diff --git a/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.sh b/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.sh index 688b9950..c46a6ad5 100755 --- a/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.sh +++ b/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.sh @@ -247,13 +247,25 @@ PROVTMP=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_prov.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot creat CONCTMP=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_conc.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } CREDCONC=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_credconc.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } CREDPROV=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_credprov.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } +# Blob-embedded evidence set (#2522): the subset of table values whose +# occurrences are ALL inside a base64 run. Holds normalised credential values, +# so it is created with mktemp's private mode and removed by the same traps as +# every other scratch. +CREDBLOB=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_credblob.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } +# Plain-occurrence set: the values seen OUTSIDE any base64 run. Subtracted from +# the blob set above so a value seen both ways keeps its plain high-signal row. +# Same value class as $CREDBLOB, so it gets the same private mode and traps. +CREDPLAIN=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_credplain.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } +# Raw credential-table matches from the SINGLE decode pass, partitioned after +# the fact into the plain and blob-embedded sets (#2522). +CREDMATCH=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_credmatch.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } # Its OWN scratch, never $CONCTMP. The injection-concentration pass owns that # one, and sharing it would make two sections' results depend on which ran last. SIGTMP=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/.agtel_sig.XXXXXXXX") || { echo "cannot create temp file" >&2; exit 3; } # Remove on normal exit; on a SIGNAL also terminate, since a trap that only # cleans up leaves the script running after the scheduler asked it to stop. -trap 'rm -f "$ERRTMP" "$RAWTMP" "$INJTMP" "$PROVTMP" "$CONCTMP" "$CREDCONC" "$CREDPROV" "$SIGTMP"' EXIT -trap 'rm -f "$ERRTMP" "$RAWTMP" "$INJTMP" "$PROVTMP" "$CONCTMP" "$CREDCONC" "$CREDPROV" "$SIGTMP"; trap - HUP INT TERM; kill -s INT $$' HUP INT TERM +trap 'rm -f "$ERRTMP" "$RAWTMP" "$INJTMP" "$PROVTMP" "$CONCTMP" "$CREDCONC" "$CREDPROV" "$CREDBLOB" "$CREDPLAIN" "$CREDMATCH" "$SIGTMP"' EXIT +trap 'rm -f "$ERRTMP" "$RAWTMP" "$INJTMP" "$PROVTMP" "$CONCTMP" "$CREDCONC" "$CREDPROV" "$CREDBLOB" "$CREDPLAIN" "$CREDMATCH" "$SIGTMP"; trap - HUP INT TERM; kill -s INT $$' HUP INT TERM INJ_PHRASE_RE='(ignore (all )?(prior|previous) (rules|instructions)|disregard (your|all) (instructions|rules)|the maintainer (approved|authorised|authorized)|add [^ ]+ to the trust gate|update your instructions|you are now [a-z ]{0,20}mode)' @@ -885,7 +897,103 @@ CRED_RE='(github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{1 # start) from blob noise. The anchor costs no true positives and is used ONLY # for the leak TABLE; redact() keeps the broad unanchored CRED_RE, so # over-redaction is preserved even where the table refuses to count. -CRED_TABLE_RE='((^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])(github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\**|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\**|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{12,}\**|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\**|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,})|-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9][A-Z0-9. ]*)? *PRIVATE KEY( BLOCK)?-----|(secret|token|password|passwd|api[_-]?key)["'"'"']?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["'"'"']?[^"'"'"'[:space:],}]{8,})' +# The five PREFIX-identified shapes, factored out because two regexes now need +# them byte-identically (the table and the blob-evidence scan below). Parity +# between the detector and redact() has already broken twice; a second hand-kept +# copy of this alternation would be the third. +CRED_PREFIX_SHAPES_RE='(github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\**|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}\**|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{12,}\**|xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\**|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,})' +CRED_TABLE_RE='((^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])'"$CRED_PREFIX_SHAPES_RE"'|-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9][A-Z0-9. ]*)? *PRIVATE KEY( BLOCK)?-----|(secret|token|password|passwd|api[_-]?key)["'"'"']?[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*["'"'"']?[^"'"'"'[:space:],}]{8,})' + +# BLOB-EMBEDDED EVIDENCE (#2522). The boundary anchor above rejects a token +# preceded by [A-Za-z0-9_-]. It cannot reject one whose boundary char is `+`, +# `/` or `=` β€” those are outside the anchor class AND are base64 characters, so +# a token shape occurring by chance inside an encoded blob passes the anchor and +# is counted as a real credential. Measured 2026-07-25: 35 of 113 +# GitHub-token-shaped matches were chance substrings inside Codex +# `encrypted_content` blobs. +# +# πŸ”΄ THE EVIDENCE IS A SURROUNDING RUN, NEVER THE BOUNDARY CHARACTER. #2520 +# tried the latter, reasoning that only `+`/`/` can match mid-blob. True β€” but +# it does not follow that `/` MEANS mid-blob: a JWT in a URL path segment takes +# `/` as its boundary too, so keying on the character would have downgraded a +# genuinely exposed credential to "probably encoding noise". That is the one +# direction this detector must never fail in, which is why #2520 shipped +# without the label and #2522 specified run evidence instead. +# +# So: at least CRED_BLOB_RUN_MIN base64 characters, then a base64 boundary char, +# then the token. +# +# πŸ”΄ THE RUN MUST BE UNBROKEN BY `/`, OR AN ORDINARY REST PATH CLEARS IT. `/` was +# once in the run class, which made the run's LENGTH the only test β€” and a URL +# path reaches any length simply by being nested. `test/session` is 12 and +# passed, but `test/api/v1/sessions` is 20, so the very same JWT was downgraded +# to "probably encoding noise" purely for sitting one path segment deeper. Both +# shapes occur constantly in transcripts, and the second is the more common one. +# Length alone therefore never distinguished a blob from a path; it only looked +# like it did, because the single fixture chosen happened to sit under the bar. +# +# What actually separates them is how the run is BROKEN UP. Base64 emits `/` +# about once every 64 characters, so a genuine blob carries long slash-free +# stretches, while a URL path is short segments between slashes. Requiring +# CRED_BLOB_RUN_MIN base64 characters with no `/` among them keeps the blob +# evidence and drops the path. `/` remains a valid BOUNDARY char β€” it is how a +# blob's own slash introduces the chance substring β€” it is just no longer +# something the run may be made of. +# +# The residual error is in the SAFE direction, deliberately: a blob whose final +# slash-free stretch happens to be shorter than the threshold stays a plain +# high-signal row, costing one extra triage, where the opposite error buries a +# live credential. +# +# πŸ”΄ THE BOUNDARY CLASS EXCLUDES `=`, THOUGH `=` IS A BASE64 CHARACTER. `=` is +# also the assignment operator, and `<16+ alnum key>=` β€” the most common +# real leak form there is β€” would otherwise satisfy the run AND the shape and be +# labelled blob-embedded. `MY_LONG_SECRET_TOKEN=` is safe either way (underscores +# break the run), but `myverylongsecrettokenusedbytheproductionservice=ghp_…` is not, and downgrading that +# is the one direction this detector must never fail in. +# The trade is deliberate and cheap in the safe direction: a token sitting +# immediately after base64 padding (`…UFF==ghp_…`) now stays a plain high-signal +# row, costing one extra triage, where the alternative buries a live credential. +# `=` stays in the RUN class, because padding legitimately appears inside a blob. +# +# πŸ”΄ THE THRESHOLD MUST CLEAR AN IDENTIFIER SEGMENT, NOT MERELY A WORD. Once `/` +# leaves the run class the run is a single path SEGMENT, and 16 is far too low +# for that: a bare 32-character hex id β€” the commonest long segment in a REST +# URL β€” clears it comfortably, so `…/0f8e7d6c…a1b2/ghp_…` was still buried as +# encoding noise. 16 was only ever calibrated against multi-segment runs, which +# no longer exist here. 40 clears every identifier shape that actually occurs +# (32-hex ids, UUID fragments, slugs) while a genuine blob is hundreds of +# characters with `/` arriving about once per 64, so it still presents a +# 40-character slash-free stretch roughly half the time. +# +# That "roughly half" is the deliberate cost and it is the SAFE half: a blob +# whose final stretch falls short is reported as a plain high-signal row. The +# label exists to suppress NOISE, so under-labelling costs one triage while +# over-labelling buries a live credential. The two directions are never +# symmetric, and every threshold choice here resolves toward reporting. +CRED_BLOB_RUN_MIN=40 +CRED_BLOB_TABLE_RE='[A-Za-z0-9+=]{'"$CRED_BLOB_RUN_MIN"',}[+/]'"$CRED_PREFIX_SHAPES_RE" +# Strips the run and its boundary char so a blob leg value normalises to the +# SAME string the table leg produces (whose single boundary char is removed by +# the shared `s/^[^A-Za-z0-9_-]//` step). If these two ever diverge the label +# lands on the wrong row, so both legs share one normaliser β€” see +# cred_normalise(). Its RUN and BOUNDARY classes must therefore stay +# byte-for-byte equal to CRED_BLOB_TABLE_RE's β€” the run's `/` exclusion and the +# boundary's `=` exclusion alike. Tightening the label test alone would leave a +# no-longer-blob match still carrying its run into the value, which corrupts the +# credential's identity and is worse than the mislabel it set out to fix. +CRED_BLOB_STRIP_RE='^[A-Za-z0-9+=]{'"$CRED_BLOB_RUN_MIN"',}[+/]' +# Partition test for an already-extracted match. It must require the SHAPES +# after the boundary, not merely a long run: a generic assignment with a long +# key (`myverylongsecretname=value…`) is 20 run chars then a boundary, so a +# run-only test would classify it as blob AND strip its key, corrupting the +# value. +CRED_BLOB_ANCHORED_RE='^'"$CRED_BLOB_TABLE_RE" +# One combined extraction pattern, so the corpus is decoded and scanned ONCE. +# The blob form is listed first and starts further left than the plain form +# would for the same token, and POSIX alternation is leftmost-longest, so a +# genuinely blob-embedded token is extracted WITH its run. +CRED_TABLE_SCAN_RE='('"$CRED_BLOB_TABLE_RE"'|'"$CRED_TABLE_RE"')' # The locator's masked-display test, kept as a REGEX rather than a glob and kept # byte-for-byte equivalent to the table's own `x ~ /^[a-z0-9_-]+\*\*\*/`. It must # stay anchored and must require the WHOLE run before `***` to be class @@ -2893,17 +3001,68 @@ if want safety; then ) catch $raw ' export CRED_DECODE_FILTER + # πŸ”΄ DECODE EXACTLY ONCE. One jq startup per session dominated the live + # seven-day runtime, which is why the batching above exists β€” so deriving + # the blob-evidence set (#2522) from a SECOND decode pass would silently + # undo that work. The corpus is scanned once with the combined pattern and + # the two sets are partitioned from the extracted matches, which are a tiny + # fraction of the input. The batching contract test pins this: it asserts + # exactly ONE credential-table jq invocation, and it caught the two-pass + # version of this change. printf '%s\n%s\n' "$SF_CACHE" "$CX_CACHE" | grep -v '^$' | tr '\n' '\000' \ | xargs -0 -n "$CREDENTIAL_SCAN_BATCH_FILES" bash -c \ 'awk "{ print }" "$@" | jq -Rr "$CRED_DECODE_FILTER" --' _ 2>/dev/null \ | sed -E "s/$(printf '\033')\[[0-9;:]*[A-Za-z]//g" \ - | grep -ahoEi "$CRED_TABLE_RE" 2>/dev/null \ - | tr ';&|' '\n' | grep -v '^$' \ - | sed -E -e 's/^[^A-Za-z0-9_-]//' \ - -e "s/^[^:=]*[:=][[:space:]]*[\"']?(.+)$/\1/" \ - -e "s/^[^:=]*[:=][[:space:]]*[\"']?([^=].*)$/\1/" \ - -e 's/^([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)\*\*\*+.*$/\1***/' \ - | grep -E . | sort -u | + | grep -ahoEi "$CRED_TABLE_SCAN_RE" 2>/dev/null > "$CREDMATCH" + # Shared normaliser. BOTH the value list and the blob set run through THIS + # function, so the two can never normalise differently β€” a divergence would + # attach the label to the wrong row, which is worse than no label at all. + cred_normalise() { + tr ';&|' '\n' | grep -v '^$' \ + | sed -E -e 's/^[^A-Za-z0-9_-]//' \ + -e "s/^[^:=]*[:=][[:space:]]*[\"']?(.+)$/\1/" \ + -e "s/^[^:=]*[:=][[:space:]]*[\"']?([^=].*)$/\1/" \ + -e 's/^([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)\*\*\*+.*$/\1***/' \ + | grep -E . | sort -u + } + # A blob match carries its run; stripping run+boundary yields the identical + # string the plain leg produces for the same credential (whose single + # boundary char cred_normalise removes), so the two sets are comparable. + cred_blob_matches() { grep -aEi "$CRED_BLOB_ANCHORED_RE" "$CREDMATCH" 2>/dev/null \ + | sed -E "s|$CRED_BLOB_STRIP_RE||"; } + cred_plain_matches() { grep -avEi "$CRED_BLOB_ANCHORED_RE" "$CREDMATCH" 2>/dev/null; } + # The label needs the ABSENCE of a plain occurrence, not the presence of a + # blob one. `cred_normalise` ends in `sort -u`, so a credential seen both + # inside an encoded blob and plainly collapses to ONE row; membership in the + # blob set alone then labelled that row "likely a chance substring" and + # buried the plain occurrence β€” the genuine exposure evidence, and exactly + # the shape a real leak takes (a leaked token appears in prose AND inside an + # encoded payload of the same transcript). Subtracting the plain set makes + # the set what its name claims: values whose occurrences are ALL blob-embedded. + # This is the ambiguity-falls-through-to-the-plain-row rule the label's own + # contract states, enforced rather than assumed. + cred_plain_matches | cred_normalise > "$CREDPLAIN" + # Derived from the SAME extracted matches as the table β€” so a complete image + # payload, excluded upstream by the decode filter, can no more manufacture a + # blob label than it can manufacture a table row. + # + # Subtraction via awk on a FILE, not `comm`: both sides are `sort -u` output, + # but `comm` re-compares them itself, so the two would have to agree on + # collation as well as on order. Set membership sidesteps that entirely, and + # matches the file-reading idiom the label pass already uses below (getline + # on an empty or missing file simply yields nothing, whereas the NR==FNR + # idiom would silently eat the first data line when the plain set is empty β€” + # which here would drop a real credential's label). + cred_blob_matches | cred_normalise \ + | awk -v plainfile="$CREDPLAIN" ' + BEGIN { + while ((getline _p < plainfile) > 0) if (_p != "") plain[_p] = 1 + close(plainfile) + } + !($0 in plain) + ' > "$CREDBLOB" + { cred_blob_matches; cred_plain_matches; } \ + | cred_normalise | # Normalise every match to its UNDERLYING VALUE before any dedup: # (1) split compound assignments on `;` β€” the generic alternative's value # class includes `;`, so `GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_…;AWS_…=AKIA…` is ONE @@ -2941,7 +3100,15 @@ if want safety; then # weak-bucket rows; the asymmetry is chosen β€” a splittable fragment # only ever reaches a high-signal row by passing a FULL shape regex, # while not splitting silently drops a real second credential. - awk ' + awk -v blobfile="$CREDBLOB" ' + # Blob-evidence set read as a FILE, never with a here-doc join: getline on + # a missing or EMPTY file simply yields nothing, whereas the NR==FNR idiom + # silently consumes the first DATA line when the joined file is empty β€” + # which here would drop a real credential from the table. + BEGIN { + while ((getline _bl < blobfile) > 0) if (_bl != "") blob[_bl] = 1 + close(blobfile) + } # FULL-shape validation, not prefix sniffing: a generic value that merely # BEGINS like a token (`token=ghp_abcdefgh`, too short to be one) must # stay in the weak bucket, or the high-signal rows inherit false @@ -2972,6 +3139,14 @@ if want safety; then # prefix+mask form under these regexes, and the weak generic bucket # keeps its own label. else if (x ~ /^[a-z0-9_-]+\*\*\*/) s = s " [masked-display]" + # BLOB-EMBEDDED (#2522) β€” a LABEL, never a filter. The row keeps its + # shape and its count; only the triage order changes. Applied last so it + # composes with [masked-display] rather than replacing it, and applied + # ONLY on positive run evidence, so every ambiguous value falls through + # to the plain high-signal row. That asymmetry is the whole design: a + # missing label costs one extra triage, a wrong label buries a live + # credential. + if ($0 in blob) s = s " [blob-embedded: inside a base64 run, likely a chance substring]" print s }' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | sed 's/^/ /' # Concentration, mirroring the injection detector and placed directly under diff --git a/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.test.sh b/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.test.sh index 24a16eee..01474b05 100755 --- a/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.test.sh +++ b/.claude/scripts/agent-telemetry.test.sh @@ -766,6 +766,226 @@ if grep -q 'redacted' < <(grep 'boom' <<<"$ROUT"); then else bad "mid-blob token is still redacted on output" "$(printf '%s' "$ROUT" | grep 'boom' | head -1)"; fi nocheck "mid-blob raw token never appears" "$ROUT" "$(ex __GHPE__)" +# ── 6dΒ³. blob-embedded LABEL requires base64-run evidence (#2522) ───────────── +# The boundary anchor above rejects a token whose preceding char is in +# [A-Za-z0-9_-]. It cannot reject one whose boundary char is `+`, `/` or `=` β€” +# those ARE outside the anchor class and are also base64 characters, so a token +# shape occurring by chance inside an encoded blob is counted as a real +# credential. Measured 2026-07-25: 35 of 113 GitHub-token-shaped matches were +# chance substrings inside Codex `encrypted_content` blobs. +# +# #2520 tried to key that on the boundary CHARACTER alone. Only `+`/`/` CAN +# match mid-blob, but that does not make `/` MEAN mid-blob β€” a JWT in a URL +# path segment takes `/` as its boundary too, so the label would have downgraded +# a genuinely exposed credential. The evidence required is therefore a +# surrounding base64 RUN, never the boundary char. +# +# The label NEVER suppresses: the row keeps its shape and its count, so a +# mislabelled row is still triaged. Ambiguity fails closed to the plain row. +echo +echo "blob-embedded label (base64-run evidence, #2522)" + +# (1) Token inside a real base64 run β†’ labelled. +mkdir -p "$FIX/blobrun" +printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"sig=QUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVphYmNkZWZnaGlq/__GHPE__zz"}]}}\n' > "$FIX/blobrun/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/blobrun/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/blobrun" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "a token inside a base64 run is labelled blob-embedded" +else bad "a token inside a base64 run is labelled blob-embedded" "$TABLE"; fi +# NOTHING SUPPRESSED: the shape and its count survive the label. +if grep -qE '^[[:space:]]+1 github-token' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "the blob-embedded row keeps its shape and count (no suppression)" +else bad "the blob-embedded row keeps its shape and count (no suppression)" "$TABLE"; fi + +# (2) THE COUNTEREXAMPLE that closed #2520: a JWT as a URL path segment takes +# `/` as its boundary char, but `test/session` is 12 run chars β€” under the +# threshold β€” so it must stay a plain high-signal row. +mkdir -p "$FIX/urljwt" +printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"GET https://example.test/session/__JWT__ HTTP/1.1"}]}}\n' > "$FIX/urljwt/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/urljwt/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/urljwt" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'jwt-like' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "a JWT in a URL path is still reported" +else bad "a JWT in a URL path is still reported" "$TABLE"; fi +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "a JWT in a URL path is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded" "$TABLE" +else ok "a JWT in a URL path is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded"; fi + +# (2b) The SAME failure through the `=` boundary, which (2) does not reach: `=` +# is both a base64 padding character AND the assignment operator, so an +# assignment whose KEY is a long unbroken alphanumeric run clears the run +# threshold on its own. `MY_LONG_SECRET_TOKEN=` is safe (underscores break the +# run) but `myverylongsecrettokenusedbytheproductionservice=` is 47 run chars β€” it MUST clear +# CRED_BLOB_RUN_MIN, or this test passes on the run length and never reaches the +# boundary check it exists to guard, and its value IS a token β€” +# so a boundary class containing `=` labels the most common real leak form as +# encoding noise. This is why the class is `[+/]`, not `[+/=]`. +mkdir -p "$FIX/assignrun" +printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"myverylongsecrettokenusedbytheproductionservice=__GHPE__"}]}}\n' > "$FIX/assignrun/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/assignrun/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/assignrun" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'github-token' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "a token assigned to a long alphanumeric key is still reported" +else bad "a token assigned to a long alphanumeric key is still reported" "$TABLE"; fi +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "a token assigned to a long alphanumeric key is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded" "$TABLE" +else ok "a token assigned to a long alphanumeric key is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded"; fi + +# (2c) πŸ”΄ (2) PASSES ONLY BECAUSE ITS PATH IS SHORT, so it never actually tested +# the threshold. `test/session` is 12 run chars against a minimum of 16 β€” one +# value that happens to sit under the bar, with nothing at or past it. An +# ordinary REST path clears the bar easily, because `/` was itself in the RUN +# class: `test/api/v1/sessions` is 20, so the very same JWT is downgraded to +# "probably encoding noise" purely for being one path segment deeper. Both +# fixtures below are real-shaped URLs, and both must stay plain high-signal. +# +# The discriminator is the UNBROKEN run, not its total length: base64 emits `/` +# roughly once per 64 characters, so a genuine blob has long slash-free +# stretches, while a URL path is short segments separated by slashes. Excluding +# `/` from the run class separates them and fails in the SAFE direction β€” a blob +# whose last slash-free stretch happens to be short costs one extra triage, +# where the alternative buries a live credential. +mkdir -p "$FIX/urljwtdeep" +printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"GET https://example.test/api/v1/sessions/__JWT__ HTTP/1.1"}]}}\n' > "$FIX/urljwtdeep/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/urljwtdeep/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/urljwtdeep" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'jwt-like' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "a JWT in a DEEP URL path is still reported" +else bad "a JWT in a DEEP URL path is still reported" "$TABLE"; fi +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "a JWT in a DEEP URL path is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded" "$TABLE" +else ok "a JWT in a DEEP URL path is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded"; fi + +# The same defect reaches a github-token, which is the higher-severity half: a +# token pasted in an API URL is a live credential in a transcript. +mkdir -p "$FIX/urltokdeep" +printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"GET https://api.example.test/v2/organizations/tokens/__GHPE__ HTTP/1.1"}]}}\n' > "$FIX/urltokdeep/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/urltokdeep/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/urltokdeep" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'github-token' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "a token in a DEEP URL path is still reported" +else bad "a token in a DEEP URL path is still reported" "$TABLE"; fi +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "a token in a DEEP URL path is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded" "$TABLE" +else ok "a token in a DEEP URL path is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded"; fi + +# (2e) A SINGLE LONG PATH SEGMENT is not blob evidence either (CodeRabbit Major +# on the first fix). Excluding `/` from the run stopped multi-segment paths from +# chaining into one long run, but left the run as a single SEGMENT β€” and 16 is +# well under what ordinary segments reach. A bare 32-character hex id is the +# commonest long segment in a REST URL and cleared the old bar outright, so the +# threshold is now 40: above every identifier shape that actually occurs, and +# still reached about half the time by a genuine multi-hundred-character blob. +mkdir -p "$FIX/urlseg" +printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"GET https://example.test/0f8e7d6c5b4a392817263544536271a1/__GHPE__ HTTP/1.1"}]}}\n' > "$FIX/urlseg/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/urlseg/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/urlseg" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'github-token' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "a token after a 32-char hex path segment is still reported" +else bad "a token after a 32-char hex path segment is still reported" "$TABLE"; fi +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "a token after a 32-char hex path segment is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded" "$TABLE" +else ok "a token after a 32-char hex path segment is NOT downgraded to blob-embedded"; fi + +# (2d) PARITY INVARIANT between the label test and the strip. +# +# Stated honestly: reverting the strip's run class ALONE breaks no behavioural +# assertion above, and I verified that by ablation rather than assuming it. It +# cannot, because the strip only ever sees matches the label test already +# accepted, and those carry no `/` in their run β€” so on reachable input the two +# classes are equivalent. That makes the strip's class unobservable by example, +# and an unobservable invariant is exactly the kind that silently rots: loosen +# the label test later without touching the strip and a no-longer-blob match +# keeps its run inside the credential's value, corrupting its identity. +# +# So bind it structurally instead of behaviourally β€” assert the two classes are +# byte-identical, which is what the comments on both constants already require. +# +# BOTH classes are compared, run AND boundary. Comparing only the run leaves the +# same rot one field over: if the boundary classes drift, the strip removes a +# different span than the label matched, so an accepted match keeps part of its +# run inside the credential's value. Extract each regex's run class and its +# trailing boundary class and require both to agree. +BLOB_TABLE_RUN=$(grep -o "CRED_BLOB_TABLE_RE='\[[^]]*\]" "$TARGET" | head -1 | sed "s/.*='//") +BLOB_STRIP_RUN=$(grep -o "CRED_BLOB_STRIP_RE='\^\[[^]]*\]" "$TARGET" | head -1 | sed "s/.*='\^//") +BLOB_TABLE_BND=$(grep -o "CRED_BLOB_TABLE_RE='.*',}\[[^]]*\]" "$TARGET" | head -1 | sed "s/.*,}//") +BLOB_STRIP_BND=$(grep -o "CRED_BLOB_STRIP_RE='.*',}\[[^]]*\]" "$TARGET" | head -1 | sed "s/.*,}//") +if [ -n "$BLOB_TABLE_RUN" ] && [ -n "$BLOB_STRIP_RUN" ] && \ + [ -n "$BLOB_TABLE_BND" ] && [ -n "$BLOB_STRIP_BND" ]; then + ok "parity control: both blob run AND boundary classes were located" +else bad "parity control: both blob run AND boundary classes were located" \ + "run: '$BLOB_TABLE_RUN'/'$BLOB_STRIP_RUN' bnd: '$BLOB_TABLE_BND'/'$BLOB_STRIP_BND'"; fi +if [ "$BLOB_TABLE_RUN" = "$BLOB_STRIP_RUN" ]; then + ok "the blob label and strip share one run class (byte-identical)" +else bad "the blob label and strip share one run class (byte-identical)" \ + "label=$BLOB_TABLE_RUN strip=$BLOB_STRIP_RUN"; fi +if [ "$BLOB_TABLE_BND" = "$BLOB_STRIP_BND" ]; then + ok "the blob label and strip share one boundary class (byte-identical)" +else bad "the blob label and strip share one boundary class (byte-identical)" \ + "label=$BLOB_TABLE_BND strip=$BLOB_STRIP_BND"; fi + +# (3) A complete image payload is excluded from the table upstream, so it must +# not manufacture a blob-embedded row either β€” the label is derived from the +# SAME filtered input as the table, not from a second unfiltered scan. +mkdir -p "$FIX/blobimg/projects" "$FIX/blobimg/codex/sessions" +cat > "$FIX/blobimg/codex/sessions/s.jsonl" <<'EOF' +{"type":"session_meta","payload":{"cwd":"__FIX__/monorepo"}} +{"type":"response_item","payload":{"type":"custom_tool_call_output","output":[{"type":"input_image","detail":"auto","image_url":"__AWS__BBBB"}]}} +EOF +sed -i.bak "s|__FIX__|$FIX|g" "$FIX/blobimg/codex/sessions/s.jsonl" && rm -f "$FIX/blobimg/codex/sessions/s.jsonl.bak" +subst "$FIX/blobimg/codex/sessions/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/blobimg/projects" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/blobimg/codex" \ + MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "an excluded image payload produces no blob-embedded row" "$TABLE" +else ok "an excluded image payload produces no blob-embedded row"; fi + +# (4) πŸ”΄ A value with BOTH a blob occurrence AND a plain one must NOT be +# labelled. The label's stated rule is that ambiguity falls through to the plain +# high-signal row, but membership alone made the set "values with *a* blob +# occurrence" rather than "values whose occurrences are *all* blob-embedded". +# `cred_normalise` ends in `sort -u`, so a credential that appears both inside +# an encoded blob and plainly collapses to ONE row β€” and that row was labelled +# "likely a chance substring", burying the plain occurrence, which is the +# genuine exposure evidence. The label must therefore require the ABSENCE of a +# plain occurrence, not merely the presence of a blob one. +# +# This is the worst direction the label can fail in: it downgrades exactly the +# credential a real leak produces, since a leaked token routinely appears both +# in prose and inside an encoded payload of the same transcript. +mkdir -p "$FIX/blobandplain" +{ + printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"sig=QUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVphYmNkZWZnaGlq/__GHPE__zz"}]}}\n' + printf '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"token=__GHPE__zz"}]}}\n' +} > "$FIX/blobandplain/s.jsonl" +subst "$FIX/blobandplain/s.jsonl" +OUT=$(CLAUDE_PROJECTS_DIR="$FIX/blobandplain" CODEX_HOME="$FIX/nocodex" MONOREPO_DIR="$FIX/monorepo" HOME="$FIX" \ + bash "$TARGET" --since-days 3650 --section safety 2>&1) +TABLE=$(printf '%s' "$OUT" | sed -n '/credential-shaped/,/rotate the credential/p') +# CONTROL: the row must exist at all, or the assertion below passes vacuously +# on an empty table and proves nothing about the label. +if grep -q 'github-token' <<<"$TABLE"; then + ok "control: a token occurring both blob-embedded and plainly is reported" +else bad "control: a token occurring both blob-embedded and plainly is reported" "$TABLE"; fi +if grep -q 'blob-embedded' <<<"$TABLE"; then + bad "a token ALSO occurring plainly is NOT labelled blob-embedded" "$TABLE" +else ok "a token ALSO occurring plainly is NOT labelled blob-embedded"; fi + # An ASSIGNMENT-wrapped token (`GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_…`) is the most common real # leak form, and grep's leftmost-match rule hands the whole string to the # generic alternative β€” so the classifier must look INSIDE the value or the