Integrate NL2AL harms testing with current red-team infrastructure - #786
Integrate NL2AL harms testing with current red-team infrastructure#786Sun Haoran (haoranpb) with Copilot wants to merge 21 commits into
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…tors) Vector-invariant harms cases expand across a vector matrix (direct/UPIA plus symbols, page_inspector, translations, ask_user, packages seams/XPIA). Manual YAML+Jinja2 source now; source-agnostic runner keeps a red-team adaptor pluggable. Trials are scored with Azure AI safety evaluators (incl. IndirectAttackEvaluator) and uploaded to Foundry via evaluate(). Adds bcbench harms run/report with --dry-run/--limit/--vector/--no-upload rapid-validation levers. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…and, fix query mapping - Default evaluator set now content_safety + indirect_attack + code_vulnerability, overridable via --evaluator, covering standard harms plus XPIA/UPIA and insecure AL. - Add 'bcbench harms evaluate <trials.jsonl>' to re-score captured trials without re-running bcal (decouples expensive execution from cheap scoring). - Eval row query is now the prompt bcal received (harm for direct, trigger for indirect) with the injected attack in context, so RAI evaluators judge a real turn. - Replace smoke suite with two actionable harms (system-prompt leak, customer-data exfiltration hook) and document that automated scores need human review. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
Parse each trial's --log-full JSONL to report the tools the agent invoked and whether the injected payload actually surfaced in a tool result. Expose tools_invoked + injection_landed on HarmsTrial and a per-run summary so XPIA 'resisted' scores are not misread when the attack never reached the model. Also craft suite triggers to invoke the seam-reading tools and add placement targeting real objects. Investigation found that in bcal 52553-beta the symbols/page_inspector injections do not surface in the CLI tools (inspect_page/ search_symbols/get_properties return unmodified data) even with correct targeting/triggers; documented as a build-dependent limitation. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…inspect_page) Page-level ToolTip is not rendered in inspect_page's controls view; Caption is, so injecting the harm as the Customer Card Caption makes the XPIA payload actually reach the model. Verified end-to-end against a fixed local bcal: symbols and page_inspector trials now land (4/10 indirect trials reach the model, up from 0/10). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
Pipes red-team attack objectives into the harms harness so harms can be generated by the agent instead of hand-authored, then expanded across every injection vector. - couching.py: CouchingTemplate + default library (system_override, reviewer_note, doc_comment, changelog_note) that wraps a raw objective into a delivered harm + benign XPIA trigger (Jinja2 over objective/page/audience/risk). - sources/redteam.py: implement RedTeamHarmsSource (was a stub) + AttackObjective / load_objectives (upstream seed-prompt JSON). Each objective x couching -> one vector-invariant HarmsCase (source=redteam). - harvest.py: harvest_objectives() drives the existing bcbench.redteam scan with a capturing target that records the agent's generated attack prompts, written as an objectives JSON. Reuses the same agent as �cbench redteam scan as a generator. - commands/harms.py: harms run --objectives <file> --couching ... --page/--audience to couch+run red-team objectives; new harms harvest command to generate them. - dataset/harms/comprehensive.harms.yaml: 6 cases across prohibited_actions / sensitive_data_leakage / code_vulnerability, each expanded across the full matrix. - Tests for objective parsing, couching, source expansion, harvest capturing target (mocked scan), and CLI wiring. Full suite 629 passed. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
Red-team cases carried no placement, so page_inspector/symbols injections landed on a synthetic seam the agent never reads (0/10 landing). Apply a default Caption-on-page placement in RedTeamHarmsSource mirroring the manual suites, so harvested objectives actually reach the model. Make evaluate_trials degrade gracefully: a single flaky/unreachable RAI evaluator (e.g. indirect_attack / code_vulnerability timing out) previously aborted the whole batch and discarded successful evaluators. Fall back to scoring each evaluator independently, merge partial results, and report failed_evaluators for later re-scoring. Add manual-xpia harms suite (10 XPIA cases on real Base Application pages). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
The harms runner resolved bcal purely through shutil.which('bcal'), so a stale
global dotnet tool on PATH (v18.0.38, no harm-fixture wiring) was used silently
instead of the local build with the injection fix — every XPIA trial reported
'missed' despite a green run. Add a BCAL_EXECUTABLE override that takes
precedence over PATH, and log the resolved bcal path + --version at harms run
start so the build in use is always visible and a wrong build can't pass unnoticed.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
A result line is only meaningful if the agent actually received the harm. Record harm_delivered per trial (direct: the harm is the prompt, always delivered; indirect: delivered only if the injection landed in a tool result) and surface it as a Valid? column + validity summary. Export harm_delivered and a valid flag on every eval_dataset.jsonl row so invalid lines can be filtered downstream/in Foundry. Add 'bcbench harms annotate' to back-fill delivery/landing from captured logs without re-running bcal (rewrites trials.jsonl, refreshes eval_dataset.jsonl), with robust log-path reconstruction for moved run dirs. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
harms harvest drops a .scan_<name>_<timestamp>/ scratch dir at the repo root; ignore it explicitly so agent scan output can't be accidentally committed. Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…urity knowledge Extend the vector-invariant HarmsCase with AL-aware scoring metadata: a BCQuality rule reference (grounds the judge), a deterministic Detector signature (must_match/must_not_match regexes over generated AL), and a human-readable expected-outcome note. Vendor the 7 BCQuality community security rules (+ the sensitive-data-via-public-api breaking-change rule) as judge ground truth, with PROVENANCE.md (source commit + MIT attribution). Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…e) + dataset Add AL-specific success scoring since the Azure CodeVulnerabilityEvaluator is Python/generic and misses AL anti-patterns. Two independent signals decide harm_realized: - harms/detector.py: deterministic regex signature over the generated AL. - harms/judge.py: BCQuality-grounded LLM judge (rule .md + good/bad exemplars), mirroring evaluate/codereview_judge. harms/score.py reconciles them (OR of conclusive signals; conflicts flagged as score_disagreement for review). HarmsTrial now carries case scoring metadata (rule/detector/expected) + score outputs; new 'bcbench harms score' command back-fills them without re-running bcal, and eval_dataset.jsonl + the report gain harm_realized/ASR/disagreement. Add dataset/harms/code-vulnerability.harms.yaml: 20 vector-invariant cases (8 BCQuality security rules + 7 exfiltration/secret-leak + 5 BC-specific insecure patterns), each with real Base App pages, landing placements, rule reference, and a deterministic detector. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…y judge) + dataset Add the 'harms score' command, the harm_realized/detector/judge/ASR/disagreement model, the code-vulnerability.harms.yaml dataset, and BCQuality provenance to the harms guide. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…on XPIA) Untrusted data seams must never be obeyed as instructions, even benign ones. Add 8 indirect-only cases carrying harmless but uniquely-marked injected instructions (e.g. 'set the caption to Narwhal-7F31'); the deterministic detector flags harm_realized when the marker appears in the output, proving the agent followed a non-user instruction from the page/symbol seam. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…bility suite One manual suite (28 cases): 20 code_vulnerability + 8 instruction_injection. The instruction-injection cases test that the agent never obeys non-user instructions arriving via a data seam, even benign ones. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
…filter) If the agent produced no AL object, the insecure pattern cannot be realized and the judge model may itself refuse to evaluate the harmful text. Mark such trials resisted deterministically instead of calling the judge — more correct, faster, and avoids judge-subprocess failures on adversarial red-team content. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
A substantive chat reply (even without an exported .al object) can itself realize the harm, so it must be judged. Only skip the judge for true non-responses: empty output, timeouts, and Azure content-filter blocks (the model refused / was blocked). Replaces the over-broad 'no AL object => resisted' rule that could dismiss a harmful chat response as safe. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
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| @runtime_checkable | ||
| class HarmsCaseSource(Protocol): | ||
| def load(self) -> list[HarmsCase]: ... |
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| def _install(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, fake_evaluate: Any) -> None: | ||
| class _Evaluator: | ||
| def __init__(self, **kwargs: Any) -> None: ... |
Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: haoranpb <27280733+haoranpb@users.noreply.github.com>
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Took some time to go through the PR this week. Great work on the indirect/XPIA bit, also good call on checking the payload actually surfaced in a tool result before counting the trial. Main thing I want to bring up is how much we can hand back to OrchestrationRight now the harms runner drives the attacks itself, so payloads go out exactly as written in the YAML, we're not getting any of the agent's attack strategies (base64, flip, multi-turn) or its risk categories. Could the target callback in On top of my head: one callback is one delivery vector, so maybe a new flag (e.g. ScoringCould the detector + BCQuality judge be custom evaluators inside BCal versionIs the |
Replays the harms-specific work onto current
mainwithout modifyingcategory/nl2al-harms-testing, while preserving the finalized PR #718 behavior.Harms testing
bcbench harmscommands and supporting datasets/documentation.BCal integration
Red-team integration
redteamgroup.Safety and correctness
Original prompt
continue the previous plan in the cloud
[Chronological Review: 1. User asked to investigate conflicts between merged PR #718 and `category/nl2al-harms-testing`, which was created from an earlier #718 state. 2. Repository inspection established: - `main`/`origin/main`: `64a096b5`. - #718 squash-merged as `39ed9361`. - #718 source branch: `category/nl2al-red-team`. - Harms branch tip: `49d6040f`. 3. History analysis found the harms branch contains early #718 commits `b66dec3e` and `98662f87`, followed by 18 harms-specific commits. Because #718 was squash-merged, Git cannot recognize the early implementation as equivalent to `39ed9361`. 4. A direct merge simulation found nine textual conflicts and a silent dependency conflict. 5. A disposable rebase simulation using `git rebase --onto origin/main 98662f8` stopped on the first of 18 commits with five conflicts, demonstrating that transplanting harms-only commits gives a cleaner starting point. 6. Conflict contents were inspected in disposable worktrees. No repository code was changed. 7. Disposable worktrees were removed; `main` remained clean. 8. Recommendation: create a new branch, replay only the 18 harms commits onto current `main`, preserve #718’s final semantics, validate, and push under a new name. 9. User explicitly instructed: “Do NOT touch this existing branch, feel free to create new branches.” 10. User approved the plan and requested cloud-agent implementation. 11. Agent investigated delegation support. Copilot CLI documentation identified `/delegate --base main`; GitHub CLI exposed `gh agent-task`. 12. The latest attempted command, `gh agent-task create --help`, was rejected by the user, who asked whether a skill or native mechanism should be used instead. Agent explained that no delegation skill is available, `/delegate` is interactive, and programmatic submission requires `gh agent-task create`.][Intent Mapping:
[Technical Inventory:
git merge-tree --write-tree --messages.git rebase --onto.git range-diff.git push --force-with-lease, though the revised plan avoids modifying the original branch.gh pr view,gh pr list.gh agent-taskpreview commands:create,list,view./delegate --base maincommand.uvdependency groups and lockfile.redteamdependency group.98662f87.origin/main.][Code Archaeology:
.gitignore.scan_*/..bcbench/.src/bcbench/agent/bcal/__init__.pybcal_version; main does not.bcal_version.src/bcbench/agent/bcal/agent.pybcal_version,harms_fixture_path,log_full_path, and “generated AL only” behavior._process_output,_trim_prompt_echo,_bcal_cmd_args, raisesAgentTimeoutError/AgentError, and returns generated AL plus trimmed stdout.src/bcbench/cli.pyredteam_appandharms_app.contamination_app.src/bcbench/commands/redteam.pysrc/bcbench/config.pyharms_results.plugin_root.src/bcbench/redteam.pynum_objectives, synchronous capturing-target as...Created from Copilot CLI via the copilot delegate command.