| title | Threat Modeling | Security Alliance | |||||||||||||||
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| description | Threat modeling for Web3 systems: structure assets, threats, and mitigations with STRIDE-oriented analysis and maintain models as systems change. | |||||||||||||||
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🔑 Key Takeaway: Threat modeling is a structured way to decide which abuses matter before they happen — name assets, threats, and mitigations, then keep the model current as the system changes.
Threat modeling identifies how a system can fail under attack and which controls reduce that risk. In Web3, models must cover smart contracts and keys, plus the operators, front ends, oracles, bridges, and admin paths that move or influence real value.
A practical threat model answers:
- What are we building and where are the trust boundaries?
- What assets matter (funds, keys, governance, availability, integrity of data)?
- Who might attack them and through which entry points?
- Which controls reduce likelihood or impact — and who owns them?
Models go stale. Treat them as living documents tied to design changes and major releases.
- Create and Maintain Threat Models: step-by-step modeling, upkeep, and common tools.
- Identify and Mitigate Threats: STRIDE-oriented enumeration, attack surface analysis, and mitigation patterns.
- Secure Software Development
- Security Testing
- External Security Reviews
- Incident Management
- Monitoring
- OWASP Threat Modeling
- OWASP Threat Dragon
- NIST SP 800-154 Guide to Data-Centric System Threat Modeling