RTOP-283: update the runtime from the editor, over Docker - #190
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The editor needs to know whether it may offer a version change before it offers one, and it needs that answer before login -- so updatePolicy joins the unauthenticated /api/capabilities payload alongside sidecarPort. Resolution is capability-based, not identity-based: an explicit OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY wins (the sidecar sets "self" when it creates the runtime container, an OEM sets "none"), otherwise a containerized runtime is "managed" -- somebody else created it and therefore chose the image tag, which is the version -- and a native install is "manual". Sniffing for orchestrator-shaped networks or cgroup patterns would have been a guess that can be wrong in both directions; this cannot report "self" unless our own sidecar said so. An unrecognised override falls through to detection, so a typo can only ever cost us an update we were allowed to make, never grant one we were not. Host facts for the Runtime Status header land on a new authenticated /api/device-info. Separate blueprint because restapi.py sits at pylint's per-module line ceiling and host metadata is not PLC control; its static rule outranks restapi_bp's /api/<command> catch-all, which a test pins. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First half of the sidecar from RTOP-283: the piece that makes a device reachable when its runtime will not start. It reconciles the runtime container at boot, then blocks on the Docker events stream and does nothing until something happens -- no timers, no polling. Go with no third-party dependencies, on scratch, 8 MB. This is the component that has to work when everything else is broken, so every dependency is a way for that recovery to fail; the Engine API is JSON over a unix socket, which net/http speaks natively. It cross-compiles for all three architectures from a native runner, so its workflow job needs no QEMU and takes seconds rather than the minutes the runtime image spends under emulation. Two decisions are load-bearing and encoded in tests rather than comments: Reconcile ADOPTS a healthy running container. The sidecar restarts far more often than the runtime does -- its own crash, a self-update -- and a reconcile that recreated or bounced a working runtime would turn a sidecar hiccup into a plant outage. A healthy restart does NOT clear the crash window. The common crash-loop shape is die, come back up fine, die again, because a program that faults on load lets the webserver start before it takes the process down. Clearing the count on each healthy start zeroed the evidence between crashes, so the threshold was unreachable and the supervisor restarted forever instead of handing the device over -- caught by the tests, fixed by letting the sliding window forget by age alone. Health stops at "the webserver came up". plc_main, PLC state and program faults belong to runtimemanager._monitor(), which already restarts and safe-modes them. A sidecar that watched PLC state would let bad ST trigger a runtime rollback. runtimespec is the single place the container's flags live, and it has no field for CpuQuota/NanoCpus/Memory at all -- those enable the cgroup CPU controller, and under CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED a non-root cgroup starts at rt_runtime_us = 0, which makes SCHED_FIFO fail silently. Operator-supplied mounts may only be added, never substituted, and the docker socket is refused outright: handing it to the runtime would give its API the host. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidecar must be able to authenticate a caller while the runtime is DOWN -- cold recovery after a reboot is exactly when there is no runtime to ask -- so it reads the runtime's .env and restapi.db directly, mounted read-only. No second user database: one set of accounts on the device, nothing to keep in sync or forget to revoke. It can read accounts and never write them, so first-user bootstrap stays in the runtime alone. That means reimplementing two formats Python owns, which is the same hazard as the ctypes mirror in shared/plugin_runtime_args.py -- silent drift whose symptom is every login failing on a device nobody can log into to diagnose. Both sides now pin one shared vector, generated by werkzeug and flask_jwt_extended themselves: the Go tests verify it, and test_sidecar_auth_vector.py asserts those libraries still produce and accept the identical bytes, so an upgrade breaks a test on the side that changed. modernc.org/sqlite is the sidecar's first dependency and the reason the "no third-party dependencies" note in go.mod is now qualified rather than absolute; reading the users table is what cold recovery needs, and a second credential store would have been the worse trade. Pure Go, so CGO stays off and the image stays on scratch. That pulled the toolchain to Go 1.25, which also let the hand-rolled PBKDF2 go in favour of stdlib crypto/pbkdf2. The JWT code never reads "alg" from the header -- HS256 is a constant, so a token asking for "none" simply fails the HMAC. Unknown user and wrong password return the same error and spend comparable time, since answering differently for the two enumerates valid accounts. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
"Sidecar" describes where the container sits; "bootloader" describes what it does, and the embedded analogy is exact. A bootloader is the small, rarely-changed program that starts the real firmware and stays reachable to flash a new image when that firmware is broken or missing -- which is precisely this component's job and its reason to exist, since many vendors do not allow SSH and without something that outlives a bad runtime there is no way back onto the device. The name also carries the constraint, which is why it is worth the churn: a bootloader is kept deliberately dumb because it is the one thing no other mechanism can recover. That is already the design -- no program uploads, no PLC control, no opinion on PLC state -- and the name now says so at every call site instead of only in a comment. Mechanical throughout: directory, Go module path, binary, image name, independent version line (bootloader-vN), state directory, the OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT variable and the bootloaderPort field on /api/capabilities. Renaming that field is free today because nothing consumes it yet -- it has not shipped. Two things came out in the wash rather than being pure substitution: resolve_update_policy and resolve_bootloader_port are now public, since the resolution rules are what the tests need to pin and a decision this security-relevant should be callable directly rather than reached through a module reload; and the package docs no longer describe the component by its position in the deployment. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
The interface to the component that recovers a device, kept to the shortest list that does the job: say what state you are in, show the runtime's logs, restart it. No program uploads and no PLC control -- those belong to the runtime, and a bootloader that could do them would be a second, less-reviewed path to the same capability. A test pins their absence so adding one has to be a decision rather than a route somebody dropped in. Capabilities is unauthenticated, for the same reason the runtime's is: a client must be able to tell what it reached, and whether the device is in recovery, before it has credentials. Everything else needs a token from the runtime's own account set -- and with no accounts on the device the bootloader accepts nothing at all, since first-user bootstrap belongs to the runtime alone. Its own TLS certificate, persisted in the bootloader's state directory. The runtime generates its certificate inside its image, so there is nothing to share, and it could not serve TLS before the runtime had ever started -- which is precisely the case recovery exists for. Persisting rather than regenerating keeps the fingerprint stable across reboots, because a fingerprint that changes on every boot just trains operators to click through warnings. ECDSA P-256: RSA keygen on a Pi-class CPU is slow enough to notice at first boot. Wiring the API into main surfaced a genuine crash path, now fixed and tested: openRuntimeCredentials legitimately returns a nil *UserStore on a device whose runtime has never started, and a typed nil in an interface is not nil at the call site, so the first request would have dereferenced nil and panicked the bootloader into a Docker restart loop -- on exactly the device that most needs a way in. Every UserStore method now tolerates a nil receiver and reports ErrNoDatabase, which the API answers as 503 with a message about the account database rather than a 401 blaming the caller's credentials. Verified against a live Docker daemon with a deliberately nonexistent image tag: the bootloader generated its certificate, served capabilities over HTTPS, got a real 404 from the daemon, entered recovery, and answered 503 on the authenticated route instead of crashing. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
The order is the safety property:
pull new -> stop old -> start new -> health-gate -> remove old
Pull first because `docker pull` is non-destructive. Until the explicit
removal at the end the device still has a working image on disk, so a link
that dies mid-pull or a new version that will not start leaves something to
fall back to -- and it costs nothing, since only one image remains
afterwards and you cannot start a version you have not downloaded anyway.
Tests pin the sequence, and pin that a failed pull never stops the running
runtime.
Upgrade and downgrade are one operation with no version floor. Reinstalling
the version already running is allowed too: it is the only repair an
operator can perform from the editor when an image is damaged.
The spec records the new version BEFORE the container is recreated, so a
power cut mid-swap boots the version it was moving to -- whose image is by
then on disk -- rather than silently reverting to one the operator was told
had been replaced.
No automatic rollback. A failure stops and hands the device to recovery,
because choosing a version has physical consequences and guessing wrong
twice is worse than stopping once. Failing to remove the OLD image is the
one exception: the new version is running, disk was merely not reclaimed,
and rolling back a working runtime over that would be absurd.
Version strings are validated against Docker's tag grammar before use. The
reference is built as repository + ":" + version, so a slash, colon or '@'
could otherwise redirect the pull to another repository, another registry,
or a digest.
The pull carries a STALL timeout rather than a total one. Docker's streaming
pull takes no timeout at all, so a half-open registry connection parks the
decoder forever -- the failure orchestrator-agent documents, where an entry
stuck in "pulling" refused every retry for the life of the process. A total
timeout would instead punish a slow-but-working link, which is the normal
case: the SLM-RP4 measured 461 KB/s with 48% iowait and took 59 minutes for
a 974 MB image without ever stalling.
The disk pre-check is advisory. It measures the bootloader's own filesystem,
which is Docker's only on a default layout -- a device with a moved
data-root (as the AM62xx Yocto board has) would otherwise be blocked by a
measurement of the wrong disk.
Also adds the runtime HEALTHCHECK the bootloader reads off the events
stream, and fixes the three /api/ping examples in docs/DOCKER.md: ping is
JWT-gated, so `curl -f` against it always returned 401 and that healthcheck
could never have passed.
RTOP-283
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
Found on hardware, and it would have silently defeated the entire point of keeping runtime data outside the container. The bind mount alone is not enough. The runtime resolves its persistent data directory by DETECTION, not by what is mounted: config.py::get_persistent_data_dir() returns /var/run/runtime whenever is_running_in_container() is true. So the containerized runtime wrote a fresh .env and restapi.db inside the container and never touched the mounted ones -- observed directly on the SLM-RP4, with the container's own .env under /var/run/runtime while the mounted restapi.db, project_snapshot/ and retain.bin sat unused beside it. Every version swap would therefore have discarded users, credentials, the stored project, retained variables and any VPP licenses, while appearing to work. It surfaced as the bootloader's token being rejected by the runtime with "Signature verification failed" -- two services, two different .env files, two different JWT secrets. Fixed by setting OPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR to the bound path, which config.py already honours. Only the persistent directory is redirected; RUNTIME_DIR keeps its default so the command and log sockets stay container-internal, which is correct since they are ephemeral and both endpoints live in the same container. Verified after the fix: /var/run/runtime holds only the two sockets, and both services now log in the same operator against the same database. Also drops the claim that tokens are interchangeable between the two services. They are not, and they do not need to be: what is shared is the credential database, not a session. The editor keeps the user's credentials after login and logs in to the bootloader separately when it needs to, so each service owns its own sessions. The claim set still mirrors flask_jwt_extended's, so VerifyToken can read a runtime-issued token if one is ever presented -- it is simply no longer a promise. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
A device that cannot be found cannot be repaired. The runtime owns UDP 33333 normally, so when it is down nothing answers and a failed update makes the device vanish from the editor's list at exactly the moment somebody needs to reach it. The responder runs ONLY in recovery mode, which is what keeps the two from ever competing: recovery is defined as "the runtime container is stopped" -- the supervisor stops it before entering that state -- so exclusivity holds by construction rather than by coordination. Wired to the supervisor's existing recovery and healthy transitions, so the port goes back to the runtime as soon as it is up. The protocol is the runtime's byte for byte, and the constants are pinned by a test: a drift in the magic string or the port would mean the editor simply does not see a device in recovery, which is a silent failure. The reply says service "openplc-bootloader" rather than impersonating the runtime, and states recovery as its own field so a client keys off data rather than inferring meaning from a name. It carries the bootloader's port -- handing that over is the whole reason the reply exists -- plus the version that was being installed and the supervisor's own reason, so a device list can say why without anyone logging in first. The cost is that an editor predating this field will not show a device in recovery; it could not have done anything about one either, and the alternative is a client that believes it found a working runtime and then fails against every endpoint. Unknown payloads, oversized packets and repeat probes inside the rate-limit window are dropped in silence, matching the runtime and keeping this from becoming an amplification target. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
…h the runtime `sudo ./install.sh` now installs no toolchain and compiles nothing: it ensures a container engine, writes the bootloader's spec, and starts the bootloader. `--native` keeps today's source build verbatim for MSYS2 and for targets that cannot host an engine -- a supported path, not a deprecated one. MSYS2 is forced to native regardless of what was asked, since failing later inside a docker command would be worse than saying so up front. Docker is the only dependency this path adds. We install no unit of our own: Docker's `--restart always` starts the bootloader at boot and the bootloader starts the runtime. The engine's OWN unit is enabled explicitly even when the daemon is already running, because an engine that is up now but disabled leaves the device dead after a power cycle -- the kind of failure nobody notices until it matters. Re-running is safe and is the intended way to add a board mount: it rewrites the spec and replaces the bootloader without touching the runtime container, so it never interrupts a running PLC. The new bootloader adopts whatever it finds healthy. The spec is written atomically, since a half-written one would stop the bootloader parsing it at all. The integration suite then caught the piece that made this incomplete: the supervisor never pulled the image it was told to run. install.sh writes the spec without pulling anything, so a fresh install went straight to recovery with "No such image" -- and so did any device whose spec named a version whose image had been retired. The supervisor now pulls when, and only when, the image is absent; re-pulling on every restart would turn each one into a network round trip and, on a slow link, minutes of delay before a working PLC came back. Download progress goes into the status reason as it happens, so the editor shows "downloading 50%" rather than an apparently hung device. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
…image Found by the integration suite, and it defeated the entire feature while reporting success. A container is created from an image reference and keeps it for life, so after a version change the existing container IS the old version. Reconcile saw "exists but stopped" and simply started it again -- so the update swapped nothing, reported success, and left the device running the version it had. The tests that caught it are unambiguous once the mechanism is visible: an upgrade left the container on the old image, and a spec whose extra environment should have made the new version fail instead came up fine, because the new spec was never applied to anything. Reconcile now compares the running container's image against the spec's and recreates on a mismatch, which is what makes it a reconcile rather than "start whatever is there". It also covers an operator editing the spec by hand -- a board mount, an environment variable -- and restarting the bootloader: the container is rebuilt from the spec instead of silently keeping its old configuration. The unit tests missed this because the Docker fake did not model Config.Image, so every container looked like the one the spec wanted. It does now, and two tests pin both halves: a mismatch is recreated, and a match is still adopted untouched -- adoption being the property that stops a bootloader restart from bouncing a working PLC. Also adds the integration harness that found it: a Debian container running its own Docker daemon and a registry, so pulls, swaps, health-gates, recovery, discovery and auth are exercised against real Docker rather than fakes. Debian rather than docker:dind because install.sh's engine handling is part of what needs testing. A stub runtime with failure knobs covers the paths a real image cannot be asked to take on demand; one case runs the real runtime image. Hardware -- SPI, GPIO, VPP plugins, real SCHED_FIFO latency -- is explicitly out of scope here and stays with the device. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
`image_present` used `docker image inspect`, which prints "[]" on stdout for
a missing image and signals absence only through its exit code -- so an
empty-stdout check returned True for everything. That reported a false
failure on the upgrade case ("the previous image should have been retired"
when it had been), and, worse, made two assertions that rely on it pass no
matter what happened: that a failed pull leaves the working image alone, and
that a failed start leaves the previous one recoverable. Both are now real,
via `docker images -q`, which prints an id or nothing.
Docker was doing the right thing all along -- it untags a shared image
happily even while a container runs from another of its tags, which a direct
experiment in the harness confirmed before this was changed.
With that, and the earlier container-existence and isolation fixes, the suite
is 17/17. It found two genuine product bugs along the way that unit tests
with fakes could not: the runtime ignoring its mounted data directory, and
Reconcile restarting a stale container instead of recreating it on a version
change.
RTOP-283
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
A container cannot replace itself: removing it kills the process doing the removing, halfway through. So the bootloader spawns a ONE-SHOT child from the new image and that child does the swap from outside -- the same shape orchestrator-agent's tools/upgrade_self.py uses in production. The runtime container is never touched, and a test pins that. Losing the ability to manage a device is a bad afternoon; stopping its plant is a different category of problem. It is also why the failure mode is acceptable: if the new bootloader will not start, Docker's restart policy keeps trying while the PLC carries on. The child reproduces the parent's configuration from the RUNNING container rather than from defaults, because an operator may have installed with extra mounts or a non-standard port and a swap that quietly dropped them would leave a device subtly wrong in a way nobody would connect to "the bootloader updated itself". Its command-line flags -- the state directory and port -- are carried over for the same reason. Three details that would each have been a nasty bug: The self-update environment is stripped from the replacement, or the new bootloader starts in child mode and tries to replace itself forever. PATH is dropped too, since it belongs to the image and carrying the old one forward is how a replacement ends up running with stale defaults. The helper gets RestartPolicy "no", because a container whose job is to delete its parent would re-run the swap on every daemon start. The pull happens before anything is touched, so a version that cannot be fetched leaves the running bootloader entirely alone. A parent that has already vanished is not an error -- a previous attempt may have got that far -- and recreating from defaults beats leaving a device with no bootloader at all. Identification refuses to guess: every caller is about to delete whatever it names, so a miss on both $HOSTNAME and the conventional name is reported rather than assumed. The repository is never taken from the request. A bootloader pulling its replacement from wherever a caller named would be a way to run an arbitrary image as host root; the env override exists for the integration harness, which has no route to ghcr.io, and is set at install time. Verified against real Docker: the bootloader replaced itself under its own name with a new container id while the runtime container kept the same id, the same start time, and kept running. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
Both of these were found on the SLM-RP4, doing the thing the feature exists to do, and neither was reachable from the harness. A failed pull stopped a RUNNING PLC. Nothing had been touched -- no image fetched, no container replaced -- yet the failure path went straight to recovery, which stops the runtime. A bad version name, a full disk or an unreachable registry would each have taken a working plant offline. Failures are now split: one that happens before the swap begins leaves the runtime entirely alone, and only a failure after the container has been replaced hands the device to an operator. My own integration test had waved this through with a comment saying the container "may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine"; it was not fine, and the test now asserts the opposite. A pull failure with the image already present is not a failure. On the device a locally tagged image produced "pull access denied" and failed an update that was entirely ready to succeed -- the version was right there. That also covers an air-gapped device with a side-loaded image and a registry that is merely unreachable. Same policy as orchestrator-agent's _pull_runtime_image: only a confirmed local copy excuses a failed pull, so no local copy still fails, with the registry's own message. And a refused update left the supervisor reporting "updating" forever. BeginUpdate moves it there and EndUpdate only releases the claim, so a device that merely declined a bad version described itself as mid-update to the editor indefinitely while the PLC ran happily underneath. The before-swap path now re-derives state from the container. Verified on hardware after the fix: with the PLC RUNNING, an update to a nonexistent version failed and left it RUNNING; an update to a locally present image swapped the container to it and came back healthy; users, .env, restapi.db, retain.bin, project_snapshot and the vpp/ licence directory all survived the swap; and a re-upload rebuilt the program and the VPP plugin on the new version, ending at PLC RUNNING with the physical GPIO mode switch read as "run" and TASK0 at 1339 scans, 1 us average, 0 overruns. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
The assertion this replaces said the container "may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine". It was not fine, and writing that down is what let the bug reach hardware: on the SLM-RP4 a failed pull stopped a RUNNING PLC. The case now checks what actually matters -- same container, still running, not in recovery. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
The daemon holds a stop request open for the whole grace period before it resorts to SIGKILL, and the shared unary client's fixed 30s timeout is exactly equal to the default grace -- so every swap raced it. Seen on the SLM-RP4 as "Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers" on a stop that was proceeding perfectly well, after which the runtime was killed by the force-remove path instead of being shut down cleanly. For a PLC that means skipping the SIGTERM handler that flushes retained variables. Stops now bound their own duration with a context of grace + margin, through a helper for calls the daemon legitimately holds open. RTOP-283 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
A device installed from a side-loaded image keeps a bare repository name
in its spec ("openplc-runtime"), which Docker resolves against Docker Hub.
Every pull then fails with "repository does not exist" against a tag that
is perfectly real, and the message blames the tag.
Report the daemon's own reason rather than the whole wrapped chain, and
name the configured repository when it has no registry host -- that is
the part nobody would think to check, and it is the actual cause.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
The Runtime Status header was fed by the runtime's /api/device-info, which exists only in a runtime carrying this change. Every device in the field runs one that does not, so the header was blank on exactly the devices an operator opens it to look at. The bootloader is the right source: it is present wherever an update is possible at all, and it reads these from the Docker daemon, which runs on the host and answers for it -- a runtime inside a container can only describe its own namespace, where the hostname is a container id. Report only facts that vary between machines. "Runs in a container" and "updates itself" were both there and are neither: a client that reached this handler has already learned them from the bootloader answering. The runtime side goes with it -- device-info, the update-policy resolver and the two capabilities fields nothing ever read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
Updating a runtime meant SSH, a clone, and a toolchain. This makes it: curl -fsSL https://runtime.getedge.me | sudo bash The script is self-contained: it installs Docker if missing, starts the bootloader and runtime, and needs no repository on disk. --native still builds from source, and still needs a checkout, which is why the one-liner cannot reach it. Stop any systemd OpenPLC it finds first. openplc.service (v3) and openplc-runtime.service (v4 source) both bind 8443, so left running the container starts, fails to bind, and the editor still reaches the OLD runtime -- a confusing failure, and the likeliest thing to go wrong on a device that has been in the field. What was stood down is recorded so --uninstall can put it back exactly as it was, started or merely enabled. Two things testing on hardware changed: The pull now happens BEFORE anything is disturbed, and a failure after that point restores the displaced runtime. With the pull inside start_bootloader, a device that could not reach the registry had already had its runtime stopped and disabled when the download failed -- a failed install left it with no PLC at all. --uninstall keeps /var/lib/openplc-runtime by default. That directory is not ours alone: webserver/config.py resolves it for native installs too, which is what makes moving a device to containers carry over its users and project -- and what made deleting it destroy the data of the runtime the uninstall had just restored. --purge deletes it, and is refused while a systemd runtime is being handed back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
…ists The job existed and built from bootloader/VERSION, but it rebuilt and overwrote on every trigger. A run of runtime tags with an unchanged bootloader therefore replaced a digest devices had already installed, with no version change to show for it -- and made "which bootloader is on this device" unanswerable. It now checks the registry first. An existing version is left exactly as it is: the runtime ships, the bootloader does not move. Bumping bootloader/VERSION is the only thing that produces a new image. `latest` is what a fresh install pulls, so it only moves for a stable version from a release tag or main -- a development push publishes its own version for testing without becoming the default every new device gets. When a version was already published and later reaches main, latest is repointed with a registry-side manifest copy rather than a rebuild, so the digest stays the one that was tested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
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Review: RTOP-283 runtime self-update over Docker
Verdict: needs changes. Three findings block the merge on their own: the runtime image build is broken by the new install.sh dispatch, the supervisor swallows genuine crashes after its first recovery, and a fresh install has an unusable bootloader API until the container is restarted. The rest are required fixes on the safety, auth and concurrency paths, plus two nits. Full-bar review (target is development). Findings are inline, each tagged with a severity.
What CI proves here
Nothing. No workflow in this repository has a pull_request trigger (docker.yml fires on tag/branch pushes and dispatch; windows-installer.yml on tags). The only go test invocation is inside bootloader/Dockerfile:44, which runs only when bootloader/VERSION names a tag not yet in GHCR (docker.yml:149-166), so once bootloader-v1.0.0 is published a bootloader change without a VERSION bump gets zero automated testing. pytest and the integration harness run nowhere in CI, and the harness has no test subcommand. A pull_request workflow running go test ./... in bootloader/ and bash scripts/run-pytest.sh would close this gap.
Local validation run for this review
go vet ./...inbootloader/: clean (golang:1.25 container, checkout mounted).go test -race -count=1 ./...: 8/8 packages pass;bootloader(main) andinternal/healthhave no test files. The races and leaks reported inline are not exercised by the unit tests because the fakes never read shared state concurrently or model Docker's 304 / no-die-event behaviour.- pytest and the integration harness were not run: no venv here, and the harness needs a local image (
openplc-runtime:retain-gate-final) that nothing in the repo builds.
Claims in the description, checked against the code
| Claim | Status |
|---|---|
A failed pull never touches a running PLC (errBeforeSwap) |
Holds (updater.go:229-269; asserted by updater_test.go:273-312) |
| A pull that fails with the image present still succeeds | Holds (updater.go:250-257) |
| Spec written before the container is recreated | Holds in code (updater.go:264-278); no directory fsync after the rename, and the test only reloads the file after success, so it does not check the ordering |
| 3 crashes in 5 min; a healthy start does not clear the window | Holds (crashwindow.go, supervisor.go:610-616), but the accounting degrades after the first recovery because of the expected-stop leak (inline) |
| Self-update never touches the runtime | Holds (selfupdate.go:150-203) |
| vPLCs are detected and refused | Does not hold: no detection code in bootloader/, and the runtime does not read OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY (inline at spec.go:268) |
runtimespec cannot set a cgroup CPU limit |
Holds (spec.go:68-74) |
| Never auto-rollback | Holds |
| A refused update does not report "updating" forever | Partial: the Reconcile on the refused path can restart a recovery-stopped runtime or stick in "starting" (inline at updater.go:196) |
Process
- Jira: RTOP-283 is in the title and branch, but the body has no
## Ticketsection or link as the repo template asks, and the issue is in Backlog and unassigned while three PRs are open for it. Its description is an implementation status report and carries no acceptance criteria a reviewer can tick against. - Requirements Gathering document and Cybersecurity Risk Assessment: not linked in the PR, not linked from the Jira issue, and a Confluence search for the ticket and the feature finds none. For a change that adds a network-exposed control plane with Docker-socket access on customer hardware, the assessment is not optional. Please link both, or state explicitly why they do not exist.
docs/DOCKER.md:581-588still describes the workflow as triggering on pull requests and running tests, and does not mention the installer,/var/lib/openplc-runtime, port 8445 or--uninstall.- No previous human review on this PR to reconcile.
Not flagged, already known: trailing whitespace, .cpp formatting, Python return annotations, pre-existing documentation drift on state count, journal limit and cycle time.
The Windows installer ships a compiled runtime inside an MSYS2 tree, and install.sh now defaults to the container path -- which installs Docker and compiles nothing. It does force native on MSYS2, so this worked, but only because of the script's own platform detection: a change there would have broken the Windows build silently, at a distance, in another file. Both callers now say --native: the workflow step and windows/provision-msys2.sh, which is what the shipped installer runs on the user's machine. The payload is assembled by copying whatever is on disk, with no idea what produced it, so add the check that closes that gap: venvs/runtime is created only by the source path, never by the container one. Without it a build that took the wrong path could package an MSYS2 tree with no runtime in it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
Three of these stopped a merge on their own. The release build was broken: Dockerfile and Dockerfile.dev still ran bare `./install.sh`, which now dispatches to the container path, and there is no engine to install inside a build layer. Both ask for --native, and CI now checks that every caller does. Expected-stop tokens leaked. StopContainer returned nil for a container that was already stopped, and such a container emits no `die` event, so the suppression outlived the stop and was spent on the next genuine crash -- which the supervisor then read as deliberate and did not restart, leaving the PLC down while Status() said healthy. The crash-loop path always ended there, since the third death is what enters recovery. The client reports ErrNotRunning now, the fake models the daemon's 304/404, and a regression test drives three deaths, recovery, reconcile and a fourth crash. Credentials were read once at start-up. On a fresh install the runtime writes .env and restapi.db only after the bootloader has started it, so every authenticated route answered 503 until the container was restarted -- while /capabilities answered and the editor offered the version action. A provider re-stats both files per request instead. Security: - Token spaces are disjoint. Both services read the same JWT_SECRET_KEY, so signing with it directly made a 2h bootloader token a valid runtime token, eight times the runtime's TTL and revoked by neither logout. The bootloader signs with a key derived from that secret, which the runtime cannot compute, plus an audience claim as belt and braces. - Restart, update and self-update require an admin. Any runtime account, including one the runtime treats as restricted, could change the version or self-update -- and a self-update starts a container with the Docker socket bound. The role is read per request, not carried in the token. - Login is throttled. Every attempt runs a 600k-iteration PBKDF2 by design, on host network beside a PLC with real-time deadlines: a concurrency cap bounds instantaneous CPU, per-source backoff makes guessing impractical. Correctness and safety: - The Docker client built a Transport per call, leaking a socket and two goroutines each time, fastest while reading logs in recovery. Built once. - Containers were compared by image tag, so "reinstall this version" saw a match and started the old layers. Resolved IDs now. - watch() no longer reconciles during recovery or an update: it restarted a runtime recovery had stopped, and raced the updater's own reconcile. - Spec.Version went through accessors; it was written by the updater while three other goroutines read it. - Self-update creates the replacement under a temporary name and renames, so a rejected create leaves the old bootloader running instead of none. - Recreating a running container stops it gracefully first, so retained variables are flushed and the exit is not counted as a crash. - A refused update restores the state it found instead of reconciling, which re-derived state by acting: from recovery it restarted the runtime. - The disk pre-check is advisory as its comment always claimed, reported as a warning on progress rather than refusing updates on any device whose Docker data-root had moved. - The discovery port is released before the runtime starts, not on the healthy transition, and the responder sets SO_REUSEADDR/SO_REUSEPORT. - Installer rollback acts only on units THIS run displaced; it was reading the first install's record and starting a native runtime beside a healthy container, then deleting the record --uninstall needed. Testing and packaging: - tests.yml runs on pull requests. Nothing did before, so every "tests pass" was a claim about a laptop, and a bootloader change without a VERSION bump got no automated testing at all. - The integration suite refuses to run outside its disposable host and is excluded from collection. A bare `pytest` collected it, and each case wipes /var/lib/openplc-runtime and removes the runtime container. - The harness defaults to a published base image instead of a tag that existed only on one machine; REAL_BASE=build covers the Dockerfile. - Dead OPENPLC_UPDATE_POLICY/OPENPLC_BOOTLOADER_PORT env removed, along with the vPLC-refusal claim that had no implementation. - go.sum pinned in the bootloader image; dead crashWindow.reset() removed; shellcheck warnings fixed; DOCKER.md no longer describes CI that never existed and documents the installer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
The new pytest job failed on its first run: the plugin suites import their driver modules at collection time, so a missing pymodbus or asyncua is a collection error that takes the whole run down. Only requirements.txt was being installed. scripts/run-pytest.sh has the same gap -- it installs modbus_master's requirements and not the other two -- which is why running it by hand fails the same way. Both now install all three. With collection fixed the plugin suites still fail: 48 failures and 10 errors, reproducible on a clean checkout of `development`, so they are not this branch's doing. They expect the per-plugin virtualenvs install.sh builds and in some cases a running OPC-UA server. Gating on them would mean a check that can never pass, which is a check everyone learns to ignore -- so they are excluded by name, with the reason and the removal condition written next to it. What remains is 147 passing tests over the REST API, compile pipeline and webserver behaviour. Repairing the plugin suites deserves its own ticket. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF
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Why
Updating a runtime today means SSH,
git stash,git pull,sudo ./install.sh. Many vendors ship devices with SSH disabled, so in practice those devices never get updated at all.This makes the runtime updatable from the editor, with no SSH and no systemd.
install.shnow installs Docker by default (--nativeis preserved, and MSYS2 is forced native), and a small Go bootloader container supervises the runtime container beside it.What the bootloader is
A mini orchestrator-agent for exactly one local runtime, resident on port 8445 with its own version line. It starts the runtime at boot, adopts one that is already running, watches Docker's event stream, and swaps the runtime image on request. The device pulls from the registry itself, which is what removes any need for signing, manifests, or a trust chain in the editor.
Its only third-party dependency is
modernc.org/sqlite(pure Go, no cgo) so it can read the runtime's user database and accept the same credentials the operator already logged in with. Auth is credential parity, not a shared token.Hardware parity
--privileged --network host -v /dev:/dev. Every NIC stays on the host and directly usable, unlike the orchestrator's dedicated-NIC mechanism which removes the interface from the host. All runtime data (restapi.db,.env, project snapshot, retain, VPP licences) lives outside the container viaOPENPLC_PERSISTENT_DATA_DIR, so a version swap cannot destroy it.Real-time is unaffected. Containers add no measurable scheduling overhead; the trap is CPU limits, not privilege — under
CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHEDany cgroup CPU limit makessched_setscheduler(SCHED_FIFO)fail silently.runtimespectherefore has no field capable of setting one.Update sequence
Pull, stop, start, health-gate, then remove the old image. Ordered so it is recoverable at every step:
errBeforeSwap). This shipped broken to hardware once because an integration test had waved it through with "the container may have been stopped by recovery, which is fine". It was not fine; the test now asserts the opposite.tools/upgrade_self.py. It never touches the runtime: losing device management is a bad afternoon, stopping a plant is a different category of problem.vPLCs are detected and refused: an orchestrator-managed runtime must not self-update.
Testing
tests/integration/): 18/18, covering fresh install, adoption, crash-loop into recovery, failed pull, version swap, and self-update.libsynergy_plugin.socompiled on-device inside the container, loaded, read its config from the mountedvpp/directory, opened/dev/spidev6.0and/dev/gpiochip0, and read the physical GPIO mode switch. TASK0 ran 1339 scans at 1 µs average with 0 overruns. A full version change recreated the container and came up healthy with every piece of persistent data intact; power-cycle boot and adoption were both validated unattended.Companion PRs: openplc-editor and openplc-web (Runtime Status screen).
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01VwWQN5S2ZKbhJz8kxMV9vF