fix(security): update vulnerability-updates [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #1414 · open-feature/openfeature.dev

renovate · 2026-07-21T06:09:32Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
brace-expansion	`2.1.0` → `2.1.2`
js-yaml	`4.1.1` → `4.3.0`
webpack-dev-server	`5.2.5` → `5.2.6`

brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups

CVE-2026-13149 / GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp

More information

Details

Summary

brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.

In expand_, post is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don't use it:

const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [''];   // always recurses
  ...
if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
  if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
    str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
    return expand_(str, max, true); // restart — `post` discarded
  }
  return [str];
}

For input like a{},{},…, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but expand_ has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away.
Each level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: T(n) = 2·T(n−1) ⇒ O(2ⁿ).

The max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.

Measured on 5.0.6:

groups (n)	input bytes	time
20	60	130 ms
24	72	1.9 s
26	78	7.8 s
30 (PoC)	90	~2 min

Proof of concept

const { expand } = require('brace-expansion');
// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes — blocks for minutes:
expand('a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}');

Impact

Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.

Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release. The fix:

Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential.
Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.

Verified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n²) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.

If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.7 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

CVE-2026-53550 / GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68

More information

Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}
b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}
all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.
Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.
Relevant code path:
lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge')
lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js
Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,
valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)
Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element
is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
  key = sourceKeys[index];
  if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
    setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
    overridableKeys[key] = true;
  }
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object
via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same
reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final
object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,
so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment:
js-yaml version: 4.1.1
Node.js: v24.5.0
Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)
Reproduction script:
Create many keys in one anchored map (&a).
Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...].
Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a).
Observed repeated runs (same machine):
K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms
K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms
K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms
K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms
K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms
Control (single merge, similar key counts):
K=2000: ~1–2 ms
K=4000: ~3 ms
K=8000: ~5 ms
Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).
Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of
the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    var seen = new Set();
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      var src = valueNode[index];
      if (seen.has(src)) continue;   // idempotent; skip redundant alias
      seen.add(src);
      mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

CVE-2026-59869 / GHSA-52cp-r559-cp3m

More information

Details

Impact

js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly. The issue is triggered by a chain of mappings where each mapping merges the previous one:

a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }
a1: &a1 { <<: *a0, k1: 1 }
a2: &a2 { <<: *a1, k2: 2 }
a3: &a3 { <<: *a2, k3: 3 }
...
b: *aN

For each new mapping, the loader has to enumerate the keys inherited from the previous mapping. With N chained mappings, this results in roughly 1 + 2 + ... + N merged-key visits, i.e., O(N^2) work for O(N) input size.

PoC

From N = 4000 delay become > 1s (doc size < 100K)

import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
import { load, YAML11_SCHEMA } from 'js-yaml'

const n = Number(process.argv[2] || 4000)

function makeMergeChain (count) {
  const lines = ['a0: &a0 { k0: 0 }']

  for (let i = 1; i < count; i++) {
    lines.push(`a${i}: &a${i} { <<: *a${i - 1}, k${i}: ${i} }`)
  }

  lines.push(`b: *a${count - 1}`)
  return `${lines.join('\n')}\n`
}

const source = makeMergeChain(n)

console.log(source.split('\n').slice(0, 8).join('\n'))
console.log('...')
console.log(source.split('\n').slice(-4).join('\n'))
console.log()
console.log(`N: ${n}`)
console.log(`YAML size: ${Buffer.byteLength(source)} bytes`)

const started = performance.now()
const result = load(source, { schema: YAML11_SCHEMA })
const elapsed = performance.now() - started

console.log(`parse time: ${elapsed.toFixed(1)} ms`)
console.log(`top-level keys: ${Object.keys(result).length}`)
console.log(`b keys: ${Object.keys(result.b).length}`)

Patches

Fix released. The most robust protection is to limit the total number of merged keys per parse call. This should close all past and future edge cases with merge. The default 10K-key limit should be okay in most cases.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

webpack-dev-server vulnerable to denial of service via a malformed Host or Origin header

CVE-2026-14631 / GHSA-m28w-2pqf-7qgj

More information

Details

Impact

An unauthenticated peer that can reach the webpack-dev-server process can terminate it by sending either a normal HTTP request with a malformed Host header, or a WebSocket upgrade to the default /ws endpoint with a malformed Origin header. The malformed header triggers an uncaught exception in the host-validation path and crashes the dev server process.

Patches

Fixed in webpack-dev-server 5.2.6 by treating malformed Host and Origin header values as invalid rather than throwing (see PR #5699).

Workarounds

Keep the dev server bound to localhost (the default) and do not expose it to untrusted networks.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

webpack-dev-server vulnerable to cross-site request forgery via internal developer endpoints

CVE-2026-14620 / GHSA-f5vj-f2hx-8m93

More information

Details

Impact

The internal /webpack-dev-server/open-editor and /webpack-dev-server/invalidate endpoints perform state-changing actions on any GET request, without verifying that the request originated from the dev server's own page. Any website a developer visits while the dev server is running can trigger them cross-origin with no interaction beyond the visit.

An attacker can open an arbitrary existing local file in the developer's editor, including files outside the project root (e.g. ~/.ssh/config). The file's contents are not returned to the attacker. Repeated requests can also spawn editor processes and force recompilations, degrading the developer's machine.

Patches

Fixed in webpack-dev-server 5.2.6 by rejecting cross-site requests to the /webpack-dev-server/open-editor and /webpack-dev-server/invalidate endpoints (see PR #5698).

Workarounds

None

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.7 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

juliangruber/brace-expansion (brace-expansion)

`v2.1.2`

Compare Source

`v2.1.1`

Compare Source

Backport v5.0.6 change to v2 (#109) c3a817c

nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

`v4.3.0`

Compare Source

`v4.2.0`

Compare Source

Added

Added docs/safety.md with notes about processing untrusted YAML.
Added maxDepth (100) loader option. Not a problem, but gives a better
exception instead of RangeError on stack overflow.
Added maxMergeSeqLength (20) loader option. Not a problem after merge fix,
but an additional restriction for safety.
Added sourcemaps to dist/ builds.

Changed

Stop resolving numbers with underscores as numeric scalars, #627.
Switched dev toolchains to Vite / neostandard.
Updated demo.
Reorganized tests.
dist/ files are no longer kept in the repository.

Fixed

Fix parsing of properties on the first implicit block mapping key, #62.
Fix trailing whitespace handling when folding flow scalar lines, #307.
Reject top-level block scalars without content indentation, #280.
Ensure numbers survive round-trip, #737.
Fix test coverage for issue #221.
Fix flow scalar trailing whitespace folding, #307.
Fix digits in YAML named tag handles.

Security

Fix potential DoS via quadratic complexity in merge - deduplicate repeated
elements (makes sense for malformed files > 10K).

webpack/webpack-dev-server (webpack-dev-server)

`v5.2.6`

Compare Source

Patch Changes

fix: allow undefined as the Server constructor options argument again (by @bjohansebas in #5695)

Restores accepting undefined (defaulting it to {}) for the options
argument, so passing a webpack config's optional devServer field type-checks and works as before.
Protect the built-in state-changing routes (/webpack-dev-server/invalidate and /webpack-dev-server/open-editor) against cross-site request forgery. Requests are now checked with Sec-Fetch-Site (falling back to an Origin/Host comparison when it is absent), so a cross-site page can no longer trigger a rebuild or open a file in the editor. Same-origin requests, user-initiated navigations, and non-browser clients (e.g. curl) are unaffected. (by @bjohansebas in #5698)
Handle malformed Host and Origin header values gracefully when validating requests. (by @bjohansebas in #5699)

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fix(security): update vulnerability-updates [security]

090d31b

renovate Bot added the renovate label Jul 21, 2026

renovate Bot requested review from a team as code owners July 21, 2026 06:09

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fix(security): update vulnerability-updates [security]#1414

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renovate Bot commented Jul 21, 2026

brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups

Details

Summary

Proof of concept

Impact

Remediation

Severity

References

JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases

Details

Summary

Details

Root cause

PoC

Impact

Suggested fix:

Severity

References

js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption

Details

Impact

PoC

Patches

Severity

References

webpack-dev-server vulnerable to denial of service via a malformed Host or Origin header

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Severity

References

webpack-dev-server vulnerable to cross-site request forgery via internal developer endpoints

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Severity

References

Release Notes

v2.1.2

v2.1.1

v4.3.0

v4.2.0

Added

Changed

Fixed

Security

v5.2.6

Patch Changes

Configuration

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`v2.1.2`

`v2.1.1`

`v4.3.0`

`v4.2.0`

`v5.2.6`

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