[Quality] Protect attestation recording from unauthorized replay

[1nonlypiece]

Problem

Attestation records influence health and compliance calculations, so duplicate or unauthorized records can corrupt trust metrics.

This issue requires a meaningful production implementation. Typo-only, documentation-only, formatting-only, dependency-only, or cosmetic changes do not satisfy the scope.

Objective

Add signer authorization, unique attestation identity, and replay-safe recording semantics.

Scope

Define nonce or evidence hash rules, actor scope, event schema, and migration behavior for existing records.

Acceptance criteria

• Only authorized actors can record each attestation type.
• The same evidence cannot be recorded twice.
• Invalid records do not change metrics or emit success events.
• Integration tests cover replay, signer rotation, malformed evidence, and rollback.
• Existing CI/CD checks remain green.
• The PR explains the design, tradeoffs, test evidence, and any remaining limitations.
• The PR references this issue with Closes #{issue-number} or Fixes #{issue-number}.

Implementation notes

Implement only the stated behavior; keep unrelated refactors out of the PR.

Non-goals

• Do not remove tests merely to make CI pass.
• Do not introduce secrets, private keys, credentials, or mainnet-only values.
• Do not change unrelated APIs, UI surfaces, contract behavior, or deployment configuration.

Contributor application

Before starting, comment with relevant experience, a 1–4 bullet implementation approach, and an estimate for opening the first draft PR. Wait for maintainer assignment before coding. Only the assigned contributor is eligible for reward consideration.

Submission requirements

• Use PR title format [#<issue-number>] <short summary>.
• Check off each completed acceptance criterion.
• Include focused automated tests for success, failure, authorization, and boundary behavior where applicable.
• Include the validation commands and results in the PR description.
• Address maintainer review feedback before merge.

GrantFox reward consideration is based on the original scope, implementation quality, tests, security review, CI/CD results, review feedback, and follow-up stability; completion or merge alone is not a guarantee.

[safal207]

Hi, I'd like to work on this issue.

Relevant experience: I recently implemented stateful invariant/fuzz coverage for this repository in #556 (merged), including lifecycle transitions, financial invariants, rollback checks, deterministic seeds, and reproducible failures. I also implemented replay/idempotency and atomic conflict handling in TrustLayer-Org/TrustLayer-Backend#12 (merged).

Proposed approach:

• Define a canonical attestation identity and authorization scope, binding the attestation type, subject, evidence hash/nonce, and signer epoch so signer rotation cannot make old credentials valid again.
• Perform authorization, malformed-evidence, and duplicate checks before any storage, metric, or success-event mutation, with explicit migration behavior for existing records.
• Add focused RED-to-green integration tests for exact replay, unauthorized actors, stale signers after rotation, malformed evidence, and rollback; rejected attempts must leave metrics and events unchanged.
• Keep the change scoped to the attestation path, document the identity/event tradeoffs, and run the full existing CI suite alongside the new tests.

I can open the first draft PR within 24 hours of assignment and will wait for maintainer assignment before starting implementation.

[shobhamerabacha-star]

Hey team,

I can tackle [Quality] Protect attestation recording from unauthorized replay. Proposed implementation roadmap:

• Analysis: Inspect current behavior and edge cases in Commitlabs-Org/Commitlabs-Contracts
• Implementation: Implement [Quality] Protect attestation recording from unauthorized replay with explicit require_auth checks, clean storage layouts, and robust Soroban contract logic.
• Testing: Add comprehensive unit tests verifying both happy-path invocations and unauthorized revert scenarios.
• PR: Atomic commit with clean git hygiene and passing CI

Looking forward to contributing—please feel free to assign!

[ranjeet150]

Hey team,

I can tackle [Quality] Protect attestation recording from unauthorized replay. Proposed implementation roadmap:

• Analysis: Inspect current behavior and edge cases in Commitlabs-Org/Commitlabs-Contracts
• Implementation: Implement [Quality] Protect attestation recording from unauthorized replay with explicit require_auth checks, clean storage layouts, and robust Soroban contract logic.
• Testing: Add comprehensive unit tests verifying both happy-path invocations and unauthorized revert scenarios.
• PR: Atomic commit with clean git hygiene and passing CI

Happy to pick this up today—please assign to me!

[guptakumarranjeet150]

Hi maintainers,

I would love to take this on. My planned approach:

• Implement [Quality] Protect attestation recording from unauthorized replay with explicit require_auth checks, clean storage layouts, and robust Soroban contract logic.
• Add comprehensive unit tests verifying both happy-path invocations and unauthorized revert scenarios.

Ready to deliver a clean, tested PR within 12–24 hours. Please assign!