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Fix potentially SPA-vulnerability #1341

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Fix potentially SPA-vulnerability #1341

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11 changes: 10 additions & 1 deletion mars/xlog/crypt/decode_log_file_c_impl/micro-ecc-master/uECC.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ static int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t* private_key,
uECC_word_t tmp[uECC_MAX_WORDS];
uECC_word_t s[uECC_MAX_WORDS];
uECC_word_t* k2[2] = {tmp, s};
uECC_word_t *initial_Z = 0;
#if uECC_VLI_NATIVE_LITTLE_ENDIAN
uECC_word_t* p = (uECC_word_t*)signature;
#else
Expand All @@ -1180,7 +1181,15 @@ static int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t* private_key,
}

carry = regularize_k(k, tmp, s, curve);
EccPoint_mult(p, curve->G, k2[!carry], 0, num_n_bits + 1, curve);
/* If an RNG function was specified, try to get a random initial Z value to improve
protection against side-channel attacks. */
if (g_rng_function) {
if (!uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve->p, num_words)) {
return 0;
}
initial_Z = k2[carry];
}
EccPoint_mult(p, curve->G, k2[!carry], initial_Z, num_n_bits + 1, curve);
if (uECC_vli_isZero(p, num_words)) {
return 0;
}
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