dashpay · bfoss765 · Aug 5, 2026 · Aug 5, 2026 · Aug 12, 2026 · Aug 12, 2026
@@ -165,6 +165,26 @@ internal object FundingNative {
         memoText: String?,
     )
 
+    /**
+     * Multi-output shielded → shielded transfer, Type 16 (bridges
+     * `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_transfer_multi`).
+     *
+     * [recipientsRaw43] holds `amounts.size` raw 43-byte Orchard addresses
+     * laid out back to back (length must be `43 * amounts.size`), and
+     * [amounts] the matching credit values. Each pair becomes its own note;
+     * repeating the same address funds it with several independent notes.
+     * [memoText] is attached to every recipient note.
+     */
+    external fun shieldedTransferMulti(
+        managerHandle: Long,
+        walletId: ByteArray,
+        resolverHandle: Long,
+        account: Int,
+        recipientsRaw43: ByteArray,
+        amounts: LongArray,
+        memoText: String?,
+    )
+
     /**
      * Shielded → Platform unshield, Type 17 (bridges
      * `platform_wallet_manager_shielded_unshield`). [toPlatformAddress] is a

@@ -1644,6 +1644,68 @@ class PlatformWalletManager(
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Multi-output shielded → shielded transfer (Type 16). Spends notes from
+     * [account] on [walletId] and creates ONE note per entry of [outputs] in
+     * a single atomic transition.
+     *
+     * Repeating the same address across entries is allowed and is the point
+     * of this call: it funds one address with several independent notes, so
+     * a later spend of that address spends several REAL notes rather than
+     * one real note plus an Orchard padding dummy (whose nullifier is
+     * randomly generated and therefore not reproducible offline).
+     *
+     * The transition always emits a change note, so the spendable balance
+     * must strictly exceed the summed amounts plus the fee. The fee grows
+     * with the output count: the bundle publishes
+     * `max(spentNotes, outputs.size + 1, 2)` Orchard actions.
+     *
+     * @param walletId the 32-byte wallet id.
+     * @param outputs (raw 43-byte Orchard address, credits) pairs; must be
+     *   non-empty, hold at most 16 entries (the native ceiling), and every
+     *   amount must be positive.
+     * @param account the ZIP-32 shielded account to spend from (usually 0).
+     * @param memo optional UTF-8 memo attached to EVERY recipient note
+     *   (null / empty = no memo; at most 32 UTF-8 bytes).
+     */
+    suspend fun shieldedTransferMulti(
+        walletId: ByteArray,
+        outputs: List<Pair<ByteArray, Long>>,
+        account: Int = 0,
+        memo: String? = null,
+    ): Unit = teardownGate.op {
+        require(outputs.isNotEmpty()) { "outputs must not be empty" }
+        // Mirror the native ceiling BEFORE flattening: the arrays built below are sized by
+        // `outputs.size`, and the native layer would reject an oversized call anyway — after
+        // this side had already allocated for it.
+        require(outputs.size <= MAX_SHIELDED_TRANSFER_RECIPIENTS) {
+            "outputs must hold at most $MAX_SHIELDED_TRANSFER_RECIPIENTS entries, got ${outputs.size}"
+        }
+        require(account >= 0) { "account must be non-negative, got $account" }
+        outputs.forEachIndexed { index, (recipientRaw43, amount) ->
+            require(recipientRaw43.size == 43) {
+                "outputs[$index] address must be exactly 43 bytes, got ${recipientRaw43.size}"
+            }
+            require(amount > 0) { "outputs[$index] amount must be positive, got $amount" }
+        }
+        val recipientsRaw43 = ByteArray(outputs.size * 43)
+        outputs.forEachIndexed { index, (recipientRaw43, _) ->
+            recipientRaw43.copyInto(recipientsRaw43, index * 43)
+        }
+        val amounts = LongArray(outputs.size) { outputs[it].second }
+        mapNativeErrors {
+            FundingNative.shieldedTransferMulti(
+                managerHandle,
+                walletId,
+                mnemonicResolver.nativeHandle,
+                account,
+                recipientsRaw43,
+                amounts,
+                memo?.takeIf { it.isNotEmpty() },
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
     /**
      * Shielded → Platform unshield (Type 17) — port of Swift's
      * `PlatformWalletManager.shieldedUnshield(walletId:account:toPlatformAddress:amount:)`
@@ -2222,6 +2284,15 @@ class PlatformWalletManager(
         /** SPV progress poll cadence — matches Swift's 1 Hz `startProgressPolling`. */
         const val POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 1_000L
 
+        /**
+         * Recipient ceiling of [shieldedTransferMulti] — mirrors
+         * `MAX_SHIELDED_TRANSFER_RECIPIENTS` in
+         * `packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs`, which the JNI adapter enforces
+         * from the array lengths before allocating. Checked here too so an oversized call is
+         * refused before this side flattens caller-sized buffers.
+         */
+        const val MAX_SHIELDED_TRANSFER_RECIPIENTS = 16
+
         /** De-offset `PlatformWalletFFIResultCode::ErrorInvalidParameter`. */
         const val PWFFI_INVALID_PARAMETER = 2
     }

@@ -414,6 +414,13 @@ mod tests {
             identity_id_from_nullifiers(&[real_nullifier]),
             "the padding action's dummy nullifier must participate in the id derivation"
         );
+        // …which is precisely what `shielded_identity_id_is_reproducible` reports: with one real
+        // spend the published set contains fresh randomness, so the id cannot be re-derived
+        // offline (a retry would build a different dummy and thus a different id).
+        assert!(
+            !crate::state_transition::identity_create_from_shielded_pool_transition::shielded_identity_id_is_reproducible(1),
+            "a single-spend bundle is padded, so its id must be reported as NOT reproducible"
+        );
         assert!(
             result.predicted_fee < DENOMINATION,
             "predicted fee must leave the new identity a positive balance"
@@ -497,5 +504,12 @@ mod tests {
             identity_id_from_nullifiers(&[nf_a, nf_b]),
             "with no padding, the published set is exactly the real spends' nullifiers"
         );
+        // …which is precisely what `shielded_identity_id_is_reproducible` reports: with two real
+        // spends no padding is added, so the id is a pure function of the spent notes and a retry
+        // re-derives the SAME id. This is the property two-note funding buys.
+        assert!(
+            crate::state_transition::identity_create_from_shielded_pool_transition::shielded_identity_id_is_reproducible(2),
+            "a two-spend bundle needs no padding, so its id must be reported as reproducible"
+        );
     }
 }
@@ -43,7 +43,10 @@ pub use identity_create_from_shielded_pool::{
 pub use shield_from_asset_lock::build_shield_from_asset_lock_transition;
 #[cfg(feature = "core_key_wallet")]
 pub use shield_from_asset_lock::build_shield_from_asset_lock_transition_with_signer;
-pub use shielded_transfer::build_shielded_transfer_transition;
+pub use shielded_transfer::{
+    build_shielded_transfer_transition, build_shielded_transfer_transition_multi,
+    ShieldedTransferOutput,
+};
 pub use shielded_withdrawal::build_shielded_withdrawal_transition;
 pub use unshield::build_unshield_transition;
 
@@ -52,6 +55,7 @@ use grovedb_commitment_tree::{
     FullViewingKey, MerklePath, Note, NoteValue, OutgoingViewingKey, PaymentAddress, ProvingKey,
     Scope, SpendAuthorizingKey, SpendingKey,
 };
+use platform_version::version::PlatformVersion;
 use rand::rngs::OsRng;
 use rand::RngCore;
 
@@ -103,6 +107,61 @@ impl From<&OrchardAddress> for PaymentAddress {
     }
 }
 
+/// The number of Orchard actions a `BundleType::DEFAULT` bundle built from `num_spends` spends
+/// and `num_outputs` outputs will publish **on the wire**, validated against the consensus
+/// action ceiling.
+///
+/// Every shielded fee predictor MUST size its fee with this function, because consensus prices
+/// the fee off the on-wire `actions.len()` (see
+/// `StateTransitionShieldedMinimumFeeValidationV0::validate_minimum_shielded_fee`, which reads
+/// `v0.actions.len()`), and an Orchard action is a *joined* spend/output slot: the action count
+/// is `max(num_spends, num_outputs)`, then padded up to Orchard's `MIN_ACTIONS = 2`.
+///
+/// The output side matters. A predictor that looks only at the spend count is correct **only**
+/// while `num_outputs <= 2`, because `max(n, 1).max(2) == max(n, 2).max(2)`. As soon as a
+/// transition publishes three or more outputs (a multi-recipient transfer plus change), a
+/// spends-only predictor under-counts and carves a fee below the one consensus computes — fatal
+/// for `ShieldedTransfer`, whose `value_balance` must equal the minimum fee **exactly**.
+///
+/// This delegates to Orchard's own [`BundleType::num_actions`] rather than re-deriving the rule,
+/// so the predictor cannot drift from the builder that actually lays out the bundle.
+///
+/// # The consensus ceiling
+///
+/// Every shielded transition's `validate_structure` rejects a bundle whose `actions.len()`
+/// exceeds `platform_version.system_limits.max_shielded_transition_actions` (via
+/// `validate_actions_count`), but the `try_from_bundle` constructors do NOT run structural
+/// validation — so without this gate an over-sized bundle is built, proved (~30 s of Halo 2),
+/// and only then rejected on chain. Because the action count is `max(spends, outputs)`, bounding
+/// it here bounds BOTH sides: a fragmented wallet spending too many notes and a caller asking
+/// for too many outputs are rejected by the same comparison, before any proving work starts.
+pub fn shielded_bundle_action_count(
+    num_spends: usize,
+    num_outputs: usize,
+    platform_version: &PlatformVersion,
+) -> Result<usize, ProtocolError> {
+    let num_actions = BundleType::DEFAULT
+        .num_actions(num_spends, num_outputs)
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            ProtocolError::ShieldedBuildError(format!(
+                "invalid Orchard bundle shape ({num_spends} spends, {num_outputs} outputs): {e}"
+            ))
+        })?;
+
+    let max_actions = platform_version
+        .system_limits
+        .max_shielded_transition_actions as usize;
+    if num_actions > max_actions {
+        return Err(ProtocolError::ShieldedBuildError(format!(
+            "a bundle of {num_spends} spends and {num_outputs} outputs publishes {num_actions} \
+             Orchard actions, exceeding the consensus limit of {max_actions} \
+             (max_shielded_transition_actions); consensus would reject the proved transition"
+        )));
+    }
+
+    Ok(num_actions)
+}
+
 /// Serializes an authorized Orchard bundle into the raw fields used by
 /// state transition constructors.
 pub fn serialize_authorized_bundle(bundle: &Bundle<Authorized, i64, DashMemo>) -> SerializedBundle {
@@ -781,4 +840,103 @@ mod mod_tests {
             other => panic!("expected the closure's error to propagate, got {:?}", other),
         }
     }
+
+    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    // `shielded_bundle_action_count` — the shared fee-sizing predictor.
+    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    /// The predictor must be `max(num_spends, num_outputs)` padded to Orchard's 2-action
+    /// minimum — for the OUTPUT side as well as the spend side. The `num_outputs >= 3` rows are
+    /// the ones a spends-only predictor gets wrong.
+    #[test]
+    fn shielded_bundle_action_count_is_max_spends_outputs_padded_to_two() {
+        let platform_version = PlatformVersion::latest();
+        for (spends, outputs, expected) in [
+            (0usize, 1usize, 2usize),
+            (1, 1, 2),
+            (1, 2, 2),
+            (2, 2, 2),
+            // Output-dominated shapes: the spend count no longer determines the fee.
+            (1, 3, 3),
+            (2, 3, 3),
+            (1, 4, 4),
+            (5, 3, 5),
+            (3, 7, 7),
+        ] {
+            let actual = shielded_bundle_action_count(spends, outputs, platform_version)
+                .expect("DEFAULT bundles accept any spend/output mix");
+            assert_eq!(
+                actual, expected,
+                "action count for {spends} spends / {outputs} outputs"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A real bundle's on-wire `actions.len()` — the number consensus prices the fee off — must
+    /// equal what the predictor said. Exercised through the output-only builder because it is
+    /// the cheapest real bundle to construct at several output counts.
+    #[test]
+    fn shielded_bundle_action_count_matches_a_real_bundle() {
+        let platform_version = PlatformVersion::latest();
+        let recipient = test_orchard_address();
+        // (dummy_outputs, total outputs = 1 real + dummies)
+        for dummies in [0usize, 1, 4] {
+            let num_outputs = 1 + dummies;
+            let bundle =
+                build_output_only_bundle(&recipient, 10_000, [0u8; 36], None, dummies, &TestProver)
+                    .expect("bundle should build");
+            let predicted = shielded_bundle_action_count(0, num_outputs, platform_version)
+                .expect("valid bundle shape");
+            assert_eq!(
+                bundle.actions().len(),
+                predicted,
+                "predicted action count must match the real bundle's on-wire count for \
+                 {num_outputs} outputs"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The predictor is also the CONSENSUS gate: `validate_actions_count` rejects
+    /// `actions.len() > max_shielded_transition_actions`, but `try_from_bundle` runs no
+    /// structural validation — so a bundle over the ceiling would be proved (~30 s of Halo 2)
+    /// and only then rejected on chain. The boundary itself must still pass.
+    #[test]
+    fn shielded_bundle_action_count_accepts_the_consensus_boundary() {
+        let platform_version = PlatformVersion::latest();
+        let max = platform_version
+            .system_limits
+            .max_shielded_transition_actions as usize;
+
+        // Exactly at the ceiling, from each side.
+        assert_eq!(
+            shielded_bundle_action_count(1, max, platform_version)
+                .expect("the output-side boundary must be accepted"),
+            max
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            shielded_bundle_action_count(max, 1, platform_version)
+                .expect("the spend-side boundary must be accepted"),
+            max
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// One action over the ceiling must fail fast — from the OUTPUT side (the 16-recipient FFI
+    /// call, which becomes 17 outputs once the unconditional change output is added) and from
+    /// the SPEND side (a fragmented wallet selecting too many notes).
+    #[test]
+    fn shielded_bundle_action_count_rejects_over_the_consensus_limit() {
+        let platform_version = PlatformVersion::latest();
+        let max = platform_version
+            .system_limits
+            .max_shielded_transition_actions as usize;
+
+        for (spends, outputs) in [(1usize, max + 1), (max + 1, 1), (max + 1, max + 1)] {
+            let err = shielded_bundle_action_count(spends, outputs, platform_version)
+                .expect_err("a bundle over the consensus action limit must be rejected");
+            assert!(
+                err.to_string().contains("exceeding the consensus limit"),
+                "unexpected error for {spends} spends / {outputs} outputs: {err}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }