fix(security): harden SSRF, upgrades, bind policy, and mutation UX - #201
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goniszewski wants to merge 3 commits into
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fix(security): harden SSRF, upgrades, bind policy, and mutation UX#201goniszewski wants to merge 3 commits into
goniszewski wants to merge 3 commits into
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Address the comprehensive code-review findings: validate redirects before following them, reject arbitrary HTTP update sources, require signed remote upgrades, fail closed on non-loopback binds outside containers, reject URL credentials consistently, apply default body limits, drop unsafe restore bypass from HTTP, and make frontend mutations confirm before success UX. Co-authored-by: Robert Goniszewski <goniszewski@users.noreply.github.com>
Prefer category_id-only list/search params in hook tests, and use a concrete ApiUpdateCheckResult shape to avoid deep DTO instantiation. Co-authored-by: Robert Goniszewski <goniszewski@users.noreply.github.com>
Preserve a "valid URL" phrase in the dialog error so existing journey coverage continues to match the safer http(s)/no-credentials check. Co-authored-by: Robert Goniszewski <goniszewski@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
Implements the comprehensive code-review hardening items for Grimoire’s critical paths while staying inside the local-first / loopback threat model.
Daemon / security
safe-fetch) so private redirect targets are never contactedGET /updates/checkrejects arbitrarysourcequery params (default/env source only)LITTLEIMP_UPGRADE_SIGNING_KEY_FINGERPRINTS, and download size caps;--allow-unsigned/LITTLEIMP_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_UPGRADE=1is an explicit escape hatchLITTLEIMP_ALLOW_NON_LOOPBACK_BIND=1is set, with a loud warningallow_unsafe_no_checksumFrontend
category_idover namewindow.open/hrefErrorBoundaryJSON.stringifytestAiConnection/ export download / update-check go throughapi.tsDocs
docs/task-reports/2026/07/2026-07-22-security-hardening-review-fixes/Test plan
npm run check(lint, type-check, frontend + daemon tests, docs:api:check, build)npm run test:e2e(25 passed; revalidated the invalid-URL dialog assertion after copy tweak)