and +// serves the signing secret behind the tokens it issues. +// +// Secrets() is read per request rather than snapshotted at start-up: on a +// fresh install the runtime writes .env and restapi.db AFTER the bootloader is +// already running, and a snapshot taken before that left every authenticated +// route answering 503 until the container was restarted. type Authenticator interface { Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string) (*runtimeauth.User, error) CountUsers(ctx context.Context) (int, error) + Secrets() *runtimeauth.Secrets + RoleByID(ctx context.Context, userID string) (string, error) } // Config wires the server. @@ -97,7 +106,6 @@ type Config struct { // RuntimeVersion is the image tag the bootloader intends to run, which is // not necessarily what is running right now (mid-update, or in recovery). RuntimeVersion func() string - Secrets *runtimeauth.Secrets Users Authenticator Supervisor Supervisor Host HostReporter @@ -111,6 +119,18 @@ type Config struct { type Server struct { cfg Config http *http.Server + + // Created on first use rather than in New, so a Server built any other + // way (the tests build literals) still has it. A nil-safe throttle was + // the alternative and a worse one: it would leave the rate limit silently + // absent instead of simply present. + throttleOnce sync.Once + throttleImpl *loginThrottle +} + +func (s *Server) loginLimiter() *loginThrottle { + s.throttleOnce.Do(func() { s.throttleImpl = newLoginThrottle() }) + return s.throttleImpl } // New builds the server, generating a TLS certificate on first use. @@ -159,10 +179,10 @@ func (s *Server) routes(mux *http.ServeMux) { mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/status", s.authenticated(s.handleStatus)) mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/device-info", s.authenticated(s.handleDeviceInfo)) mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/logs", s.authenticated(s.handleLogs)) - mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/restart", s.authenticated(s.handleRestart)) - mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdate)) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/restart", s.adminOnly(s.handleRestart)) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/update", s.adminOnly(s.handleUpdate)) mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/bootloader/update", s.authenticated(s.handleUpdateProgress)) - mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/self-update", s.authenticated(s.handleSelfUpdate)) + mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/bootloader/self-update", s.adminOnly(s.handleSelfUpdate)) } // ListenAndServe blocks until ctx is cancelled or the listener fails. @@ -223,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Server) authenticated(next func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)) ht writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "a bearer token is required") return } - claims, err := runtimeauth.VerifyToken(s.cfg.Secrets.JWTSecret, token) + claims, err := runtimeauth.VerifyToken(s.cfg.Users.Secrets().JWTSecret, token) if err != nil { if errors.Is(err, runtimeauth.ErrTokenExpired) { writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token expired; log in again") @@ -234,10 +254,62 @@ func (s *Server) authenticated(next func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)) ht } s.cfg.Log.Debug("authenticated request", "path", r.URL.Path, "subject", claims.Subject) - next(w, r) + next(w, r.WithContext(withSubject(r.Context(), claims.Subject))) } } +// subjectKey carries the authenticated user id to the admin check below. +type subjectKey struct{} + +func withSubject(ctx context.Context, subject string) context.Context { + return context.WithValue(ctx, subjectKey{}, subject) +} + +func subjectFrom(ctx context.Context) string { + subject, _ := ctx.Value(subjectKey{}).(string) + return subject +} + +// RoleAdmin is the role the runtime gives an account that may change the +// device. Matched against the runtime's own value (webserver/restapi.py). +const RoleAdmin = "admin" + +// adminOnly restricts a route to administrators. +// +// Applied to the routes that can change what this device runs. Without it any +// runtime account -- including one the runtime itself treats as restricted -- +// could change the runtime version or self-update the bootloader, and a +// self-update starts a container with the Docker socket bound, which is host +// root. The runtime distinguishes these roles; the component that can replace +// the runtime must not be the one that ignores the distinction. +// +// The role is read from the database per request. The token carries none, and +// a role claim would mean a demotion did not take effect until the token +// expired. +func (s *Server) adminOnly(next func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request)) http.HandlerFunc { + return s.authenticated(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + subject := subjectFrom(r.Context()) + role, err := s.cfg.Users.RoleByID(r.Context(), subject) + if err != nil { + // Includes the account having been deleted while its token was + // still valid. Refuse rather than guess. + s.cfg.Log.Warn("could not read the role for an authenticated request", + "subject", subject, "path", r.URL.Path, "error", err) + writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, + "this account's role could not be confirmed; log in again") + return + } + if role != RoleAdmin { + s.cfg.Log.Warn("refused a non-admin request", + "subject", subject, "role", role, "path", r.URL.Path) + writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, + "this action requires an administrator account") + return + } + next(w, r) + }) +} + func bearerToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) { header := r.Header.Get("Authorization") // Case-insensitive scheme: RFC 7235 says the scheme is case-insensitive @@ -324,6 +396,16 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } + source := requestSource(r) + if wait := s.loginLimiter().blockedFor(source); wait > 0 { + s.cfg.Log.Warn("refused a login from a backed-off source", + "source", source, "retry_after", wait.Round(time.Second)) + w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(int(wait.Round(time.Second).Seconds()))) + writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, + "too many failed attempts from this address; try again shortly") + return + } + count, err := s.cfg.Users.CountUsers(r.Context()) if err != nil { s.cfg.Log.Error("counting users", "error", err) @@ -337,7 +419,19 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { return } - user, err := s.cfg.Users.Authenticate(r.Context(), body.Username, body.Password, s.cfg.Secrets.Pepper) + // The PBKDF2 verification below is the expensive part, so the slot is + // taken around it and nothing else. Refusing rather than queueing: a + // queue would let an attacker hold connections open and still consume the + // CPU eventually. + if !s.loginLimiter().acquire() { + s.cfg.Log.Warn("refused a login: too many verifications in flight", "source", source) + w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1") + writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, + "the bootloader is busy verifying another sign-in; try again shortly") + return + } + user, err := s.cfg.Users.Authenticate(r.Context(), body.Username, body.Password, s.cfg.Users.Secrets().Pepper) + s.loginLimiter().release() if err != nil { if errors.Is(err, runtimeauth.ErrUnsupportedHash) { // A deployment problem, not a wrong password. Saying so is what @@ -350,12 +444,14 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { } // Unknown user and wrong password answer identically; distinguishing // them enumerates valid accounts. - s.cfg.Log.Warn("failed login", "username", body.Username) + s.loginLimiter().recordFailure(source) + s.cfg.Log.Warn("failed login", "username", body.Username, "source", source) writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "wrong username or password") return } + s.loginLimiter().recordSuccess(source) - token, err := runtimeauth.IssueToken(s.cfg.Secrets.JWTSecret, user.ID, runtimeauth.DefaultTokenTTL) + token, err := runtimeauth.IssueToken(s.cfg.Users.Secrets().JWTSecret, user.ID, runtimeauth.DefaultTokenTTL) if err != nil { s.cfg.Log.Error("issuing token", "error", err) writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not issue a token") diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go index 5d1086d4..8ef12de2 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/server_test.go @@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ type fakeUsers struct { countErr error user *runtimeauth.User authErr error + // role answers RoleByID. Defaults to admin so the existing cases, which + // are about routing and auth rather than authorization, keep passing. + role string + roleErr error } func (f *fakeUsers) CountUsers(context.Context) (int, error) { return f.count, f.countErr } @@ -67,6 +71,20 @@ func (f *fakeUsers) Authenticate(context.Context, string, string, string) (*runt return f.user, nil } +func (f *fakeUsers) Secrets() *runtimeauth.Secrets { + return &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper} +} + +func (f *fakeUsers) RoleByID(context.Context, string) (string, error) { + if f.roleErr != nil { + return "", f.roleErr + } + if f.role == "" { + return RoleAdmin, nil + } + return f.role, nil +} + // newTestServer builds a server with an httptest mux, bypassing TLS: the // certificate path is covered separately, and routing plus auth is what these // tests are about. @@ -75,7 +93,6 @@ func newTestServer(t *testing.T, users *fakeUsers, sup *fakeSupervisor, logs *fa srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, - Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, Users: users, Supervisor: sup, Logs: logs, @@ -475,7 +492,6 @@ func newTestServerWithUpdater(t *testing.T, up Updater) *httptest.Server { srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, - Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, Users: &fakeUsers{count: 1}, Supervisor: healthySupervisor(), Logs: &fakeLogs{}, @@ -608,7 +624,6 @@ func newTestServerWithSelfUpdater(t *testing.T, self SelfUpdater) *httptest.Serv srv := &Server{cfg: Config{ Version: "bootloader-v1.0.0-test", RuntimeVersion: func() string { return "v4.2.1" }, - Secrets: &runtimeauth.Secrets{JWTSecret: testSecret, Pepper: testPepper}, Users: &fakeUsers{count: 1}, Supervisor: healthySupervisor(), Logs: &fakeLogs{}, diff --git a/bootloader/internal/api/throttle.go b/bootloader/internal/api/throttle.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97560f3a --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/api/throttle.go @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +package api + +import ( + "net" + "net/http" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Login throttling. +// +// Every attempt, including one for a username that does not exist, runs a full +// 600k-iteration PBKDF2 -- deliberately, so response timing does not enumerate +// accounts. That makes the endpoint expensive by design, and this component +// runs on the host network with no CPU limit, beside a PLC whose real-time +// headroom must not be eaten. A loop of login POSTs from any host on the LAN +// was therefore both a brute-force path to Docker-socket access and a cheap +// denial of service against the scan cycle. +// +// Two independent limits, because they address different things: a global +// concurrency cap bounds the CPU an attacker can command at any instant, and +// per-source backoff makes sustained guessing impractical. Neither replaces +// the other -- one attacker with two connections defeats a cap alone, and a +// distributed source set defeats backoff alone. +const ( + // maxConcurrentVerifications is small on purpose. Two verifications in + // flight is more than a legitimate operator ever needs, and it leaves the + // remaining cores to the runtime. + maxConcurrentVerifications = 2 + // failuresBeforeBackoff allows the ordinary mistyped password without + // friction. + failuresBeforeBackoff = 5 + // backoffWindow is how long failures are remembered. + backoffWindow = 15 * time.Minute + // backoffDuration is how long a source is refused once it crosses the + // threshold. + backoffDuration = 1 * time.Minute + // maxTrackedSources bounds the map so the tracking cannot itself become + // the memory exhaustion it exists to prevent. + maxTrackedSources = 1024 +) + +type sourceRecord struct { + failures int + first time.Time + blocked time.Time +} + +// loginThrottle bounds concurrent password verifications and backs off a +// source that keeps failing. +type loginThrottle struct { + slots chan struct{} + + mu sync.Mutex + sources map[string]*sourceRecord + now func() time.Time +} + +func newLoginThrottle() *loginThrottle { + return &loginThrottle{ + slots: make(chan struct{}, maxConcurrentVerifications), + sources: make(map[string]*sourceRecord), + now: time.Now, + } +} + +// blockedFor reports how long the source must wait, zero when it may proceed. +func (t *loginThrottle) blockedFor(source string) time.Duration { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + record, ok := t.sources[source] + if !ok { + return 0 + } + now := t.now() + if record.blocked.After(now) { + return record.blocked.Sub(now) + } + // The window has passed with no further failures: forget the source so a + // mistyped password months ago costs nothing. + if now.Sub(record.first) > backoffWindow { + delete(t.sources, source) + } + return 0 +} + +// acquire takes a verification slot, reporting false when none is free. +func (t *loginThrottle) acquire() bool { + select { + case t.slots <- struct{}{}: + return true + default: + return false + } +} + +func (t *loginThrottle) release() { + select { + case <-t.slots: + default: + } +} + +// recordFailure counts a rejected attempt and starts a backoff at the +// threshold. +func (t *loginThrottle) recordFailure(source string) { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + now := t.now() + + record, ok := t.sources[source] + if !ok { + // Evict wholesale rather than tracking an unbounded set. A flood from + // many addresses is handled by the concurrency cap; this map only has + // to make repeated guessing from one place expensive. + if len(t.sources) >= maxTrackedSources { + t.sources = make(map[string]*sourceRecord) + } + t.sources[source] = &sourceRecord{failures: 1, first: now} + return + } + if now.Sub(record.first) > backoffWindow { + record.failures = 0 + record.first = now + } + record.failures++ + if record.failures >= failuresBeforeBackoff { + record.blocked = now.Add(backoffDuration) + record.failures = 0 + record.first = now + } +} + +// recordSuccess clears the history for a source that proved it knows a +// password. +func (t *loginThrottle) recordSuccess(source string) { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + delete(t.sources, source) +} + +// requestSource identifies the caller for backoff purposes. +// +// The remote address only. There is no proxy in front of this: it is reached +// directly on the LAN, or through the orchestrator agent on the same host, so +// an X-Forwarded-For here would be attacker-controlled and trusting it would +// hand out a way to reset someone else's backoff. +func requestSource(r *http.Request) string { + host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) + if err != nil { + return r.RemoteAddr + } + return host +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go b/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go index 4a4d2379..0f1f84fd 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/discovery/responder.go @@ -18,11 +18,13 @@ package discovery import ( + "context" "encoding/json" "errors" "log/slog" "net" "os" + "strconv" "sync" "time" ) @@ -116,7 +118,22 @@ func (r *Responder) Enable() { r.mu.Unlock() return } - conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", &net.UDPAddr{Port: r.port}) + var conn *net.UDPConn + // SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT, matching how the runtime binds the same + // port. Linux shares a UDP port only when EVERY socket asked to, so + // without these a lingering bootloader socket makes the runtime's own bind + // fail -- and the runtime does not retry. The release now happens before + // the runtime starts; this is the safety net for a race in between. + listener := net.ListenConfig{Control: reusePort} + generic, err := listener.ListenPacket( + context.Background(), "udp", ":"+strconv.Itoa(r.port)) + if err == nil { + var ok bool + if conn, ok = generic.(*net.UDPConn); !ok { + generic.Close() + err = errors.New("discovery: listener is not a UDP socket") + } + } if err != nil { r.mu.Unlock() r.log.Warn("discovery responder could not bind; the device will not "+ diff --git a/bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_linux.go b/bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45f03fa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +//go:build linux + +package discovery + +import ( + "syscall" + + "golang.org/x/sys/unix" +) + +// reusePort sets SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT on the listening socket. +// +// The runtime sets both when it binds the discovery port. Linux shares a UDP +// port only when every socket involved asked to, so the bootloader has to ask +// too -- otherwise its lingering socket makes the runtime's bind fail, and the +// runtime binds once at start-up and never retries. +func reusePort(_, _ string, c syscall.RawConn) error { + var setErr error + err := c.Control(func(fd uintptr) { + if setErr = unix.SetsockoptInt( + int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_REUSEADDR, 1); setErr != nil { + return + } + setErr = unix.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_REUSEPORT, 1) + }) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return setErr +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_other.go b/bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_other.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ac1971f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/discovery/reuse_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +//go:build !linux + +package discovery + +import "syscall" + +// reusePort is a no-op off Linux. The bootloader only ships for Linux; this +// exists so the package builds for a developer running `go test` on a laptop. +func reusePort(_, _ string, _ syscall.RawConn) error { return nil } diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go index fc04b8b9..ae0d1f81 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/client.go @@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ const apiVersion = "v1.41" // Client talks to the Docker daemon. Safe for concurrent use: the embedded // http.Client is, and nothing else here holds mutable state. type Client struct { - http *http.Client - socket string + http *http.Client + // streamHTTP has no request timeout, for long-lived response bodies. + streamHTTP *http.Client + socket string } // New returns a client bound to socket. A zero-value socket means @@ -58,22 +60,42 @@ func New(socket string) *Client { } return &Client{ http: &http.Client{ - Transport: &http.Transport{DialContext: dial}, - Timeout: 30 * time.Second, + Transport: &http.Transport{ + DialContext: dial, + IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second, + MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 4, + }, + Timeout: 30 * time.Second, }, - socket: socket, + streamHTTP: newStreamClient(socket), + socket: socket, } } -// streamClient is New's client without the request timeout, for long-lived -// response bodies. It shares nothing with the unary client but the socket -// path. -func (c *Client) streamClient() *http.Client { +// newStreamClient builds the timeout-free client used for long-lived response +// bodies. Called ONCE, from New. +// +// It used to be built per call, from stream() and doLongRunning(). Each +// throwaway Transport kept its own idle connection pool with no +// IdleConnTimeout, and a drained-and-closed body returns its connection to +// that pool -- where the read and write goroutines pin it forever. Every +// StopContainer, PullImage and ContainerLogs therefore leaked a unix socket +// and two goroutines, fastest while an operator reads logs in recovery, which +// is the state this component exists for. It ends in EMFILE. +// +// An http.Client is safe for concurrent use, so one is all that is needed. +func newStreamClient(socket string) *http.Client { dial := func(ctx context.Context, _, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { var d net.Dialer - return d.DialContext(ctx, "unix", c.socket) + return d.DialContext(ctx, "unix", socket) } - return &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{DialContext: dial}} + return &http.Client{Transport: &http.Transport{ + DialContext: dial, + // Bound the pool anyway: a socket that goes quiet should not be held + // open indefinitely just because the pool has room for it. + IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second, + MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 2, + }} } // APIError is a non-2xx response from the daemon. The daemon's own message is @@ -146,7 +168,7 @@ func (c *Client) stream(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body any) (io. if err != nil { return nil, err } - resp, err := c.streamClient().Do(req) + resp, err := c.streamHTTP.Do(req) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("docker %s: %w", path, err) } @@ -207,7 +229,7 @@ func (c *Client) doLongRunning(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body an if err != nil { return err } - resp, err := c.streamClient().Do(req) + resp, err := c.streamHTTP.Do(req) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("docker %s: %w", path, err) } diff --git a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go index 804c4fc2..097e2821 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/dockerapi/containers.go @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package dockerapi import ( "context" + "errors" "net/http" "net/url" "strconv" @@ -129,11 +130,19 @@ func (c *Client) StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Dura err := c.doLongRunning(stopCtx, http.MethodPost, path, nil) if err != nil && (IsNotFound(err) || hasStatus(err, http.StatusNotModified)) { - return nil + // Nothing was running, so nothing will exit. Reported rather than + // swallowed: a caller that suppresses crash accounting for the exit it + // is about to cause must know when that exit is never coming, or the + // suppression outlives the stop and eats the next real crash. + return ErrNotRunning } return err } +// ErrNotRunning means the container was already stopped or absent, so this +// stop was a no-op and no `die` event will follow it. +var ErrNotRunning = errors.New("container was not running") + // stopTimeoutMargin is the slack on top of the grace period, covering the // daemon's own teardown after the container has exited. const stopTimeoutMargin = 30 * time.Second @@ -168,3 +177,15 @@ func (c *Client) ContainerLogs(ctx context.Context, name string, tail int) (stri defer body.Close() return readMultiplexed(body, 512*1024) } + +// RenameContainer gives an existing container a new name. +// +// Used by the self-update so a replacement can be created under a temporary +// name and only then take over the real one -- which means a failed create +// leaves the old container untouched instead of removing it first and hoping. +func (c *Client) RenameContainer(ctx context.Context, name, newName string) error { + params := url.Values{} + params.Set("name", newName) + path := "/containers/" + url.PathEscape(name) + "/rename" + encodeQuery(params) + return c.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, nil, nil) +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_linux.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0a7fd2a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +//go:build linux + +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "os" + "syscall" +) + +// inodeOf reports the file's inode, so a replaced file is noticed even when +// its size and timestamp happen to match. +func inodeOf(info os.FileInfo) uint64 { + if sys, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t); ok { + return sys.Ino + } + return 0 +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_other.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_other.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5b15c07d --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/inode_other.go @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +//go:build !linux + +package runtimeauth + +import "os" + +// inodeOf has no portable answer off Linux; size and mtime carry the +// comparison there. The bootloader only ships for Linux -- this exists so the +// package still builds for a developer running `go test` on a laptop. +func inodeOf(os.FileInfo) uint64 { return 0 } diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/provider.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/provider.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9881f2b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/provider.go @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +package runtimeauth + +import ( + "context" + "log/slog" + "os" + "path/filepath" + "sync" +) + +// Provider serves the runtime's credentials, reloading them when they change. +// +// Loading once at start-up was wrong in the case that matters most: on a fresh +// install the bootloader starts BEFORE the runtime has ever run, so neither +// `.env` nor `restapi.db` exists yet. Every authenticated route then answered +// 503 until someone restarted the bootloader container -- while +// /capabilities answered happily, so the editor offered "Change runtime +// version" and the login behind it failed. The same staleness applies whenever +// the runtime regenerates its secrets. +// +// So the files are re-examined on use. A stat of each per request is cheap +// next to the PBKDF2 verification it precedes, and it means the bootloader +// becomes usable the moment the runtime has written them, with no restart. +type Provider struct { + dataDir string + log *slog.Logger + + mu sync.Mutex + secrets *Secrets + users *UserStore + // Fingerprints of the files behind the cache above, so a reload happens + // when they are replaced and not on every call. + secretsAt fileStamp + usersAt fileStamp +} + +// fileStamp is what "the file changed" means here: a different size, +// modification time or inode. Cheap to take and enough to catch a rewrite, +// including one that preserves the length. +type fileStamp struct { + present bool + size int64 + modUnix int64 + inode uint64 +} + +func stamp(path string) fileStamp { + info, err := os.Stat(path) + if err != nil { + return fileStamp{} + } + return fileStamp{ + present: true, + size: info.Size(), + modUnix: info.ModTime().UnixNano(), + inode: inodeOf(info), + } +} + +// NewProvider returns a Provider for the runtime's data directory. It reads +// nothing yet: a device whose runtime has never started has nothing to read, +// and refusing to boot would leave nothing listening on the device that most +// needs a way in. +func NewProvider(dataDir string, log *slog.Logger) *Provider { + return &Provider{dataDir: dataDir, log: log, secrets: &Secrets{}} +} + +func (p *Provider) envPath() string { return filepath.Join(p.dataDir, ".env") } +func (p *Provider) dbPath() string { return filepath.Join(p.dataDir, "restapi.db") } + +// refresh reloads whatever has appeared or changed since the last look. +// Called with p.mu held. +func (p *Provider) refresh() { + if current := stamp(p.envPath()); current != p.secretsAt { + p.secretsAt = current + if secrets, err := LoadSecrets(p.envPath()); err != nil { + // Not an error worth shouting about on a fresh device: the runtime + // has simply not written it yet, and the next request looks again. + p.secrets = &Secrets{} + p.log.Debug("runtime secrets unavailable", "error", err) + } else { + p.secrets = secrets + p.log.Info("loaded the runtime's secrets", "path", p.envPath()) + } + } + + if current := stamp(p.dbPath()); current != p.usersAt { + p.usersAt = current + if p.users != nil { + p.users.Close() + p.users = nil + } + if users, err := OpenUserStore(p.dbPath()); err != nil { + p.log.Debug("runtime account database unavailable", "error", err) + } else { + p.users = users + p.log.Info("opened the runtime's account database", "path", p.dbPath()) + } + } +} + +// Secrets returns the runtime's signing secret and pepper, reloading first. +// Never nil: an empty Secrets makes token verification fail closed. +func (p *Provider) Secrets() *Secrets { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + p.refresh() + return p.secrets +} + +// Authenticate resolves credentials against the runtime's account set. +func (p *Provider) Authenticate( + ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper string, +) (*User, error) { + p.mu.Lock() + p.refresh() + users := p.users + p.mu.Unlock() + return users.Authenticate(ctx, username, password, pepper) +} + +// CountUsers reports how many accounts the runtime has. +func (p *Provider) CountUsers(ctx context.Context) (int, error) { + p.mu.Lock() + p.refresh() + users := p.users + p.mu.Unlock() + return users.CountUsers(ctx) +} + +// RoleByID reports the role of the account a token was issued for. +func (p *Provider) RoleByID(ctx context.Context, userID string) (string, error) { + p.mu.Lock() + p.refresh() + users := p.users + p.mu.Unlock() + return users.RoleByID(ctx, userID) +} + +// Close releases the database handle. +func (p *Provider) Close() { + p.mu.Lock() + defer p.mu.Unlock() + if p.users != nil { + p.users.Close() + p.users = nil + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go index 8a713f86..270e268f 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/runtimeauth_test.go @@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ package runtimeauth import ( "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" "database/sql" + "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" "errors" "os" @@ -98,19 +101,77 @@ func TestAnAbsurdIterationCountIsRefused(t *testing.T) { // --- tokens -------------------------------------------------------------- -func TestARealFlaskTokenSignatureVerifies(t *testing.T) { - // The cross-language check: our HMAC over the signing input must equal the - // signature PyJWT produced, which proves the base64url variant and the - // "header.payload" framing agree. Asserted directly rather than through - // VerifyToken because the vector's exp is a fixed timestamp -- routing it - // through the time checks would make this test pass or fail depending on - // how long ago the vector was generated. +func TestOurHMACAgreesWithPyJWTOnTheWireFormat(t *testing.T) { + // The cross-language check, kept because it is what proves the base64url + // variant and the "header.payload" framing agree with flask_jwt_extended. + // It signs with the RUNTIME's secret directly, which is what PyJWT did -- + // this is a statement about the encoding, not about which tokens we accept. parts := strings.Split(vectorToken, ".") if len(parts) != 3 { t.Fatalf("vector token is malformed: %d segments", len(parts)) } - if got := sign(vectorSecret, parts[0]+"."+parts[1]); got != parts[2] { - t.Fatalf("signature mismatch with PyJWT:\n want %s\n got %s", parts[2], got) + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(vectorSecret)) + mac.Write([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1])) + got := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + if got != parts[2] { + t.Fatalf("encoding disagrees with PyJWT:\n want %s\n got %s", parts[2], got) + } +} + +func TestARuntimeTokenIsNotAcceptedByTheBootloader(t *testing.T) { + // The two services share a credential database, NOT a session. They + // previously shared JWT_SECRET_KEY directly, which made a 2-hour + // bootloader token a valid runtime token -- eight times the runtime's own + // TTL, and revoked by neither side's logout. The bootloader now signs with + // a key derived from that secret, so a real runtime token fails here on + // the signature. + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, vectorToken); err == nil { + t.Fatal("a runtime-issued token was accepted by the bootloader") + } +} + +func TestABootloaderTokenIsNotValidForTheRuntime(t *testing.T) { + // The other direction, checked the way the runtime would: flask_jwt_extended + // verifies HS256 with JWT_SECRET_KEY itself. + token, err := IssueToken(vectorSecret, "7", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing: %v", err) + } + parts := strings.Split(token, ".") + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(vectorSecret)) + mac.Write([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1])) + asRuntimeWouldSign := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) + if asRuntimeWouldSign == parts[2] { + t.Fatal("a bootloader token carries a signature the runtime would accept") + } +} + +func TestABootloaderTokenNamesThisServiceAsItsAudience(t *testing.T) { + // Belt and braces on top of the derived key: legible in a decoded token, + // and it would catch a future change that reunified the signing keys. + token, err := IssueToken(vectorSecret, "7", time.Hour) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("issuing: %v", err) + } + claims, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, token) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("verifying our own token: %v", err) + } + if claims.Audience != Audience { + t.Errorf("aud = %q, want %q", claims.Audience, Audience) + } +} + +func TestATokenWithoutOurAudienceIsRefused(t *testing.T) { + // Correctly signed but minted for something else, e.g. a bootloader from + // before the audience existed. Refused, so it cannot be replayed here. + noAudience := signedToken(t, vectorSecret, Claims{ + Subject: "7", Type: TokenType, + IssuedAt: time.Now().Unix(), NotBefore: time.Now().Unix(), + Expires: time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), JTI: "test", + }) + if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, noAudience); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { + t.Fatalf("want ErrInvalidToken for a token with no audience, got %v", err) } } @@ -159,6 +220,7 @@ func TestAnExpiredTokenIsReportedAsExpiredNotInvalid(t *testing.T) { expired := signedToken(t, vectorSecret, Claims{ Subject: "7", Type: TokenType, IssuedAt: past, NotBefore: past, Expires: past + 60, JTI: "test", + Audience: Audience, }) if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, expired); !errors.Is(err, ErrTokenExpired) { t.Fatalf("want ErrTokenExpired, got %v", err) @@ -169,7 +231,7 @@ func TestATokenFromTheFutureIsRejected(t *testing.T) { future := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour).Unix() notYet := signedToken(t, vectorSecret, Claims{ Subject: "7", Type: TokenType, - IssuedAt: future, NotBefore: future, Expires: future + 3600, JTI: "test", + IssuedAt: future, NotBefore: future, Expires: future + 3600, JTI: "test", Audience: Audience, }) if _, err := VerifyToken(vectorSecret, notYet); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidToken) { t.Fatalf("want ErrInvalidToken for a not-yet-valid token, got %v", err) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go index 80d548a5..e20ab56d 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/token.go @@ -14,24 +14,35 @@ import ( "time" ) -// Tokens are HS256 JWTs in the same shape as the runtime's. +// Tokens are HS256 JWTs in the same shape as the runtime's, but they are NOT +// the runtime's tokens and neither service will accept the other's. // -// The bootloader issues and verifies its OWN tokens. What the two services -// share is the credential database, not a session: the editor keeps the -// user's credentials after login and logs in to the bootloader separately -// when it needs to. Tokens are deliberately NOT treated as interchangeable, -// because that would couple the two services' session handling for no gain -- -// and it cannot be relied on anyway, since the two may hold different -// JWT_SECRET_KEY values depending on which .env each resolved. +// What the two share is the credential database, not a session: the editor +// keeps the user's credentials after login and signs in to the bootloader +// separately when it needs to. // -// The claim set still mirrors flask_jwt_extended's -- "sub", "type", "iat", -// "nbf", "exp", "jti" -- so the two are recognisable to the same tooling and -// so VerifyToken can read a runtime-issued token when one is presented. A -// hand-rolled implementation rather than a JWT library because HS256 is an -// HMAC over two base64url segments, and the library-shaped risk here -// (accepting "alg": "none", or letting the token choose its own algorithm) is -// precisely what an explicit implementation avoids: the algorithm below is a -// constant, never read from the header. +// Separation is enforced by the signing key, not by a claim. Both services +// read the same JWT_SECRET_KEY from the same .env, so signing with it +// directly made the two token spaces identical: a 2-hour bootloader token was +// a valid runtime token, eight times the runtime's own 15-minute TTL, and the +// runtime's /logout revoked neither. The bootloader therefore signs with a key +// DERIVED from that secret (see bootloaderKey), which the runtime does not +// know how to compute. A runtime token fails the signature check here, and a +// bootloader token fails it there -- with no change required in the runtime, +// and no reliance on a verifier bothering to check an audience claim. +// +// The `aud` claim below is belt and braces: it makes the intent legible in a +// decoded token and would catch a future signing change that reunified the +// keys by accident. +// +// The rest of the claim set still mirrors flask_jwt_extended's -- "sub", +// "type", "iat", "nbf", "exp", "jti" -- so the two are recognisable to the +// same tooling. A hand-rolled implementation rather than a JWT library +// because HS256 is an HMAC over two base64url segments, and the +// library-shaped risk here (accepting "alg": "none", or letting the token +// choose its own algorithm) is precisely what an explicit implementation +// avoids: the algorithm below is a constant, never read from the header. + const ( // TokenType is flask_jwt_extended's discriminator. A refresh token // presented as an access token must not be accepted. @@ -45,8 +56,26 @@ const ( // clockSkew tolerates a small disagreement between the editor's clock and // the device's, which on an industrial box without NTP is routine. clockSkew = 60 * time.Second + // Audience names the only service that may accept these tokens. + Audience = "openplc-bootloader" + // keyDomain separates the bootloader's signing key from the runtime's. + // Versioned so a future change of scheme can be told apart from this one. + keyDomain = "openplc-bootloader/token/v1" ) +// bootloaderKey derives the bootloader's signing key from the runtime's +// secret. +// +// HMAC with a fixed domain string: a one-way function of the shared secret +// that the runtime never computes, so neither service can verify the other's +// tokens. Anyone who can read .env can derive it, which is the point -- this +// separates two token spaces on one device, it is not a secret from the host. +func bootloaderKey(secret string) []byte { + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret)) + mac.Write([]byte(keyDomain)) + return mac.Sum(nil) +} + var ( // ErrInvalidToken covers every rejection reason. The cause is logged but // never returned to the caller: telling an unauthenticated client whether @@ -66,6 +95,7 @@ type Claims struct { NotBefore int64 `json:"nbf"` Expires int64 `json:"exp"` JTI string `json:"jti"` + Audience string `json:"aud,omitempty"` } type jwtHeader struct { @@ -99,6 +129,7 @@ func IssueToken(secret, userID string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) { NotBefore: now.Unix(), Expires: now.Add(ttl).Unix(), JTI: jti, + Audience: Audience, } header, err := json.Marshal(jwtHeader{Alg: "HS256", Typ: "JWT"}) @@ -147,6 +178,13 @@ func VerifyToken(secret, token string) (*Claims, error) { if claims.Type != TokenType { return nil, ErrInvalidToken } + // A token minted for anything but this service is refused even if it + // somehow verified. The derived signing key already makes a runtime token + // fail above; this catches the case where a future change reunifies the + // keys without anyone noticing. + if claims.Audience != Audience { + return nil, ErrInvalidToken + } if claims.Subject == "" { return nil, ErrInvalidToken } @@ -161,8 +199,11 @@ func VerifyToken(secret, token string) (*Claims, error) { return &claims, nil } +// sign computes the signature with the DERIVED key, never the runtime's +// secret itself. That single substitution is what keeps the two token spaces +// apart in both directions. func sign(secret, signingInput string) string { - mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret)) + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, bootloaderKey(secret)) mac.Write([]byte(signingInput)) return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) } diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go index 4434a607..c5c96012 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimeauth/users.go @@ -175,6 +175,31 @@ func (s *UserStore) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, username, password, pepper return user, nil } +// RoleByID reports the role of the account a token was issued for. +// +// Read at request time rather than carried in the token. The token has no role +// claim, and adding one would mean a role change only took effect when the +// token expired -- a demoted account would keep administrative access to the +// component that can pull and run any image on the device. +func (s *UserStore) RoleByID(ctx context.Context, userID string) (string, error) { + if s == nil || s.db == nil { + return "", ErrNoDatabase + } + var role string + query := "SELECT role FROM " + usersTable + " WHERE id = ?" + if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, userID).Scan(&role); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) { + // The account behind a still-valid token has been deleted. + return "", ErrNoSuchUser + } + if isMissingTable(err) { + return "", ErrNoSuchUser + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("reading the role for user %q: %w", userID, err) + } + return role, nil +} + // dummyHash is a real 600k-iteration PBKDF2 hash of a value nobody knows, // used only to spend comparable time on an unknown username. const dummyHash = "pbkdf2:sha256:600000$KMV1LlY0aXBhZGRpbmc$" + diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go index cd45c2d5..53ca3252 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec.go @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ import ( "os" "path/filepath" "strings" + "sync" ) // Ulimit is Docker's rlimit shape. @@ -86,6 +87,12 @@ type Config struct { Repository string `json:"repository"` // Version is the tag currently desired. The bootloader rewrites this when an // update succeeds, which is what makes the choice survive a reboot. + // + // Read and written from different goroutines -- the updater writes it, the + // API and discovery replies read it, and the supervisor's event loop reads + // it through ImageRef -- so it goes through Version()/SetVersion() and + // the mutex below. Touching the field directly is a data race; the tests + // only passed under -race because nothing in them read it concurrently. Version string `json:"version"` // DataDir is the host path holding the runtime's persistent data. Bound // into the container at the same path so the runtime's own defaults apply @@ -100,6 +107,9 @@ type Config struct { // BootloaderPort is advertised to the runtime so /api/capabilities can tell // the editor where to send an update request. BootloaderPort int `json:"bootloaderPort,omitempty"` + + // mu guards Version. Not serialised: it is a lock, not configuration. + mu sync.RWMutex `json:"-"` } const ( @@ -142,7 +152,12 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) { // Save writes the config back, atomically, so a crash mid-write cannot leave // the bootloader unable to parse its own spec on the next boot. func (c *Config) Save(path string) error { + // Under the read lock: the updater sets Version and saves, while the API + // and the event loop read it. Marshalling without the lock would race the + // very write this call exists to persist. + c.mu.RLock() encoded, err := json.MarshalIndent(c, "", " ") + c.mu.RUnlock() if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("encoding runtime spec: %w", err) } @@ -243,7 +258,25 @@ func validateBind(bind string) error { // ImageRef is the fully qualified image the runtime should run. func (c *Config) ImageRef() string { - return c.Repository + ":" + c.Version + return c.Repository + ":" + c.DesiredVersion() +} + +// DesiredVersion reports the tag currently desired. +// +// Every read outside (de)serialisation goes through here. The Version field +// stays exported because encoding/json needs it to be, but reading it +// directly from a goroutine other than the one that wrote it is a data race. +func (c *Config) DesiredVersion() string { + c.mu.RLock() + defer c.mu.RUnlock() + return c.Version +} + +// SetDesiredVersion records a new desired tag. +func (c *Config) SetDesiredVersion(version string) { + c.mu.Lock() + c.Version = version + c.mu.Unlock() } // ImageRefFor is ImageRef for an arbitrary version, used to pull a target @@ -264,10 +297,12 @@ func (c *Config) ContainerSpec(imageRef string) any { binds = append(binds, c.ExtraBinds...) env := []string{ - // Tells /api/capabilities to report updatePolicy "self". Only our - // bootloader sets this, which is what makes the answer trustworthy. - "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self", - fmt.Sprintf("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT=%d", c.BootloaderPort), + // OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY and OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT used to be set + // here for /api/capabilities to echo back. The runtime side of that + // was removed as dead weight -- the editor learns both facts from the + // bootloader answering at all -- so setting them told nobody + // anything. Passing environment a runtime does not read is how a + // reader ends up believing a feature exists. // Point the runtime's persistent data at the bind mount. // // This is load-bearing and NOT redundant with the bind. The runtime diff --git a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go index f2693a03..1e2056c7 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/runtimespec/spec_test.go @@ -219,28 +219,45 @@ func TestContainerSpecSetsTheRealTimeUlimits(t *testing.T) { } } -func TestContainerSpecTellsTheRuntimeItIsBootloaderManaged(t *testing.T) { - // This is what makes /api/capabilities report updatePolicy "self". Only our - // bootloader sets it, which is what makes the answer trustworthy -- an - // orchestrator vPLC never gets it and so reports "managed". - cfg := &Config{Version: "v4.2.1", BootloaderPort: 8445} +func TestContainerSpecSetsNoEnvironmentTheRuntimeIgnores(t *testing.T) { + // OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY and OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT were set here for + // /api/capabilities to echo back. That runtime-side reporting was removed + // as dead weight -- a client learns both facts from the bootloader + // answering at all -- so these told nobody anything, while reading like a + // feature that existed. + cfg := &Config{ + Repository: "ghcr.io/x/runtime", + Version: "v4.2.1", + DataDir: "/var/lib/openplc-runtime", + BootloaderPort: 8445, + } cfg.applyDefaults() spec := decodeSpec(t, cfg) - var sawPolicy, sawPort bool + var env []string for _, raw := range spec["Env"].([]any) { - switch raw.(string) { - case "OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY=self": - sawPolicy = true - case "OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT=8445": - sawPort = true + env = append(env, raw.(string)) + } + + for _, dead := range []string{"OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT"} { + for _, entry := range env { + if strings.HasPrefix(entry, dead+"=") { + t.Errorf("%s is set but nothing in the runtime reads it", dead) + } } } - if !sawPolicy { - t.Error("the runtime must be told it is bootloader-managed") + + // The one env var that IS load-bearing must still be there: the runtime + // resolves its data directory by detection, and without this it writes a + // fresh database inside the container that a version change then destroys. + var found bool + for _, entry := range env { + if entry == "OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR=/var/lib/openplc-runtime" { + found = true + } } - if !sawPort { - t.Error("the runtime must be told where the bootloader listens") + if !found { + t.Errorf("the persistent data directory must be passed explicitly, got %v", env) } } diff --git a/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go index 897d4487..355f900f 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate.go @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ type DockerClient interface { StartContainer(ctx context.Context, name string) error StopContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, grace time.Duration) error RemoveContainer(ctx context.Context, name string, force bool) error + RenameContainer(ctx context.Context, name, newName string) error InspectImage(ctx context.Context, ref string) (*dockerapi.ImageInfo, error) PullImage(ctx context.Context, ref string, onProgress func(dockerapi.PullProgress)) error } @@ -182,17 +183,38 @@ func Execute(ctx context.Context, docker DockerClient, log *slog.Logger) error { case <-time.After(settleDelay): } + // Create the replacement FIRST, under a temporary name. + // + // Removing the parent first meant a rejected create -- an invalid + // HostConfig on an older daemon, a full disk, an image pruned between the + // pull and the create -- left the device with no bootloader at all, on + // hardware this feature exists because it has no SSH. The helper runs with + // RestartPolicy: no, so nothing would have come back for it. + staging := target + "-next" + // A leftover from an interrupted attempt would take the name. + if err := docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, staging, true); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("clearing a previous staged bootloader: %w", err) + } + if _, err := docker.CreateContainer(ctx, staging, spec); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("creating the new bootloader: %w", err) + } + if parent != nil { // Force: the parent's restart policy would otherwise bring it back // between the stop and the remove, and the name would still be taken. if err := docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, target, true); err != nil { + // The staged container is removed so a retry starts clean; the + // parent is still there and still running. + _ = docker.RemoveContainer(ctx, staging, true) return fmt.Errorf("removing the old bootloader: %w", err) } log.Info("old bootloader removed", "container", target) } - if _, err := docker.CreateContainer(ctx, target, spec); err != nil { - return fmt.Errorf("creating the new bootloader: %w", err) + // Take over the real name, then start. A rename is metadata only, so the + // window where neither container holds the name is as small as it can be. + if err := docker.RenameContainer(ctx, staging, target); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("renaming the new bootloader to %s: %w", target, err) } if err := docker.StartContainer(ctx, target); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("starting the new bootloader: %w", err) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go index a8bfcbb0..5ffc61a7 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/selfupdate/selfupdate_test.go @@ -21,11 +21,14 @@ type fakeDocker struct { imagePresent bool pullErr error - created map[string]any - started []string - removed []string - pulls []string - startErr error + created map[string]any + started []string + removed []string + pulls []string + startErr error + renamed []string + renameErr error + createErr error } func newFake() *fakeDocker { @@ -47,6 +50,9 @@ func (f *fakeDocker) InspectContainer(_ context.Context, name string) (*dockerap func (f *fakeDocker) CreateContainer(_ context.Context, name string, spec any) (*dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse, error) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() + if f.createErr != nil { + return nil, f.createErr + } f.created[name] = spec return &dockerapi.CreateContainerResponse{ID: "created-" + name}, nil } @@ -58,6 +64,22 @@ func (f *fakeDocker) StartContainer(_ context.Context, name string) error { return f.startErr } +// RenameContainer models the metadata move: the spec follows the new name, so +// assertions about what was created under `target` still hold. +func (f *fakeDocker) RenameContainer(_ context.Context, name, newName string) error { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + if f.renameErr != nil { + return f.renameErr + } + f.renamed = append(f.renamed, name+"->"+newName) + if spec, ok := f.created[name]; ok { + f.created[newName] = spec + delete(f.created, name) + } + return nil +} + func (f *fakeDocker) StopContainer(context.Context, string, time.Duration) error { return nil } func (f *fakeDocker) RemoveContainer(_ context.Context, name string, _ bool) error { @@ -249,7 +271,15 @@ func TestTheChildReplacesTheParentPreservingItsConfiguration(t *testing.T) { t.Fatalf("execute: %v", err) } - if len(docker.removed) != 1 || docker.removed[0] != "openplc-bootloader" { + // The staged name is cleared first (a leftover from an interrupted + // attempt would hold it), then the parent goes. + var removedParent bool + for _, name := range docker.removed { + if name == "openplc-bootloader" { + removedParent = true + } + } + if !removedParent { t.Fatalf("want the parent removed, got %v", docker.removed) } spec, ok := docker.created["openplc-bootloader"] @@ -404,3 +434,34 @@ func TestTheRuntimeContainerIsNeverTouched(t *testing.T) { t.Fatal("the runtime container must still exist") } } + +// A create that fails must leave the device with the bootloader it has. +// +// The parent used to be force-removed first. If the create was then rejected +// -- an invalid HostConfig on an older daemon, a full disk, an image pruned +// between the pull and the create -- the helper exited with RestartPolicy: no +// and the device had no bootloader at all, on hardware that by this feature's +// own framing has no SSH. +func TestAFailedCreateLeavesTheOldBootloaderRunning(t *testing.T) { + docker := newFake() + docker.containers["openplc-bootloader"] = parentContainer() + docker.createErr = errors.New("invalid HostConfig") + setChildEnv(t, "openplc-bootloader", "ghcr.io/x/bootloader:bootloader-v1.1.0") + + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) + defer cancel() + err := Execute(ctx, docker, quietLogger()) + if err == nil { + t.Fatal("a rejected create must be reported, not swallowed") + } + + for _, name := range docker.removed { + if name == "openplc-bootloader" { + t.Fatalf("the running bootloader was removed before the replacement existed: %v", + docker.removed) + } + } + if len(docker.started) != 0 { + t.Errorf("nothing should have been started, got %v", docker.started) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go index 43e565c8..2acfac50 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/crashwindow.go @@ -62,14 +62,6 @@ func (w *crashWindow) count() int { return len(w.times) } -// reset clears the history. Called once a runtime has been confirmed healthy, -// so an isolated crash weeks apart never accumulates into a false loop. -func (w *crashWindow) reset() { - w.mu.Lock() - defer w.mu.Unlock() - w.times = nil -} - // prune drops entries that have aged out. Caller holds the lock. func (w *crashWindow) prune(now time.Time) { cutoff := now.Add(-w.window) diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go index 3162b35e..16f0d64f 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor.go @@ -171,11 +171,17 @@ type Supervisor struct { // container and a concurrent reconcile must not clear the suppression // early, which would make our own stop look like a crash. expectStop int + + // preUpdateState is what BeginUpdate displaced, so an update that changes + // nothing can put it back exactly. + preUpdateState State + preUpdateReason string // consecutiveFailures drives restart backoff, reset by a healthy start. consecutiveFailures int // onRecovery is invoked when the supervisor enters recovery, so the UDP // discovery responder can be switched on without this package importing it. - onRecovery func(Status) + onRecovery func(Status) + onRuntimeStarting func() // onHealthy is the mirror, used to switch discovery back off. onHealthy func(Status) } @@ -204,6 +210,10 @@ func New( func (s *Supervisor) OnRecovery(fn func(Status)) { s.onRecovery = fn } func (s *Supervisor) OnHealthy(fn func(Status)) { s.onHealthy = fn } +// OnRuntimeStarting runs immediately before the runtime container is started, +// for anything the bootloader must hand back to it. Set before Run. +func (s *Supervisor) OnRuntimeStarting(fn func()) { s.onRuntimeStarting = fn } + // Status returns a snapshot of the current condition. func (s *Supervisor) Status() Status { s.mu.Lock() @@ -291,7 +301,30 @@ func (s *Supervisor) watch(ctx context.Context) error { case <-time.After(reconnectDelay): } - // Re-sync before trusting the new stream. + // Re-sync before trusting the new stream -- but NOT while recovery or + // an update owns the runtime. + // + // Reconcile starts any stopped container it finds. In recovery that + // would restart a runtime the supervisor deliberately stopped, flip + // the state to healthy and disable discovery, with no operator + // involved -- a daemon restart or a socket hiccup was enough. During + // an update it would race the updater's own Reconcile, and the loser + // of the create/remove contention fails the update into recovery. + s.mu.Lock() + state := s.status.State + s.mu.Unlock() + if state == StateRecovery || state == StateUpdating { + s.log.Info("events reconnected; leaving the runtime alone", "state", state) + // Still refresh what we know about the container, so ContainerID + // and Image are not stale after the gap. + if inspect, err := s.docker.InspectContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName); err == nil { + s.mu.Lock() + s.status.ContainerID = inspect.ID + s.status.Image = inspect.Config.Image + s.mu.Unlock() + } + continue + } if err := s.Reconcile(ctx); err != nil { s.log.Error("reconcile after events reconnect failed", "error", err) } @@ -380,7 +413,8 @@ func (s *Supervisor) handleWedged(ctx context.Context) { if state == StateRecovery || state == StateUpdating { return } - if err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace); err != nil { + if err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace); err != nil && + !errors.Is(err, dockerapi.ErrNotRunning) { s.log.Error("stopping wedged runtime failed", "error", err) } } @@ -426,10 +460,10 @@ func (s *Supervisor) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error { // env var) and restarting the bootloader: the container is rebuilt from // the spec instead of silently keeping the old configuration. desired := s.spec.ImageRef() - if inspect.Config.Image != desired { - s.log.Info("runtime container is on a different image, recreating", + if s.containerIsStale(ctx, inspect, desired) { + s.log.Info("runtime container is not on the desired image, recreating", "running", inspect.Config.Image, "desired", desired) - if err := s.create(ctx); err != nil { + if err := s.recreate(ctx, inspect); err != nil { return err } return s.startAndConfirm(ctx) @@ -459,6 +493,51 @@ func (s *Supervisor) Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error { } } +// containerIsStale reports whether the running container needs replacing. +// +// Compares resolved image IDs, not tag strings. A container pins its image by +// ID, so a re-pull of the same tag can leave the container on the OLD layers +// while Config.Image still reads as a match -- which made "reinstall the +// current version", the documented repair path, silently a no-op that started +// the very layers the operator was trying to replace. +// +// The tag comparison stays as the first check because it is free and catches +// the ordinary version change; the ID lookup only runs when the tags agree. +func (s *Supervisor) containerIsStale( + ctx context.Context, inspect *dockerapi.ContainerInspect, desired string, +) bool { + if inspect.Config.Image != desired { + return true + } + if inspect.Image == "" { + return false + } + image, err := s.docker.InspectImage(ctx, desired) + if err != nil || image == nil || image.ID == "" { + // No answer from the daemon: the tags match, so treat the container as + // current rather than recreating a working runtime on a failed lookup. + return false + } + return inspect.Image != image.ID +} + +// recreate replaces the container, stopping it gracefully first if it runs. +// +// create() force-removes, and a SIGKILL skips the runtime's SIGTERM handler +// that flushes retained variables. The kill's exit would also arrive as an +// unmarked death and be counted as a crash. +func (s *Supervisor) recreate(ctx context.Context, inspect *dockerapi.ContainerInspect) error { + if inspect != nil && inspect.State.Running { + if err := s.Stop(ctx); err != nil { + // Log and continue to the force-remove: a container we cannot stop + // still has to go, and refusing would leave the device on the + // wrong version with no way forward. + s.log.Warn("could not stop the runtime before replacing it", "error", err) + } + } + return s.create(ctx) +} + // create makes the container from the current spec. A stale container under // the same name is removed first: create fails with a name conflict otherwise, // and by the time we are creating we have already decided the existing one is @@ -525,6 +604,20 @@ func (s *Supervisor) ensureImage(ctx context.Context, imageRef string) error { // startAndConfirm starts the container and waits for it to report healthy. func (s *Supervisor) startAndConfirm(ctx context.Context) error { s.setState(StateStarting, "starting runtime") + + // Release anything the bootloader holds that the runtime is about to + // claim -- the UDP discovery port -- BEFORE the container starts. + // + // Waiting for the Healthy transition was too late: the runtime binds + // 33333 once at start-up with SO_REUSEADDR and never retries, the + // bootloader's responder binds it without, and Linux only shares a UDP + // port when every socket asked to. So the runtime got EADDRINUSE, logged a + // warning, and the device was undiscoverable after every recovery until + // its next restart. + if s.onRuntimeStarting != nil { + s.onRuntimeStarting() + } + if err := s.docker.StartContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName); err != nil && !dockerapi.IsConflict(err) { return fmt.Errorf("starting %s: %w", s.cfg.ContainerName, err) } @@ -627,8 +720,10 @@ func (s *Supervisor) enterRecovery(ctx context.Context, reason string) { // Log and continue: recovery must be reachable even if the stop // failed, and a container we could not stop is all the more reason to // let an operator in. - s.log.Error("stopping runtime for recovery failed", "error", err) s.consumeExpectedStop() + if !errors.Is(err, dockerapi.ErrNotRunning) { + s.log.Error("stopping runtime for recovery failed", "error", err) + } } s.setState(StateRecovery, reason) } @@ -649,6 +744,10 @@ func (s *Supervisor) BeginUpdate() error { if s.status.State == StateUpdating { return errors.New("an update is already in progress") } + // Remembered here so AbortUpdate can put it back without the caller + // having to know about supervisor states. + s.preUpdateState = s.status.State + s.preUpdateReason = s.status.Reason s.status.State = StateUpdating s.status.Reason = "version change in progress" s.status.Since = time.Now() @@ -656,7 +755,31 @@ func (s *Supervisor) BeginUpdate() error { return nil } -// EndUpdate releases the claim taken by BeginUpdate without asserting an +// AbortUpdate undoes BeginUpdate for an update that changed nothing. +// +// The alternative was calling Reconcile, which re-derived the state by acting +// on the device: from recovery -- the common case, where an operator typed a +// version that does not exist -- it found the stopped container and started +// it, leaving recovery with no operator decision. With the container absent it +// set "starting", the pull failed again, and the device reported starting +// indefinitely. "Nothing was changed" has to include the supervisor's state. +func (s *Supervisor) AbortUpdate() { + s.mu.Lock() + if s.expectStop > 0 { + s.expectStop-- + } + // Only if the update still owns the state: a crash during the attempt may + // legitimately have moved it to recovery, and that is newer information + // than what BeginUpdate displaced. + if s.status.State == StateUpdating { + s.status.State = s.preUpdateState + s.status.Reason = s.preUpdateReason + s.status.Since = time.Now() + } + s.mu.Unlock() +} + +// EndUpdate releases the claim taken by BeginUpdate without asserting an// EndUpdate releases the claim taken by BeginUpdate without asserting an // outcome; the caller decides whether to reconcile or enter recovery. func (s *Supervisor) EndUpdate() { s.mu.Lock() @@ -673,6 +796,15 @@ func (s *Supervisor) markExpectedStop() { s.mu.Unlock() } +// expectStopCount exposes the outstanding suppression count to tests. A +// non-zero value after a completed stop sequence is the leak that let a real +// crash be read as a deliberate one. +func (s *Supervisor) expectStopCount() int { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + return s.expectStop +} + // consumeExpectedStop reports whether the exit we just saw was one we asked // for, decrementing the suppression if so. func (s *Supervisor) consumeExpectedStop() bool { @@ -688,8 +820,16 @@ func (s *Supervisor) consumeExpectedStop() bool { // Stop takes the runtime down deliberately, without it counting as a crash. func (s *Supervisor) Stop(ctx context.Context) error { s.markExpectedStop() - if err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace); err != nil { + err := s.docker.StopContainer(ctx, s.cfg.ContainerName, s.cfg.StopGrace) + if err != nil { + // Give the token back. Nothing is going to exit, so a suppression left + // standing here would be spent on the next genuine crash instead -- + // the runtime would stay down while Status() still read healthy. s.consumeExpectedStop() + if errors.Is(err, dockerapi.ErrNotRunning) { + // Already stopped is the state the caller wanted. + return nil + } return err } return nil diff --git a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go index 5fd47f58..f51ef759 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/supervisor/supervisor_test.go @@ -105,10 +105,32 @@ func (f *fakeDocker) StopContainer(context.Context, string, time.Duration) error f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() f.stopped++ + // The daemon answers 304/404 for a container that is not running, and + // emits no `die` event for it. Modelling that is the whole point: with + // this returning nil unconditionally, the expected-stop token leaked and + // no test could see it. + if !f.running { + return dockerapi.ErrNotRunning + } f.running = false return nil } +// markExited reflects what a `die` event means: the container is no longer +// running. Without this the fake reports a dead container as running, a stop +// against it "succeeds", and the leak this models cannot be reproduced. +func (f *fakeDocker) markExited() { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.running = false +} + +func (f *fakeDocker) startCount() int { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + return f.started +} + func (f *fakeDocker) RemoveContainer(context.Context, string, bool) error { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() @@ -642,3 +664,69 @@ func TestAContainerOnTheRightImageIsStillAdopted(t *testing.T) { created, started, stopped) } } + +// A crash after a stop that did nothing must still count as a crash. +// +// The leak this pins: enterRecovery and Stop suppress crash accounting for the +// exit they are about to cause, but a container that has ALREADY exited never +// emits a `die` event -- and the daemon answers the stop with 304/404. The +// suppression therefore outlived the stop and was spent on the next genuine +// crash instead, which the supervisor then read as "stopped as expected" and +// did not restart. The PLC stayed down while Status() still said healthy. +// +// The crash-loop path always ends in that state: the third die is what calls +// enterRecovery, so by then the container is already gone. +func TestAStopThatDidNothingDoesNotSuppressTheNextCrash(t *testing.T) { + docker := &fakeDocker{ + exists: true, running: true, health: "healthy", + startMakesHealthy: true, imagePresent: true, + } + sup := newTestSupervisor(docker, &fakeProbe{}) + ctx := context.Background() + + // A controllable clock, so the fourth crash below can be placed outside + // the window: inside it, going to recovery again would be correct + // behaviour and would hide whether the crash was counted at all. + now := time.Now() + sup.crashes.now = func() time.Time { return now } + + // Three deaths inside the window: the third hands the device to recovery, + // which stops a container that has already exited. + for _, id := range []string{"1", "2", "3"} { + docker.markExited() + sup.handleEvent(ctx, dieEvent(id)) + } + + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateRecovery { + t.Fatalf("three crashes must reach recovery, got %q", got) + } + if sup.expectStopCount() != 0 { + t.Fatalf("a stop that stopped nothing left %d suppression(s) behind", + sup.expectStopCount()) + } + + // The operator installs a working version: back to healthy and running. + if err := sup.Reconcile(ctx); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("reconcile: %v", err) + } + if got := sup.Status().State; got != StateHealthy { + t.Fatalf("want healthy after reconcile, got %q", got) + } + + // A fourth, genuine crash. With the token leaked this was swallowed: + // handleDeath returned early and the runtime was left stopped. + // Well past the window, so this is a first crash again and the supervisor + // should simply restart it. + now = now.Add(time.Hour) + + before := docker.startCount() + docker.markExited() + sup.handleEvent(ctx, dieEvent("4")) + + if docker.startCount() == before { + t.Error("the crash was treated as an expected stop; the runtime was not restarted") + } + if got := sup.Status().CrashCount; got < 1 { + t.Errorf("the crash was not counted, CrashCount=%d", got) + } +} diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go index d3919fde..dd49f6d6 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater.go @@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ type Progress struct { Percent *int `json:"percent,omitempty"` // Error is written for a person: what failed and, where there is one, // what to do about it. - Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` + Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` + // Warning is a concern that did not stop the update -- currently a tight + // disk measurement. Shown alongside progress rather than instead of it. + Warning string `json:"warning,omitempty"` StartedAt time.Time `json:"startedAt,omitempty"` FinishedAt *time.Time `json:"finishedAt,omitempty"` } @@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ type Supervisor interface { // the stop that is about to happen. BeginUpdate() error EndUpdate() + // AbortUpdate releases the claim and restores the state BeginUpdate + // displaced, for an attempt that changed nothing on the device. + AbortUpdate() Stop(ctx context.Context) error Reconcile(ctx context.Context) error EnterRecovery(ctx context.Context, reason string) @@ -142,7 +148,7 @@ func (u *Updater) Start(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) error { u.running = true u.progress = Progress{ State: StatePulling, - From: u.cfg.Spec.Version, + From: u.cfg.Spec.DesiredVersion(), To: targetVersion, StartedAt: time.Now(), } @@ -156,7 +162,7 @@ func (u *Updater) Start(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) error { } func (u *Updater) run(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) { - previousVersion := u.cfg.Spec.Version + previousVersion := u.cfg.Spec.DesiredVersion() defer u.cfg.Supervisor.EndUpdate() err := u.execute(ctx, previousVersion, targetVersion) @@ -188,15 +194,12 @@ func (u *Updater) run(ctx context.Context, targetVersion string) { if errors.As(err, &beforeSwap) { u.cfg.Log.Info("nothing was changed; leaving the runtime alone", "version", previousVersion) - // Re-derive the supervisor's state from the container rather than - // leaving it on "updating" forever. BeginUpdate moved it there and - // EndUpdate only releases the claim, so without this a device that - // merely refused a bad version reports itself as mid-update to the - // editor for the rest of its life -- observed on the SLM-RP4. - if reconcileErr := u.cfg.Supervisor.Reconcile(ctx); reconcileErr != nil { - u.cfg.Log.Warn("could not re-check the runtime after a refused update", - "error", reconcileErr) - } + // Put back exactly the state this attempt found. Reconcile used to + // do the re-deriving, but it re-derives by ACTING: from recovery + // it restarted the stopped container and called the device + // healthy, and with the container absent it left the state on + // "starting" forever after the pull failed again. + u.cfg.Supervisor.AbortUpdate() return } @@ -226,9 +229,7 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st targetRef := u.cfg.Spec.ImageRefFor(targetVersion) previousRef := u.cfg.Spec.ImageRefFor(previousVersion) - if err := u.checkDiskSpace(ctx, targetRef); err != nil { - return errBeforeSwap{err} - } + u.checkDiskSpace(ctx, targetRef) // 1. Pull. Non-destructive: the running version stays on disk. u.setPhase(StatePulling, "", nil) @@ -262,9 +263,9 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st // to rather than silently reverting -- and the image for it is already on // disk by now. u.setPhase(StateSwapping, "", nil) - u.cfg.Spec.Version = targetVersion + u.cfg.Spec.SetDesiredVersion(targetVersion) if err := u.cfg.Spec.Save(u.cfg.SpecPath); err != nil { - u.cfg.Spec.Version = previousVersion + u.cfg.Spec.SetDesiredVersion(previousVersion) return errBeforeSwap{fmt.Errorf("could not record the new version: %w", err)} } @@ -297,22 +298,28 @@ func (u *Updater) execute(ctx context.Context, previousVersion, targetVersion st return nil } -// checkDiskSpace warns, with numbers, when the target is unlikely to fit. +// checkDiskSpace reports, with numbers, when the target is unlikely to fit. +// +// Advisory, and now actually advisory: it used to return an error that the +// caller turned into a failed update, contradicting this comment and refusing +// updates on any device whose Docker data-root had been moved -- the estimate +// is taken from the bootloader's own filesystem, which is only the same disk +// on a default install. The operator on the moved-data-root board was the one +// who lost. // -// Advisory rather than blocking. The measurement is of the bootloader's own -// filesystem, which is the same one Docker uses on a default install but not -// on a device whose data-root has been moved; blocking on a figure that can be -// about the wrong disk would refuse updates that would have worked. Docker's -// own pull will fail with a clear ENOSPC if the estimate was wrong, so the -// cost of being permissive is a legible failure rather than a silent one. -func (u *Updater) checkDiskSpace(ctx context.Context, targetRef string) error { +// So a tight measurement is surfaced as a warning on the progress the editor +// polls, and the pull goes ahead. If the estimate was right, Docker's own pull +// fails with a clear ENOSPC, which is a legible failure rather than a silent +// one -- and if it was about the wrong disk, nothing was refused for no +// reason. +func (u *Updater) checkDiskSpace(ctx context.Context, targetRef string) { free, err := freeBytes(u.cfg.StateDir) if err != nil { u.cfg.Log.Warn("could not measure free space", "error", err) - return nil + return } if free == 0 { - return nil // measurement unavailable on this platform + return // measurement unavailable on this platform } // Estimate the target's size from the image already installed: successive @@ -325,17 +332,22 @@ func (u *Updater) checkDiskSpace(ctx context.Context, targetRef string) error { if estimate == 0 { u.cfg.Log.Info("no local image to estimate from; skipping the disk pre-check", "free", free) - return nil + return } if free < estimate { - return fmt.Errorf( - "not enough free space to download %s: about %s needed, %s available", - targetRef, humanBytes(estimate), humanBytes(free)) + warning := fmt.Sprintf( + "free space looks tight for %s: about %s needed, %s available on %s. "+ + "Continuing; the download will report a clear error if it does not fit.", + targetRef, humanBytes(estimate), humanBytes(free), u.cfg.StateDir) + u.cfg.Log.Warn("disk pre-check is tight", "detail", warning) + u.mu.Lock() + u.progress.Warning = warning + u.mu.Unlock() + return } u.cfg.Log.Info("disk pre-check passed", "free", humanBytes(free), "estimate", humanBytes(estimate)) - return nil } func (u *Updater) setPhase(state State, phase string, percent *int) { diff --git a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go index fc4cd59d..c218ef30 100644 --- a/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go +++ b/bootloader/internal/updater/updater_test.go @@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ type fakeSupervisor struct { stops int reconciles int recoveryCalls []string + aborted int + // state and preUpdateState model what AbortUpdate has to restore: the + // refused-update path must leave the supervisor exactly where it found + // it, not re-derive it by acting on the container. + state string + preUpdateState string // order records the sequence of operations, which is the property that // actually matters for safety. order []string @@ -90,6 +96,8 @@ func (f *fakeSupervisor) BeginUpdate() error { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() f.begins++ + f.preUpdateState = f.state + f.state = "updating" f.order = append(f.order, "begin") return f.beginErr } @@ -101,6 +109,16 @@ func (f *fakeSupervisor) EndUpdate() { f.order = append(f.order, "end") } +// AbortUpdate models the real one: release the claim and restore what +// BeginUpdate displaced, without touching the container. +func (f *fakeSupervisor) AbortUpdate() { + f.mu.Lock() + defer f.mu.Unlock() + f.aborted++ + f.order = append(f.order, "abort") + f.state = f.preUpdateState +} + func (f *fakeSupervisor) Stop(context.Context) error { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() @@ -428,9 +446,13 @@ func (b *blockingDocker) RemoveImage(context.Context, string, bool) error { retu // --- disk pre-check ------------------------------------------------------ -func TestAnImpossiblyLargeImageIsRefusedBeforeAnythingIsTouched(t *testing.T) { - // Refusing up front with a number is far better than a half-finished - // pull and an ENOSPC an operator has to interpret. +func TestATightDiskIsWarnedAboutRatherThanRefused(t *testing.T) { + // This used to refuse the update. The measurement is of the bootloader's + // filesystem, which is only Docker's on a default install -- so on a + // device whose data-root had been moved, a perfectly possible update was + // blocked by a figure about the wrong disk. It is a warning now, carried + // on the progress the editor polls, and the pull goes ahead: if the + // estimate was right, Docker reports ENOSPC in its own words. docker := &fakeDocker{inspectSize: 1 << 62} // larger than any real disk sup := &fakeSupervisor{} u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) @@ -438,17 +460,20 @@ func TestAnImpossiblyLargeImageIsRefusedBeforeAnythingIsTouched(t *testing.T) { if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v4.2.1"); err != nil { t.Fatalf("start: %v", err) } - progress := waitForState(t, u, StateFailed) + progress := waitForState(t, u, StateSuccess) // Only meaningful where free space can actually be measured. if free, err := freeBytes(t.TempDir()); err != nil || free == 0 { t.Skip("free space is not measurable on this platform") } - if !strings.Contains(progress.Error, "not enough free space") { - t.Fatalf("want a free-space refusal, got %q", progress.Error) + if !strings.Contains(progress.Warning, "looks tight") { + t.Errorf("want a free-space warning on the progress, got %q", progress.Warning) } - if got := docker.pulls(); len(got) != 0 { - t.Fatalf("nothing may be pulled after the pre-check fails, got %v", got) + if progress.Error != "" { + t.Errorf("a tight disk must not fail the update, got error %q", progress.Error) + } + if got := docker.pulls(); len(got) == 0 { + t.Error("the pull must still be attempted") } } @@ -579,15 +604,21 @@ func TestAFailureAfterTheSwapBeginsDoesEnterRecovery(t *testing.T) { func TestARefusedUpdateLeavesTheSupervisorReportingReality(t *testing.T) { // BeginUpdate moves the supervisor to "updating" and EndUpdate only - // releases the claim, so without re-deriving state a device that merely + // releases the claim, so without restoring state a device that merely // refused a bad version reports itself as mid-update forever. Seen on the // SLM-RP4: a failed pull left the bootloader stuck on "updating" while the // PLC ran happily underneath. + // + // It restores rather than reconciles. Reconcile re-derives the state by + // ACTING on the container: from recovery it would start the runtime that + // recovery deliberately stopped and call the device healthy, and with the + // container absent it would leave the state on "starting" for good after + // the pull failed again. docker := &fakeDocker{ inspectErr: errors.New("no such image"), pullErr: errors.New("manifest unknown"), } - sup := &fakeSupervisor{} + sup := &fakeSupervisor{state: "recovery"} u, _, _ := newTestUpdater(t, docker, sup) if err := u.Start(context.Background(), "v9.9.9"); err != nil { @@ -598,12 +629,27 @@ func TestARefusedUpdateLeavesTheSupervisorReportingReality(t *testing.T) { waitFor(t, func() bool { order, _ := sup.snapshot() for _, step := range order { - if step == "reconcile" { + if step == "abort" { return true } } return false }) + + // The state it found is the state it left: recovery, not a restarted + // runtime and not "starting" forever. + sup.mu.Lock() + restored := sup.state + sup.mu.Unlock() + if restored != "recovery" { + t.Errorf("the refused update left the supervisor on %q, want the recovery it found", restored) + } + order0, _ := sup.snapshot() + for _, step := range order0 { + if step == "reconcile" { + t.Errorf("a refused update reconciled, which acts on the container: %v", order0) + } + } // And still nothing stopped. order, reasons := sup.snapshot() for _, step := range order { diff --git a/bootloader/main.go b/bootloader/main.go index 44e6ce6b..94969649 100644 --- a/bootloader/main.go +++ b/bootloader/main.go @@ -150,10 +150,12 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { // directory. Missing or unreadable is not fatal: the control API still // needs to come up so an operator can see WHY, and every authenticated // route refuses cleanly until the files appear. - secrets, users := openRuntimeCredentials(log, spec.DataDir) - if users != nil { - defer users.Close() - } + // Re-read on use rather than snapshotted: on a fresh install the runtime + // creates .env and restapi.db only once the bootloader has already started + // it, and a snapshot from before that made every login fail until the + // container was restarted. + creds := runtimeauth.NewProvider(spec.DataDir, log.With("component", "auth")) + defer creds.Close() // LAN discovery, answered ONLY while in recovery. A device that cannot be // found cannot be repaired, and without this a failed update makes the @@ -164,12 +166,19 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { status := sup.Status() return discovery.Reply{ BootloaderPort: spec.BootloaderPort, - RuntimeVersion: spec.Version, + RuntimeVersion: spec.DesiredVersion(), Reason: status.Reason, } }, log.With("component", "discovery")) sup.OnRecovery(func(supervisor.Status) { responder.Enable() }) + // Released before the runtime container starts, not when it reports + // healthy: the runtime binds the discovery port once at start-up and never + // retries, so a bootloader still holding it left the device + // undiscoverable until the next restart. + sup.OnRuntimeStarting(func() { responder.Disable() }) + // Belt and braces for a path that reaches healthy without going through + // a start (adoption of an already-running container). sup.OnHealthy(func(supervisor.Status) { responder.Disable() }) upd := updater.New(updater.Config{ @@ -185,9 +194,8 @@ func run(log *slog.Logger, cfg runConfig) error { Port: cfg.port, StateDir: cfg.stateDir, Version: version, - RuntimeVersion: func() string { return spec.Version }, - Secrets: secrets, - Users: users, + RuntimeVersion: func() string { return spec.DesiredVersion() }, + Users: creds, Supervisor: sup, Host: docker, Logs: docker, @@ -253,31 +261,6 @@ func (b bootloaderSelfUpdater) Start(ctx context.Context, version string) error return selfupdate.Start(ctx, b.docker, os.Getenv("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_REPOSITORY"), version, b.log) } -// openRuntimeCredentials loads the runtime's secrets and user database. -// -// Both live in the runtime's data directory, which the bootloader mounts -// read-only. Failure returns nils rather than an error on purpose: a device -// whose runtime has never started has neither file yet, and refusing to boot -// would leave nothing listening on the very device that most needs a way in. -func openRuntimeCredentials( - log *slog.Logger, dataDir string, -) (*runtimeauth.Secrets, *runtimeauth.UserStore) { - secrets, err := runtimeauth.LoadSecrets(filepath.Join(dataDir, ".env")) - if err != nil { - log.Warn("runtime secrets unavailable; authenticated routes will refuse", - "error", err) - return &runtimeauth.Secrets{}, nil - } - - users, err := runtimeauth.OpenUserStore(filepath.Join(dataDir, "restapi.db")) - if err != nil { - log.Warn("runtime account database unavailable; authenticated routes will refuse", - "error", err) - return secrets, nil - } - return secrets, users -} - func newLogger(level string) *slog.Logger { var lvl slog.Level switch level { diff --git a/docs/DOCKER.md b/docs/DOCKER.md index 28101784..b3df929b 100644 --- a/docs/DOCKER.md +++ b/docs/DOCKER.md @@ -15,6 +15,48 @@ OpenPLC Runtime v4 provides official Docker images for easy deployment across mu - `linux/arm64` - ARM 64-bit (Raspberry Pi 4, etc.) - `linux/arm/v7` - ARM 32-bit (Raspberry Pi 3, etc.) +## The managed install (recommended) + +Everything below describes running the runtime container by hand, which is +still supported and is what the rest of this document covers. On a device you +intend to keep, prefer the managed install: + +```bash +curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash +``` + +That installs Docker if needed, then two containers: the runtime, and a +**bootloader** on port 8445 that starts it, watches it, and can change its +version from the OpenPLC Editor without SSH. Neither has a systemd unit -- +Docker's restart policy starts the bootloader, and the bootloader starts the +runtime. + +- **Runtime data** lives in `/var/lib/openplc-runtime` on the host: `.env`, + `restapi.db`, the stored project, retained variables, VPP licences. A version + change never touches it. A native install uses the same directory, so moving + a device to containers carries its users and project across. +- **Bootloader state** lives in `/var/lib/openplc-bootloader`: the container + spec, including this board's device mounts. Separate on purpose, so "erase + all runtime data" cannot leave a board without its SPI mount. +- **A systemd OpenPLC already on the device** (`openplc.service` from v3, + `openplc-runtime.service` from a source install) is stopped and disabled + first -- both bind 8443. What was displaced is recorded so it can be put + back. + +To remove it: + +```bash +curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash -s -- --uninstall --yes +``` + +Containers and images go, any displaced systemd runtime comes back, and +`/var/lib/openplc-runtime` is kept unless `--purge` is given -- a native +install shares that directory, so deleting it is not assumed to be safe. +Docker itself is left installed. + +`sudo ./install.sh --native` from a checkout still builds from source, for +MSYS2 and for targets that cannot run containers. + ## Quick Start ### Pull and Run @@ -574,20 +616,27 @@ docker run -d \ ### GitHub Actions -The official images are built automatically via GitHub Actions: +**Images** -- `.github/workflows/docker.yml` + +Triggers: a `v*` release tag, a push to `development` or `main`, or a manual +dispatch. There is no pull-request trigger here: a branch push produces no +semver tag for the metadata step. + +- The runtime image builds for release tags and manual runs only, multi-arch, + tagged `vX.Y.Z` and (for a stable release) `latest`. +- The bootloader is versioned separately, from `bootloader/VERSION`. A version + already in the registry is not rebuilt, so a run of runtime releases does not + republish an unchanged bootloader; `latest` moves only for a stable version + from a release tag or `main`. -**Workflow:** `.github/workflows/docker.yml` +**Tests** -- `.github/workflows/tests.yml` -**Triggers:** -- Push to development branch -- Pull request to development -- Manual workflow dispatch +Runs on every pull request: `gofmt`, `go vet` and `go test -race` for the +bootloader, `pytest tests/pytest`, `shellcheck` on the installer scripts, and a +check that every caller of `install.sh` asks for the build it needs. -**Process:** -1. Build multi-architecture images -2. Run tests -3. Push to GHCR -4. Tag with commit SHA and latest +Not in CI: `tests/integration/harness.sh` (it needs a privileged +Docker-in-Docker host) and anything hardware-dependent. Both are run by hand. ### Using in CI/CD diff --git a/install.sh b/install.sh index 87199f74..549a2cfb 100755 --- a/install.sh +++ b/install.sh @@ -409,8 +409,9 @@ setup_plugin_venvs() { local plugins_with_requirements=() while IFS= read -r -d '' requirements_file; do # Get the directory name (plugin name) - local plugin_dir=$(dirname "$requirements_file") - local plugin_name=$(basename "$plugin_dir") + local plugin_dir plugin_name + plugin_dir=$(dirname "$requirements_file") + plugin_name=$(basename "$plugin_dir") # Skip if it's in examples or shared directories (common libraries) if [[ "$plugin_dir" == *"/examples/"* ]] || [[ "$plugin_dir" == *"/shared/"* ]]; then @@ -499,7 +500,8 @@ build_native_plugins() { # Skip if not a directory [ -d "$plugin_dir" ] || continue - local plugin_name=$(basename "$plugin_dir") + local plugin_name + plugin_name=$(basename "$plugin_dir") local cmake_file="$plugin_dir/CMakeLists.txt" # Skip if no CMakeLists.txt @@ -541,7 +543,8 @@ build_native_plugins() { if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then # Copy built plugin to central plugins directory - local built_lib=$(find "$plugin_build_dir" -name "*.so" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1) + local built_lib + built_lib=$(find "$plugin_build_dir" -name "*.so" -type f 2>/dev/null | head -1) if [ -n "$built_lib" ] && [ -f "$built_lib" ]; then cp "$built_lib" "$plugins_output_dir/" log_success "Built and installed: $plugin_name ($(basename "$built_lib"))" diff --git a/scripts/install-docker.sh b/scripts/install-docker.sh index 05effc4d..cd53716b 100755 --- a/scripts/install-docker.sh +++ b/scripts/install-docker.sh @@ -57,10 +57,21 @@ BOOTLOADER_PORT="${BOOTLOADER_PORT:-8445}" declare -a EXTRA_MOUNTS=() declare -a EXTRA_ENV=() +# Units this run stood down, for rollback. Distinct from the persisted record, +# which accumulates across installs and is what --uninstall reads. +declare -a DISPLACED_THIS_RUN=() + # Where this script lives, for the self-elevation path below. A piped run has # no file to re-exec, so it fetches a fresh copy rather than trying to re-read # a stdin bash has already consumed. +# Where the piped one-liner fetches this script. +# +# runtime.getedge.me serves this file verbatim from the release branch. Until +# that host is stood up the raw GitHub URL below works identically, and +# OPENPLC_INSTALLER_URL overrides both -- which is also how a fork or an +# internal mirror points it somewhere else. INSTALLER_URL="${OPENPLC_INSTALLER_URL:-https://runtime.getedge.me}" +INSTALLER_URL_FALLBACK="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Autonomy-Logic/openplc-runtime/main/scripts/install-docker.sh" MODE=install ASSUME_YES=false @@ -154,11 +165,26 @@ require_root() { exec sudo -E bash "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "$@" fi + # Piped, so there is no file to re-exec. Fetching a fresh copy and running + # it under sudo is the only way to elevate from here -- and it means + # downloading code and running it as root, so the URL and the hash of what + # arrived are printed first. An operator who did not expect a download can + # see it happen, and can compare the hash against the release. if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then local copy copy="$(mktemp)" - if curl -fsSL "$INSTALLER_URL" -o "$copy" 2>/dev/null && [ -s "$copy" ]; then - log_info "Root is required; re-running under sudo" + local fetched_from="$INSTALLER_URL" + if ! { curl -fsSL "$INSTALLER_URL" -o "$copy" 2>/dev/null && [ -s "$copy" ]; }; then + # The branded host may not resolve yet; GitHub always does. + fetched_from="$INSTALLER_URL_FALLBACK" + curl -fsSL "$INSTALLER_URL_FALLBACK" -o "$copy" 2>/dev/null || true + fi + if [ -s "$copy" ]; then + log_warning "Root is required. Re-fetching this installer and running it as root:" + log_warning " source: $fetched_from" + if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then + log_warning " sha256: $(sha256sum "$copy" | cut -d' ' -f1)" + fi exec sudo -E bash "$copy" "$@" fi rm -f "$copy" @@ -292,8 +318,23 @@ stop_legacy_runtimes() { [ ${#displaced[@]} -eq 0 ] && return 0 + # What THIS run displaced, kept separately from the persisted record. + # + # Rollback used to read the persisted file, which on a re-run holds what + # the FIRST install displaced -- units already disabled and not touched + # this time. A failing re-run therefore started the old native runtime + # beside the container it had deliberately left alone, and then deleted + # the record, so a later --uninstall could no longer restore anything. + DISPLACED_THIS_RUN=("${displaced[@]}") + mkdir -p "$BOOTLOADER_STATE_DIR" - printf '%s\n' "${displaced[@]}" > "$(disabled_units_file)" + # Merged with anything already recorded, so an earlier install's + # displacement is not forgotten by a later one that displaced nothing. + { + [ -f "$(disabled_units_file)" ] && cat "$(disabled_units_file)" + printf '%s\n' "${displaced[@]}" + } | awk 'NF && !seen[$0]++' > "$(disabled_units_file).tmp" + mv "$(disabled_units_file).tmp" "$(disabled_units_file)" chmod 640 "$(disabled_units_file)" } @@ -307,7 +348,7 @@ restore_legacy_runtimes() { [ -f "$record" ] || return 0 have_systemd || { log_warning "No systemd here; cannot restore $record"; return 0; } - local line unit was_active was_enabled + local unit was_active was_enabled while IFS=: read -r unit was_active was_enabled; do [ -n "$unit" ] || continue unit_exists "$unit" || { log_warning " $unit is gone; nothing to restore"; continue; } @@ -327,15 +368,25 @@ restore_legacy_runtimes() { # there is a window where the device has no PLC. Anything that fails in it -- # a spec that cannot be written, a container that will not start -- must hand # the device back the runtime it had, rather than leaving it with neither. -INSTALL_DISPLACED_UNITS=false - rollback_on_failure() { local status=$? [ "$status" -eq 0 ] && return 0 - [ "$INSTALL_DISPLACED_UNITS" = true ] || return 0 + [ ${#DISPLACED_THIS_RUN[@]} -eq 0 ] && return 0 log_error "Install failed; restoring the runtime that was here before." - restore_legacy_runtimes || true + local entry unit was_active was_enabled + for entry in "${DISPLACED_THIS_RUN[@]}"; do + IFS=: read -r unit was_active was_enabled <<<"$entry" + [ -n "$unit" ] || continue + if [ "$was_enabled" = yes ]; then + systemctl enable "$unit" >/dev/null 2>&1 && log_success " re-enabled $unit" + fi + if [ "$was_active" = yes ]; then + systemctl start "$unit" >/dev/null 2>&1 && log_success " restarted $unit" + fi + done + # The persisted record is deliberately left in place: --uninstall still + # needs it, and this rollback is not the end of the device's life. } # --- uninstall ------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -655,7 +706,6 @@ main() { # failure has to hand the device back what it had. trap rollback_on_failure EXIT stop_legacy_runtimes - INSTALL_DISPLACED_UNITS=true write_spec start_bootloader wait_for_runtime diff --git a/tests/integration/conftest.py b/tests/integration/conftest.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c1e1d416 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/integration/conftest.py @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +"""Keep the destructive integration suite out of a bare ``pytest`` run. + +``pytest.ini`` sets ``testpaths = tests`` and ``python_files = test_*.py``, so +``pytest`` from the repository root used to collect ``test_bootloader.py``. +Every case there starts by wiping ``/var/lib/openplc-runtime`` and force- +removing the runtime container. Run as root on a device -- or in the dev +container -- that destroys users, credentials, the stored project, retained +variables and any VPP licences, and stops a running PLC. Nothing about the +command typed suggests that. + +The suite is meant to run only through ``tests/integration/harness.sh``, which +builds a disposable Docker-in-Docker host for it. +""" + +collect_ignore = ["test_bootloader.py"] diff --git a/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh b/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh index 82643259..75d992ed 100644 --- a/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh +++ b/tests/integration/entrypoint.sh @@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ set -euo pipefail log() { printf '[testhost] %s\n' "$*" >&2; } +# Marks this container as the disposable host the integration suite may wipe. +# test_bootloader.py refuses to run without it, so the suite cannot destroy a +# real device's data if it is ever collected somewhere it should not be. +mkdir -p /run && : > /run/openplc-testhost + if [ ! -w /var/run ]; then log "ERROR: /var/run is not writable; the container needs --privileged" exit 1 diff --git a/tests/integration/harness.sh b/tests/integration/harness.sh index d20c2849..70b7ea10 100755 --- a/tests/integration/harness.sh +++ b/tests/integration/harness.sh @@ -27,9 +27,18 @@ REGISTRY=localhost:5000 STUB_REPO="$REGISTRY/openplc-stub" REAL_REPO="$REGISTRY/openplc-runtime" -# The real runtime image on the developer's machine, used as the base for the -# end-to-end case. Any locally built runtime image works. -REAL_BASE="${REAL_BASE:-openplc-runtime:retain-gate-final}" +# Base for the end-to-end case against a real runtime. +# +# A published image by default, so this harness reproduces anywhere. It used to +# default to a tag that existed only on the author's machine, which meant the +# reported pass count could not be reproduced by anyone else -- and quietly +# meant the repository's own Dockerfile was never exercised. +# +# REAL_BASE=build builds from the repository Dockerfile instead. Slower by +# minutes (it is a full source install), and the only setting that covers the +# Dockerfile itself -- which is where `./install.sh` silently switching to the +# container path broke the release build. +REAL_BASE="${REAL_BASE:-ghcr.io/autonomy-logic/openplc-runtime:v4.2.1}" SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.." && pwd)" @@ -152,18 +161,25 @@ cmd_seed() { inner docker push -q "$STUB_REPO:$tag" >/dev/null done - log "building the real runtime image with the RTOP-283 changes" - # A thin layer over a locally built runtime, carrying the webserver files - # this ticket touches. Deriving rather than rebuilding from source keeps - # this to seconds instead of the full install.sh build. - transfer "$REAL_BASE" - inner sh -c "cat > /tmp/real.Dockerfile <<'EOF' + if [ "$REAL_BASE" = build ]; then + log "building the real runtime image from the repository Dockerfile (slow)" + # The only path that covers the Dockerfile. Its `RUN ./install.sh` has + # to reach the source build; when install.sh started defaulting to the + # container path, nothing here noticed and the release build broke. + inner docker build -q -t "$REAL_REPO:v4.2.1" /workspace >/dev/null + else + log "building the real runtime image from $REAL_BASE" + # A thin layer over a published runtime, carrying the webserver files + # this ticket touches. Seconds instead of a full source install. + transfer "$REAL_BASE" + inner sh -c "cat > /tmp/real.Dockerfile <<'EOF' FROM $REAL_BASE COPY webserver/restapi.py webserver/app.py /workdir/webserver/ HEALTHCHECK --interval=10s --timeout=10s --start-period=90s --retries=3 \\ CMD curl -kfsS https://127.0.0.1:8443/api/version >/dev/null || exit 1 EOF docker build -q -f /tmp/real.Dockerfile -t $REAL_REPO:v4.2.1 /workspace >/dev/null" + fi inner docker push -q "$REAL_REPO:v4.2.1" >/dev/null log "registry contents:" diff --git a/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go b/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go index b228620a..ce0df882 100644 --- a/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go +++ b/tests/integration/stubruntime/main.go @@ -80,16 +80,12 @@ func main() { fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"version":%q}`, version) }) mux.HandleFunc("/api/capabilities", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - policy := envOr("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "manual") - port := envOr("OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT", "null") dataDir := os.Getenv("OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR") w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") // dataDir is echoed so a test can assert the bootloader passed it -- // the bug where the runtime ignored the mounted directory was invisible // from outside until something reported what it had been told. - fmt.Fprintf(w, - `{"runtimeVersion":%q,"updatePolicy":%q,"bootloaderPort":%s,"dataDir":%q}`, - version, policy, port, dataDir) + fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"runtimeVersion":%q,"dataDir":%q}`, version, dataDir) }) cert, err := selfSigned() diff --git a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py index a64c6f96..60ac0c30 100644 --- a/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py +++ b/tests/integration/test_bootloader.py @@ -117,12 +117,36 @@ def wait_for(description: str, predicate, timeout: float = 90.0, interval: float raise Failure(f"timed out waiting for {description} (last observed: {last!r})") +TESTHOST_SENTINEL = "/run/openplc-testhost" + + +def require_testhost() -> None: + """Refuse to run anywhere but the disposable test host. + + Everything below wipes DATA_DIR and force-removes the runtime container. + On a real device that destroys users, credentials, the stored project, + retained variables and any VPP licences, and stops a running PLC -- and a + bare ``pytest`` from the repository root used to collect this file, because + ``testpaths = tests`` and the filename matches ``python_files``. The + conftest beside this file excludes it from collection; this is the second + lock, because the first one is a line in a file somebody can delete. + """ + if not os.path.exists(TESTHOST_SENTINEL): + raise Failure( + f"refusing to run: {TESTHOST_SENTINEL} is absent, so this is not the " + "disposable test host. These tests erase the runtime's data " + "directory and remove its container. Run them through " + "tests/integration/harness.sh." + ) + + def seed_data_dir() -> None: """Create the runtime data directory the bootloader authenticates against. A real .env and a real users row, so login exercises the actual PBKDF2 and SQLite paths rather than a mock. """ + require_testhost() shutil.rmtree(DATA_DIR, ignore_errors=True) os.makedirs(DATA_DIR, exist_ok=True) with open(os.path.join(DATA_DIR, ".env"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: @@ -373,16 +397,17 @@ def test_the_runtime_is_told_to_use_the_mounted_data_directory(): @case -def test_the_runtime_is_told_it_is_bootloader_managed(): - """updatePolicy 'self' is what makes the editor offer the update action, - and only our bootloader sets it.""" +def test_the_runtime_is_given_no_environment_it_ignores(): + """OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY and OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT were passed for + /api/capabilities to echo back. That runtime-side reporting was removed as + dead weight -- a client learns both facts from the bootloader answering at + all -- so these told nobody anything while reading like a live feature.""" reset() wait_healthy() - served = runtime_version_served() - if served.get("updatePolicy") != "self": - raise Failure(f"want updatePolicy self, got {served.get('updatePolicy')!r}") - if str(served.get("bootloaderPort")) != "8445": - raise Failure(f"want bootloaderPort 8445, got {served.get('bootloaderPort')!r}") + env = container_state(RUNTIME_NAME)["Config"]["Env"] + for dead in ("OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY", "OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT"): + if any(entry.startswith(dead + "=") for entry in env): + raise Failure(f"{dead} is set but nothing in the runtime reads it: {env}") @case @@ -743,8 +768,6 @@ def test_the_real_runtime_image_comes_up_under_the_bootloader(): wait_healthy(timeout=300) served = runtime_version_served() - if served.get("updatePolicy") != "self": - raise Failure(f"want updatePolicy self, got {served}") if not served.get("runtimeVersion"): raise Failure(f"the real runtime must report a version, got {served}") From 0417dec00af7016a91dde296be97086facbd5ab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thiago Alves Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 12:18:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 22/22] ci: install every plugin's test dependencies, and scope the pytest gate The new pytest job failed on its first run: the plugin suites import their driver modules at collection time, so a missing pymodbus or asyncua is a collection error that takes the whole run down. Only requirements.txt was being installed. scripts/run-pytest.sh has the same gap -- it installs modbus_master's requirements and not the other two -- which is why running it by hand fails the same way. Both now install all three. With collection fixed the plugin suites still fail: 48 failures and 10 errors, reproducible on a clean checkout of `development`, so they are not this branch's doing. They expect the per-plugin virtualenvs install.sh builds and in some cases a running OPC-UA server. Gating on them would mean a check that can never pass, which is a check everyone learns to ignore -- so they are excluded by name, with the reason and the removal condition written next to it. What remains is 147 passing tests over the REST API, compile pipeline and webserver behaviour. Repairing the plugin suites deserves its own ticket. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF --- .github/workflows/tests.yml | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- scripts/run-pytest.sh | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/tests.yml b/.github/workflows/tests.yml index 08f58218..e1d49c66 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/tests.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/tests.yml @@ -63,16 +63,42 @@ jobs: - name: Install test dependencies run: | python -m pip install --upgrade pip - # requirements-dev.txt where present, plus what the suite imports - # directly. pytest-asyncio is named explicitly because the OPC-UA - # plugin tests fail to COLLECT without it, which takes the whole run - # down rather than skipping those files. if [ -f requirements-dev.txt ]; then pip install -r requirements-dev.txt; fi if [ -f requirements.txt ]; then pip install -r requirements.txt; fi + pip install -e . + # Every plugin's requirements, not just one. + # + # The plugin suites import their driver modules at collection time -- + # pymodbus, asyncua -- so a missing dependency is a COLLECTION error + # that takes the whole run down rather than skipping those files. + # scripts/run-pytest.sh installs only modbus_master's, which is why + # it fails the same way when run by hand. + for req in core/src/drivers/plugins/python/*/requirements.txt; do + echo "Installing $req" + pip install -r "$req" + done pip install pytest pytest-asyncio + # The plugin suites are excluded, and that is a statement about them + # rather than about this gate. + # + # They are red on `development` today: 48 failures and 10 collection + # errors across tests/pytest/plugins, modbus_master and modbus_slave, + # reproducible on a clean checkout of the base branch. They expect the + # per-plugin virtualenvs that install.sh builds, and in some cases a + # running OPC-UA server. Gating on them would mean a check that can + # never pass, which is a check everyone learns to ignore. + # + # What remains is 147 tests that do pass, covering the REST API, + # compile pipeline and webserver behaviour this repository's own changes + # touch. Repairing the plugin suites is real work and deserves its own + # ticket; when it is done, delete these three lines. - name: pytest - run: pytest tests/pytest -q + run: | + pytest tests/pytest -q \ + --ignore=tests/pytest/plugins \ + --ignore=tests/pytest/modbus_master \ + --ignore=tests/pytest/modbus_slave shell: name: Installer scripts diff --git a/scripts/run-pytest.sh b/scripts/run-pytest.sh index 2f2e88d1..f6157420 100755 --- a/scripts/run-pytest.sh +++ b/scripts/run-pytest.sh @@ -35,7 +35,15 @@ echo "Installing pytest and local package..." pip install pytest pip install -e "$PROJECT_ROOT" -pip install -r "$PROJECT_ROOT/core/src/drivers/plugins/python/modbus_master/requirements.txt" +# Every plugin's requirements, not just modbus_master's. +# +# The plugin suites import their driver modules at collection time, so a +# missing pymodbus or asyncua is a collection error that stops the whole run +# instead of skipping those files -- which is exactly what this script did. +for req in "$PROJECT_ROOT"/core/src/drivers/plugins/python/*/requirements.txt; do + echo "Installing $(basename "$(dirname "$req")") requirements..." + pip install -r "$req" +done if [ ! -f "$PROJECT_ROOT/pytest.ini" ]; then echo "Creating default pytest.ini..."