diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/5671-5672-pentesting-amqp.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/5671-5672-pentesting-amqp.md
index a65ae14ccc5..14429528f58 100644
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/5671-5672-pentesting-amqp.md
+++ b/src/network-services-pentesting/5671-5672-pentesting-amqp.md
@@ -139,6 +139,40 @@ for method, props, body in ch.consume('loot', inactivity_timeout=5):
 
 Swap the routing key for `audit.#` or `payments.*` to focus on sensitive flows, then republish forged messages by flipping `basic_publish` arguments—handy for replay attacks against downstream microservices.
 
+### Consumer-side command injection (message bus -> RCE)
+
+Treat every message broker as a potential **code-delivery primitive** when downstream consumers turn message data into shell commands, SQL, template input, or config updates. The critical anti-pattern is a worker that reads attacker-controlled content from a queue/topic and feeds it into a shell, for example `bash -c "$MESSAGE"`, `sh -c`, `os.system`, `subprocess(..., shell=True)`, `Runtime.exec`, or `Command::new("bash").arg("-c").arg(message)`.
+
+Typical exploitation chain:
+
+1. Gain **publish capability** to a queue/topic:
+   - Direct broker access with weak/default credentials or no auth
+   - Access to an HTTP publish feature such as RabbitMQ Management `POST /api/exchanges/%2F/<exchange>/publish`
+   - SSRF into an internal broker or debug endpoint that can speak raw TCP to the broker
+   - Compromise of any producer service that already writes to the target queue/topic
+2. **Locate the sink** in source/config:
+   - Workers calling shells after deserializing messages
+   - "task runners" that accept commands over the queue
+   - Consumers that rebuild config files and then execute hooks/reload scripts
+3. Publish a **benign probe** first (`id`, `whoami`, `uname -a`) to confirm execution without destroying the worker
+4. Upgrade to a reverse shell or data theft once the execution path is confirmed
+
+Things to look for during source review:
+
+- Consumer groups named `update`, `jobs`, `tasks`, `commands`, `hooks`, `admin`, `dns`, or `sync`
+- Supervisor/systemd entries launching both a broker consumer and a privileged helper in the same container
+- Log lines showing a worker executes each message and then republishes results to a second queue/topic
+
+Example RabbitMQ publish through the management API:
+
+```bash
+curl -u user:pass -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+  -X POST http://TARGET:15672/api/exchanges/%2F/amq.default/publish \
+  -d '{"properties":{},"routing_key":"update","payload":"id","payload_encoding":"string"}'
+```
+
+The same pattern appears outside AMQP. In Kafka, once you can reach the broker and craft a valid **Produce** request for the attacker-controlled topic, any consumer that forwards the message body to `bash -c` becomes an RCE sink. If the only reachable primitive is SSRF, check whether it can send **raw TCP bytes** or follow a `gopher://` redirect so you can still speak the broker protocol.
+
 ## Other RabbitMQ ports
 
 In [https://www.rabbitmq.com/networking.html](https://www.rabbitmq.com/networking.html) you can find that **rabbitmq uses several ports**:
@@ -172,5 +206,7 @@ In [https://www.rabbitmq.com/networking.html](https://www.rabbitmq.com/networkin
 - [CVE-2024-51988 – RabbitMQ HTTP API queue deletion bug](https://www.cve.news/cve-2024-51988/)
 - [GHSA-gh3x-4x42-fvq8 – RabbitMQ logs Authorization header](https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-gh3x-4x42-fvq8)
 - [rabbitmqadmin v2 (rabbitmqadmin-ng)](https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmqadmin-ng)
+- [Apache Kafka Protocol Guide](https://kafka.apache.org/41/design/protocol/)
+- [HTB: Sorcery](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/04/25/htb-sorcery.html)
 
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